JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by four accused persons, who have been convicted of having committed theft and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 each, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Out of the fine, if realised, the complainant was to get Rs. 175 as compensation. In view of the decision at which I have arrived it will not be necessary to go into the facts in any detail. 2. The case for the prosecution is that the four accused persons, together with others armed with various deadly weapons, snatched away the fishing net and about three maunds of fish which had been caught by the complainant from his tank. The defence case is that the accused persons took settlement of the tank orally from the complainant, reared fish therein and that the arrangement was that, after giving one-fourth share of the fish to the complainant, they would take the rest. The court has disbelieved the defence case and has convicted the accused. The case first came up for hearing before Mr. A.B. Mukherji, Sub-divisional Magistrate, Jhargram. He examined certain prosecution witnesses and framed a charge u/s 379 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused. Then this learned magistrate was transferred and the case was taken up for hearing by his successor Sri P.K. Chatterji. The accused exercised the option given to them u/s 350(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and demanded a de novo trial. Thereafter, the witnesses were recalled and the case was tried de novo. After the witnesses were examined-in-chief, the learned pleader appearing for the accused represented to the magistrate that he would be satisfied if the cross-examination of the witnesses already recorded by Sri A.B. Mukherji were put in and accepted as the cross-examination in the present case. He said that he had no new question to put in cross-examination. The learned magistrate agreed to this somewhat extraordinary request and all that be recorded as constituting the cross-examination of the witnesses is in the following terms: What I stated in previous deposition in cross-examination is all correct. It is read over and admitted by him as correct. It is admitted in evidence in this case. After doing this the learned magistrate examined defence witnesses and thereafter convicted the accused. 3. It is read over and admitted by him as correct. It is admitted in evidence in this case. After doing this the learned magistrate examined defence witnesses and thereafter convicted the accused. 3. The accused have obtained this Rule on the ground that the procedure followed by the learned magistrate in accepting the previous cross-examination as being the cross-examination in the present case was illegal and constituted a violation of the provisions of Section 350(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second ground taken is that the learned magistrate acted illegally in basing his judgment on the evidence recorded by another magistrate in a de novo trial. 4. It must be said at the outset that the lawyer of the accused is to the largest extent to blame for the illegalities which have undoubtedly been committed in this case, but that fact would not justify me in overlooking such illegalities in a criminal case which have to be conducted strictissimi juris. There has, in my opinion, been such a flagrant disregard of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the law of evidence that a conviction at a trial of this description must be set aside. 5. When a trial is started de novo, the witnesses must all be examined afresh and if the accused desires, be cross-examined. Had the accused stated that he declined cross-examination, there would have been an end of the matter and the court could have proceeded on the evidence recorded at the de novo trial given by the witnesses in examination-in-chief, but in this case this is not what has happened. The accused did not decline to cross-examine the witnesses, but asked the court to accept as cross-examination what the witnesses had said at a previous stage of this trial, although the present trial was a de novo trial. 6. Under the Evidence Act, the evidence, given by the witnesses in cross-examination at the trial which was held before the de novo trial, could have been utilised only for the purpose of contradiction or corroboration, as the case may be, of the evidence given in the new trial; it cannot be used as substantive evidence. The court has, in fact, used this evidence as substantive evidence and in doing this, it has violated a fundamental principle of the Evidence Act. 7. The court has, in fact, used this evidence as substantive evidence and in doing this, it has violated a fundamental principle of the Evidence Act. 7. The learned magistrate says in his explanation that he used this evidence as corroborative evidence in accordance with the provisions of Section 157 of the Evidence Act. I entirely fail to appreciate what he means by this. The defence, obviously, did not put in this evidence in cross-examination for the purpose of corroborating the evidence-in-chief of the prosecution witnesses. Again, obviously the previous evidence could not be used for corroborating itself. The defence put it in as substantive evidence and as evidence contradicting the evidence given in chief. The law of evidence does not permit this. Section 145 of the Evidence Act lays down the method by which previous statements may be used for contradicting the present testimony of a witness. The attention of the witness must be drawn to the particular portions of the evidence which are to be used for contradicting him. This was not done. The previous statement in cross-examination cannot be used as substantive evidence as the Evidence Act does not permit this. 8. The learned magistrate seems to have forgotten that, in cross-examining a witness, the cross-examining lawyer not only tries to bring out contradictions in the evidence given in examination-in-chief, but he also tries to build up his case by establishing new facts. The learned magistrate in his own explanation, shows that he has misapprehended the law as also the object of cross-examination. He seems to think that the only value of evidence in cross-examination is corroboration or contradiction. He has evidently viewed the evidence put in from that standpoint. This is an element which has certainly prejudiced the accused 9. The learned magistrate should have followed the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are perfectly clear, instead of trying to invent a procedure of his own for the purpose of shortening proceedings. As I have said before, I recognise the fact that it was the pleader appearing for the accused who made the suggestion which has led to all this trouble. The magistrate, however, was there to see that proceedings were conducted according to law. He should not have accepted blindly suggestions made by the lawyers. As I have said before, I recognise the fact that it was the pleader appearing for the accused who made the suggestion which has led to all this trouble. The magistrate, however, was there to see that proceedings were conducted according to law. He should not have accepted blindly suggestions made by the lawyers. I trust that in future the learned magistrate will follow the Code of Criminal Procedure without trying to invent a novel method of trial unknown to the Code. 10. In the circumstances, I set aside the orders of conviction and sentences and direct that the accused be tried de novo by some other magistrate who may be appointed in this behalf by the District Magistrate. 11. The Rule is made absolute.