JUDGMENT : K.S. Govinda Pillai, J. Plaintiffs 1, 3 and 4 are the appellants. The sole defendant in the lower court is the 1st respondent. Plaintiffs 3 and 5 are respondents 2 and 3. The parties are governed by the Hindu Mitakshara Law. Plaintiffs 3 and 4 are the brothers of the 1st defendant. Their father was done Krishna Iyer who died in 1099. 1st plaintiff is the 3rd plaintiff’s son and plaintiffs 2 and 5 are the sons of the 4th plaintiff. The 3rd plaintiff is the present manager of the family. Krishna Iyer was the manager of the family from 1059. According to the plaintiffs he continued in management till Makaram 1095 when owing to ill-health he relinquished the management in favour of the 3rd plaintiff and finally died in Medom 1099. All assets standing in the name of Krishna Iyer and the 3rd plaintiff are the joint ancestral properties of the plaintiff’s family. On 3.11.1098 Krishna Iyer executed two instruments in the form of promissory notes for Rs. 4000 each securing interest at 6 per cent per annum in favour of the defendant and her sister. These two notes have got registered. The copy of the note to the defendant is Ext A. The consideration for both the notes was recited to be natural love and affection. There was no liquid cash available in the family then, and so according to the plaintiff, the recital in the notes could import only an agreement to make each of the daughters a gift of the respective amounts in the future from the cash earnings or from money raised by alienation of family properties or from collections of family outstandings. Such a gift was void ab initio and hence not binding even on the maker himself. In due course the defendant sued plaintiffs 3 and 4 on Ext. A in O.S. No. 128 of 1110 of the district Court of Trichur. The suit was decreed there and in appeal the decree was confirmed.. Ext. IX is copy of the judgment of the trial court and Ext. S copy of the judgment of the High Court. This Ext. S is also reported at page 362 of the Cochin Law Reports, Vol. 33. The suit was decreed there and in appeal the decree was confirmed.. Ext. IX is copy of the judgment of the trial court and Ext. S copy of the judgment of the High Court. This Ext. S is also reported at page 362 of the Cochin Law Reports, Vol. 33. Afterwards the 5th plaintiff on his behalf and on behalf of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 who were minors then filed O.S. 119/1118 in the District Court of Trichur to set aside the decree in O.S. 128 of the 1110. He lost the suit in the District Court and in the High Court. Ext. R is the copy of the High Court judgment in that case. The defendant had been given dowry, ornaments, and other perquisite legitimately due to her at the time of the marriage and thereafter, so that there was no necessity to make any provision for payment of Rs. 4000 as was done in this case. The debt itself was one not binding on the family. In the previous litigation, the real import of the liability ""EW'' Rina under the Mitakshara Law, the non-binding nature of the instrument sued on, and the incompetence of one member of a joint family to make a gift by himself alone had neither been properly placed before the courts nor been considered or decided by them. The status of the family and its capacity to gift away Rs. 4000 out of the family properties had not been advanced by the parties nor considered by the court. The family was then heavily involved to the extent of about Rs. 20,000. It would appear that the Advocate who conducted Ext. S case had made an admission that Ext. A evidenced a debt and was binding on the executant. Such an admission was wrong in law and in fact. This concession had considerably vitiated the findings in the case. This would amount to laches on the part of the Advocate. Besides, there was some subsequent litigation between the defendant’s son and the plaintiff’s family under which there was liability to the extent of Rs. 9000 and interest and costs to be discharged by the family. The fact that there was such a heavy potential debt binding on the family had not been disclosed by the defendant in Ext. IX suit. Besides, there was some subsequent litigation between the defendant’s son and the plaintiff’s family under which there was liability to the extent of Rs. 9000 and interest and costs to be discharged by the family. The fact that there was such a heavy potential debt binding on the family had not been disclosed by the defendant in Ext. IX suit. If that had been done no decree for the full 4000 rupees would have been passed by the court then. Though this a matter subsequent to the decree passed in the case it would have bearing upon the claim of the defendant for the entire sum secured under Ext. A. The plaintiffs wanted the court to give a direction to the defendant that in case any portion of Ext. A debt was binding on the family, the defendant might be directed to proceed against the decree obtained by the family regarding the mortgage amount to the extent of about Rs. 12,000 due to the family. On these grounds the plaintiffs who were the only members of the family had filed the suit to set aside all the decrees passed in the two previous litigations. 2. The defendant in the written statement contended that her father Krishna Iyer had at no time relinquished the management of the family, that he had continued in management till his death in Medom 1099, that himself and plaintiffs 3 and 4 had their self-acquisitions, that in view of his advancing age and the pitiable circumstance in which she was placed, her father had thought it necessary to render some pecuniary help, that the execution of the original of Ext. A was the result of the same, that as it would have been obviously inconvenient for her to have the money invested elsewhere the father decided to have it invested in the family itself and accordingly executed Ext. A and handed it over to her, that it was got registered in due course, that Ext. A was really a promissory note, that with due regard to the financial position of the family then, this was only a very small amount, that when demand was subsequently made for the same a portion of the interest alone was paid by the plaintiffs 3 and 4, that such payment was got endorsed on the back of Ext. A was really a promissory note, that with due regard to the financial position of the family then, this was only a very small amount, that when demand was subsequently made for the same a portion of the interest alone was paid by the plaintiffs 3 and 4, that such payment was got endorsed on the back of Ext. A, that she was forced to file the suit on the date previous to the day of limitation as her brothers did not pay her the sum, that there was a hot contest by the present plaintiffs 3 and 4, that their appeal to the High Court and application to review the High Court decision were dismissed, that without paying her the amount they got the 4th plaintiff’s son to file a suit to set aside the decree, that in that case the present plaintiffs 1 and 2 were not impleaded with a view to keep them to file another suit, that they were however impleaded at her instance, that his latter suit was also dismissed by the trial court and the appellate court, that while she was executing the decree and bringing the properties to sale these plaintiffs got time to pay the decree amount, that instead of taking steps to discharge the debt they got the present suit filed without the least bona fides, that they applied to restrain her from executing the decree, that there were no laches or gross negligence in the conduct of the previous litigations, that plaintiffs 3 and 4 were then Advocates, that they had advanced all imaginable contentions in the two suits, that their appeals in the High Court were argued by eminent Advocates specialised in Hindu Law, that all their contentions were meticulously considered and decided upon by the trial and appellate courts, that the subsequent suits filed by her son were for the return of monies collected by plaintiffs 3 and 4 on his behalf, that the same could not in any way affect her right to claim the money due under the decree, that there was nothing to show that the family was heavily indebted at the time of Ext. A, that the family was in very affluent circumstances at that time, that the plaintiffs were not competent to ask for a direction how she was to realise her money under the decree, that there was absolutely no bona fides in this suit, that it was barred by res judicata by reason of the decisions in the two suits already on record, that the present suit was based on false, frivolous and vexatious contentions, that the same constituted an abuse of the process of court and that she was entitled to get compensatory costs under S. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code. She therefore pressed for the dismissal of the suit with costs. 3. The lower court found that Ext. A was not void, that the present suit was barred by the rule of the res judicata by virtue of the decisions in O.S. 128 of 1110 and O.S. 119 of 1118 and the appellate court decision in the two cases, that the previous decisions were not vitiated by laches or by admission of questions of law by counsel in the matter of assertion of the joint family rights, that the matters subsequent would not in any way affect the present defendant’s claim recognised by the decree in O.S. 128 of 1110, that there was no reason to disallow the defendant’s interest on Ext. A amount, that the present suit was frivolous and vexatious and without any bona fides and that the defendant would be entitled to get maximum compensatory costs under the law. The suit was therefore dismissed with costs and the defendant was allowed the maximum compensatory costs of Rs. 500 under S. 32 of the Cochin Civil Procedure Code. 4. In appeal court fee had been paid on the plaint valuation in the lower court. Subsequently at the time when the appeal was argued the appellants paid court fees on compensatory costs of Rs. 500 awarded by the lower court. 5. The defendant’s father Krishna Iyer had decided to give his daughter Rs. 4000 out of the family assets. Accordingly he executed a promissory note, the original of Ext. A, on 3.111.1098. He also got it registered. After his death his sons paid her a portion of the interest and that fact was endorsed on the back of the note. The 4th plaintiff had also signed that endorsement. 4000 out of the family assets. Accordingly he executed a promissory note, the original of Ext. A, on 3.111.1098. He also got it registered. After his death his sons paid her a portion of the interest and that fact was endorsed on the back of the note. The 4th plaintiff had also signed that endorsement. Since the money was not paid she filed O.S. No. 128 of 1110 in the District Court of Trichur. Ext. IX is copy of the judgment decreeing the suit and Ext. S (reported in Vol. 33 of the Cochin Law Reports at page 382) is the appellate court decision. The defendants there were the two sons of Krishna Iyer i.e. the present plaintiffs 3 and 4. The 3rd plaintiff was the manager of the family then. There can be no dispute about the proper representation of the family in that case. The other members of the family would not be in a position to make this decree reopened so as to avoid the liability of the family for the debt unless they alleged and proved fraud and collusion or laches on the part of the manager of the family in defending the suit. This decree was however sought to be set aside by the 4th plaintiff’s son who is the 5th plaintiff in the case. The two remaining members of the family i.e. the present plaintiffs 1 and 2 were minors at that time. They were represented by the 5th plaintiff as guardian ad litem. Plaintiffs 3 and 4 had been impleaded in that case, i.e. O.S. 119 of 1118 as defendants 2 and 3. They attacked Ext. S decree in all possible ways and in this they were ably supported by plaintiffs 3 and 4 who are experienced Advocates of long standing at the bar. This suit came to be dismissed and the decree passed by the trial court was as seen from Ext. R judgment, confirmed by a Full Bench of the High Court. Afterwards all the members of the family joined as plaintiffs and filed this suit to set aside the decree in O.S. 128 of 1110 and 119 of 1118. The lower court dismissed the suit and the plaintiffs would be entitled to succeed only if they were able to establish one of the conditions by which the two prior decrees could be avoided. The lower court dismissed the suit and the plaintiffs would be entitled to succeed only if they were able to establish one of the conditions by which the two prior decrees could be avoided. There was not case for the plaintiffs now that the family was not properly represented in the two prior litigations, or that the decrees passed in those two cases were vitiated by fraud or collusion. Their present position is that there were grave laches on the part of the defendants in the conduct of the two suits before. According to them, this would give them a fresh lease of life to start another fight against their sister, the defendant. They attempted to substantiate the laches by stating that Ext. A in its inception was a void document, that the said contention was not put forward in the two prior litigations, and that this would by itself give them a right to get the decrees reopened. They also stated that on account of subsequent events there was liability established against the family, so that even if Ext. A was enforceable the amount under the same has to be reduced. 6. Both these contentions of the defendant did not appear to us to be sound or acceptable. It was argued that Ext. A was not a valid document as it did not purport to convey movable property in the possession of the family. This aspect had been considered in Exts. S and R judgments. At page 365 of 33 Cochin Law Reports 362, this argument that Ext. A did not create a completed gift was considered. It was stated thus in that judgment:- “When a gift of money can be made, what possible objection can there be to execute a pronote for the said amount? The learned Advocate for the appellants was not in a position to cite any authority against this proposition. Ext. A recites that the executant had decided to give Rs. 4000 to his daughter the plaintiff, on account of his natural love and affection towards her. Instead of actually paying the amount he executes a pronote and delivers it over to the plaintiff. Ext. A recites that the executant had decided to give Rs. 4000 to his daughter the plaintiff, on account of his natural love and affection towards her. Instead of actually paying the amount he executes a pronote and delivers it over to the plaintiff. What was done here is that instead of the donee taking the amount in her own hands and giving it back to the donor on interest, the donee accepted a valuable security in the place of the money that is gifted to her. It is different from a promise to make a gift. It appears to us that there is sufficient transfer of movable property by the donor to the donee and sufficient acceptance by the latter”. 7. In the subsequent suit also the binding nature of Ext. A was considered. His Lordship the Chief Justice while delivering the judgment observed thus in paragraph 2 of Ext. 8:- “It was said that the promissory note did not create a binding debt at all because there was no debt in existence and the promissory note executed in the circumstances mentioned does not constitute a debt, a contention which was only to be stated to be rejected. What was the purpose of executing the promissory note except to give the daughter a sum of Rs. 4000 which the father did intend to give but had not the immediate wherewithal to give? The object undoubtedly was that it should be a gift out of the assets of the family and when the assets became available the amount should be paid, and how it is possible to argue that it is not a gift passes our comprehension.” 8. The aspect whether the gift related to property in the possession of the donor or not was also considered. Since there was no delivery of the property intended to be gifted it was stated that the gift was void under the Transfer of Property Act. Under S. 123 (Indian) of the Transfer of Property Act a gift of movable property can either be by a registered deed or by the delivery of the property to the donee. The registration of Ext. A will take away all objections relating to the gift. This principle was interpreted and applied in Idal v. K.H. Chambers (A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 154). Ext. A could not also be avoid under S. 25(i) of the Indian Contract Act. The registration of Ext. A will take away all objections relating to the gift. This principle was interpreted and applied in Idal v. K.H. Chambers (A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 154). Ext. A could not also be avoid under S. 25(i) of the Indian Contract Act. Even if the document is governed by that section it could be seen that for an agreement to be valid it is enough if it is made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each other. These questions were therefore properly put forward in the two prior litigations and they were decreed against the family. Even if the decisions are wrong on a question of fact, or of law, they are binding on the family. That aspect was considered in detail by a ruling reported by the Travancore High Court in Jadavedan Namboori v. Ravi Namboori (33 T.L.J. 349). The rulings in Badar Bee v. Habib Mgican Noordin (1909 A.C. 615), Hook v. The Administrator General of Bengal (41 I.A. 187) Raja of Ramnad v. Velusami Thevar (48 I.A. 45) and other decided cases were referred to and followed in laying down the principle that a wrong decision as to a point of law does not alter the law for the parties to that adjudication for ever for all matters, but for the case and the subject matter with reference to which the law was so wrongly laid down, the decision will be final and conclusive. It is unnecessary to multiply the decisions on this question, for the parties or their representatives litigating under the same title are bound by the decisions of the same matter in previously instituted suits. In the first suit the validity of the debt and the liability of the family had been raised in the case. In the second suit also this identical question was raised, and apart from the ingenuous argument of the 4th plaintiff who presented the case in person before us there is nothing substantial that is necessary to engage the serious attention of this court. 9. It was stated that this was not a debt for which the sons’ share of the family properties are to be made liable under the principle of pious obligation. That too had been considered in the first case, 33 Cochin Law reports 362. This debt is not tainted with illegality or immorality. 9. It was stated that this was not a debt for which the sons’ share of the family properties are to be made liable under the principle of pious obligation. That too had been considered in the first case, 33 Cochin Law reports 362. This debt is not tainted with illegality or immorality. The father who was an earning member and in whose possession were properties worth about 2 lakhs of rupees, thought of giving Rs. 4000 out of the family assets to one of the daughter who at that time was undergoing the utmost mental worry and strain because of the insanity of her husband, the minority of her son, and the unsympathetic attitude of the members of her husband’s family. To us it appears that the gift made by the father to the daughter was only reasonable and equitable for which the sons should have been proud instead of disputing the liability of the family in a series of litigations, which with some propriety, should have been avoided. 10. A reference may also be made to Nachimuthu v. Balasubramonia (A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 450) where the connotation of the word “Dhana” and “Rina” was considered by His Lordship Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar who presided as Cochin High Court Chief Justice and delivered Ext. R judgment. The following passage extracted from the judgment of that eminent Judge would take the wind out of the sails of the present appellant. “According to the tests, a surety debt, commercial tolls, debts due for spirituous liquors, for lustful pleasures, gambling debts, unpaid fines, promises without consideration, had in terms to be excluded as otherwise, being rinas, the sons would be bound to discharge them by reason of their pious obligation; see the texts collected in 39 Cal. 862. The words “dhana” and “rina” (Manu), ............................ “riktha, and ‘rina’ (Yagnavalkya, Chap. II, 119), .......................... coupled together in the texts, seem to have been so used in a comprehensive sense, for describing all varieties of divisible assets and liabilities. Otherwise, obligations other than debts strictly so called would bind only the man who incurred them while he is alive and will die with him when he dies, and though alive or dead, the family assets in his hands will be divisible among the sons while the liabilities will be left unprovided for. Otherwise, obligations other than debts strictly so called would bind only the man who incurred them while he is alive and will die with him when he dies, and though alive or dead, the family assets in his hands will be divisible among the sons while the liabilities will be left unprovided for. Such an absurdity could not have been in the contemplation of the author of the tests and we at any rate do not feel justified in attributing it to them, in the absence of the clear and definite words to the contrary. If ‘dhana’ includes in its connotation all varieties of property and assets, we see no reason why ‘rina’ should not be held to include all varieties of obligations and debts as well. Apart from the texts of Hindu Law, the words has been frequently used in the wider sense in Sanskrit literature.” The obligations created under Ext. A would therefore come under the category ‘Rina’ enforceable against the family. The decrees in Exts. S and R were passed with the proper representatives of the family on record, and as such, by virtue of Explanation 6 to S. 9 of the Cochin Civil Procedure Code, the whole family is bound by those decisions. In the case of a Hindu family where all have rights it is impossible to allow each member of the family to litigate on the same point over and over again, and each infant to wait till he comes of age and then bring an action, or before that bring an action by his guardian. In each of these cases therefore the court looks to Explanation of S. 9 of the S. 11 of the Indian C.P.C. corresponding to S. 9 of the Cochin C.P.C. to see whether or not the litigating member of the family has been acting either on behalf of the minors in their interest or if they are majors, with the assent of the majors. Vide Linga Gowda v. Basan Gowda (A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 56) and Madaprasad v. Nageswar Sahai (A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 272). This principle has been followed in 36 Cochin Law Reports 182 and A.I.R. 1933 Nag. 44. Being so, Ext. S and R are binding on the whole family and this suit is a misconceived one. 11. Vide Linga Gowda v. Basan Gowda (A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 56) and Madaprasad v. Nageswar Sahai (A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 272). This principle has been followed in 36 Cochin Law Reports 182 and A.I.R. 1933 Nag. 44. Being so, Ext. S and R are binding on the whole family and this suit is a misconceived one. 11. The present suit is therefore clearly barred by res judicata by virtue of the decision in O.S. 128 of 1110 and O.S. 119 of 1119 of the District Court of Trichur. The appeal has to be dismissed on this ground. 12. It was stated that owing to subsequent development in the affairs of the family the assets have been burdened with other liabilities and that they should be taken into account in reducing the liability under the decree passed in O.S. 128 of 1110. It appears to be a very abnormal proposition that a decree passed long ago is liable to be reopened on account of subsequent events. We have heard of maintenance decrees being reopened because of change in circumstances. At the time when Ext. A was executed the family was in very affluent circumstance, and the number of members was limited. The gift of Rs. 4000 to a daughter then was in no way a burden to the family. There was an attempt to argue that even at that time there were debts in the family to the extent of Rs. 20,000. No details were given in the plaint and no prayer had been made in the plaint to reduce the amount because of the existing liability in the family at that time. Because of this the 4th plaintiff was not allowed to argue on that question. The subsequent development was stated to be because of a suit taken by the defendant’s son against the family for rendition of accounts and for a decree for the amount found due. In 1095 the defendant’s husband became insane. She had only a minor son and a suit had to be taken for getting a partition of the share of her husband and son. Since the defendant’s brothers were Advocates they were helping her in conducting that suit. The collected several amounts due to the minor and appropriated the same. The accounts asked for by the defendants’s son were for these amounts. Since the defendant’s brothers were Advocates they were helping her in conducting that suit. The collected several amounts due to the minor and appropriated the same. The accounts asked for by the defendants’s son were for these amounts. Those amounts were utilised by defendants 3 and 4 either for their own purpose or for family necessity and it was only proper that they were asked to disgorge the amounts which they had appropriated, but which belonged to a helpless minor. The subsequent liability of the family on this account as evidenced by Ext. O.P.T. could not in any way be considered in this suit so as to reopen Ext. S decree and to reduce the liability. The appellant is not entitled to succeed on this point also. 13. The last argument related to compensatory costs allowed to the defendant. S.32 of the Cochin Civil Procedure Code enabled the court to pass a decree for compensatory costs when the claim or defence or any part of it is, as against the objector, false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party by whom it has been put forward. There is no doubt that the present suit is a misconceived one though on account of the ingenuity of the two Advocates in the family an attempt has been made to show a presentable case before the court. But these Advocates could have very well known that there was not even the remotest chance of success particularly because of the points now raised were in one form or other taken due note of by the court and decided. In Ext. R judgment, His Lordship the Chief Justice had made the following observations regarding the intention of the parties and the hollowness of their position. “The object is to get rid of the decree which was passed in the previous suit by attacking it as not binding upon the family. It cannot be pretended that the family was not duly and property represented by defendants 2 and 3 in the former suit. There is not reason for thinking that they did not put forward every possible defence, good, bad or indifferent, but they ultimately failed. It cannot be pretended that the family was not duly and property represented by defendants 2 and 3 in the former suit. There is not reason for thinking that they did not put forward every possible defence, good, bad or indifferent, but they ultimately failed. Now this is a fresh attempt, I am sorry to say, a disingenuous attempt, supported by defendants 2 and 3 to get rid of a valid decree passed by a competent court and I am still more sorry to say that in spite of the dismissal or this suit the parties have considered it necessary and proper to bring an appeal into this court against the decision of the court below." 14. There can be no doubt that the present suit was a vexations one and that between the nearest of relations in regard to an obligation created by the father of plaintiffs 3 and 4 and grandfather of plaintiffs 1, 2 and 5. The plaintiffs are therefore liable to pay compensatory costs but we do not think that they have to be made liable for the maximum amount provided for in the section. The value of the suit itself is only Rs. 2011 and the sum of Rs. 500/- awarded was unduly high. While accepting that the plaintiffs are liable to pay compensatory costs we reduce the same to Rs. 100/- The argument that plaintiffs 1 and 2 are not to be made liable as they were minors on the date of Ext. R suit cannot be accepted for they were majors when the present suit was filed. Any one who had gone through Ext. S and R judgments would have hesitated even to cross the gates of the court house to present a plaint of this kind. All the plaintiffs are therefore made liable for the compensatory costs awarded. 15. In the result the decree of the lower court is confirmed and the appeal dismissed except as regards the compensatory costs which are reduced to Rs. 100. The appellants will pay the respondent her costs in both the courts. Appeal dismissed.