Judgement CHAGLA, C.J. :- The prosecution alleged that the applicant before us carried on the business of a money-lender without obtaining a license and without keeping and maintaining the accounts as required by the Bombay Money-lenders Act XXXI (31) on 1947. The contention of the accused was that his advanced moneys only on security and that he took security which was sufficient to cover the whole of the loan advanced by him to his customers, and the further contention of the accused was that the Money-lenders Act only applied to cases where unsecured loans were made and not to cases where the loan advanced was a secured loan. The facts in this case are not in dispute, and the only question that arises, and the only question that has been argued, is the interpretation of Act xxxi (31) of 1947. 2. What we have to decide is, what is the true meaning according to the language used of the expression "loan" as defined by the Bombay Money-lenders Act. "Loan" is defined as an advance at interest by way of credit. Whether of money or in kind, and then it sets out what it does not include, with which we are not concerned for the purposes of this application. Mr. Somjees contention is that the expression "by way of credit" means that the advance must be only on the personal security of the debtor. If the advance is against a security either movable or immovable, then it is not a loan within the meaning of this expression as used in the Act. Mr. Somjee is right to this extent that if the legislature intended that all loans, whether secured or unsecured, should be covered by the expression "loan," then it is rather difficult to understand why the legislature used the expression "by way of credit." Even without the use of that expression, if "loan" was defined merely as an advance at interest, it would have covered both a secured and an unsecured loan. But we cannot accept Mr. Somjees contention that the expression "by way of credit" is a restrictive expression. In our view, the legislature has used an expression which is superfluous or unnecessary and that expression does not in any way affect the true meaning of loan as is apparent from the language used by the legislature. But we cannot accept Mr. Somjees contention that the expression "by way of credit" is a restrictive expression. In our view, the legislature has used an expression which is superfluous or unnecessary and that expression does not in any way affect the true meaning of loan as is apparent from the language used by the legislature. If the legislature intended to restrict the expression "loan" only to unsecured loans or to loans in which only the personal credit of the debtor was involved, then the legislature would undoubtedly have used proper language for that purpose. The legislature could have used the expression "an unsecured loan" or could have stated that loan means an advance only on the personal security of a debtor. But the legislature has used the general expression "an advance," and the expression "by way of credit" is, in our opinion, not restrictive of that general expression. It is perfectly true that the legislature did intend by using the expression "by way of credit" that the loan must be given on the credit of the debtor. But the legislature did not intend and does not so state that the loan must be only on the credit of the debtor. The difficulty in the way of Mr. Somjee is that even when a loan is secured, the personal liability of the borrower is not excluded. When a money-lender advances money and takes security, he advances it, first, on the credit of the debtor, and, secondly, on the security which he gets from his debtor. It is not as if when ha advances money on some security ha does not look to the debtor at all in the event of the security not being sufficient to satisfy the money advanced. Therefore, once it is conceded (and it must be conceded) that in law in every loan whether secured or unsecured the liability of the debtor must remain and the loan must always be on the credit of the debtor, the expression used by the legislature "by way of credit" becomes immediately intelligible. If we were to accept Mr. Somjees contention, it would lead to this extraordinary result, (and Mr. Somjee concedes that that extraordinary result must be given effect to), viz., that in every case the prosecution would have to establish what the value of the security was, because Mr. If we were to accept Mr. Somjees contention, it would lead to this extraordinary result, (and Mr. Somjee concedes that that extraordinary result must be given effect to), viz., that in every case the prosecution would have to establish what the value of the security was, because Mr. Somjee does not dispute that even if we were to interpret the expression "loan" as he wants us to do, if a money-lender advances money on security which was not sufficient to cover the loan, then to the extent - that the loan remained uncovered the loan would fall within the meaning of the expression used in this Act. It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended such a curious and anomalous result to ensue from the working of this Act. It is right that when the Court construes a statute it must try and give a meaning to every expression used by the legislature. But cases are not unknown where the legislature, out of greater caution or out of every desire to eschew any ambiguity, has used expressions which are unnecessary or superfluous, and therefore, in our opinion, it would be violating a more fundamental canon of construction to construe an expression which is superfluous or unnecessary as an expression which is restrictive of a more general word used by the legislature in that very definition. 3. Therefore, in our opinion, the expression "loan" used by the legislature and as defined by S. 9(9) covers a loan which is secured as well as a loan which is unsecured, and it is immaterial whether the lender advances money on security which fully covers the loan advanced by him. On that view of the case, the conviction of the accused must be upheld. Rule discharged. 4. As regards sentence, it is not suggested by the Government Pleader that the accused wanted to defy the law or to act in contravention of the law. As a matter of fact he called upon responsible authorities on several occasions to elucidate the meaning of the expression "loan" as used in the Money-lenders Act, and the accused baa also fought this case more as a test case than anything else. He wanted an authoritative pronouncement of the Court as to what the true position in law was, and after his prosecution be has completely stopped doing money-lending business. He wanted an authoritative pronouncement of the Court as to what the true position in law was, and after his prosecution be has completely stopped doing money-lending business. In that view of the case we can only take the view that the offence committed by the accused is a purely technical offence. We, therefore, reduce the sentence of fine from Rs. 100 to a fine of Rs. 10 on each count. Rule discharged. AIR (37) 1950 BOMBAY 120 [C. N. 32] "Gopal Anant Prabhu v. Anandrao Vishnu" BOMBAY HIGH COURT Coram : 1 SHAH, J. ( Single Bench ) Gopal Anant Prabhu v. Anandrao Vishnu Phanse. Civil Revn. Appln No. 423 of 1949, D/- 26 -7 -1949., from decision of Chief Judge, Small Cause Court Bombay, in Suit No. 191/2987 of 1947. (A) Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (15 of 1882), S.47 - SMALL CAUSES COURT - WORDS AND PHRASES - TENANCY - POSSESSION - Occupant - Meaning of - Term does not include sub-tenant in possession who was not made party to application u/S.41. The expression occupant used in S. 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, means only a person who was a party to the proceedings filed under S. 41 and not a person who is or claims to be in possession, either at the time of the institution of those proceedings or thereafter, but who has not been sued. A sub-tenant therefore who is in possession but was not made party to the proceedings under S. 41 is not entitled to apply under S. 47 relying solely upon his occupation : AIR (36) 1949 Cal 248, Rel. on. [Para 6] Annotation : (46-Man.) Presi. Small Cause Courts Act, S. 47, N. 1. (B) INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES - SMALL CAUSES COURT - Interpretation of Statutes - Reference to English statute - Terms not identical - Interpreting Indian statute by such reference is unsafe. Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (15 of 1882), S.47. Where the words of the two statutes are not identical it is always unsafe to decide a question of construction of an Indian statute by reference to supposed analogous provisions of a similar statute under a different system of law. Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (15 of 1882), S.47. Where the words of the two statutes are not identical it is always unsafe to decide a question of construction of an Indian statute by reference to supposed analogous provisions of a similar statute under a different system of law. Thus, the observations made by the learned Judges of the Courts in England in suits filed for compensation for trespass at the instance of some persons who had been in possession at the date when summary proceedings were taken against the tenant for obtaining possession and to which they were not made parties cannot be utilized for the purpose of construing the provisions of S. 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. [Para 5] Annotation : (44-Com.) Civil P.C. Pre-amble. N. 7 (C) Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (15 of 1882), S.47 - SMALL CAUSES COURT - Application under - Whether can lie after order u/S.43 is passed. (Quare) [Para 7] S.H. Lulla and P.A. Gandhi - for Applicant. B.K. Thakkar - for Opponent. Judgement ORDER :- This is an application in revision under S. 115, Civil P.C. 1908. The petitioner is one Gopal Anant Prabhu who says that be was a sub-tenant of certain premises, being rooms Nos. 14 and 15 and shops Nos. 5, 6. 7, 8 and 9 on the ground floor of a property known as No. 11 Phanse Building situate at Tulsirampada Kalachowki, Bombay. The respondent, Anandrao Vishnu, is the owner of the property; and he let out the premises in dispute in the present application to one Hanumanta Naik as a monthly tenant. Sometime after the tenancy commenced, it is stated, Hanumanta Naik, the tenant, assigned or sub-let the premises to the petitioner, Gopal Anant Prabhu, in February 1946. Thereafter the respondent took out a summons, which was numbered as Suit No. 191/2987 of 1947 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay, for an order requiring the tenant Hanumanta Naik. to deliver possession of the premises in his occupation as a tenant, on the allegation that he had served a notice terminating the tenancy as required by law and had called upon the tenant to vacate and deliver possession of the premises, and that the tenant had failed or neglected to comply with the same. to deliver possession of the premises in his occupation as a tenant, on the allegation that he had served a notice terminating the tenancy as required by law and had called upon the tenant to vacate and deliver possession of the premises, and that the tenant had failed or neglected to comply with the same. On 6th August 1947, the Court of Small Caused passed an order requiring the tenant to vacate and deliver possession of the premises, but it was directed that the execution of the order for delivery of possession of the premises should be postponed until 30th November 1948. After 30th November 1948, the petitioner, who was in possession of the premises having failed to vacate a writs for possession was applied for by the opponent and was obtained from the Court of Small Causes. When the writ was sought to be enforced, the petitioner obstructed delivery of possession claiming that he was entitled to possession in his own right, and claimed that the termination of the tenancy was wrongful and unjustified. An application was filed by the opponent for removal of obstruction, and the Court of Small Causes by order dated 22nd December 1948, directed the removal of obstruction. But the Court appears as a matter of indulgence to have granted time to the petitioner to deliver possession by 31st May 1949. The time given till 31st May 1949, was further extended on the application of the petitioner to 30th June 1949, with the result that an order for delivery of possession which was passed on 6th August 1947, has remained unexecuted for a period of about two years. After the expiry of the period provided under the order of the Court of Small Causes, the petitioner applied to that Court purporting to do so under S. 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for an order to stay the proceedings for the recovery of possession pending the hearing and disposal of a suit for compensation for trespass which he proposed to file in a competent Court. The learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes rejected the application holding that the applicant had no right to apply under S. 47. The learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes rejected the application holding that the applicant had no right to apply under S. 47. The learned Judge observed : "It is clear that the right to sue for trespass is given by statute under the last part of S. 47 only to the person or persons against whom the landlord baa made the application under S. 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, and in consequence the suit that is spoken of by S. 47 is a suit for that statutory trespass which can only be maintained by the person who has been made a patty to the original ejectment proceedings by the landlord and such person alone can take advantage of S. 47 by filing such a suit for compensation for a statutory trespass." He held that the application was misconceived and should be dismissed with costs. The petitioner Domes in revision to this Court against that order. 2. It is contended on behalf of the applicant by Mr. Lulla that the expression occupant as used in S. 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act includes a sub-tenant whether or not such a sub-tenant was a party to the ejectment proceeding in which an order for ejectment was passed. Mr. Lulla contends that every person, who is in occupation of premises at the date when a summons is taken out under S. 41, is entitled to a notice terminating his right to remain in possession followed by a demand for possession, and if no such notice is given or there is failure to make a demand for possession, a person in occupation is entitled, even after an order has been passed against a tenant under whom he claims to remain in possession, to demand that the execution proceedings taken against him shall be stayed on his undertaking to file a suit within the time to be specified by the Court of Small Causes under S. 47. In effect, the contention comes to this, that a person who is in possession of premises at the time when the summons is taken out, whether or not he is a party to the summons, is entitled to make an application under S. 47 for stay of proceedings and the Court of Small Causes is bound to stay the proceedings on security being furnished as demanded by that Court. As a corollary to the argument, Mr. Lulla baa contended that an application to be filed under S. 47 need not be filed during the pendency of the summons taken out under S. 41, that is before an order in ejectment is passed under S. 43, but may be filed so long as the occupier remains in occupation of the premises which are the subject-matter of the proceeding. Section 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, provides : "Whenever on an application being made under S. 41 the occupant binds himself, with two sureties, in a bond for such amount as the Small Cause Court thanks reasonable, having regard to the value of the property and the probable costs of the suit next hereinafter mentioned, to institute without delay a suit in the High Court against the applicant foe compensation for trespass and to pay all the costs of such suit in case he does not prosecute the same or in case judgment therein is given for the applicant, the Small Cause Court shall stay the proceedings on such application until such suit is disposed of. If the occupant obtains a decree in any such suit against the applicant, such decree shall supersede the order, if any, made under S. 43." Now, the question arising for determination is, does the expression occupant include every person who occupies at any given time premises for possession of which the summons is applied for, or does it refer only to a person who being in occupation was called upon to deliver possession and has failed to comply with it and has consequently been sued under S. 41 ? The scheme of Chap. VII, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act may be briefly stated. Section 41 provides for a summary remedy in certain cases for obtaining possession of premises from persons who occupy them as tenants or licensees. In order to obtain possession the tenancy or license must be determined or withdrawn, and there must be a demand for delivery of possession. On failure to comply with the demand the landlord or the licensor may apply for a summons against the occupant calling upon him to show cause why be should not be compelled to deliver the property. From para. On failure to comply with the demand the landlord or the licensor may apply for a summons against the occupant calling upon him to show cause why be should not be compelled to deliver the property. From para. 3 of S. 41 it will be seen that a tenant or an occupier or any person holding under or by assignment, from him is called an occupant; and it is evident that under para. 4 of that section, a summons may be applied for against an occupant. A summons is required to be served on an occupant (sought to be sued) under S. 42 in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. Under S. 43 if the occupant does not appear or if he appears and does not show sufficient cause, then the Court is entitled to pass an order directing him to vacate and deliver possession. Then follows an explanation, which enables the occupant to prove that the tenancy was created or permission granted by virtue of a title which had determined previously to the date of the application, and if he establishes that, he must be deemed to have shown cause within the meaning of the section. Now, in Ss. 42 and 43, the expression occupant obviously refers to a person who conforms to the definition in S. 41 and from whom possession has been demanded, and who has refused to deliver possession. In its context the expression cannot refer to a person who is merely in possession and upon whom no demand is made. It is only a person who is sued as an occupant after demand, who can appear and show cause, and against whom alone an order can be passed. Section 46 provides foe imposing a liability upon an applicant who obtains an order when he is not entitled to obtain an order and mere making of an application in such circumstances is deemed to be an act of trespass. This section is followed by S. 47, which I have set out above. 3. If in para. 4 of S. 41, in S. 42 and in S. 43 the expression occupant means a person against whom proceedings are taken for obtaining possession, I see no reason why it should be assumed that the Legislature has used that expression in S. 47 in a different sense. 3. If in para. 4 of S. 41, in S. 42 and in S. 43 the expression occupant means a person against whom proceedings are taken for obtaining possession, I see no reason why it should be assumed that the Legislature has used that expression in S. 47 in a different sense. It would, I think, be putting an unwarranted construction upon the words of S. 47 to hold that the expression occupant as used in that section has a different connotation from that in Ss. 41, paras. S. 42 and 43. The expression occupant in S. 47 must mean the same person as is referred to in Ss. 41, 42 and 43, namely, the person who is sued by the applicant as a person in possession of the premises; and the effect of that view would be that a person who has not been sued as an occupant would not be entitled relying solely upon his occupation to make an application under S. 47 to the Presidency Small Clause Court for stay of proceedings instituted under S. 41. In this connection I may refer to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gangaram Dhar v. Santosh Kumar, AIR (36) 1949 Cal 248 : (53 CWN 187), where Harries C.J. in considering an argument very similar to the argument which has been presented by Mr. Lulla before me, held that in para. 4 of S. 41 the occupant refers to the person who has actually been asked to deliver up possession and has refused to do so. The learned Chief Justice observed (p. 249) : "It is clear from Para. 3 of S. 41 that such a parson may either be the tenant or occupier or any person holding under or by assignment from him. But whoever is proceeded against must be the person who had been requested to give up possession and has refused to do so. It is that person who is to be the defendant in the proceedings as contemplated by Para. 4 of S. 41." The learned Chief Justice further stated (p. 249) : "... that the word occupant in S. 47 must have the same meaning as it has in the last paragraph of S. 41 and in Ss. It is that person who is to be the defendant in the proceedings as contemplated by Para. 4 of S. 41." The learned Chief Justice further stated (p. 249) : "... that the word occupant in S. 47 must have the same meaning as it has in the last paragraph of S. 41 and in Ss. 42 and 43, namely, the person who has refused to deliver up possession when requested to do so, and who has been made a defendant in the proceedings under S. 41. To give the term a wider meaning would be to allow persons not parties to a proceeding to move to have it stayed." Consequently, according to the learned Chief Justice S. 47 could have no application to a sub-tenant who was not a party to the proceedings for recovery of possession. The learned Chief Justice pointed out (p. 250) : "If the term occupant covers persons other than those made defendants in the proceedings in the Small Cause Court, then a very strange result would follow, namely, that the decree in a suit between, for example, a sub-tenant and the landlord, would supersede an order made between the landlord and the tenant, though the sub-tenant was never a party to those proceedings." 4. Mr. Lulla has contended that the view taken by the Calcutta High Court ignores the definition of the expression occupant contained in S. 41. He says that the statutory right to make an application for stay conferred upon a sub-tenant who satisfies the definition of occupant would be rendered nugatory if an effective exercise of that right depended upon the circumstance that such person was a party to the proceeding under S. 41 and, he contends that it would be an unwarranted restriction upon the connotation of the word occupant to say that a person who is in actual possession and who would be an occupant to whom it would have been possible for the applicant to give a notice under S. 41 and to demand possession from him would not be competent to make an application under S. 47, because no notice was given to him and he was not sued. Now, if the Legislature has conferred a statutory right upon a class of persons to obtain a specified relief, it is no argument to say that another class of persona should not be deemed to have been excluded from obtaining that relief, because the foundation of their right is the same as that of the specified class. This at best is an argument of convenience. The right to the relief must be confined to the class designated, and cannot be extended on grounds of convenience. Mr. Lulla further contends that the expression trespass has been given a special meaning in S. 46, it does not mean actual unlawful entry on premises in the possession of another person, but even an application for order for possession is deemed to be trespass; and from that Mr. Lulla contends that if under the second part of S. 46, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act it is open to a person who is in possession to treat an application for an order for possession as trespass, then such a person should be entitled under the provisions of S. 47 to make an application as a person in occupation for stay of the suit proceedings in the Court of Small Causes pending the determination of the question of compensation in a suit to be instituted by him. That argument, in my view, proceeds upon a fallacy. The argument assumes that the second part of S. 46 enables a person other than a person who has been sued as an occupant to treat the application for possession as an act of trespass. That is plainly not so. The section is terms refers to the application by an applicant not entitled to possession as an act of trespass against the occupant who would obviously be the person sued. 5. Mr. Lulla has referred to certain decisions of the English Courts in support of the view that, unless notice is given to the person in actual possession, no possession can be taken from him under proceedings which are analogous to the proceedings which can be instituted under Chap. 7, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 5. Mr. Lulla has referred to certain decisions of the English Courts in support of the view that, unless notice is given to the person in actual possession, no possession can be taken from him under proceedings which are analogous to the proceedings which can be instituted under Chap. 7, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. I do not propose to refer to those decisions for the simple reason that the words of the two statutes are not identical; and it is always unsafe to decide a question of construction of an Indian statute by reference to supposed analogous provisions of a similar statute under a different system of law. Those observations made by the learned Judges of the Courts in England in suits filed for compensation for trespass at the instance of some persons who had been in possession at the date when summary proceedings were taken against the tenant for obtaining possession and to which they were not made parties cannot be utilized for the purpose of construing the provisions of S. 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, is a matter hardly open to any argument. 6. I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court, and hold that the expression occupant used in S. 47, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, means only a person who was a party to the proceedings filed under S. 41 and not a person who is or claims to be in possession, either at the time of the institution of those proceedings or thereafter, but who has not been sued. On that view of the case, it would be unnecessary for me to consider the further question which was argued by Mr. Lulla, that an application can lie even after an order has been passed under S. 43 for possession. 7. Mr. Lulla has referred me to a decision of my brother Bavdekar in Bai Parvatibai Ganpat v. Resurdas Bhagwandas, CRA No. 827 of 1948, D/-5-4-1949 in which the view appears to be taken that an application under S. 47 for stay can be maintained even after an order has been passed under S. 43. 7. Mr. Lulla has referred me to a decision of my brother Bavdekar in Bai Parvatibai Ganpat v. Resurdas Bhagwandas, CRA No. 827 of 1948, D/-5-4-1949 in which the view appears to be taken that an application under S. 47 for stay can be maintained even after an order has been passed under S. 43. I have grave doubts whether it is open, after the disposal of an application filed under S. 41, when an order has been passed for delivery of possession, to a person who is bound by that order, to contend that an action taken in furtherance or execution of an order lawfully passed by a Court competent to pass that order is an act of trespass. Bavdekar, J., has, no doubt, taken the view that an application may lie under S. 47 even after an order is passed under S. 43. But for the purposes of the present application, I think it is unnecessary for me to go into that question and decide the point raised by Mr. Lulla. 8. On the view taken by me on the first question, that the applicant was not entitled to file an application for stay under S. 47, the rule in this case must be discharged with costs. Rule discharged.