Judgment Agarwala, J. 1. This is an appeal by defendants first party from the decision of a single Judge of this Court in a suit in which the plaintiffs-respondent claimed a right to pre-empt land which the defendants-second party sold to the appellants, the plaintiffs being co-sharers in that land with the vendors, the defendants-second party. The facts are that the plaintiffs performed the first ceremony necessary to enable them to exercise the right of pre-emption, namely, the talab-i-mawasibat, as soon as they heard of the sale to the appellants, in the presence of Bhagwat Lal, whom they examined as witness no. 2, and another man, whom they examined as witness No. 3. Then, in the company of these two witnesses, the plaintiffs went to the land which was the subject matter of the sale, and it is claimed that they also performed the second ceremony necessary for exercising the right of pre-emption, namely, talab-i-ishad. Thereafter, they offered the appellants the amount for which the land had been sold to them, but the appellants did not accept it. The first Court decreed the suit. The appellate Court, however, held that there was a defect in the performance of the talab-i-ishad inasmuch as no reference was made during the performance of that ceremony to the performance of the first ceremony, namely, talab-i-mawasibat. The appellate Court, therefore, reversed the decision of the Munsif and dismissed the suit. In second appeal to this Court the decision of the Munsif has been restored. 2. The question that falls for determination is whether it is necessary to refer, during the ceremony of talab-i-ishad, to the performance of the ceremony of talab-i-mawasibat, when the witnesses who were present during the performance of the second ceremony were also witnesses to the performance of the first ceremony. There are cases directly on the point which is in issue between the parties before us, in which it has been held that a strict compliance with the requirements of the Muhammadan law is necessary in order to enable the plaintiff successfully to claim the right of pre-emption, and one of those requirements is that during the performance of the second ceremony reference must be made, in the presence of witnesses, to the performance of the first ceremony. The reason for this has been succinctly stated by Jackson J. in Hosseinee Khanum V/s. Mt. Lallun, (1864) W. R. (Gap. The reason for this has been succinctly stated by Jackson J. in Hosseinee Khanum V/s. Mt. Lallun, (1864) W. R. (Gap. No.) 117 at p. 118 : "When a plaintiff sues on the ground of a right such as that of pre-emption, vexatious even when most fairly exercised, and always restrictive of the rights of property, we think the Court should be fully satisfied that he has really and exactly performed the conditions essential to the maintenance of that right. We must look upon these preliminaries, not as mere matter of form, but as the immediate expressions of (perhaps) a pre-existent desire to become owner of the particular property, arising out of those circumstances of necessity or convenience which the Mahomedan law recognises as giving birth to the right. It is not, therefore, as it seems to us, merely for forms sake, but as intimately connected with the question of light, that we require proof of the tulub-i-mowasibut and of the istishad." Similarly, in Jadu Lal Sahu V/s. Jariki Koer, 39 I. A. 101 at p. 107 : (39 Cal. 915 P. C.) their Lordships of the Privy Council cited with approval the observations of Sir Barnea Peacock, C. J. in Fakir Rawot V/s. Sheikh Emambaksh, Beng. L. R. sup. vol 35 F. B. " .... 915 P. C.) their Lordships of the Privy Council cited with approval the observations of Sir Barnea Peacock, C. J. in Fakir Rawot V/s. Sheikh Emambaksh, Beng. L. R. sup. vol 35 F. B. " .... a right or custom of pre-emption is recognized as prevailing among Hindus in Behar, and some other provinces of Western India; that in districts where its existence has not been judicially noticed, the custom will be matter to be proved ; that such custom when it exists, must be presumed to be founded on and co-extensive with the Mahomedan law upon that subject, unless the contrary be shown; that the Court may, as between Hindus, administers modification of that law as to the circumstances under which the right may be claimed, when it is shown that the custom in that respect does not go the whole length of the Mahomedan law of pre-emption, but that the assertion of the right by suit must always be preceded by an observance of the preliminary forms prescribed in the Mahomedan law, which forms appear to have been invariably observed and insisted on through the whole of the cases from the earliest times of which we have record." In the face of these observations, it is difficult to find any justification for the arguments that have been advanced before us that one of the preliminary requirements of the Muhammadan law of pre-emption is not necessary in cases where the witnesses to the ceremony of talab-i-ishad are the persons who were witnesses to the ceremony of mawasibat also. Exactly the contrary to this proposition was held in Mubarak Husain V/s. Kaniz Bano, 27 ALL, 160: (1 A. L. J. 569) the bead-note of which is : "When, in asserting a claim for pre-emption under the Muhammadan law, the making of the talab-i-istishhad, is required, it is absolutely necessary that at the time of making this demand reference should be made to the fact of the talab-i-mawasibat having been previously made, and this necessity is not removed by the fact that the witnesses to both demands are the same." On behalf of the appellants, however, the learned counsel refers to an observation made in the course of the judgment: "We can well understand why the law in this respect should be so strict. The second demand is not made for the information of the witnesses, but for the information of the vendee or vendor, to whom it happens to be* made. If the witnesses to both the immediate and the second demands be the same, it naturally does seem unnecessary to repeat the same thing to them; but then at the second demand not only may the same witnesses be present, but also a third party, namely, the vendee or vendor must be present, and it is for his information that at the second demand reference is required to be made to the fact that the first and immediate demand has been made." On the strength of this observation, it is contended that when neither the vendor nor the vendee is present and the witnesses at the second ceremony are the same persona who witnessed the first ceremony, it is unnecessary to refer to the performance of the talab-i-mawasibat. That does not seem to me to be the intention of the learned Judge who made that observation. In fact the Allahabad High Court, in a later decision, has again affirmed the necessity of a reference to the making of the first demand before the performance of the second ceremony even when the witnesses are the same : Sadiq Ali V/s. Abdul Baqui Khan, A. I. R. (10) 1923 ALL. 251: (45 ALL. 290). The same view was taken by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Rujjub Ali V/s. Chundi Churn Bhadra, 17 Cal. 543 (F. B.) where reference was made to Baillies Digest of Mahomedan law, Hamiltons Hedaya and Macnaghtens Precedents. This case is important because what led to a reference being made to the Pull Bench was that, when the case came before the Division Bench consisting of Petheram C. J. and Gordon J., they held that in a previous decision of, the Court in Nundo Pershad Thakur V/s. Gopal Thakur, 10 Cal. This case is important because what led to a reference being made to the Pull Bench was that, when the case came before the Division Bench consisting of Petheram C. J. and Gordon J., they held that in a previous decision of, the Court in Nundo Pershad Thakur V/s. Gopal Thakur, 10 Cal. 1008 it had been held that when a person seeking preemption had performed the talab-i-mawasibat in the presence of witnesses, and as soon as possible demanded the right from the vendors and the purchasers in the presence of the same witnesses, it was unnecessary that he should again state, when making his demand, that be had declared his right as soon as he beard of the sale, or, in the words of the judgment, "that it was unnecessary for him to go through the form of reminding the witnesses that he had claimed bis right as soon as he heard of the sale." This decision was in conflict with another decision of the Calcutta High Court : Jadunandan Singh V/s. Dulput Singh, 10 Cal. 581, The matter was referred to a Full Bench, and the Full Bench expressly overruled, Nundo Pershad V/s. Gopal Thakur, 10 Cal. 1008. The case eventually went to the Privy Council, where the decision of the Full Bench was upheld, Jadulal Sahu V/s. Janki Koer, 39 I. A. 101 : (39 Cal. 915 P. C.). In this Court we have not been referred to any case directly on the point, but there have been cases in this Court in which the necessity of referring to the first demand having been made during the performance of the second ceremony has been affirmed, Kheyali Prasad V/s. Mullick Nazarul Alum, 1 P. L. J. 174 at p. 178 : (A. I. R. (3) 1916 Pat. 364), Sarjug Singh V/s. Jagmohan Singh, 51 I. C. 40 at p. 41 : (A. I. R. (6) 1919 Pat. 496) and Medni Proshad V/s. Suresh Chandra, 21 Pat. 799 at p. 808 : (A. I. R. (30) 1943 Pat. 96). 364), Sarjug Singh V/s. Jagmohan Singh, 51 I. C. 40 at p. 41 : (A. I. R. (6) 1919 Pat. 496) and Medni Proshad V/s. Suresh Chandra, 21 Pat. 799 at p. 808 : (A. I. R. (30) 1943 Pat. 96). In the last mentioned case Chatterji J. said : "But it is well settled that such reference to the first demand is absolutely necessary." In these circumstances I can find no justification for accepting the suggestion that reference to the first demand may be dispensed with when the wit nesses to the second demand were present when the first demand was made and the vendor and the vendee are absent. I would, therefore, allow this appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the learned Judge of this Court and restore the judgment of the lower appellate Court. Meredith, J. 3 I agree. The Muhammedan law of pre-emption is a law of technicality, and the existence of the right depends upon the full and complete observance of the formalities. It is a ritual. If the ritual be defective, the Djinn will not emerge from his bottle : Unless the words are "open sesame" the door will not open. If the ceremonies are in any way incomplete or erroneous, the right of shaffa does not take form, but remains unsubstantial. It is right that it should be so, because the doctrine involves an interference with one of the fundamental human rights, the right of freedom of contract. The Hedaya says: "The existence of the right of shaffa is repugnant to analogy, as it involves the taking possession of anothers property contrary to his inclination; whence it must be confined solely to those to whom it is expressly granted by the law." My Lord the Chief Justice has quoted the observations of Sir Barnes Peacock in a case of 1863, cited with approval by the Privy Council in Jadu Lal Sahu V/s. Janki Koer, 39 I. A. 101 : (39 Cal. 915 P. C.). 915 P. C.). To the passage quoted by the Privy Council, Sir Barnes Peacock added : "In this requirement (as to the preliminary forms) we see no evil inasmuch as a right of preemption, undoubtedly, tends to restrict the free sale and purchase of properties, and it is desirable, therefore, to encompass it with certain rules and limits lest the right should be exercised vexatiously." Again, the Hedaya gays : "The right of shaffa is but a feeble right, as it is disseizing another of his property merely in order to prevent the apprehended inconveniences." So, the general tendency of the Courts, in the interest of free alienations and free contracts, has been to restrict the right within the narrowest limits and to insist upon the most literal fulfilment of the formal requirements of the Shariat. This was clearly laid down in the case of Mt. Hosseinee Khanum V/s. Mt. Lallun, (1864) W. R. (Gap. no.) 117, in the passage quoted by my Lord the Chief Justice. It is certain that the preliminaries cannot be looked upon as merely matters of form. 4. In performing the talab-i-isshad it is necessary to refer expressly to the fact of the talab-i-mawasibat having been duly made, as is clear from the Hedaya itself and from Baillies Digest. The form given in the Hedaya is "I have already claimed my privilege of shaffa, and now again claim it; be therefore witness thereof." 5. The contrary was held in the case of Nundo Pershad Thakur V/s. Gopal Tkakur, 10 Cal. 1008 by the Calcutta High Court. Bat, as my Lord the Chief Justice has pointed out, this decision was expressly overruled by the Full Bench in Rujjub Ali Chopedar V/s. Chundi Churn Bhadra, 17 Cal. 543 (F. B.) and that Full Bench decision has been followed by the Allahabad High Court in Akbar Husain V/s. Abdul Jalil, 16 ALL. 383 : (1894 A. W. N. 122) Abbasi Begam V/s. Afzal Husen, 20 ALL, 457 : (1898 A. W. N. 112), Abid Husen v, Bashir Ahmad, 20 ALL. 499 : (1898 A. W. N. 132), Mubarak Husain V/s. Kaniz Bano, 27 ALL. 160: (1 A. L. J. 569) and Sadiq Ali V/s. Abdul Baqi Khan, A. I. R. (10) 1923 ALL. 251 : (45 ALL. 290). Yet it is merely upon an observation made in an Allahabad decision that the respondents seek to rely. 499 : (1898 A. W. N. 132), Mubarak Husain V/s. Kaniz Bano, 27 ALL. 160: (1 A. L. J. 569) and Sadiq Ali V/s. Abdul Baqi Khan, A. I. R. (10) 1923 ALL. 251 : (45 ALL. 290). Yet it is merely upon an observation made in an Allahabad decision that the respondents seek to rely. The view taken in Nundo Pershad Thakur V/s. Gopal Thakur, 10 Cal. 1003 was that the requirements might be dispensed with when the pre-emptor had made his first assertion before competent witnesses and had then repeated it after a very short interval in the presence of those same witnesses. It seemed to those learned Judges unnecessary that the plaintiff should go through the empty form of reminding those witnesses of what they had just heard. The same feature was present, however, in the case that came before the Calcutta Full Bench, but it was held that the authorities were clear and must be strictly followed. 6. The view taken in some Allahabad cases that the object of the second ceremony is merely to inform the vendor or purchaser of the performance of the first ceremony, and the consequent suggestion (which has not been made in the Allahabad decisions) that the reference is unnecessary in the absence of the vendor and vendee, cannot be accepted, since the ceremony can be validly performed on the premises in the absence of both. Its object is to call attention, in the presence of witnesses, to the performance of the first ceremony, and so to impress the fact upon their minds for the purpose of future evidence. The theory that the formality is unnecessary when its object is already served by the prior knowledge of the witnesses represents, in my opinion, a wrong line of approach to the problem, when formality is of the essence of the doctrine and the emergence of the right is dependent upon the correct performance of the ritual.