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1949 DIGILAW 44 (CAL)

Madhusudan Banerji v. Mathura Prasad Rajgharia

1949-01-20

body1949
JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This is an application in revision on behalf of the claimants in an apportionment case now pending before the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal. 2. Premises No. 1, Bahir Surah Road, had been compulsorily acquired in 1943. The Collector made a joint award in favour of the co-sharers, viz., the Petitioner now before us and one Surabala Debi as also the lessee Rajgharia. As Surabala had a limited interest and there was also a question of apportionment as between the lessors and the lessee the entire amount was remitted to the Tribunal by the Collector u/s 31 of the Land Acquisition. Act. After the amount had been so transferred, an application was filed before the Tribunal, on behalf of the lessee Rajgharia, for investment of the amount, as there might be delay in the disposal of the apportionment case. No objection appears to have been raised to the investment as proposed and the President of the Tribunal passed the following B order on September 27, 1943: This is an application by Mathura Prasad Rajgharia for investment of the compensation money in G.P. notes for reasons stated in the petition. Notice of the application was served upon the other party and there is no opposition. I direct that the amount be invested in the second Defence Loan at the risk and cost of the Applicant. 3. The amount was thereafter invested and remained so until the opposite party Rajgharia made another application for the sale of the Government Securities, on the ground that there was chance of fall in the market price of the securities. The order was, accordingly, made and the sale effected. The securities were actually sold at a premium. As a result of this transaction, Rs. 39, 678-8 was credited to the account in addition to the amount originally invested, being the accumulated interest and the premium at which the sale had been effected. 4. During the period the amount had remained invested in Government Securities, Surabala's interest was purchased by the opposite party Rajgharia. The latter, thereafter, put forward his claim to a share of the compensation money in his capacity as a co-sharer owner in addition to that of a lessee originally made. Litigation has commenced in the Alipore court questioning the legality and' the effect of the sale by Surabala in favour of Rajgharia. The latter, thereafter, put forward his claim to a share of the compensation money in his capacity as a co-sharer owner in addition to that of a lessee originally made. Litigation has commenced in the Alipore court questioning the legality and' the effect of the sale by Surabala in favour of Rajgharia. It appears that, after the securities had been sold, out of the excess receipt of the sale-proceeds, Rs. 14,000 had been paid to Rajgharia, being the owner of half the share at least during the life-time of Surabala. Subsequently, Rajgharia made another application for the payment of the balance of the excess amount which was lying in deposit. This was contested by the other co-sharer, the present Petitioner Madhusudan Banerji. The learned President, by his order dated September 2, 1948, held that, as the investment had been made at the risk of Rajgharia, the latter was entitled to the entire amount which had been received by way of profits of the investment as also the interest which had accrued due. It is against this order that the other claimant Madhusudan Banerji moved this Court and obtained this Rule. 5. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the investment, which had been made in the present case, was u/s 33 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 33 provides that when any money has been deposited in court in any case other than the one covered by Section 32 of the Act, the said amount may, on the application of any party interested or claiming an interest in such money, be invested in such Government or other approved securities as the said court may think proper. 6. It is further provided in the said section that the Court may-- direct the interest or other proceeds of any such investment to be accumulated and paid in such manner as it may consider will give the parties interested therein the same benefit therefrom as they might have had from the land in respect whereof such monoy shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be. 7. It is clear that the investment in the present case was not u/s 32 of the Act, although one of the parties, viz., Surabala, was the holder of a limited interest. The other claimants, viz., Madhusudan Banerji and Mathura Prasad Rajgharia were sui juris. 7. It is clear that the investment in the present case was not u/s 32 of the Act, although one of the parties, viz., Surabala, was the holder of a limited interest. The other claimants, viz., Madhusudan Banerji and Mathura Prasad Rajgharia were sui juris. As in the present case Section 32 cannot be attracted, the court was not bound to invest the amount u/s 32 of the Act. It may be argued that, in every case which is not covered by Section 32 of the Act, the provisions of Section 33 will be attracted. In this particular case, there was a dispute as to the apportionment of the compensation money awarded and the Collector had to make a reference u/s 30 of this Act. The amount remitted u/s 31(2) of the Act is to remain with the Tribunal pending a decision as to apportionment or inherent investment. Even when Section 33 is not attracted in terms to the facts of any particular case, the court has authority under the inherent powers to direct investment of the money lying in deposit pending the disposal of the apportionment case. When an investment is directed to be made, whether u/s 33 or the inherent powers of the court, it must be made by the court and under the orders of the court. Such an investment ought not to, and cannot be, made at the sweet will by one of the parties and the court cannot shirk its responsibility in the matter by passing an, order for investment at the risk of one of the parties. The court has to exercise a judicial discretion while directing or refusing to direct any investment to be made, and also as to in what form. The investment so directed may either result in profit or ultimate loss; the person at whose instance the court passes an order for investment may or may not ultimately be found to be entitled to any portion of the compensation money. If an Applicant, who moves the court to invest the amount, is ultimately found, after the hearing of the compensation case, as not being entitled to any portion of the compensation money, it will be most inequitable and unjust to allow such a person to take the benefit of the investment made including the premium, if any, and the interest which accumulates. A person, who is not entitled to the corpus, to be paid the interest accumulating and the premium earned, is manifestly unjust and improper. If on the other hand a party at whose instance the investment is directed to be made is found not to be entitled to any portion of the compensation money and there is ultimately a heavy loss on the investment as a result of depreciation of the market-value of securities, there is no procedure provided in the Land Acquisition Act for the realisation of the amount of the loss from that party. I do not think I need multiply instances to illustrate the illegality and the inequitable nature of an order making an investment at the risk of one of the parties. 8. The ground which had weighed with the learned President in allowing the entire additional amount to Rajgharia is that, if a person is made liable for the loss, he must be allowed the profits which may accrue. As indicated already, such a, person cannot be held to be either entitled to the profits or liable for the loss, if any. The order which had, therefore, been passed previously while making the investment as on the risk of Rajgharia was a misconceived order and could not have the legal effect of entitling Rajgharia alone to the entire accretions. The court had no jurisdiction to divest itself of its responsibility of deciding for itself whether a particular investment is to be made or not. Even though the court had at that time directed that the investment be made at the risk of one of the parties, that did not affect the legal right of any one of the parties ultimately found entitled to a share of the compensation money. 9. The question next arises how the amount, which had been received by way of interest and premium, is to be apportioned amongst the claimants. If the investment is made by the court under the discretion vested in it as u/s 33 of the Land Acquisition Act, the amount, which is received either by way-of interest or other proceeds of such investment, must, in terms of the concluding portion of that section, be divided amongst the parties interested in the compensation money, in the same proportion as they would be interested in the compensation money or as near thereto as may be. Even if it be held that the investment had been made, not strictly u/s 33 of the Act but under the inherent powers of the court, the same principle for the apportionment of the proceeds of the investment should be followed. Any procedure different from the one mentioned above, if followed will lead to anomalies and may also be unjust and improper. In no view of the case can the proceeds of the investment be allowed to be paid to a person who may ultimately be found not entitled to any share of the compensation money. Under no equitable principle should the proceeds of the investment be allowed to be apportioned except in the same manner as if it were a portion of the compensation money itself. 10. The order passed in the present case by the learned President of the Tribunal directing the balance of the proceeds of the investment now lying in court to be paid to the opposite party Rajgharia alone must be set aside. The record will now go back to the Tribunal for a decision in terms of the principles enunciated ! above. The amount in question is to be apportioned as provided in the concluding portion of Section 33 of the Land Acquisition Act. 11. It will be for the Tribunal to decide as to whether the amount !e can be or is to be directed to be paid to the parties at this stage or after the apportionment case is disposed of. It is in the interest of the parties concerned that the apportionment case which has been pending for a long time should be brought to trial and disposed of as early as possible. 12. The Rule is, accordingly, made absolute. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court.