Judgment Sinha, J. 1. This is a defendants appeal from the decision of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga decreeing the plaintiffs suit for damages for breach of a contract in writing registered. 2. The facts, which are no more in controversy at this stage, may shortly be stated as follows; The plaintiff executed a mortgage bond on 9th August 1929, in favour of one Raghunandan Singh for Rs. 2,700. In order to pay off this pre-existing debt, the plaintiff executed a sale-deed on 1st June 1931, in favour of the appellant who was a mere name lender on behalf of her husband and his other members of the joint family who are also party-defend ants to the suit. The bulk of the consideration money was left in the hands of the vendee for the payment of the mortgage-debt aforesaid. But the vendee did not pay up the mortgage-debt, with the result that judgment was recovered by the mortgagee. The preliminary decree for sale was passed on 15th January 1940, which was made final on 27th January 1941. The plaintiff had also been impleaded as defendant along with the vendee. He paid up the decretal money in several instalments in course of the years 1941 and 1942, and then instituted this suit on 31st May 1943, for recovery of the money which he paid, and which, he claimed should have been paid by the vendee, the appellant. 3. A number of defences were raised in the Court below, challenging the plaintiffs allegations on questions of fact. These defences have not been persisted in in this Court. 4. Mr. Ganesh Sharma, appearing on behalf of the appellant, first raised the contention that the decree being one for sale of the mortgaged property, the plaintiff was not interested in the payment of the money, and, therefore, if he actually paid the decretal sum, he was a mere volunteer who could not recover the said amount from the defendants. This contention was raised apparently with reference to the provisions of Sections 69 and 70, Contract Act. But the suit, in terms is one for damages for breach of contract as evidenced by the sale-deed of the year 1931. To that sale-deed, the mortgagee was not a party. The vendee undertook, on behalf of the vendor, to pay up his outstanding mortgage-debt. But the suit, in terms is one for damages for breach of contract as evidenced by the sale-deed of the year 1931. To that sale-deed, the mortgagee was not a party. The vendee undertook, on behalf of the vendor, to pay up his outstanding mortgage-debt. In so far as she did not liquidate that debt, she has committed a breach of contract in writing registered. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant-appellant. 5. 6. It was nest contended that, viewed as a suit for a breach of contract, this suit was barred by limitation. Mr. Ganesh Sharma contended that, as no time was fixed for the payment of the money, the period of limitation began to run from the date of the contract itself, namely, 1st June 1931. If he is right in that contention, certainly the suit is barred by limitation either of three years or of six years. But, in my opinion, there is no substance in this contention, because the plaintiffs cause of action would arise on the date he was made to pay the decretal sum, that is to say, when he was damnified, or, at the earliest, when the decree was made final on 27th January 1941, on the default of payment by the mortgagor or his vendee, the appellant--see in this connection the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mt. Rajbansi Kuer v. Bishundeo Narayan Singh, 10 Pat. 451: (A. I. R. (18) 1931 Pat. 271. In that case, this Court has laid it down that the cause of action for such a suit would arise upon the payment being made by the plaintiff. It would on that date be deemed that the vendee had not carried out the terms of his contract. 7. These were the only contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, and, as there is no substance in either of them, the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Mahabir Prasad, J. 8 I agree.