Judgment Reuben, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against a decision of the District Judge of Gaya, reversing in appeal, a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya. 2. The suit was instituted to obtain a declaration that a certificate sale of certain mokarrari property was void ab initio. In dismissing the suit, the District Judge, besides other grounds, relied on the ground that the suit is barred Under the provisions of Sec. 45, Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914. Obviously this section has no application, as it relates to suits for the setting aside of certificate sales. 3. The suit property is a share of 4 annas and odd in a mokarrari tenure in village Murhera, tauzi No. 1755. The certificate was filed at the instance of the Maharaja of Darbhanga, the mortgagee of the proprietary interest in the village, for the recovery of arrears of rent of the entire mokarrari interest for the years 1344 to 1345 Fasli at the rate of ES. 1363 per year. During the course of the execution, of the certificate, one of the cosharers-mokarraridars, defendant 1, whose share is 7 annas and odd filed an application for accepting from him a fraction of the certificate dues proportional to his share and for exempting his share from being proceeded against. A similar petition was filed by another set of co-sharer Mokarraridars, defendants 3 to 7, who hold a share of 8 pies and odd. These two applications were agreed to by the certificate-holder and were allowed by the Certificate Officer by an order dated 29-5-1939. The execution of the certificate proceeded against the other certificate-debtors for the balance of the certificate dues and 7 annas and odd of the mokarrari tenure was sold on 31-7-1939, delivery of possession being taken by the purchaser defendant 1 on 24-1-1940. An application Under Section 29, Public Demands Recovery Act for setting aside the sale was filed by the plaintiff on 28-9-1939. It was allowed conditionally by the Certificate Officer, but was dismissed by the Collector in appeal. 4. The learned Advocate-General, for the appellant, has challenged the validity of the sale on two grounds, firstly that, by his order of 29-5-1939, the Certificate Officer amended the certificate and, therefore, Under Sec.11, Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914, should have issued a fresh notice Under Section 7. 4. The learned Advocate-General, for the appellant, has challenged the validity of the sale on two grounds, firstly that, by his order of 29-5-1939, the Certificate Officer amended the certificate and, therefore, Under Sec.11, Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914, should have issued a fresh notice Under Section 7. In the absence of such a notice, he argues, the Certificate Officer had no jurisdiction to sell the property. Secondly, he argues, on the basis of Sec.158 A, Tenancy Act (vide Schedule 3 to the Public Demands Recovery Act) which section was then in force but has since been repealed, and Sub- section (3) of Sec.26, Public Demands Recovery Act, that the Certificate Officer could only proceed in respect of the rent against the entire tenure, and, therefore, has acted without jurisdiction in proceeding against only some of the Mokarraridars in respect of a fraction of the tenure. 5. The first point is readily answered by a perusal of the Certificate Officers order of 29-5-1939 which is as follows: "R. O. Reports that the share of the C. Ds. 1 and 2 to 6 may be temporarily exempted as they have paid their full quota. The share of C. Ds. 1 to 6 is therefore temporarily exempted. Issue fresh Section N. fixing 31-7-1939 on payment of cost by 1-6-1939. Put up on 30-6-39." I have stressed the word "temporarily" because it indicates what was the essence of the order of the Certificate Officer. He had before him a certificate filed by the landlord against all the tenure-holders for the rent of the entire tenure. During the course of the proceeding, some of the co-sharer-tenants paid up what he took to be their quota, and at the request of the landlord he directed execution to proceed against the remaining co-sharer-tenants for the balance of the amount due. This, however, was a "temporary" step. If the sale of the shares of the remaining co-sharers failed to realise the balance still due, the Certificate Officer intended to proceed against the shares which had been "temporarily" exempted. The effect, therefore, was that these certificate-debtors though for the time being they were not being proceeded against, remained as certificate debtors. It follows that it is not correct that there was any amendment in the certificate. 6. The effect, therefore, was that these certificate-debtors though for the time being they were not being proceeded against, remained as certificate debtors. It follows that it is not correct that there was any amendment in the certificate. 6. Coming to the second point, Sec.158-A, Tenancy Act empowers the Provincial Government to extend the procedure prescribed by the Public Demands Recovery Act to the recovery of rent by private landlord. When a certificate is filed on the requisition of such a landlord, the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act apply mutatis mutandis for the purpose of the execution and of proceedings arising out of the execution of the certificate (vide Sub-section (7) of Sec.158A). In the present case, there is no suggestion that the requisition made by the landlord and the certificate filed thereupon are not in accordance with the law. The learned Advocate General stresses merely Sub- section(3) of Sec.26, which provides that the sale in certificate proceedings of a tenure or holding for arrears of the rent thereof shall in certain circumstances have the effect of a rent sale. This provision must be read with Sub- section (1) of Sec.26 of the Act, and E. 24 of the rules in Schedule 2 to the Act, which rules have a statutory effect [vide Sec. 47 of the Act). Rule 24 empowers the Certificate Officer when executing a certificate to sell the whole or a portion of the property liable to sale. Under Sub- section (1) of Sec.26 where property is sold in execution of a certificate, there vests in the purchaser "merely the right, title and interest of the certificate-debtor at the time of the sale, even though the property itself be specified." The two provisions clearly empower the Certificate Officer to execute the certificate only against a portion of the property liable for the certificate-debt, such a sale operating as a money sale. This is all that has happened in the case before us. 7 Our attention has been drawn to Ambika V. Laxmi Ahir, 26 Pat. 66: (A. I. Rule (35) 1948 Pat. 223) and Parmeshwar Singh V/s. Jajo Singh, 29 Pat. L. T. 9 : (A. I. Rule (36) 1949 Pat. 89). These are authorities for the proposition that no suit can be entertained for the recovery of rent for a non-existent tenancy. They have no application to the present case. 66: (A. I. Rule (35) 1948 Pat. 223) and Parmeshwar Singh V/s. Jajo Singh, 29 Pat. L. T. 9 : (A. I. Rule (36) 1949 Pat. 89). These are authorities for the proposition that no suit can be entertained for the recovery of rent for a non-existent tenancy. They have no application to the present case. Here, we are past to stage of a suit to recover arrears of rent. The certificate which was duly filed is a decree for rent, and has been held to be for the correct rent of the whole tenure. We are now at the stage of execution. 8. The learned Advocate-General has spoken of certain irregularities, for example, he complains that the order of 29-5-1939, was passed without notice to the applicant and that there is no provision under which the Certificate Officer could proceed only against some of the certificate-debtors. At the best, these are irregularities. Apart from Sec. 45, the only provision for challenging a sale on the ground of an irregularity is Sec.29. This provision is analogous to that in ORDER 21, E. 90, Civil P. C, but goes much further, for it extends to material irregularities in the certificate proceedings" and not merely "in publishing and conducting the sale". Further, the Certificate Officer is empowered to entertain an objection even after the expiry of sixty days after the sale (vide Sub- section (2) of the section). The plaintiff is barred from relief Under Sec. 45 as he has been found to have appeared in the proceedings (vide cl. (b) of the proviso to Sec. 45) and the sale having been confirmed after the dismissal of his objection Under Sec.29 has become absolute (vide Sec.31). 9. The learned Advocate-General has also cited Baijnath Sahai V/s. Ramgut Singh, 23 I. A. 45 : (23 Cal. 775 P. C.) and Sudhir Chandra V/s. Sudhanshu Kumar, 44 C. w. N. 1097 : (A. I. R. (27) 1940 Clause. 556) and has stressed the observation of Lord Davey, about the necessity for the Certificate Officer to comply precisely with the forms prescribed by the Public Demands Recovery Act. These were both cases where the Court found that there was no certificate. Now, the certificate is the basis of the Certificate Officers power to proceed in execution. 556) and has stressed the observation of Lord Davey, about the necessity for the Certificate Officer to comply precisely with the forms prescribed by the Public Demands Recovery Act. These were both cases where the Court found that there was no certificate. Now, the certificate is the basis of the Certificate Officers power to proceed in execution. The defect was one which went to the root of jurisdiction and entirely invalidated the proceedings of the Certificate Officer. But here we are concerned only with irregularities. The provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act to which I have referred show that the Legislature was not anxious that the civil Court should interfere with the proceedings of the Certificate Officer on the ground of irregularities. By Sec.29 and 31 it has kept such matters for the consideration of the Certificate Officer himself, and even where that important notice, the notice Under Section 7, is alleged not to have been served it has refused relief to the certificate-debtor Under Sec. 45 if he appears in the certificate proceedings. 10. On the above grounds, I think that the appeal has no merits and must be dismissed with costs. Narayan, J. 11 I agree.