Judgement Jagannadhadas, J. :- The pltf. is the applt. in this second appeal. It arises out of a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of 36 decimals of land which belonged to defts. 1 and 2. Defendants 1 and 2 are minors and the suit-contract is one entered into on their behalf by their mother as guardian. The contract was for selling the property for a sum of Rs. 75 out of which rs. 35 was paid as advance and the balance was to be paid later. Defendant 3 who is the sisters husband of defts. 1 and 3 has purchased the suit, property on 3-2-1943 subsequent to the agreement in favour of the pltf. The genuineness of the consideration alleged to have bean paid thereunder were denied by the defts. and contested in the Cts. below. It has been found by the trial Ct. that the agreement was true and that a sum of Rs. 35 was paid as an advance under it. It was also found that the agreement was executed in order to raise money to repay a decretal debt for Rs. 60 against the minors in respect of which there was an execution pending at the time. It was further found that deft. 3 was fully aware of the agreement and took the sale deed in his favour with notice of the same. These findings of the trial Ct. were not challenged in first appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge. It is not clear from the judgments of the Cts. below whether the decree-debt for the discharge of which money was sought to be raised by the suit agreement was one binding on the minors estate or not. The Cts. below have been assumed that the agreement was entered into by the guardian for legal necessity and the case must be dealt with on that footing. 2. The argument that has been advanced on behalf of the defts. is that no specific performance can be decreed against the minors (and against the subsequent purchaser) on the basis of a contract entered into on their behalf by their guardian even though it may be for legal necessity or for the benefit of the minor. This contention has been accepted by both the Cts. below and the suit has been accordingly dismissed. Hence this second appeal. 3. This contention has been accepted by both the Cts. below and the suit has been accordingly dismissed. Hence this second appeal. 3. The same question of law is urged in this second appeal and in view of the conflict on this matter, between the view taken by Das J. in Abdul Haq v. Md. Yahya Khan, a.i.r. (11) 1924 Pat. 81 : (78 i. C. 483) that of Wort J. in Brahamdeo v. Haro Singh, a. i. r. (22) 1935 Pat. 237 : (157 i. C. 327), this appeal has been referred to a Bench. The matter has been fully argued before us. On a consideration of the argument, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the view of Das J. expressed in Abdul Haq v. Md. Yahya Khan, a. i. r. (11) 1924 Pat. 81 : (78 I. C. 483) to the effect that a contract for sale entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian cannot be specifically enforced. 4. This view is now almost unanimously held in all the H. Cs., and the reasons, therefor, do not require to be elaborated. The crucial question in such a case is whether a contract entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor is binding on the minors estate. It is said that it would be binding if it is for necessity or benefit. It is urged by the learned Advocate for the applts., that just as the sale of a property of the minor by his guardian for legal necessity is valid and binding, so also the antecedent contract to sell the property is equally binding on minor. It is stated that a contrary view would produce anomalous results and would not be in the interests of the minor himself. The question, however, turns on the powers of e, minors guardian. In Hanooman fersaud v. Mt. Babooee Munraj, 6 M. i. A. 393 : (18 w. r. 81 P. C.) which is the foundation of judicial decisions relating to the guardians powers, their Lordships at p. 423 state as follows : "The power of the Manager for an infant heir to charge ancestral estate by loan or mortgage, is, under the Hindu law, a limited and qualified power. It can only be exercised rightly in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate." 5. It can only be exercised rightly in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate." 5. It will be noticed that what is recognised here is the power to charge an estate and not the power to bind the estate by a mere personal covenant. In a later P. C. case in Waghela Rasanji v. Masludin, 11 Bom. 551 P. C., their Lordships dealing with the question of the powers of a guardian state at p. 561 as follows: "Now it was most candidly stated by Mr. Mayne, who argued the case on behalf of the reap., that there is not in Indian law any rule which gives a guardian and manager greater power to bind the infant ward by a personal covenant than exists in English law. In point of fact, the matter mast be decided by equity and good conscience, generally interpreted to mean the rules of English law if found applicable to Indian society and circumstances. Their Lordships are not aware of any law in which the guardian has such a power, nor do they see why it should be so in India. They conceive that it would be a very improper thing to allow the guardian to make covenants in the name of his ward so as to impose a personal liability upon the ward and they hold that in this case the guardian exceeded her powers so far as she purported to bind the ward." 6. Since that decision, it has been taken as settled law that a mere executory contract entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor imposing a personal obligation on the minors estate is not valid and binding and it makes no difference that it is for necessity or benefit. Indeed the P. C. in a later case appear to have recognised this principle even to the extent of saying that not only can such a contract not be enforced against the minor, but that the minor cannot even take advantage of it in his own favour and enforce it against the other party to the contract. That was what was held in Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddm, 39 Cal. 232: (39 I. A. 16 P. C). That was a case of a contract for purchase of lands entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor. That was what was held in Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddm, 39 Cal. 232: (39 I. A. 16 P. C). That was a case of a contract for purchase of lands entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor. It was found as a fact in the case that the contract was intended to bind the minors estate, and that it was for his advantage. All the same, it was held by their Lordships that the minor could not take advantage of the contract and enforce it specifically as against the other party thereto, and they give their reasons for the conclusion as follows: "Their Lordships are of the opinion that it is not within the competence of the guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minors estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property and they are further of the opinion that as the minor in the present case was not bound by the contract, there was no mutuality and that the minor who has now reached his majority cannot obtain specific performance of the contract." 7. This is an unequivocal recognition by the F. C. of the position that a contract by a guardian on behalf of the minor seeking to bind the minors estate is invalid. It has been suggested that the unenforceability of the contract in this case was assumed by the P. C. on account of the fact that it was a contract of purchase which prima facie cannot be one for the necessity or the benefit of the minors estate and that therefore this does not militate against the view that a contract for legal necessity is binding. But this suggestion ignores the facts of that case which show clearly that the P. C. recognised the contract to be for the advantage of the minor and therefore for his benefit and yet held it to be unenforceable, obviously on the same principle as has been laid in the prior case of Waghela Rajsanji v. Masluddin, 11 Bom. 551. The case, therefore, in Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin: 39 Cal. 232: (39 I. a. 16 F. C.) is clear authority for the position that a contract by a minors guardian for his benefit (or necessity) is not binding and it is only in that view that the scope for the application of the principle of mutuality arose. 551. The case, therefore, in Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin: 39 Cal. 232: (39 I. a. 16 F. C.) is clear authority for the position that a contract by a minors guardian for his benefit (or necessity) is not binding and it is only in that view that the scope for the application of the principle of mutuality arose. The question has been considered by a F. B. of the Madias H. C. in Ramajogaya v. Jagnanadham, 42 Mad. 185: (a. I. r. (6) 1919 Mad. 641 F. B.) and it has been there pointed out that the effect of the P. C. decision in Waghela Rajsanji v. Masluddin, 11 Bom. 551, is that a decree cannot be passed against the minor or his estate on a covenant entered into by his guardian for his benefit. That F. B. decision deals with the further question as to whether this principle would affect the liability of the minors estate under S. 68, Contract Act, if it is also secured by a personal bond executed by the guardian on behalf of the minor; but that is a question with which we are not concerned in the present case. 8. Even on principle, apart from authority, the contention of the applts advocate that since the sale by the guardian on behalf of the minor for necessity or benefit is binding, the prior contract to sell must also be equally binding, has no force. In respect of dealings by a guardian on behalf of of a minor, the law has recognised for very salutary reasons, the broad distinction between the binding character of a completed alienation by way of a sale or charge and an executory contract which merely imposes an obligation to alienate. In the former, the validity is recognised as much in the interests of the minor as in the interests of the bona fide, purchaser for value. But in the latter, if for any reason, the guardian declines to complete the transaction by actual transfer there is no interest of a bona fide purchaser to be protected and the fact that the guardian has resiled from the executory arrangement is itself a reason why the Ct. should not enforce it against the minors estate. 9. Before the deoision of the P. C. in Mohri Bibi v. Dharmadas, 30 Cal. should not enforce it against the minors estate. 9. Before the deoision of the P. C. in Mohri Bibi v. Dharmadas, 30 Cal. 539: (30 I. a. 114 p.C.), holding that a minors contract is absolutely void and not merely voidable, and before the later decision of the P. C. in Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin, 39 Cal. 232: (39 i. A 16 p. C.), importing the principle of mutuality with reference of contracts, there were undoubtedly a number of decisions in the H. Cts., that a contract for sale by a guardian on behalf of the minor if for necessity or benefit, is valid and binding. But it has been recognised in subsequent decisions that the earlier decisions are no longer good law. Some of the later decisions have, however, attempted to distinguish the case of a contract for sale of minors property by a guardian for necessity or benefit from the case of and contract for purchase of property by a guardian on behalf of a minor. They have accordingly attempted to distinguish the case in Sarwirjan v. Fakhruddin, 39 Cal. 232: (39 I. A. 16 p. C.) on that ground. Those cases have however, failed to appreciate that the decision in Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin, 39 Cal. 232 (39 I. A. 16 P. C.) is based on the view, firstly, that the contract by the guardian though for the benefit of the minor is not enforceable and secondly, that since it is not enforceable against the minors estate, it cannot be enforced in his favour for lack of mutuality. Subsequent decisions have therefore recognised that there is no scope for this distinction. It is enough to refer to the cases in Srinath v. Jatindra Mohan, a.I.R. (13) 1926 Cal. 445: (89 I. C. 892); Ramkrishna v. K. Chidambara, A. I. R. (15) 1928 Mad. 407: (108 I. C. 282); Venkatachalam v. Sethuramrao, a. i. R. (20) 1933 Mad. 322: (56 Mad. 432 F. b.); Swarathram Ramsaran v. Ramballabh, A. I. R. (12) 1925 All. 595: (47 All. 784) and Krishtachandra v. Rishabha Kumar, A. I. R. (26) 1939 Nag 265: (I. L. r. (1940) Nag. 56). There have been some exceptions recognised to this principle such as in the case of a contract by the manager of a joint Hindu family consisting of some minors and it is unnecessary to notice them in this connection. 10. 784) and Krishtachandra v. Rishabha Kumar, A. I. R. (26) 1939 Nag 265: (I. L. r. (1940) Nag. 56). There have been some exceptions recognised to this principle such as in the case of a contract by the manager of a joint Hindu family consisting of some minors and it is unnecessary to notice them in this connection. 10. We are, therefore, satisfied that the contract in this case which the pltf. seeks to enforce is not specifically enforceable. 11. Learned counsel for the applt. has further urged that the pltf. would at least be entitled to a decree for the refund of the sum of Rs. 35 advanced by him, since it has been found that it was raised for legal necessity, that is, to discharge the decree debt in respect of which an execution was pending against the minors estate at the time. But this would depend upon whether as a fact the amount has been utilised for the discharge of the debt. This is a question of fact which has not been raised in the Cts. below. If it were absolutely clear on the evidence that the pltf.s money has been in fact utilised for the partial discharge of the decree-debt, we might have inclined to consider this request. The learned advocate has drawn our attention to certain portions of the pltf.s evidence as P. W. 1 to substantiate chat his amount was in fact utilised for partial discharge of the decree debt.- But on a perusal of the record, it is found that the defts. who had denied the advance in their defence, have given evidence that the decree debt was satisfied with the money supplied by the third deft. That is what the guardian of the minors, D. W. 2, states in her deposition. In this state of contacting evidence, we do not consider that we will be justified in acceding to the request of the applts. Advocate that there should be a decree for refund of the amount advanced. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. 12. Narasimham, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.