JUDGMENT G.N. Das, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The dispute concerns the property described in Sch. 4 to the plaint. It comprises 16 gandds 2 karhas 2 krantis share in two O.S. plots Nos. 241 and 242. The Plaintiff's case shortly stated is that the properties described in Schs. 1, 2 and 3 to the plaint belonged to two brothers Ram Satya and Mahendra. Ram Satya's interest devolved on Chandra Kumar and ultimately passed to the Plaintiff, who got 8 annas shares. Mahendra's interest devolved on his four sons, Baidya Nath, Ram Kumar, Ram Lal and Ram Dayal. Baidya Nath's wife was Kunti. Baidyanath had four sons, Radhika, Manindra, Gobinda and Hem Chandra. On Radhika's death, his interest devolved on Kunti. Manindra is pro forma Defendant No. 8. Gobinda's interest devolved on his three sons, Tarapada, Kalipada and Biswanath, pro forma Defendants Nos. 9, 10 and 11. Hem Chandra's interest devolved on his son Haridas, pro forma Defendant No. 12. The interest of Ram Kumar, Ram Lal and Ram Dayal vested in Defendants Nos. 3 to 6; by the law of inheritance they have succeeded to six annas share in the joint properties, two annas share having devolved on Kunti, Manindra, pro forma Defendant No. 8, and pro forma Defendants Nos. 9, 10 and 11 and pro forma Defendant No. 12. The shares, as aforesaid, are not disputed by the Defendants. Schedule 4 property is a part of Sch. 1 property, being only one item thereof. The Plaintiff's case further is that there was an oral partition after arbitration, and thereafter the terms of the partition were embodied in a partition deed which is dated July 24, 1937. The Plaintiff further alleges that on allegation of purchase from pro forma Defendants Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12, Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 tried to disturb the possession of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff, therefore, brought this suit for declaration of his title and for confirmation of possession. 2. The principal defence to the suit is that the partition is not binding on pro forma Defendants Nos. 11 and 12, who were minors at the date of partition, and, therefore, the entire partition is invalid, and the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have acquired the disputed share in Sch. 4 property by purchase from pro forma Defendants Nos. 9, 11 and 12. 3. 11 and 12, who were minors at the date of partition, and, therefore, the entire partition is invalid, and the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have acquired the disputed share in Sch. 4 property by purchase from pro forma Defendants Nos. 9, 11 and 12. 3. The trial court decreed the suit in part. On appeal, the lower appellate Court has found that the partition was a fair one, that Radhika represented the minors in the partition proceedings, that Radhika was competent to act on behalf of the minors, that there was no inequality in the partition; and as such, the partition is binding on the parties to the present suit. Against the decree passed by the lower appellate court, Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have appealed. 4. Mr. Chatterji appearing on behalf of the Appellants has contested the finding of the lower appellate court that the partition was binding on the minors. He has also contested the finding of the lower appellate court that the partition was a fair one. I shall deal with these points in their proper order. 5. On the first question, whether the partition is binding or not, Mr. Chatterji contends that a partition is after all an agreement, and a minor cannot be bound by a partition which was entered into during his minority. It is true that an agreement entered into by a minor is void on the ground of want of mutuality. It is also true that specific performance of an agreement entered into on behalf of a minor by a guardian cannot be decreed, but this principle has no application to the case of partition in an undivided Hindu family where one of the coparceners, or some of them happen to be minors. This is now well established by the decision of the Judicial Committee in 7 CWN 578 (Privy Council) . As the Judicial Committee points out, a contrary view would be to postpone a partition till all the coparceners are majors, and such a contingency may never happen. 6. Mr. Chatterji next contends that, even conceding that a partition can be entered into during the minority of some of the coparceners, before the partition can be enforced, the interest of the minors must be represented by a guardian, either legal or de 'facto. 6. Mr. Chatterji next contends that, even conceding that a partition can be entered into during the minority of some of the coparceners, before the partition can be enforced, the interest of the minors must be represented by a guardian, either legal or de 'facto. In support of this proposition, he has relied on a decision of this Court in Banku Behari Mondol v. Banku Behari Hazra (1942) 47 C.W.N. 288, where Pal J., delivering the judgment of this Court, observed that alienation by a guardian ad hoc is void and does not require to be set aside. Mr. Grhose appearing on behalf of the Respondent has relied on a passage from Mayne's book on Hindu Law, 10th Ed. Article 476, at p. 539. He has also referred me to the decision of Bhagwati Prasad v. Bhagwati Parsad ILR (1912) All. 126. The statement of the law in the latest edition of his work on Hindu Law edited by Mr. Mayne himself is to be found in the 7th Ed. of his work, Article 476, on p. 642. The statement runs as follows: Of course, his interest ought to be represented by his guardian, or some one acting on his behalf, though I imagine that the fact of his not being so represented would be no ground for opening up the partition, if a proper one in other respects. 7. In support of this statement, Mr. Mayne refers to a decision of this Court in Deo Bunse Kunwar v. Dwarkanath (1868) 8 B.L.R. 363 fn, and to the decision in Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu (supra). A perusal of these eases does not support the broad statement of the law as contained in the passage quoted above. In my opinion, it is not the law that a partition by an ad hoc guardian is binding on the minor if the partition is a proper one. 8. In the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Bhagwati Parsad (supra) the partition was entered into by a manager of the joint family. Mr. Chatterji also referred me to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Partap Singh v. Sant Kaur ILR (1938) Lah. 313 : L.R. 65 IndAp 213. In that case, the question arose whether a deed of compromise entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or manager was binding on the minor or not. Mr. Chatterji also referred me to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Partap Singh v. Sant Kaur ILR (1938) Lah. 313 : L.R. 65 IndAp 213. In that case, the question arose whether a deed of compromise entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or manager was binding on the minor or not. Their Lordships held that if the compromise was entered into by the guardian or a minor or his manager, the compromise cannot be set aside even if the minor was not given his proper share. This does not touch the present question. 9. A partition prima facie is not for the benefit of a minor coparcener because this deprives a minor in Mitakshara joint family of his right of survivorship, and further because joint management is less expensive and more conducive to the interest of the coparceners than management in severality, vide Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi (1866) 3 Mad. H.C.R. 94. The true test in such cases is whether the interest of the minor was properly represented and whether the person representing the minor acted bona fide in his interest, and whether the partition was prejudicial or otherwise to the interest of the minor, vide Lal Bahadur Singh v. Sispal Singh ILR (1892) All. 498. The decision in the case of Banku Behari Mondol v. Banku Behari Hazra (1942) 47 C.W.N. 288, does not really touch the present question. That was a case of alienation of the estate of a minor and cannot apply to the case of a partition which has been dealt with on different principles so far as the minor coparceners of a joint Hindu family are concerned. 10. In the present case, as I have said already, the lower appellate court has pointed out that Radhika represented the minors in the partition proceedings, that Radhika was competent to act on behalf of the minors. Mr. Chatterji has referred me to para. 4 of the plaint, wherein it was stated that Radhika was the karta of the joint family. He has suggested that the evidence on record does not support the allegations made in the plaint. He has also contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that Radhika represented the minor is inconsistent with the case made in the plaint. 4 of the plaint, wherein it was stated that Radhika was the karta of the joint family. He has suggested that the evidence on record does not support the allegations made in the plaint. He has also contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that Radhika represented the minor is inconsistent with the case made in the plaint. In my opinion, the statement in the plaint that Radhika was the karta of the joint family is perfectly consistent with the finding of the lower appellate court that Radhika represented the minor. He has also referred me to the evidence of the Plaintiff's witness No. 1. I do not think that on the facts of the present case, it can be said that the finding of the lower appellate court that Radhika represented the minor was not based on any evidence. 11. On the question of fairness of the partition, the lower appellate court has clearly found that it is not unfair. The circumstances of the case also support this position. The partition in question was accepted by all the co sharers of the family with the exception of pro forma Defendants Nos. 11 and 12, who, on attaining majority, have purported to disassociate themselves from the partition and have sold their interest to the Defendants No. 1 and 2. The interest of these minor coparceners is small. The significant fact is that these coparceners belong to the group of coparceners who are descended from Baidyanath. The other co-sharers of the same branch of the joint family who are adults have affirmed the partition. Defendants Nos. 3 to 6, who have six annas share, did not dispute the partition. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the finding of the lower appellate court that the partition is fair should be upset in Second Appeal. 12. Mr. Chatterji's further contention that the lower appellate court has not referred to the ekrarnama, and, as such, the finding of the lower appellate court is not a proper finding of reversal does not appeal to me. The trial court referred to the ekrarnama, and the lower appellate court must have considered the effect of the ekrarnama so far as its effect on this question is concerned. The trial court referred to the ekrarnama, and the lower appellate court must have considered the effect of the ekrarnama so far as its effect on this question is concerned. The position, therefore, is that, in the present case, the partition was entered into by a competent person representing the interest of the minor and that the partition is a fair one. In this view, the partition cannot be avoided by the minors on attaining majority: vide Kalee Sunker Sannyal v. Denendra Nath Sannyal (1874) 23 W.R. 68; Thavva Rangasayi v. Thavva Nagaranathnamma ILR (1933) Mad. 95; Awadh Sarju Prosad Singh v. Sitaram Singh ILR (1906) All. 37; Mohan Singh v. Gur Devi ILR (1931) Lah. 767, and Chanvirapa v. Danava ILR (1894) Bom. 593. 13. Mr. Chatterji next contended that the bantannama suffers from defects of registration. He has contended that the document was not presented for registration by a person competent in. that behalf. This objection was not raised in the courts below, and I do not think that I should allow the Appellants to upset a partition which was accepted by almost all the co-sharers, on a new ground sought to be made for the first time in Second Appeal. 14. This disposes of all the objections raised on behalf of the Appellants. I hold, therefore, that the lower appellate court has taken a correct view of the rights of the parties. 15. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.