JUDGMENT : K.T. Koshi, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the District Judge of Trichur dated 3rd Kumbhom 1124, dismissing Original Suit No. 17 of 1121. On 23.2.1115 the defendant, a subject of the then State of Cochin, executed in favour of the plaintiff, a subject of the then State of Travancore, a promissory note for the sum of Rs. 3138-8-0 at Kottayam (Travancore). On foot of the said promissory note the plaintiff instituted a suit in O.S. No. 102 of 1115 before the District Court at Kottayam, on 18.6.1118. After due issue of summons, the defendant remaining ex-parte, that court passed a decree in terms of the plaint on 30.11.1115. Along with the institution of the suit the plaintiff attempted to attach before judgment 200 shares the defendant held in a limited Company known as the Tropical Plantations Limited which had its Head Office at Kottayam. The attempt was unsuccessful. The defendant manoeuvered to transfer the shares before the order of attachment could reach him or the Company. Evidently the plaintiff instituted the suit in the District Court at Kottayam thinking that he could realise his amounts by proceeding against the defendant's shares in the said limited Company. But foiled in that attempt he instituted the present suit before the Trichur District Court, within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. But this was done only on 20.2.1121 close within six years of the execution of the promissory note, but well within six years of the passing of the judgment by the Kottayam District Court. The suit is based on the judgment of the Kottayam District Court which for present purposes has to be treated as a foreign court and alternatively on the primary cause of action viz., the promissory note. 2. The defendant contended inter alia that the judgment of the Kottayam District Court was a nullity in that Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree against a non-resident foreigner who has neither appeared in the suit nor otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of that Court and that the suit on the original cause of action was barred by time as the law applicable was the law of the place where action was brought which admits of only a three years' period to bring a suit on a promissory note. Both these contentions found favour with the learned Judge in the Court below and he accordingly dismissed the suit. The plaintiff had brought this appeal against the learned Judge's judgment and decree. 3. The first question is whether the learned Judge's view that the judgment of the Kottayam District Court cannot be enforced in Cochin either by a suit or by processes in execution is correct. Admittedly the defendant was a subject of the Cochin State. He had no residence at Kottayam nor was he even temporarily present there while the action was brought. He had no place of business there either. He did not enter appearance in the case nor had he contracted to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Kottayam Court. The plaintiff, however, attempted to show that the judgment sued upon was valid and binding upon the defendant. The facts relied upon in that behalf were that the defendant was not only a share-holder of the Tropical Plantations Limited, but one of its Promoters, and a Director thereof that his Directorship continued even after the suit was filed and that in connection with that Office he had of necessity to go over to and either stay at Kottayam occasionally. The defendant was once having a partnership business with the plaintiff at Kottayam, but the execution of the promissory note in question marked the termination of that business. As the promissory note was executed at Kottayam the cause of action for a suit on the same arose there and the District Court there had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass a decree which was good for domestic or internal purposes. It is however difficult to appreciate how an occasional visit to that place by the defendant or a stay there by him for one or two days at a time, can confer jurisdiction on that Court to pass a decree against him which would be good for extra-territorial or international purpose. The argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant was that by virtue of the defendant's Directorship of the Tropical Plantations Limited which necessarily took him to Kottayam occasionally, he must be regarded as constructively resident there and also as having impliedly bound himself to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court under whose protection the Company was functioning. The argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant was that by virtue of the defendant's Directorship of the Tropical Plantations Limited which necessarily took him to Kottayam occasionally, he must be regarded as constructively resident there and also as having impliedly bound himself to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court under whose protection the Company was functioning. That these are considerations which cannot invest the Kottayam District Court with jurisdiction to pass a binding decree against the defendant, a non-resident foreigner, we shall presently show by reference to decided cases, of which the facts are even stranger, but before we attempt to do that it is useful to recall the general principles recognised as investing a foreign court with jurisdiction in an international sense with respect to personal actions. 4. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume VI Edn. 2, paragraph 385, it is set out that in a personal action, a foreign Court has jurisdiction in an international sense if (i) the defendant is the subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has been obtained; or (ii) he, the defendant, is a resident in that foreign country when the action began; or (iii) the defendant was served with process while temporarily present in the foreign country; or (iv) the defendant in his character as plaintiff in the foreign action himself selected the forum where the judgment was given against him; or (v) where he the defendant had voluntarily appeared in that court and submitted to its jurisdiction; or (vi) where the defendant had contracted to submit himself to the foreign forum in which the judgment was obtained. To the same effect is R. 95 in Dicey's Conflict of Laws. See Fifth Edition pp. 398 to 399. 5. The leading case on the subject so far as the Indian Courts are concerned is the decision of the Privy Council in the well-known Faridkote case Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (21 I.A. 171). There His Lordship the Earl of Selborne pronouncing the judgment of the Board laid down certain propositions which are summarised in the headnote to the case as follows:- "No territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any foreign Court ought to recognise against absent foreigners who owe no allegiance or obedience to the Power which so legislates. There His Lordship the Earl of Selborne pronouncing the judgment of the Board laid down certain propositions which are summarised in the headnote to the case as follows:- "No territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any foreign Court ought to recognise against absent foreigners who owe no allegiance or obedience to the Power which so legislates. In all personal actions the Courts of the Country in which the defendant resides, not the Courts of the country where the cause of action arose, should be resorted to. Where a Faridkote Court passed ex-parte money decrees against the defendant, who had been treasurer of Faridkote, but at the date of suit had ceased to be such, and was resident in Jhind, of which State he was a domiciled subject:- HELD:- that such decrees were a nullity by international law." 6. The rule of this decision has been recognised and given effect to both in Cochin and Travancore. It was settled law in both the States that their Courts will not recognise the judgment of the Courts of a foreign Country passed in action in personam against their subjects not resident in that country at the date of the action who have neither appeared in the suit nor submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign Court. See Lekshmichand Manik Chand v. Haji Easa Haji Moosa (4) Select Decisions 41 (F.B.); Ashtamoorthi Namburi v. Narayanan Namburi (4 Select Decisions 377); Kesava Pai v. Joseph Mudaliar (6 Coch. L.R. 439); M. Iyyaku v. A. Iyyaku (12 Coch. L.R. 14); Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd. Mariyan (19 Coch. L.R. 494); Swaminatha Ayyar v. Rama Sastrigal (20 Coch. L.R. 275); Joseph v. Namicha Eliyavoo (39 Coch. L.R. 91); Kadirbhoy v. Cheriyan (33 T.L.R. 166 (F.B.): Alabi v. Ampoo Aji (10 T.L.J. 85); and Sivarama Disshithar v. Ittisseri Antharjanam (10 T.L.J. 387 (F.B.). 7. The Madras High Court had even earlier than the Faridkote Case refused enforcement by suit of a decree passed by a Court in Pudukotta State against a British Indian Subject, neither domiciled, resident, nor possessing property in the State, who casually resorted thither and there drew a bill for a sum found due to his creditor resident in that State. The Madras High Court had even earlier than the Faridkote Case refused enforcement by suit of a decree passed by a Court in Pudukotta State against a British Indian Subject, neither domiciled, resident, nor possessing property in the State, who casually resorted thither and there drew a bill for a sum found due to his creditor resident in that State. Holloway, J.(Morgan, C.J. concurring) held that the mere making of a contract within the jurisdiction of a foreign Court does not necessarily render the Court competent to adjudicate upon all obligatory relations which flow directly or indirectly from it. See Mathappa Chetti v. Chellappa Chetti (I.L.R. 1 Mad. 196.) Among other Indian decisions which may usefully be referred to as laying down the same rule may be mentioned, Shaik Atham Sahib v. Dayud Sahib (I.L.R. 32 Mad. 469); Chormal Balchand Firm v. Kasturi Chand (A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 511) and Mallappa v. Raghavan (A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 173). 8. To come back to the case on hand, before the judgment of the Kottayam District Court can be regarded as having extra-territorial validity at least one of the conditions referred to above must be satisfied. Of these conditions, obviously conditions, 1, 3, 4, and 5 have no application to the present case. The attempt of the appellant's learned Advocate, however, was to show that conditions 2 and 6 are virtually satisfied here. On principle and authority we are unable to accept the argument that the defendant's occasional visit to Kottayam in connection with his Directorship of the Tropical Plantations Limited would invest that Court with jurisdiction to pass a decree that would be valid according to recognised principles or private international law. Had there been evidence in the case that the defendant was present at Kottayam at the commencement of the action so as to have the benefit and be under the protection, of the laws there, the position would no doubt have been different. There is no such evidence and all that the plaintiff states - which the defendant also does not deny - is that he, the defendant occasionally used to go to Kottayam in connection with some business or other and even stay there for a day or two. But such visits or even stay would not constitute the defendant a resident of that place. But such visits or even stay would not constitute the defendant a resident of that place. The lower court's view that the defendant was a non-resident foreigner so far as Travancore was concerned is therefore plainly right. Mr. Moothedan's argument that by taking shares in the Tropical Plantations Limited and becoming a Promoter or director of that Company the defendant must be deemed to have become a resident of the place where the Company had its Head Office and he must also be deemed to have impliedly bound himself to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court under whose protection the Company was functioning remains to be considered. A similar argument as to submission was raised in one of the Cochin cases referred to viz., Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd. v. Mariyan (19 Coch. L.R. 494). There Tata Oil Mills Company Limited obtained an ex-parte decree in the small Causes Court of Bombay against one of their share-holders for unpaid call money. The share-holder was a subject of Cochin State and a non-resident so far as Bombay was concerned. A suit was instituted to enforce the foreign judgment and the (then) Chief Court of Cochin held that judgment to be unenforceable. It was contended that by accepting shares in the Company the defendant must be taken to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Courts in Bombay where the Company was registered. It was held that it may be so in particular cases and for particular purposes but not in all cases and all for purposes. It was pointed out that in its corporate character the Company was subject to the jurisdiction of the place where it has been incorporated and its share-holder may be bound by all orders passed against it by those Courts in the exercise of such jurisdiction to the extent that they are or become personally liable for the Company's obligations either by statutes or by its Articles of Association. Except to that extent it was held, the Bombay Court had no jurisdiction over a share-holder who was a non-resident foreigner in the absence of any specific provision in the memorandum of Articles of Association of the Company providing for such suits. There the facts are stronger in that the suit related to a liability that arose with respect to the contract for taking shares of the Company that brought the action. There the facts are stronger in that the suit related to a liability that arose with respect to the contract for taking shares of the Company that brought the action. Here the plaintiff is an absolute stranger to the Company of which the defendant was a Director or a Promoter. The plaint claim has nothing to do with the Company or with any undertaking of the defendant with the Company. 9. Decided cases even go to the length of saying that a decree ex-parte passed by a Court where a non-resident foreigner was doing partnership business cannot be enforced against him through the Courts in his own country unless one or the other of the conditions referred to above is satisfied. It is with reference to such cases that mention was made earlier that even on stronger facts than we have in this case courts have held an ex-parte decree passed against a non-resident foreigner who did not appear in the case or submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign Court will not be recognised by Courts in his own country. The case of a Director of a limited Concern cannot certainly stand on a higher footing than the partner of a Firm. The first of the cases we would refer to in this connection is that reported in Nalla Karuppa Settiar v. Mhd. Iburam Saheeb (I.L.R. 20 Mad. 12). There the plaintiff having obtained against the defendant a judgment in the District Court of Kandy brought a suit on it in British India to enforce it. The defendant was domiciled and ordinarily resident in British India and he had not appeared to defend the suit at Kandy. He was not at the date of that suit even temporarily resident in Ceylon; but he was a partner in a firm which carried on business at Kandy and he was interested in lands at that place which he had visited once or twice. The same contentions as raised by the appellant here were raised there, but it was held that the Court at Kandy had no jurisdiction over the defendant. The same contentions as raised by the appellant here were raised there, but it was held that the Court at Kandy had no jurisdiction over the defendant. The discussion Collins, C.J. and Benson, J. made in that case, after referring to the well-known tests for a decree by a foreign Court to have extra-territorial validity, is really instructive and may usefully be quoted here in extenso: "If these tests are adopted in the present case, it will be seen that not one of them applies. It is, however, urged that the law as to the authority, to be ascribed to foreign judgments is in course of development by means of judicial legislation; and we are asked, on the apology of Becquet v. Maccarthy (2 B & Ad. 951), to hold that the defendant by carrying on business through his partners at Kandy should be regarded as constructively resident there, and as having impliedly bound himself to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court under the protection of which his business was being carried on. We do not think that the current of decided cases will justify us in going so far. In Bacquet v. Maccarthy (2 B & Ad. 951) the defendant still held, at the time of the suit, a public office in the colony in which he was sued, and the cause of action arose out of or was connected with it. His duties required him to be present in the colony, and, therefore, amenable to the jurisdiction of its Courts. It was on this ground that he was held to be constructively present in the colony, though, in fact, temporarily absent. This case was stated in Don v. Lippmann (2 Cl. & F. 1) to go to the verge of the law, "and the Privy Council in the recent case of Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (21 I.A. 171 (186)) were of the same opinion, and stated that, if the case could not have been distinguished by the said special features from the case of any absent foreigner who, at some previous time, might have served the Colonial Government they would have regarded the case as wrongly decided. In the present case there was obligation on the defendant to reside in Kandy, nor did he do so except for every short periods. In the present case there was obligation on the defendant to reside in Kandy, nor did he do so except for every short periods. The business was carried on by a resident partner who, by the fact of his residence, was liable to the colonial jurisdiction, but we are unable to find any ground for holding that the defendant was constructively resident, or at the time of the suit present within the jurisdiction of the Kandy court. Nor does the possession by the "defendant of some immovable property in Kandy give that Court jurisdiction over him in matters of contract like the present, for in Schibsu v. Westenholz I.L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (159) it was observed: "We doubt very much whether the possession of property locally situated in that country and protected by its laws, does afford such a ground. It should rather seem that, while every tribunal may very properly execute process against the property within its jurisdiction, the existence of such property, which may be very small, affords no sufficient ground for imposing on the foreign owner of that property a duty or obligation to fulfil the judgment". The general law laid down very clearly by the Privy Council in the case of Sirdar Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (21 I.A. 171 (186)) in these words: "All jurisdiction is properly territorial and extra-territorium jus dicenti, impune non paretur. Territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon all persons either permanently or temporarily resident within the territory while they are within it; but it does not follow them after they have withdrawn from it, and when they are living in another independent country. It exists always as to land within the territory, and it may be exercised over movables within the territory, and in question of status or succession governed by domicile, it may exist as to persons domiciled, or who when living were domiciled, within the territory. As between different provinces under one Sovereignty (e.g. under the Roman Empire) the legislation of the Sovereign may distribute and regulate jurisdiction; but no territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any foreigners, who owe no allegiance or obedience to the power which so legislates. As between different provinces under one Sovereignty (e.g. under the Roman Empire) the legislation of the Sovereign may distribute and regulate jurisdiction; but no territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any foreigners, who owe no allegiance or obedience to the power which so legislates. "In a personal action to which none of these causes of jurisdiction apply, a decree pronounced in absentem by a foreign Court to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not in any way submitted himself is by international law an absolute nullity. He is under no obligation of any kind to obey it; and it must be regarded as a mere nullity by the Courts of every nation, except (when authorised by special local legislation) in the country of the forum by which it was pronounced. These are doctrines laid down by all the leading authorities of international law, among others, by Story (Conflict of laws, 2nd edition Ss. 546, 549, 553, 554, 556, 586, and by Chancellor Kent (Commentaries, Vol. I.P. 284, note c 10th edition) and no exception is made to them in favour of the exercise of jurisdiction against a defendant not otherwise subject to it, by the Courts of the country in which the cause of action arose, or (in cases of contract) by the courts of the locus solutionis. In those cases, as well as all others, when the action is personal, the Courts of the country in which a defendant resides have power, and they ought to be resorted to, to do justice." "We do not think that there are any special circumstances in the present case to take it out of the general rule that the plaintiff must sue in the Court to which the defendant is subject at the time of the suit - a rule which is stated by Sirt Robert Phillimore (International Law Vol. 4, S. 891), and by the Privy Council in the case already quoted "to lie at the root of all international and of most domestic jurisprudence on this matter." That was the course which the plaintiff in this case ought to have followed, if he desired a remedy against the defendant personally." "On the ground that the Kandy Court had not jurisdiction over the defendant, the Lower appellate Court rightly dismissed the suit. We, therefore, confirm the decree of that court and dismiss this Second Appeal with costs." 10. We, therefore, confirm the decree of that court and dismiss this Second Appeal with costs." 10. This case is referred to and followed in a subsequent decision of the Madras High Court reported in Guruswami v. Mhd Khan (A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 112). In that case, the District Court of Bangalore (Mysore State) passed a decree against a firm of partners of whom defendant 3 was a subject of British India. The suit was based upon a promissory note, alleged to have been executed by the defendants and also upon a contract, which they were stated to have entered into. Though served with summons defendant 3 remained ex-parte and a decree was subsequently passed against him also. The plaintiff sought the execution of the decree through the Coimbatore District Court within whose jurisdiction defendant 3 was residing. Defendant 3's objection that the decree has no validity as against him was upheld by the executing Court. On appeal it was contended that on the facts of the case defendant 3 must be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Bangalore Court, and that the decree cannot be held invalid for international purposes. The facts relied on were that the defendants were a firm of partners carrying on business within the State of Mysore that the partnership was subsisting on the date of the action and that the suit related to certain dealings with that firm. Venaktasubba Rao, J., who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Division Bench consisting of himself and Beilly, J., stated as follows in disposing of this contention and affirming the lower court's decision in favour of defendant 3: "The question to decide is, can the inference be drawn from the facts alleged, that defendant 3 agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court? In Nallakaruppa Chettiar v. Mauhammed Iburam Saheeb (1897) 20 Mad. 112 a somewhat similar contention was raised. "The argument there was twofold: that the defendant, by carrying on business through his partners at Kandy, should first be regarded as constructively resident there; and secondly, as having impliedly bound himself to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court under the protection of which his business was being carried on. The second contention shows that the dealings to which the suit related were not with the defendant individually, but with the partnership of which he was a member. The second contention shows that the dealings to which the suit related were not with the defendant individually, but with the partnership of which he was a member. But a later case, to which I shall presently refer, puts it beyond doubt that this makes no difference. The contentions were overruled and it was held that the Court at Kandy had no jurisdiction over the defendant. The point now raised has been more fully considered by the Court of appeal in England in Emanuel v. Symon (1908) I.K.B. 302. There it was argued that by the fact of entering into a partnership in a foreign country, the defendant bound himself to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of that country in regard to matters arising in connection with that partnership. The Court negatived that argument and explained the case of Copin v. Adamson (1874) 9 Ext. 546 Lord Alverston, C.J. thus observed: "The judgment in that case went in favour of the plaintiff because the defendant had expressly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. And in the Court of appeal the judgment of Lord Cairns proceeded on that footing and he refrained from deciding the question whether the mere fact of becoming a share-holder in a French Company conferred jurisdiction upon the Courts of France." Kennedy, C.J., points out that the effect of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gurudayal Singh v. The Rajah of Faridkote (1894) 22 Cal. 222 is that the mere fact that a person enters into a contract in a foreign country, does not lead the inference that he agrees to be bound by the decisions of the Courts of that country. Having said so, he goes on to say that in this respect, there is no distinction between entering into an ordinary contract and contract of partnership. "It is contended: says Kennedy L.J., "that there may be some difference between a contract to be fulfilled for the immediate benefit of the promises, e.g., a contract for the sale of goods, and the contract contained in articles of partnership; but I can see no true line of distinction between the two cases." "In the opinion of Kennedy L.J., also Copin v. Adamson (1874) 9 Ext. 345 is not an authority for the proposition that a person, by the mere fact of becoming a shareholder in a foreign company, agrees to be bound by the decision of the foreign Court. These authorities very clearly show that the appellant's contention cannot prevail and this appeal must be dismissed with costs." Reilly, J., who concurred in this decision added as follows: 'I agree. In my opinion the matter is concluded by Gurudayal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (1894) 22 Cal. 222 and Nalla Karuppan Chettiar v. Muhammad Iburam Saheb (1897) 20 Mad. 112." 11. The next and the last case to be referred to in this connection is the decision in Emanuel v. Symon (1908) I.K.B. 302 referred to in the decision of Venkatsubba Rao, J. The head note to that case which correctly sets out the facts and the points decided reads thus: "Neither the fact of possessing property situate in a foreign country nor the fact of entering into a contract of partnership in that country to deal with that property is sufficient to give the Courts of the foreign country jurisdiction in an action in personam over a British subject not resident in the foreign country at the date of the action, who has neither appeared to the process nor expressly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. In 1895 the defendant, who was then residing and carrying on business in Western Australia, entered into a partnership for the working of a gold mine situate in the Colony and owned by the partnership. The defendant ceased to carry on business in Western Australia, and in 1899 he left the Colony permanently and came to live in England. In 1901 the plaintiffs, being partners other than the defendant, brought an action in the Supreme Court of Western Australia claiming a decree for dissolution of the partnership, sale of the mine, and the taking of the partnership accounts. The writ was served on the defendant in England but he entered no appearance, and took no step to defend the action. The Court decreed a dissolution of the partnership and the sale of the mine, and on taking the accounts found a sum to be due from the partnership. The writ was served on the defendant in England but he entered no appearance, and took no step to defend the action. The Court decreed a dissolution of the partnership and the sale of the mine, and on taking the accounts found a sum to be due from the partnership. The plaintiffs paid the sum, and brought an action in England to recover the share which they alleged to be due from the defendant: "Held, that the defendant, not being domiciled in Western Australia, nor resident there at the date of the action in the Supreme Court of that Colony, and not having appeared to the process or expressly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of that Court, was not bound by its finding or decree; and that the action in this country which was based on that finding and decree, could not be maintained." 12. In the face of these authorities it is idle to contend that by reason of the defendant's Directorship of the Tropical Plantations Limited or his occasional visits to Kottayam in that connection he must be regarded as constructively resident there or that he had impliedly bound himself to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts in that place with respect to all or any cause of action that might arise against him in that place. Even in respect of judgments obtained concerning liabilities arising out of partnership transactions the Courts held such judgments cannot be enforced against partners who were non-resident foreigners and who had not submitted to the foreign Court's jurisdiction. The decision in Biramji Limji v. Official Receiver (23 Cochin L.R. 522) relied on by the learned Advocate for the appellant in support of his contention is clearly distinguishable in that at the time of the foreign Court passed the decree the defendant in that case was actually doing business at the place where the foreign Court was situated. The appeal thus fails on the first point. 13. The second question raised is whether the six years' period of limitation for a suit on a promissory note obtaining in Travancore or the three years' rule obtaining in Cochin should govern the case. It was argued for the appellant that as the promissory note was made in Travancore the six years' rule must apply to the case and the lower Court's decision reversed. It was argued for the appellant that as the promissory note was made in Travancore the six years' rule must apply to the case and the lower Court's decision reversed. Reliance was placed for this position on S. 138 of the Cochin Negotiable Instruments Act corresponding to S. 134 of the Indian enactment. That section so far as it is relevant provides that in the absence of a contract to the contrary the liability of the maker of a foreign promissory note is regulated in all essential matters by the law of the place where he made the instrument. The contention was, the term 'essential matters' would include the period of limitation to enforce the obligation as well. The argument ignores not only the provision in S. 12 of the Cochin Limitation Act (corresponding to S. 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, IX of 1908) that suits instituted in Cochin on contracts entered into in a foreign country are subject to the rules prescribed by the Act, but also the well settled principle of private international law that the rules of procedure are determined by lex fori, that is the law of the place where the action is brought. The time within which an action should be brought on a promissory note is governed by that law. In U.N. Mitra's Limitation and Prescription Vol. I (6th Edn.) Page 38, it is seen stated: "In respect of actions ex contractu it may be observed that the limitation of the remedy is not a part of the contract, but relates to the breach of it, which it would be contrary to good faith to suppose the parties had in contemplation at the time of entering into it;" and as a foot-note to this Lord Brougham's statement of the law in Don v. Lippman (5 Clerke and Finnelly 1) is referred to and the following passage from Story's Conflict of Laws quoted: "The law of limitation of a particular country, even in the case of a contract made in such country, forms no part of the contract itself, but merely acts upon it ex post facto if a suit is instituted in respect of it. It cannot properly be deemed a right stipulated for or included in the contract. Story's Conflict of Laws, p.583". These extracts from well-recognised authorities effectively meet Mr. It cannot properly be deemed a right stipulated for or included in the contract. Story's Conflict of Laws, p.583". These extracts from well-recognised authorities effectively meet Mr. Moothedan's argument based on S. 138 of the Cochin Negotiable Instruments Act which argument we have already mentioned is in utter defiance of the rules of private international law. 14. What the Indian Legislature did in enacting S. 11 of the Limitation Act (1908) was merely to give legislative sanction to the principles laid down in English cases. The reason of the rule is given in Huber v. Steiner (1825) 2 Bing. N.C. 202; 2 Scott 327; 4 L.J.C.P., 383 as: "Courts of law being instituted by every nation for its own convenience, the nature of the remedies available therein and the time and modes of proceeding therein are regulated by that nation's own views, of what is just and proper and expedient and it is not obliged out of any comity to the countries to depart (in the matter of procedure) from its own opinions of what is just and proper and expedient." The above case (Huber v. Steiner) is cited with approval in Huckmaboya v. Lullobhoy Noottichund (3 Moore's Indian Appeals 294). There it was held that "where a Court entertains a cause of action which originated in a foreign country, the rule is to adjudicate according to the law of that country, yet the Court proceeds according to the prescription of the country in which it exercises jurisdiction". In the body of the judgment in that case we get, if we may so with respect very illuminating and instructive comments with reference to certain paragraphs in Story's Conflict of Laws, where from copious extracts are taken. What is relevant for here is contained on pages 267 and 268 of the report and reads thus: "In S. 576 of Story's Conflict of laws, the law is thus succinctly expressed: "In regard to Statutes of Limitation or prescription of suits, there is no doubt that they are strictly questions affecting the remedy, and not questions upon the merits. They go ad litis ordinationem and not ad litis decisionem, in a just juridical sense. The object of them is to fix certain periods, within which all suits shall be brought in the Courts of a State, whether they are brought by or against subjects, or by or against foreigners. They go ad litis ordinationem and not ad litis decisionem, in a just juridical sense. The object of them is to fix certain periods, within which all suits shall be brought in the Courts of a State, whether they are brought by or against subjects, or by or against foreigners. And there can be no just reason, and no sound policy in allowing higher or more extensive privileges to foreigners, than are allowed to subjects. Laws, thus limiting suits, are founded in the noblest policy." Then follow many important observations, showing the wisdom and justice of the law of prescription, but which will not aid in the investigation of the question under consideration. In S. 577, Mr. Justice Story proceeds, "It has accordingly become a formulary in international jurisprudence, that all suits must be brought within the period prescribed by the local law of the country where the suit is brought, (lex fori) otherwise the suits will be barred; and this rule was fully recognised in foreign jurisprudence as it is in the Common Law. Not indeed, that there are no diversities of opinion upon this subject; but the doctrine is established by a decisive current of well considered authorities". The author then quotes numerous foreign writers on jurisprudence, in confirmation of the law as stated in the text. The author also refers to several cases, in which the Courts of law of this country have acted in confirmity with the principles there stated. A summary of those cases will be found in the note to the case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1 Smith's Leading Cases, 367), and the case Huber v. Steiner there mentioned, and reported in 2 Bing, N.C. 202, is a leading authority upon the subject. "There are two cases which mark distinctly the application of the law as stated in Story. The case of the British Linen Company v. Drummond, which was a suit in England, upon a contract made in Scotland, where the prescription is forty years. The plaintiffs sued in England where the defendant pleaded the Statute, 21 James 1., e. 16, which was held to be "a good plea. Huber v. Steiner was a suit in England, upon a promissory note made in France, where the prescription is shorter than in England. The suit was commenced in England after the expiration of the French prescription, but within six years. Huber v. Steiner was a suit in England, upon a promissory note made in France, where the prescription is shorter than in England. The suit was commenced in England after the expiration of the French prescription, but within six years. The defendant pleaded the French prescription, but which was held to be a bad plea. "It appears to the Committee, after much consideration, that the plea is an admissible and valid plea in this suit, and that the allowance of it is alike consistent with the 29th section of the Charter as with the 37th Section, the terms of which section have been already stated." 15. In an earlier Privy Council case reported in Lopez v. Burslem and others (4 Moore's Privy Council Cases 300) the question arose whether S. 29 of the Slave Abolition Act which enacted a period of 12 months to prefer an appeal against a decree or sentence passed there under applied to Brazilian subjects. In holding that it did apply Lord Campbell, who pronounced the judgment of the Board observes:- "The British Parliament certainly has no general power to legislate for foreigners out of the dominions and beyond the jurisdiction of the British Crown, but it cannot be doubted for a moment that a British Statute may fix a time within which application must be made for redress to the tribunals of the empire. This is a matter of procedure and becomes the law of the forum. On matters of procedure, all mankind, whether aliens or liege subjects, plaintiffs or defendants, appellants or respondents, are bound by the law of the forum." 16. No decision of the Cochin Travancore High Court dealing with the question was brought to our notice. However, in Cochin it arose more than once whether the foreign law of limitation or the Cochin law would apply when foreign decrees are sought to be executed in Cochin. The decision given has always been to the effect that the law of limitation applicable to such cases is the law of the Court executing the decree i.e., Cochin Law. This accords with the view of the High Courts in India based on general principles as S. 11 has application only to suits. The decision given has always been to the effect that the law of limitation applicable to such cases is the law of the Court executing the decree i.e., Cochin Law. This accords with the view of the High Courts in India based on general principles as S. 11 has application only to suits. The case in Ramayan v. Suppu Pillai (2 Select Decisions 19) refers to a case where a decree of the Tinnavelly (British India) Court was sought to be executed in Cochin and that in Meethian v. Athruman (3 Select Decisions 85) related to the execution of the decree of the Parur (Travancore) Court. There is therefore no merit in the second point either. The appeal fails and it will stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.