Judgment TYABJI, C.J. This is a reference made by a Judge of this Court (Agha, J.) under R. 10 of the Rules of this Court (Original Side). 2. The learned Judge has completely heard Suit No. 250 of 1946 in which the plaintiff, Noor Bibi, claims a dissolution of her marriage with the defendant Pir Bux. One of the grounds on which the dissolution is sought is that the defendant had neglected or failed to provide for the plaintiff's maintenance for a period of more than two years immediately preceding the suit (cl. (ii) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, viii [8] of 1939). The learned Judge has disposed of all the issues in the suit, except the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to a dissolution under cl. (ii) on the facts proved, and he has referred this issue to us after stating the facts found by him which are as follows. The plaintiff, Mt. Noor Bibi, a young woman of about twenty-two, was married to the defendant Pir Bux, about five years before the suit, and thereafter went and lived with him at Mirpurkbas for some six months. Her parents then brought her to Karachi with the permission of the defendant. Thereafter she did not return to the defendant. She had refused to go back to the defendant inspite of the fact that the defendant had come to Karachi and attempted to take her back with him. The defendant had not paid anything to her by way of maintenance for more than two years before the suit. The learned Judge found that the failure of the defendant to maintain the plaintiff during the period in question was due to the disobedience of the plaintiff and her refusal to go back to the defendant. It was incontestable under the circumstances that the plaintiff was not entitled to any maintenance from the defendant in respect of the period in question under Mubammadan law. 3. Clause (ii) of S. 2 is as follows: “A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely, (ii) that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years.” 4. 3. Clause (ii) of S. 2 is as follows: “A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely, (ii) that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years.” 4. The question raised, whether the plaintiff Noor Bibi is entitled to a dissolution of her marriage on the facts found, is a question of law depending upon the correct construction of cl. (ii), and more particularly, upon the question whether, where the husband's failure to maintain bad occurred under circumstances in which, on account of the wife's conduct, the wife could not in law sustain a claim for maintenance, the failure was still a ground for dissolution by virtue of cl. (ii). As this was a very important question and there was a conflict between the decision of Lobo, J. in Mt. Khatijan v. Abdullah, ILR 1942 KAR 535 : (A.I.R. (30) 1943 Sind 65) and an unreported decision made by me, on 18th October 1943, in Suit No. 288 of 1942 (Mt. Hajra v. Kassim) and as there were also confilting decisions of other High Courts, the learned Judge has referred this question to us. 5. During the argument in Mt. Khatijan v. Abdulla, ILR 1942 KAR 635 : (A.I.R. (30) 1943 Sind 65), two decisions of the Lahore High Court, Manak Khan v. Mt. Mulkhan Bano, A.I.R. (28) 1941 Lah. 167 : (194 I.C. 567) and Mt. Akbari Begum v. Zafar Hussain, A.I.R. (29) 1942 Lah. 92 : (199 I.C. 347), were relied upon on behalf of the plaintiff wife before Lobo the first of these cases was not strictly in point, as it was in that case contended on behalf of the husband that his failure to maintain his wife was not wilful, as he was in jail during the period in question, and it was argued that cl. (ii) did not, therefore, apply. It was, however, emphasised in that case that having regard to the words of cl. (ii), once the failure to maintain was proved as a fact, it was irrelevant to enquire into the causes of that failure. (ii) did not, therefore, apply. It was, however, emphasised in that case that having regard to the words of cl. (ii), once the failure to maintain was proved as a fact, it was irrelevant to enquire into the causes of that failure. In rejecting the husband's plea, Beckett, J. stated: “There is nothing in the wording of this clause to suggest that the failure must be wilful and the other clauses show that divorce may be granted on grounds which do not necessarily involve any deliberate default on the part of the husband. That such is the plain meaning of the clause is the view taken by Mr. A.C. Gose in his commentary on the Act. Before the passing of the Act, it had been held that mere inability to maintain a wife was no ground for granting a divorce. The author considers that the effect of the present clause is to supersede this view of the law. He considers that it is now absolutely immaterial whether the failure to maintain is due to poverty, failing health, loss of work or to any other cause whatsoever I see no reason for differing from him as to the effect of the clause.” 6. The other case was a decision by Abdul Rashid, J. as he then was, which was directly in point, as the husband's failure to maintain the wife in that case was found to be due to the wife's own conduct. In rejecting the husband's plea, Abdul Rashid, J. stated: “Where the words of the statute are unambiguous, effect must be given to them whatever the consequences. It is laid down expressly in cl. (iv) of S. 2 that where the husband has failed to perform without reasonable cause his marital obligations for a period of three years the wife is entitled to a dissolution of her marriage. In cl. (ii), however, the words ‘without reasonable cause’ do not occur. It must, therefore, be held that whatever the cause may be the wife is entitled to a decree for the dissolution of her marriage, if the husband fails to maintain her for a period of two years, even though the wife may have contributed towards the failure of the maintenance by her husband.” 7. Lobo, J. did not accept the reasoning and the interpretation of cl. Lobo, J. did not accept the reasoning and the interpretation of cl. (ii) adopted in these two Lahore decisions, and stated: “No doubt the decisions of these learned Judges of the Lahore High Court, on the facts of the cases before them, are correct, but, with all respect to those learned Judges, I do not agree generally with their interpretation of S. (2)(ii) of the Act, VIII of 1939. In my view Act VIII of 1939 was never intended to abrogate the general law applicable to Muhammadans. Under S. 2[ii] it appears to me that the husband cannot be said to have neglected or failed to provide maintenance for his wife, unless under the general Muhammadao law he was under an obligation to maintain that wife.” 8. It may be mentioned that in Khatijan's case (ILR 1942 KAR 535 : A.I.R. (30) 1943 Sind 65), her husband had bound himself by a term in the marriage contract to live in the house of Khatijan and had stipulated that Khatijan would be entitled to refuse to live with him, unless he stayed in her house with her mother. The effect of this stipulation was not considered by Lobo, J., and the stipulation was apparently regarded as being of no consequence. 9. I come next to my decision in Mt. Hajra v. Kassim (Suit No. 288 of 1942). The plaintiff Hajra, who sued for a dissolution of her marriage, proved that she had not been maintained by her husband for more than two years immediately preceding the suit. It was also proved that her husband had offered to take her back to his house after she had left him as a result of some quarrels, but she had refused to go and live with him again. It, therefore, became necessary for me to consider whether the decision of Lobo, J., was correct. I did not agree with that decision either with regard to the effect of the stipulation in the marriage contract or with regard to the interpretation of cl. (ii). It, therefore, became necessary for me to consider whether the decision of Lobo, J., was correct. I did not agree with that decision either with regard to the effect of the stipulation in the marriage contract or with regard to the interpretation of cl. (ii). With regard to the stipulation I stated: “This decision is based on a view of the Muslim law, which appears to me to be incorrect, that a condition in a marriage contract by which the husband bound himself to live in the house of the wife was not a valid condition, and that the wife was not entitled to hold the husband to such a contract. It seems to me that the texts, the legal theory, and the precedents, are all against such a view Cf. Ameer Ali's Mahomedan Law, Edn. IV, Vol. II, p. 479; and Tyabji's Muhammadan Law, Edn. III p. 6 and pp. 112 to 116.” 10. It is unnecessary to say anything further on this matter, as the question does not arise before us here. With regard to the interpretation of cl. (ii), I held that having regard to the plain terms of the clause, all that the wife needed to prove was that her husband had in fact failed to maintain her for the period of two years, that the absence of all words of qualification in the clause was deliberate and intentional and in accord with the principles upon which a dissolution is allowed in Muslim jurisprudence, and that the fact that the wife under the particular circumstances would not be entitled in law to claim maintenance for the period in question was of no consequence when the question was whether she was entitled to a dissolution. I agreed with the two Lahore decisions referred to above, and with the decision of Mir Ahmed 3 (with whom Almond, J.C. concurred) in Ahmed Jan v. Mt. Sultanbibi, A.I.R. (30) 1943 Pesh. 73 : (209 I.C. 248). I stated: “The decision of Lobo, J., is not based on a strict construction of the language used in S. 2(ii) but on a much broader ground.” 11. Sultanbibi, A.I.R. (30) 1943 Pesh. 73 : (209 I.C. 248). I stated: “The decision of Lobo, J., is not based on a strict construction of the language used in S. 2(ii) but on a much broader ground.” 11. It was clear that Lobo, J. had found the two propositions: (1) that a Muslim wife is not entitled to maintenance unless she is capable of rendering conjugal rights and places herself or offers to place herself in the husband's power so as to allow him free access to her at all lawful times, and (2) that a Muslim wife, even when she had refused to live with her husband and was not entitled to maintenance was entitled to a dissolution on the failure of her husband to maintain her for two years, as irreconcilable; and had, therefore, felt compelled to hold that the failure to maintain, in case (2) was not a failure to maintain within the meaning of cl. (ii). In my view, this supposed irreconcilability lacked any real foundation, and was based on an erroneous conception of the principles on which the law relating to dissolution in Muslim Jurisprudence was based, and that these principles were entirely distinct and different from those on which main, tenance during the subsistence of a marriage was enforced. 12. With regard to the interpretation of the actual words enacted in cl. (ii), I stated: “At present I am mainly concerned with the difficulty which I feel in accepting the view that there was no failure to maintain in a case where admittedly no payments were made and nothing had been done by the husband to provide for the wife's maintenance. Among the meanings of the word ‘fail’, the Oxford Dictionary includes, ‘to leave undone, omit to perform, miss (some customary or expected action).’ Muslim morals and religion “undoubtedly expect and require a husband to maintain a wife during the subsistence of the marriage, even though the law will not enforce such payments under certain conditions. A husband may maintain a wife whether she is or is not entitled to maintenance, and similarly not maintain a wife whether she is or is not entitled to maintenance. A husband may maintain a wife whether she is or is not entitled to maintenance, and similarly not maintain a wife whether she is or is not entitled to maintenance. Whether a husband maintains or fails to maintain a wife is a question entirely distinct from, and so far as I can see in no way dependent upon, the question whether the wife is or is not entitled to enforce the payment of maintenance to her in law. The terms of S. 2(ii) do not require that the failure to maintain should have occurred under circumstances when the wife was entitled in law to claim maintenance.” 13. With regard to the reasoning on which the decision of Lobo, J. was based, and the principles upon which maintenance during the subsistence of a marriage was enforced, and those upon which a dissolution (khula) was allowed, I stated: “Would the general law applicable to Muslims be abrogated by construing the language of S. 2(ii) in this manner? In this question is examined, the answer must I think be, as was pointed out in Ahmed Jan v. Mt. Sultan Bibi, A.I.R. (30) 1943 Pesh. 73 : (209 I.C. 248) that Act VIII [8] of 1939 in fact crystallizes a portion of the Muslim law which before it came into force was not codified and consisted of principles only. The argument of Mr. Qareshsi—and this appears to be the reasoning underlying the decision of Lobo, J.,—is that in the case in question the wife's claim to a dissolution must be regarded as based on a breach of the marriage contract, and that the claim cannot be allowed when the alleged breach was of a term which had become unenforceable, when therefore there was no real breach. A brief examination of the Muslim attitude towards marriage and divorce and the principles upon which a dissolution is allowed is therefore necessary. A Muslim marriage is a covenant by which the parties enter the state of marriage. The parties are permitted to stipulate the conditions upon which they will do so, provided the conditions are not illegal according to Muslim law. The subsistence of the marriage confers certain essential rights and imposes certain duties upon the husband and the wife. These rights and duties are stated in the Quran, which speaks of them as “the limits of Allah” (Cf. The subsistence of the marriage confers certain essential rights and imposes certain duties upon the husband and the wife. These rights and duties are stated in the Quran, which speaks of them as “the limits of Allah” (Cf. e.g. verse II, 239), within which the husband and the wife have to live. The conditions of the covenant of marriage have also to be fulfilled. Not only does the Quran repeatedly exhort every Muslim to fulfil the covenants which he enters into, but the Prophet has particularly emphasised: “Of all the conditions which you have to fulfil, those most entitled to fulfilment are the conditions upon which you enter the union of marriage” (Bukbari 67: 53). The Muslim marriage differs from the Hindu and from most Christian marriages in that it is not a sacrament. This involves an essentially different attitude towards dissolution. There is no merit in preserving intact the connection of marriage when the parties are not able and fail ‘to live within the limits of Allah’, that is to fulfil their mutual marital obligations, and there is no desecration involved in dissolving a marriage which has failed. The entire emphasis is on making the marital union a reality, and when this is not possible, and the marriage becomes injurious to the parties, the Quran enjoins a dissolution. The husband is given an almost unfettered power of divorce, the only restraints upon him being those imposed by the law relating to dower and by his own conscience. He has to remember the Prophet's words: ‘Of all things permitted by the law, the worst is divorce.’ The Quran enjoins a husband either to render to his wife all her rights as a wife and to treat her with kindness is the approved manner, or to set her free by divorcing her, and enjoins him not to retain a wife to her injury (Cf. verses II, 229 and 231). Any suspension of the marriage is strongly condemned (Cf. e.g. Quran IV, 129). The attitude of the Prophet is Illustrated by the well-known instance of Jameela, the wife of Sabit Bin Kais, who hated her husband intensely although her husband was extremely found of her. According to the acsount given in Bukhari (Bu. 68: 11) Jameela appeared before the Prophet and admitted that she had no complaint to make against Sabit either as regards his moral or as regards his religion. According to the acsount given in Bukhari (Bu. 68: 11) Jameela appeared before the Prophet and admitted that she had no complaint to make against Sabit either as regards his moral or as regards his religion. She pleaded, however, that she could not be wholeheartedly loyal to her husband, as a Muslim wife ought to be because she hated him, and she did not desire to live disloyally (‘in kufr’). The Prophet asked her whether she was willing to return the garden which her husband had given to her, and on her agreeing to do so, the Prophet seat for Sabit, asked him to take back the garden, and to divorce Jameela. From the earliest times Muslim wivas have been held to be entitled to a dissolution when it was clearly shown that the parties could not live ‘within the limits of Allah’, when (1) instead of the marriage being a reality, a suspension of the marriage had in fact occurred, or (2) when the continuance of the marriage involved injury to the wife. The grounds upon which a dissolution can be claimed are based mainly on these two principles. The grounds stated in S. 2 of Act VIII[8] of 1939 in sub-cls. (i) to (iv) are based on the principle that a suspension of the marriage had occurred which justified a dissolution, and in sub-clauses (v) to (viii) on the principle that the continuance of the marriage in those cases would be injurious to the wife. It is important to remember that the breach of a valid condition in the marriage covenant does not a such give the wife a right to claim a dissolution. The law regarding the enforcement of the terms of a marriage contract is entirely distinct and is governed by entirely different principles from the law regarding the dissolution of a marriage. When a husband and a wife have been living apart, and the wife is not being maintained by the husband, a dissolution is not permitted as a punishment for the husband who had failed to fulfil one of the obligations of marriage, or allowed as a means of enforcing the wife's eights to maintenance. In the Muslim law of dissclutions, the failure to maintain when it has continued for a prolonged period in such circumstances, is regarded as an instance where a cessation or suspension of the marriage had occurred. In the Muslim law of dissclutions, the failure to maintain when it has continued for a prolonged period in such circumstances, is regarded as an instance where a cessation or suspension of the marriage had occurred. It will be seen therefore that the wife's disobedience or refusal to live with her husband does not affect the principle on which the dissolution is allowed.” 14. I also referred to the particular controversy which had existed with regard to the right of a Hanafi wife to claim a dissolution which was one of the principal reasons for the enactment of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. As the nature of that controversy throws considerable light on the historical aspect of the question before us, I cite another extract from my judgment: “One of the principal reasons—there were several — which led to the enactment of Act VIII[8] of 1939 was the existence of a controversy as to whether a Hanafi marriage could be dissolved on the ground that the husband had failed to maintain his wife. Abu Hanlla, the “founder of the earliest of the four Surmi Schools, lived 80-150 A.H. The original Hanafi texts lay down that (1) if a husband by reason of quarrels (nizaa) and incompatibility of temperament (adam Muafiqat) neither maintained his wife in his own house nor provided for her maintenance, or (2) if the husband left his wife and went to live in some other place and did not send her sufficient money for her maintenance, or (3) if the husband was unable to maintain his wife by reason of poverty or other disability, the Kazi could order that the wife should be provided with maintenance, and permit the wife to borrow in the name and on the account of her husband. Destitute wives at that time were maintained out of the funds of the baitulmal. These texts did not in such cases authorise the Kazi to effect a dissolution of the marriago without the husband's consent. The texts of the three later Sunni Schools of Malik Ion Anas (93-175 A.H.), Sbafii (150-204 A.H.) and Ibn Hanbal (164-241 A.H.), as also the Shiah tests construed the Quran in the light of the traditions and the precedents of the time of Caliphs timer and AH, and laid down that the Kazi or other proper authority could in such cases effect a dissolutions the marriage. The Sbafii texts are the most explicit on the point. Both Umer and Ali had forced husbands who had left their wives and gone to other places to pay up all arrears of maintenance, and further forced them either to continue to provide sufficient sums for the maintenance of their wives or to divorce them. Later Faqihs (jurists) whose works are held by all Sunnis, including Hanans, to be of the highest authority, adopted the same view. The “Hashia Bahr-ur-Raiq” by Ibn Abidin (a Hunafi doctor) is commonly used and generally accepted by Hanafis as the most authoritative exposition of Hanafi law. In this work (Cf. Vol. VI, Kitab-ul-Kaza, p. 280) the author cites the opinion of Ramli (an ancient Hanafi doctor) expressed while commenting on the Jame Fusulein and the Kinia, that in cases mentioned, the Kazi could effect a dissolution even where the parties were Hanafis and not Shafils on Hanafi principles. The statement of Abu Hanifa: ‘If any hadis (tradition) regarding any matter should be proved to be true, then that is my religions is relied upon, and several traditions are cited on the highest authority in favour of the view that in such cases a dissolution could be ordered. It is pointed out that the procedure advocated by Abu Hanifa depended upon the existence of the bait-ul-mal and was inapplicable when the bait-ul-mal did not exist. It is also argued that the coutinuace of the marriage in such cases was morally injurious for wives. The view most widely prevalent among Haoafis, who form the largest part of the Muslims in India, has since long been that among Hanafis, as among the other sects, a marriage could be dissolved on the ground that a husband had failed to maintain his wife, and many falwas have been given to this effect by the most learned Moulvis. Act VIII of 1939, now sets all doubts finally at rest.” 15. I accordingly held that Hajra was entitled to a dissolution. 16. There have been several decisions of this Court since Hajra's case, (Suit No. 288 of 1942) in which that decision was followed, and, so far as I am aware, none in which it was not followed. 17. I come next to the decision of other Courts which have since been made regarding the same question. In Mt. Badrulnisa Bibi v. Mohammad Yusuf, A.I.R. (31) 1944 All. 17. I come next to the decision of other Courts which have since been made regarding the same question. In Mt. Badrulnisa Bibi v. Mohammad Yusuf, A.I.R. (31) 1944 All. 23 : (I.L.R. (1944) All. 27), the learned Judges (Collister and Bajpai, JJ.) stated: “The submission is that cl. (ii) does not use the words ‘without any reasonable cause’ and the wife is entitled to a dissolution of the marriage on the mere neglect or the failure of the husband to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years, and this may be with reasonable cause or without reasonable cause. We have given this part of the argument our anxious consideration, and we are of the opinion that the word ‘neglect’ implies wilful failure and it cannot be said that in the present case there was any wilful failure on the part of the husband to provide for the maintenance of his wife. The words ‘baa failed to provide’ are not very happy, but even they imply an omission of duty. Where the wife through her own conduct leads the husband to stop the maintenance, the Court will not allow dissolution of marriage for that would be giving her a benefit if benefit it can be called—arising from her own wrongful acts. It may be that the husband is too poor to maintain the wife and then perhaps it will be open to the wife to claim dissolution of marriage for oven in that case there might be some omission of duty on the part of the husband although such omission may be due to circumstances beyond his control. It is to cover such cases that the words ‘without reasonable cause’ have been omitted from cl. (ii), but where the wife or her parents are entirely to blame and no blame attaches to the husband it is not possible for the Courts to say that the husband has failed to provide for the maintenance of the wife.” 18. Then came the decision of the Lahore High Court in Zafar Hussain v. Mt. Akbari Begum, A.I.R. (31) 1944 Lah. 336 : (I.L.R. (1945) Lah. 517) on an appeal against the decision of Abdul Kashid, J. which has been referred to above. Then came the decision of the Lahore High Court in Zafar Hussain v. Mt. Akbari Begum, A.I.R. (31) 1944 Lah. 336 : (I.L.R. (1945) Lah. 517) on an appeal against the decision of Abdul Kashid, J. which has been referred to above. Harries, C.J. (Mahajan, J. concurring) followed the decisions of Lobo, J. and of the Allahabad High Court above referred to and stated: “In the present case, as I have already stated, it is abundantly clear that the plaintiff for no valid reason has refused to live with her husband and to perform her marital obligations. That being so, it must be held that the defendant husband was not liable to maintain the plaintiff. As there was no duty to maintain, it cannot be held that the husband had either neglected to provide maintenance for his wife or bad failed to do so for a period of two years. The view which. I take of sub-s. (2) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, is the same as that taken by a learned Single Judge of the Sind Chief Court in Mt. Khatijan v. Abdulla, A.I.R. (30) 1943 Sind 65 : (ILR 1942 KAR 535). Further a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mt. Badrulnisa v. Mohammad Yusaf, A.I.R. (31) 1944 All. 23 : (I.L.R. (1944) All. 27) came to the same conclusion. In that case it was held that the word ‘neglect’ in Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, implied wilful failure and that the words ‘has failed to provide’ though not very happy words, implied an omission of duty. Consequently, where the wife through her own conduct led the husband to atop maintenance, the Court would not allow dissolution of marriage for that would be giving her a benefit—if benefit it could be called—arising from her wrongful acts. Where the wife or her parents were entirely to blame and no blame attached to the husband, it could not be said that the husband had failed to provide for the maintenance of the wife. The facts of this Allahabad case are very similar to the facts of the case before us. To hold otherwise would result in a somewhat startling state of affairs.” 19. In Mt. Umat ul-Hafiz v. Talib Hussain, A.I.R. (32) 1945 Lah. The facts of this Allahabad case are very similar to the facts of the case before us. To hold otherwise would result in a somewhat startling state of affairs.” 19. In Mt. Umat ul-Hafiz v. Talib Hussain, A.I.R. (32) 1945 Lah. 56 : (46 P.L.R. 343), a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court (Abdul Rahman, J.), merely followed the Bench decision in Akbari Begum's case, (A.I.R. (29) 1942 Lah. 92 : 199 I.C. 847). 20. The question again arose in Mt. Zainabai v. Abdul Rahman, A.I.R. (33) 1945 Pesh. 51 : (222 I.C. 277), before Almond, J.C. and Mir Ahmed, J., who did not agree with the Bench decisions of the Allahabad and the Lahore High Courts, and stated: “With due respect we regret we do not feel persuaded to agree with the views expressed by their Lordships of the Lahore and Allahabad High Courts in the judgments cited by counsel for the respondent. The fact that S. 6 of Act 8 of 1939, repealed S. 5 of Act 26 of 1937, clearly shows that the Legislature intended that the general provisions of Mahomedan law should not control the operation of Act 8 of 1939. The inference is clear that the Act was respected to be complete by itself. The question whether a woman was entitled to maintenance under Mahomedan law would, therefore, be absolutely foreign to the inquiry under Act 8 of 1939, as to whether a marriage should be dissolved for failure on the part of the husband to pay maintenance. We do not see why we should read the words ‘if she is entitled to be maintained by Mahomedan law’ towards the end of cl. (ii) of S. 2 of Act 8 of 1939 (reproduced above), when they are not there. In our opinion the clause has been deliberately couched in very wide terms so that a woman should be protected in any case, and there was no intention whatsoever that the Courts should find out whether the woman was entitled to maintenance or not before they considered her claim to dissolution of marriage on the ground of failure to pay maintenance. The Legisiature would have made it clear if that were intended.” 21. In a later Peshawar decision, Fazal Mahmud v. Mt. Umatur Rahim, A.I.R. (36) 1949 Pesh. The Legisiature would have made it clear if that were intended.” 21. In a later Peshawar decision, Fazal Mahmud v. Mt. Umatur Rahim, A.I.R. (36) 1949 Pesh. 7, Mohamed Ebrahim, J.C. and Karn Labhaya, J. dissented from the two earlier Peshawar decisions and followed the decisions of Lobo, J., and of the Allahabad and the Lahore High Courts, on the ground that cl. (ii) was not intended to abrogate the general law applicable to Muhammadans. 22. Having very carefully considered the reasoning in all these cases, I can see no reason for taking a different view of the question before us from that which I expressed in Hajra's case (Suit No. 298 of 1942). The plain ordinary grammatical meaning of the words: “Has failed to provide maintenance” in cl. (ii) appears to me to be very clear. It is true that these words occur in an enactment which deals with the dissolution of Muslim marriages, but the meaning of these words cannot therefore be different from what it would be, for instance, if these words were used with reference to a Hindu or a Christian or a Parsi husband. To hold otherwise would be to make the task of a draftsman impossible. The question whether there was a failure to maintain, was a pure question of fact, which did not in any manner depend upon the circumstances in which the failure had occurred. A husband may maintain a wife whether she was or was not, under the particular circumstances, entitled to maintenance; and similarly not maintain a wife, whether she was or not entitled to maintenance. As I pointed out in Hajra's case (Suit no. 288 of 1942), Muslim morals and ideas undoubtedly expect every husband to maintain his wife as long as the marriage subsists, even when the wife does not deserve to be maintained, and may not in law be able to enforce any claim for maintenance. It is therefore no less correct to speak of a man's failure to maintain his wife even when she is not entitled to claim maintenance, than it is to speak of a man's failure to pay his debts of honour on bets or his debts which have become time barred. It is therefore no less correct to speak of a man's failure to maintain his wife even when she is not entitled to claim maintenance, than it is to speak of a man's failure to pay his debts of honour on bets or his debts which have become time barred. But apart from this, it seems to me to be clear that the choice of the words “had failed to provide for her maintenance” was necessitated by the very nature and effect of cl. (ii). To make my point clear, let it be assumed that it was clearly intended to draft the clause so as to on title the wife to a dissolution on a mere omission by the husband—no matter under what circumstances—to maintain the wife for two years and further that a suggestion was made that the word “omitted” be substituted for the words “neglected or has failed.” I think the draftsman would have preferred the words as they are and said: “As the clause itself enacts that a right to a dissolution will be the consequence of an omission to maintain, ever; omission to maintain must be spoken of as a failure to maintain in this enactment. The fact that there are no farther qualifying words is sufficient to show that nothing more than an omission to maintain could possibly be intended.” 23. In the cases in which it has been held that there could be no failure to maintain, unless the wife was entitled to enforce a claim for maintenance, the plain ordinary meaning of the words, it seems to me, was intentionally departed from, on the express ground that the ordinary meaning of the words was not the one which could really have been intended, that the really intended meaning had been sought to be expressed, rather unhappily, by the use of words which in fact had a different meaning; and the supposed intended meaning which necessarily involved importing into the enacted words something which was not there, was then preferred to the ordinary meaning; on the supposition that unless that was done an abrogation of the general Muhammad an law and a startling state of affairs would result. With all respect to the learned Judges who adopted this method of construction, it seems to me that this is not permissible. With all respect to the learned Judges who adopted this method of construction, it seems to me that this is not permissible. It is a settled rule of construction that when the enacted words are clear, they must be given effect to, and the Courts must not busy themselves with supposed intentions or consequences. 24. As a matter of fact, no abrogation of the Mubammadan law relating to the maintenance of wives or otherwise is involved in dissolving a marriage, on proof of a husband's failure to maintain his wife, even when the wife had by her conduct disentitled herself from claiming maintenance. The principles upon which maintenance is enforced during the subsistence of a marriage, and those upon which a dissolution is allowed, are entirely different. A dissolution of a marriage is allowed when a cessation of the state of marriage has in reality taken place, or the continuance of the marriage has become injurious to the wife. The continuance of a state of affairs in which a marriage had ceased to be a reality, when the husband and the wife no longer lived “within the limits of Allah” is abhorred in Islam, and the prophet an joined that such a state of affairs should be ended. The main object of enacting the Disscution of Muslim Marriages Act was to bring the aw as administered in this subcontinent into conformity with the authoritative tests. A very strong select committee which included Sir Nripendra Nath Sircar. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan and several notable Muslim Scholars exanined the Muslim law and drafted the bill with the greatest not when the bill was passed, Sir Nripendra Nath Sircar stated with regard to the object of the Bill (Cf. C.L.A. Debates, 1939 vol. I, p. 883): “This Bill has cleared on the mistakes and the misinterpretations which had gathered round the Muslim law. They have not tried to advance from the seventh century, but they are trying to show what was the law in the seventh century.” 25. And Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan stated (id p. 880): “…. the Muslims will feel particular satisfaction at the fact that this Bill brings the practice of the Muslim law in this country into conformity with what has been recognised throughout as the correct Interpretation of that law on the subject dealt with in this Bill.” 26. And Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan stated (id p. 880): “…. the Muslims will feel particular satisfaction at the fact that this Bill brings the practice of the Muslim law in this country into conformity with what has been recognised throughout as the correct Interpretation of that law on the subject dealt with in this Bill.” 26. With regard to the provisions of the enactment, Sir Muhammd Zafrullah Khan made a statement which is of particular interest with regard to the question now before us (id p. 877): “Sir, the oustanding merit of this Bill is that it puts down, in the space of one printed page, the various grounds on which divorce may be obtained by a woman married under the Muslim law. This is a matter the lack of which has, in the past, caused a great deal of distress and misery and suffering in India …. As I have said, this Bill defines the grounds on which Khula may be obtained by a married woman under the Muslim law in very definite, clear and precise terms and cannot imagine that any Judge, whether be is a Muslim or a non-Muslim, could have much room left for doubt with regard to them. There may be a dispute with regard to the facts in any particular case—that is inherent in every litigation—but I do not think there can now be much doubt with regard to the grounds upon which divorce is permissible under the Muslim law. That is the chief merit of this Bill.” 27. In my view the claim made in the last portion of the above extract was justified by the language actually used in the enactment. It must also be borne in mind that the enactment intentionally ironed out the differences which had existed in the texts of the various Muslim sects.’ 28. Agha, J. has clearly found that the defendant Pir Bux had failed to provide for the maintence of the plaintiff Noor Bibi for the two years immediately preceding the suit. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to correct an error which I have noticed in several publications with regard to what I decided in Asmabai v. Umar Muhammad, ILR 1941 KAR 114 : (A.I.R. (28) 1941 Sind 23). I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to correct an error which I have noticed in several publications with regard to what I decided in Asmabai v. Umar Muhammad, ILR 1941 KAR 114 : (A.I.R. (28) 1941 Sind 23). It was not decided in that case, as has sometimes been supposed, that a wife could claim a dissolution in a case where her husband had been maintaining her within two years of her suit, on the ground that the husband had during an earlier period of two years or more failed to maintain her. The failure to maintain under cl. (ii) must obviously be for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the suit. This was not even questioned before me. I stated in that decision: “Now, with regard to the first ground urged by the plaintiff, it has ben admitted by the defendant that nothing by way of maintenance or otherwise was paid by him to the plaintiff after the plaintiff left him, admittedly some time in or about 1925, until after 28th of February 1936, when the order was made by the Magistrate. It is, therefore, clear that during this period of about 10 years the defendant did wholly neglect and fail to provide for the pontiff's maintenance. It is true that after the order made by the Magistrate in 1936 certain payments have been made by the defendant to the plaintiff under the orders of the Court, and it cannot therefore he said that during the two years immediately preceding the suit the defendant had not paid anything towards the plaintiff's maintenance, but Ido not think that in the circumstances of this case the plaintiff is thereby debarred from relying on S. 2(ii) of the Act in respect of the earlier period as a good ground for the dissolution of her marriage.” 29. Elsewhere in the same judgment I made it clear that the irregular payments made to the plaintiff on certain occasions during the two years immediately preceding the suit, of Rs. 7-8-0 per month, were wholly insufficient to maintain the plaintiff. The argument before me which I up-held was that despite those payments there had in fact been a failure to maintain the plaintiff for a period of more than 10 years immediately preceding the suit. 7-8-0 per month, were wholly insufficient to maintain the plaintiff. The argument before me which I up-held was that despite those payments there had in fact been a failure to maintain the plaintiff for a period of more than 10 years immediately preceding the suit. The reason really underlying my decision on this point was, as O'Sullivan, J. pointed out in Satgunj v. Rahmat Dil Murad, A.I.R. (33) 1946 Sind 48 : (ILR 1945 KAR 327), that a husband cannot claim to have provided maintenance for his wife, unless the provision made by him was in fact sufficient to provide adequately for her necessities. The question in such cases must always be; was the husband really maintaining his wife? If the wife was being maintained by herself, or by some person other than her husband, or was not being sufficiently provided for at all, there would be a failure by her husband to maintain her. In view of what has been stated above, I would answer the question referred to us by stating that as the defendant Pir Bux had in fact failed to provide for the maintenance of the plaintiff Noor Bibi during the two years time irately preceding the suit, the plaintiff Noorbibi was entitled to a dissolution of her marriage under clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, inspite of the fact that on account of her conduct the plaintiff would not have been entitled to enforce any claim for maintenance against the defendant in respect of the period during which the defendant had failed to maintain the plaintiff.” MAHOMED BACHAL, J.:— I agree, and have nothing to add. K.S. 30. Answer accordingly.