The Chief Justice.-The plaintiff in O. S. No. 21 of 1945 on the file of the Court of the District Judge of West Godavari at Ellore files this appeal against the dismissal of his suit brought to recover a sum of Rs. 5,373-15-0 as damages for breach of contract to sell certain quantities of groundnut oil cake. On 19th November, 1943, the plaintiff entered into three contracts with the defendant for the purchase of groundnut oilcake of various quantities (Exs. P-1 P-2 and P-3). Under Ex. P-1, the quantity was 340 bags of 164 lbs. and the price was Rs. 22-8-0 per putti of 500 lbs. exclusive of gunny bag. The place of delivery was Ellore boat or platform. The time of delivery was before the end of May 1944. Under Ex. P-2, a similar qua’ntity at similar price was agreed to be sold and to be delivered at the same place, but the time for delivery was before the end of April 1944. Under Ex. P-3 the price and the place of delivery were the same as in Ex. P-1 and Ex. P-2 and the quantity 2040 bags in all, i.e., 150 tons of which 50 tons were to be delivered in April 1944, 50 tons in May 1944 and 50 tons by June 1944. Long before the due date of performance, on 8th January, 1944, the Central Government promulgated the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1944. Under the provisions of that Order, all forward contracts in respect of the articles specified in the schedule to the Order were prohibited after the specified date which was 12th January, 1944. Clause 4 of the Order provided that notwithstanding any custom, usage or practice of the trade or the terms of any contract, every forward contract in any article to which the Order applied outstanding at the close of business on the specified date shall be deemed to be closed out at such rate as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette fix in this behalf. The clause also provided that the difference arising out of any contract so closed out shall be payable on the basis of the rate fixed as aforesaid, and the seller was not bound to give and the buyer not bound to take delivery. The clause also provided that the difference arising out of any contract so closed out shall be payable on the basis of the rate fixed as aforesaid, and the seller was not bound to give and the buyer not bound to take delivery. By a subsequent notification on the 13th January the rate referred to in clause 4 was declared to be “the market rate applicable to such class of business on that date,” i.e., on 12th January. On the same day that the order was promulgated, there was a notification excluding from the provisions of the Order: “Forward contracts for specific qualities or types of any article to which the said order applies, and for specific delivery at a specified price, delivery orders, railway receipts or bills of lading against which contracts are not transferable to third parties.” On the 10th April, 1944, the plaintiff issued through his vakil a notice, Ex. D-1, to the defendant stating that by reason of the aforesaid Order, the delivery in respect of the contracts which he had entered into with the defendant had been cancelled and calling upon him to pay the difference in price between the contract rate and the rate prevailing on 12th January, 1944, which according to him was Rs. 27-8-0 per putti of 500 lbs. The defendant never replied to this notice. On 20th March, 1945, the suit was filed for recovery of damages on the basis set out in the notice with interest from 12th January, 1944, the specified date under the Order. The main plea on behalf of the defendant was that the suit contracts were exempt from the application of the Order as they fell within the scope of the notification under clause 5 of the Order, and therefore as the plaintiff himself had committed breach of the contracts by terminating them before the date of performance, he was not entitled to any damages. The learned District Judge upheld this plea and dismissed the suit. He also gave his finding that if it were that the plaintiff was entitled to damages he would fix the market rate on 12th January, 1944, at Rs. 24 per putti. The main question in the appeal is whether the suit contracts fall within the class of contracts set out in the notification under clause 5 of the Vegetable Oil and Oilcakes (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1944. 24 per putti. The main question in the appeal is whether the suit contracts fall within the class of contracts set out in the notification under clause 5 of the Vegetable Oil and Oilcakes (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1944. It is common ground that these contracts are forward contracts for specific quality of an article to which the order applied and for specific delivery at a specified price. The controversy is mainly confined to the construction of the last part of the notification, namely, delivery orders, railway receipts or bills of lading against which contracts are not transferable to third parties. The learned District Judge held that as neither delivery orders nor railway receipts nor bills of lading were contemplated in this case, because the contracts did not contain any stipulation as regards such documents, the suit contracts must be deemed to fall within the scope of the exclu sion under the notification. Mr.P.Somasundaram, the learned advocate for the plaintiff-appellant, contended that this construction of the notification was erro neous and that unless it was established that in respect of these contracts, delivery orders, railway receipts or bills of lading were not transferable, the benefit of the notification would not be available. On the other hand, Mr. M.S.Ramachandra Rao for the defendant contended that this condition must be fulfilled only if delivery orders, railway receipts or bills of lading are contemplated or provided for in the contract. We must confess that the language of the notification is not as clear as it could have been and it is possible to take two views on the construction of this last clause. A similar clause came up for interpretation before a Division Bench of this Court in A. S. No. 97 of 1948. The learned Judges (Horwill and Raghava Rao, JJ.) held that before the exclusion from the general prohibition contained in the Order could be made, four conditions should be fulfilled, namely, (1) the contract must relate to an article to which the order applied, (2) it must be of a specific quality or type, (3) it must be for specific delivery at a specified price, (4) delivery orders, railway receipts or bills of lading against such a contract must not be transferable to third parties. They accepted a contention that the last clause had a reference to the contracts themselves and held that the condition related to delivery orders, railway receipts or bills of lading. In a decision of the Bombay High Court in Firm Hansraj v. Vasanji1, the point was discussed at some length by Desai, J. In that case the principal contract was for what is known as spot delivery; that is to say, where no delivery order or railway receipt or bill of lading would be ordinarily issued. The learned Judge held that the contract would not fall within the Exemption Notification, because the last condition was not fulfilled, namely, there were no delivery orders or railway receipts or bills of lading in respect of these contracts which were not transferable to third parties. The ratio decidendi of his judgment is to be found in the following passage: “The only classes of cases of forward contracts which were exempted were those which contained in them the guarantee against speculation by reason of a provision that the Delivery Orders, Railway Receipts, or Bills of Lading (which were contemplated by the contracts and would be issued) should not be transferable to third parties.......” The learned Judge’s conclusion was as follows: “In my opinion, if Delivery Orders were contemplated under these contracts, they were illegal as the Delivery Orders were not made non-transferable. If Delivery Orders, Railway Receipts or Bills of Lading were not contemplated under the contracts, then the exemption (which deals with cases where Delivery Orders, Railway Receipts or Bills of Lading are issued) has no application.” With respect to the learned Judge we agree with this construction of the notification. The intention underlying the notification appears to be to grant the exemption only to cases of forward contracts in respect of which there could be some guarantee that they would not be subject to speculation. In our opinion, before any forward contract could fall within the notification, it must also be established that one of the terms of the contract is that a delivery order or railway receipt or bill of lading relating to it is not transferable. In this case, it may be that none of these documents was contemplated, but it cannot be said that they were prohibited. In this case, it may be that none of these documents was contemplated, but it cannot be said that they were prohibited. There was nothing to prevent the buyers sending the delivery order in respect of the goods covered by the contract and in that case there is no provision in the contract to make such a delivery order non-transferable. The result would be that the very mischief sought to be prevented by the Order and the notification would occur. We therefore differ from the finding of the learned Judge that the suit contracts fell within the notification under clause 5 of the Order. The plaintiff then will be certainly entitled to the difference between the contract rate and the rate to be fixed in accordance with the notification of the Government of 13th January, 1944, above mentioned. Now that notification mentions “at the market rate applicable to such class of business on that date.” The learned Judge on the evidence on record held that the market rate on the 12th January, 1944, was Rs. 24 per putti or Rs. 8 a bag. Mr. Somasundaram for the appellant wanted the case to be sent back to the trial Court for fresh disposal of the issue relating to the market rate, because according to him this matter did not receive the attention it ought to have received. We do not agree with him that the parties considered the matter of the rate as of minor importance. Practically the entire oral evidence is concerned only with the market rate. Apart from oral evidence, documentary evidence was also adduced by both the plaintiff and the defendant. In the lower Court an application for the admission of additional evidence was made after the trial was practically over. The evidence was as regards the market rate for groundnut oilcake in January 1944. The learned Judge refused to grant the application, evidently because the application was made at a very late stage of the trial. In this Court, the appellant has filed an application (C.M.P. No. 1228 of 1948) for the admission of the entry sought to be relied on as additional evidence. We do not think that there is sufficient ground for permitting the appellant to adduce additional evidence now. In this Court, the appellant has filed an application (C.M.P. No. 1228 of 1948) for the admission of the entry sought to be relied on as additional evidence. We do not think that there is sufficient ground for permitting the appellant to adduce additional evidence now. If such evidence is allowed to be adduced, certainly opportunity must again be given to the other side to adduce such other evidence as he may choose to let in. This will mean practically retrying the issue and such a course is certainly not warranted. Hence C.M.P. No. 1228 of 1948 is dismissed. Mr. M.S. Ramachandra Rao for the defendant drew our attention to the decision of Govinda Menon, J., in S. A. No. 1204 of 1948 in which it was held that the rate contemplated by the notification of the 13th January was the rate to be computed at the market price in the case of a forward contract entered into about 90 days earlier in which the delivery became due either on 12th January, 1944, or on the date between 8th January, 1944, and 12th January, 1944. With great respect to the learned Judge, we think there is nothing in that notification to justify the computation of the rate in that manner. The learned Judge was evidently influenced by the use of the words “class of business” in the notification. But in our opinion, the class of business refers to forward contracts. It refers to the class of goods in which the business is carried on. Otherwise, it would mean that the Government after having decided to prohibit all forward trading, at the same time wanted to take into account the main ingredient of such trading, namely, fixing of a price in advance for future delivery. On the other hand, there; is another decision of Balakrishna Aiyar, J., in C.R.P. Nos. 1058 and 1059 of 1948 with which we are in agreement. The learned Judge held that the market rate must mean the rate at which the article could be purchased in the market and taken ready delivery of. We agree with the following remarks of the learned Judge: “By the notification issued, the Government of India made forward contracts illegal. In other words, the result was that in the eye of the law the market for forward contracts ceased to exist. We agree with the following remarks of the learned Judge: “By the notification issued, the Government of India made forward contracts illegal. In other words, the result was that in the eye of the law the market for forward contracts ceased to exist. The Government of India would have been stultifying themselves if they had in the same breath stated that these contracts were to be liquidated with reference to prices prevailing in a supposititious market which in law could not exist and which they themselves had absolutely forbidden.” The question then is whether the finding of the lower Court that the market rate on 12th January, 1944, was Rs. 24 a candy or Rs. 8 a bag should not be accepted. We see no reason not to accept it. As the quantity covered by the three contracts is large and as there is likely to be a difference in price between wholesale and retail, the best material for fixing the price appears to be the sale of no bags of oilcake on nth January, 1944, at Rs. 24 a candy. On this basis the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for Rs.1,360 as damages. The learned advocate for the appellant claims interest on the amount of damages,This he will be entitled to only from the date of the plaint. Otherwise, there cannot be an award of interest on damages ascertained for the first time now. The amount of damages will carry interest at six per cent, per annum from the date of the institution of the suit. The appeal is allowed in part and the parties will pay and receive proportionate costs in this Court and in the lower Court the plaintiff will get his costs on the amount decreed. V.P.S. ------ Appeal allowed in part.