JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by one Sushil Chandra Ghosh, who is described as the first party, against an order passed in proceedings u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By this order, the learned Magistrate, Sri V.S.C. Bonerji, Sub-divisional Magistrate of Baraset, "dropped" the proceedings u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and referred the parties to the civil court. 2. Sushil Chandra Ghosh filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Officer of Baraset, in which he stated that there was a public pathway existing from time immemorial which is marked plot No. 1036 in the cadastral survey map and which was recorded in khatiyan No. 9 of the said mouza and described therein by the words Sushil Chandra Ghosh further alleged that he has got some land measuring about fifty bighas and several buildings with brick kilns to the south of the said pathway and that he has been using the pathway as a member of the public for a long time as one of the approaches to his adjoining land. He added that the second party No. 1, namely, Tushar Kanti Ghosh, is the owner of plot No. 1037 lying to the adjoining north of the said pathway and that second party No. 2, Ajit Kumar Datta, is the owner of plot Nos. 1032 and 1038, which also border on the same pathway, while the second party No. 3 Nripendra Nath Majumdar was the agent of second parties Nos. 1 and 2. He states that recently members of the second party put up a barbed wire fencing on the western extremity of the pathway where it joins the Jessore Road and also uprooted trees and were removing all traces of the pathway. 3. Upon this application being filed, the learned Magistrate drew up proceedings u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing the second party to remove the obstructions within fourteen days or to appear and have the conditional order set aside or modified. The second party was directed to appear on July 29, 1949. Tushar Kanti Ghosh applied to the court to permit him to appear by a lawyer and to exempt him from personal appearance on the ground that he had been asked by the Government of India to attend the Inter-Dominion Conference at New Delhi and certain other preliminary conferences. The second party was directed to appear on July 29, 1949. Tushar Kanti Ghosh applied to the court to permit him to appear by a lawyer and to exempt him from personal appearance on the ground that he had been asked by the Government of India to attend the Inter-Dominion Conference at New Delhi and certain other preliminary conferences. In support of his application there was a letter from the Government of India as also a telegram. The learned Magistrate granted this prayer. On the date fixed for hearing, the other two members of the second party appeared and disclaimed all complicity in erecting any obstruction to any pathway. Nripendra Nath Majumdar of the second party stated that he had no interest in the land surrounding this alleged pathway and that he had nothing to do with the matter. The other member of the second party, Ajit Kumar Datta, stated that he was not interested in the matter as Tushar Kanti Ghosh had purchased the land which belonged to him. He denied the existence of any public pathway and said that, so long as he was in possession of the adjoining land, he did not see any pathway being used by the public. 4. On behalf of Tushar Kanti Ghosh a written statement was filed by his lawyer in which he denied that there was any public pathway and stated that the pathway shown in the cadastral survey map was a private pathway for the use of only the owner of plot 1032 and that he had purchased that plot. He relied upon the cadastral survey map which showed that the alleged public pathway came to an end at plot No. 1032 and that it served as a passage for the owner of plot 1032 by which persons could pass from plot 1032 to the Jessore Road; he said that the pathway was not used for any purpose by the public and that, except the owners of plot 1032, no one else needed it. The learned Magistrate, after hearing lawyers for the different parties and seeing the cadastral survey map, passed the following order: Considered the causes shown by the second party. The learned Magistrate, after hearing lawyers for the different parties and seeing the cadastral survey map, passed the following order: Considered the causes shown by the second party. In view of paras 13, 14 and 15 of the written statement (showing cause), the court is convinced that the facts of the case are such as should be decided by a civil court and not in a criminal court. Drop proceedings u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The parties are referred to the civil courts accordingly. I may mention here that at the hearing, the lawyer on behalf of Sushil Chandra Ghosh raised a vehement objection against the order of the learned Magistrate dispensing with the personal attendance of Tushar Kanti Ghosh. That objection was overruled by the learned Magistrate. 5. In this Court, the order of the learned Magistrate is challenged mainly on the following grounds: (1) That the learned Magistrate should not have dispensed with the personal attendance of Tushar Kanti Ghosh and that the hearing in his absence was not according to the procedure prescribed u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the following sections. (2) That the learned Magistrate should have questioned the said Tushar Kanti Ghosh personally on the date fixed for showing cause and as that was not done the subsequent order of the Magistrate must be taken to have been passed without jurisdiction. Reliance for this proposition was laid upon the provisions of Section 139A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (3) That evidence should have been taken before the learned Magistrate decided not to proceed with the enquiry pursuant to the order made by him u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (4) That the Magistrate had no authority to drop the proceedings and that, even if everything else were conceded in favour of the opposite party, the proper order for the Magistrate to pass was to stay the proceedings. 6. As regards the first ground I am of opinion that there is no substance whatsoever in it. (4) That the Magistrate had no authority to drop the proceedings and that, even if everything else were conceded in favour of the opposite party, the proper order for the Magistrate to pass was to stay the proceedings. 6. As regards the first ground I am of opinion that there is no substance whatsoever in it. It is true that there is no express provision in the Code for dispensing with the personal appearance of parties against whom proceedings have been drawn up u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but I think the court has inherent power to dispense with such attendance and to permit parties to appear by lawyer in quasi-criminal proceedings like these. In my opinion, there were ample and good grounds for dispensing with the personal appearance of Tushar Kanti Ghosh. I am further of opinion that the application of Tushar Kanti Ghosh to be absolved from personal appearance was made not for the purpose of evading any liability, but on perfectly bona fide grounds. It was made with the intention of not delaying proceedings. There can be no doubt that on the relevant dates Tushar Kanti Ghosh was required by the Government of India to be present at New Delhi. He could easily have obtained an adjournment on this ground, but instead of allowing proceedings to be delayed he chose the more reasonable course of asking that his personal attendance may be dispensed with and that this case may be represented by a lawyer. In my opinion, the objection of the Petitioner Sushil Chandra Ghosh to the Magistrate granting this prayer indicates that his application was not motivated to protect the interests of the public, but it was to further his own personal ends, whatever they may be. I hold, therefore, that the first ground has no substance. 7. There is some substance in ground No. 2. Section 139A of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the Magistrate shall question the person against whom an order was made to state whether he denied the existence of any public right in respect of the way alleged to have been obstructed. Here, the learned Magistrate could not question Tushar Kanti Ghosh personally on the matter, as he was being represented by a pleader; he could have questioned the lawyer; but there is nothing to show that he did so. Here, the learned Magistrate could not question Tushar Kanti Ghosh personally on the matter, as he was being represented by a pleader; he could have questioned the lawyer; but there is nothing to show that he did so. This, however, seems to me to be a mere technical irregularity, of which no notice need be taken. The opposite party in his written statement expressly denied the existence of a public way. That being so and his personal appearance having been dispensed with, it seems to me that it was quite unnecessary for the learned Magistrate formally to question the lawyer of the opposite party regarding whether his client denied the existence of the public way. The denial was before the Magistrate in the written statement. 8. The third ground, viz., that the Magistrate was bound to take evidence u/s 139A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to come to a decision as to whether there was any reliable evidence in support of the denial of the opposite party regarding the existence of the public right of way is, in my opinion, not tenable. There is nothing in Section 139A of the Code which lays down any procedure of this description. All that Section 139A says may be put thus: If a party, asked to show cause, denies the existence of any public right of way, the Magistrate shall hold an enquiry and if in such enquiry he finds that there is reliable evidence in support of such denial he shall stay the proceedings until the matter of the existence of such right of way is decided by a competent civil court. It is quite clear from the wording of the section that the learned Magistrate has not to decide anything finally at this enquiry held u/s 139A. All he has to ascertain in this enquiry is whether a person denying the existence of public right of way has reliable evidence in support of such denial. He need not take any evidence. All he has to satisfy himself is that evidence exists in support of this denial and that the evidence is reliable. In this connection I would refer to an Allahabad decision, namely, the case of The Emperor v. Bodha Rai ILR (1949) All. 735. He need not take any evidence. All he has to satisfy himself is that evidence exists in support of this denial and that the evidence is reliable. In this connection I would refer to an Allahabad decision, namely, the case of The Emperor v. Bodha Rai ILR (1949) All. 735. That Court held that nothing is laid down in the Code as to the form which the enquiry should take and no restrictions are imposed upon the discretion of the Magistrate as to how he should conduct the enquiry except such as can be inferred from the purpose for which the enquiry is intended. Then the learned Judge goes on to say that the Magistrate must determine not only whether there is some evidence in support of the denial, but whether the evidence is reliable and for such purpose, there is nothing to prevent him from allowing witnesses examined at the enquiry from being cross examined. I need not go into the rest of the judgment. All I need say is that this judgment supports the view I have taken, namely, that there is no procedure laid down for an enquiry u/s 139A and that it is not necessary in every case that evidence should be given in support of such denial. What this Court has to see is whether the enquiry held by the Magistrate was a fair one and whether such enquiry established that there was reliable evidence in support of the case of the person denying the existence of a public right of way. In some cases, oral evidence may have to be given. In some cases, the production of documents which are difficult to be challenged will be sufficient, provided they are sufficient to justify the court in holding that the person proceeded against has reliable evidence to support his plea. In the present case, the learned Magistrate has not taken any oral evidence, but he has relied upon the statement made in the written statement of the opposite parties and upon the cadastral survey map, the situation of the different plots and the ownership thereof. If the Magistrate acting upon this has come to a reasonable decision, it is not for this Court to interfere. If the Magistrate acting upon this has come to a reasonable decision, it is not for this Court to interfere. In my opinion, cadastral survey map, which shows the pathway, affords reasonable ground for holding that there was reliable evidence in support of the claim that this path was not a public way. The plots on either side of this pathway abuts on the Jessore Road this path is not at all necessary to serve the plots on either side, that is to say, to serve the plot of Sushil Chandra Ghosh. This pathway is plot No. 1036. It starts from the Jessore Road, which is at its western extremity. On the north of the pathway is plot No. 1037 and on the south is plot No. 1035. Plot 1035 belongs to Sushil Chandra Ghosh. It is clear from the cadastral survey map that plot 1035 abuts on the Jessore Road and therefore, there is no necessity for any one to use this pathway to enter or leave plot 1035, nor was there any necessity for the owners of plot 1037 to use this pathway. The pathway travels from west to east, then takes a northerly direction and comes to an end at plot No. 1032 which formerly belonged to some one else and now belongs to Tushar Kanti Ghosh. It also passes by plot No. 1038, which also belongs to Tushar Kanti Ghosh. It is thus clear that this pathway can only be of use to plots 1032 and possibly 1038. It could not have been of any use to either plot 1037 or 1035. In these circumstances, I do not think that the learned Magistrate acted unreasonably in holding that the denial of Tushar Kanti Ghosh regarding the public way was a denial which could be supported by reliable evidence. In this connection, I would like to observe that these proceedings are held by a Magistrate in the interests of the public and not in the interests of any particular person. The proceedings are of a quasi-criminal nature and they should not be used for the purpose of establishing the title of a particular individual. The proceedings are meant for the purpose of protecting the public at large. I would refer to the observations made in the case of Ramu v. Murli Das ILR (1943) Cal. 22. The proceedings are of a quasi-criminal nature and they should not be used for the purpose of establishing the title of a particular individual. The proceedings are meant for the purpose of protecting the public at large. I would refer to the observations made in the case of Ramu v. Murli Das ILR (1943) Cal. 22. Although I do not entirely agree with all that has been said in this judgment, I fully concur in the general principle laid down that these are proceedings between the public at large and the person who is alleged to have created a nuisance or obstructed a public way and that in dealing with these proceedings this fundamental fact should not be forgotten. 9. The last ground taken by the Petitioner Sushil Chandra Ghosh is that the order dropping the proceedings is wrong and that all that the Magistrate could do was to pass an order for the stay of proceedings. This view is perfectly correct. There is no provision in the Code for dropping proceedings in the circumstances stated above. I, therefore, alter the order of the learned Magistrate and direct that the proceedings be stayed "until the matter of the existence of a public right in respect of this pathway has been decided by a competent civil Court. 10. I may mention that, in the course of the argument, several other cases were cited before me, but they dealt with the law as it was prior to the introduction of Section 139A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Those cases are not directly applicable but the principle to be deduced from most of those cases is that where a party proceeded against raises a bona fide case that a pathway is not a public pathway, the Magistrate should not proceed further under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but refer the parties to the civil court. This principle has now been adopted in Section 139A of the Code and it has been followed in the present case by the learned Magistrate. 11. I discharge the Rule, but with this amendment that the proceedings are not dropped but stayed for the purpose mentioned in the preceding part of this judgment.