JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by Ramanlal Phumra, against whom a warrant has been issued asking him to stand his trial on a charge of abetment of cheating. 2. The facts briefly are as follows: On September 17, 1948, one C.T. Amin filed a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate charging Gopal Bhatiya with the offence of cheating. His allegation was that Gopal Bhatiya took certain goods from the complainant promising to pay for them at the time of taking delivery. He took delivery and then disappeared and has not paid for the goods. On these allegations Gopal Bhatiya was complained against by Amin. A warrant was issued against Gopal Bhatiya charging him with cheating. Gopal Bhatiya absconded and has not been traced. Thereafter, on September 17, 1948, certain premises, namely, 56, Barhtala Street was searched, but no goods of the description mentioned in the complaint were found there. Then the complainant filed a petition before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, stating that his pleader was told by the sub-inspector, who had conducted the search at 2 Barhtala Street, that one Ramanlal Phunira had admitted before him that he had purchased goods of the description mentioned above from Gropal Bhatiya. The officer told Ramanlal not to remove the goods. Later on, the officer went to Ramanlal's premises and found there were no such goods there. After obtaining this information from the police officer a petition was filed on behalf of the complainant before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate praying that, in these circumstances, a warrant should issue against Ramanlal Phunira to stand his trial for the offence of abetment of cheating. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate issued a warrant and against this order the present Rule has been obtained. Learned advocate for the Petitioner states that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue this warrant inasmuch as he had not examined on oath the complainant who had filed the subsequent application. His contention is that if the subsequent application be treated as a petition of complaint, process could only be issued after the examination on oath of the complainant. 3. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the complainant contends that the second application, whether it be a complaint or not, justified the learned Magistrate in issuing process against Ramanlal, as it disclosed that Ramanlal was concerned. with Bhatiya in the offence of cheating. 3. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the complainant contends that the second application, whether it be a complaint or not, justified the learned Magistrate in issuing process against Ramanlal, as it disclosed that Ramanlal was concerned. with Bhatiya in the offence of cheating. He argued that, as the learned Magistrate had already taken cognisance of the offence, there was no necessity for him to examine the complainant for a second time on oath. In support of his contention he relied on the case of Charu Chandra Das v. Narendra Krishna Chahravarti (1900) 4 C.W.N. 367, which, according to the learned advocate, has laid down this principle. 4. I am unable to accept this contention. The case relied upon does not lay down any principle which would justify the Magistrate in issuing a warrant against Ramanlal in the circumstances mentioned above. In the case cited, there was a complaint made against X, cognisance was taken on the complaint and the trial was started. In the course of the trial, the evidence disclosed that T also was concerned in the offence. The Magistrate upon the evidence before him issued process against Y. Against this order, this Court was moved and this Court decided that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to do this. What their Lordships said was that the Magistrate had already taken cognisance properly of an offence and-- having taken cognisance of the offence, it was his duty to proceed to deal with the evidence brought before him and to see that justice was done in regard to any person who might be proved by the evidence to be concerned in that offence. 5. There was thus evidence before the learned Magistrate upon which he proceeded to issue process against Y. The position here is quite different. There is no evidence before the Magistrate that Ramanlal is in any way connected with the offence committed by Bhatiya. There was merely a petition filed which is not supported by any testimony on oath. As I understand it, the principle underlying the law regarding these matters is this no person shall be harassed by being brought into court for trial on insufficient materials. That is the general principle. There was merely a petition filed which is not supported by any testimony on oath. As I understand it, the principle underlying the law regarding these matters is this no person shall be harassed by being brought into court for trial on insufficient materials. That is the general principle. Even if there is a petition of complaint filed before the Magistrate implicating somebody, the law says that process shall not issue until the court has examined the complainant on oath in support of the complaint. This clearly indicates that a mere petition making allegations is not sufficient ground for issuing process. There must be something in the nature of evidence before the Magistrate before he issues process. Certain exceptions are made to this general rule and they are mentioned in Section 190 and other parts of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate may, for instance, issue process upon a report in writing by a police officer. In that case no further evidence is necessary.. He may also act upon his own information and, lastly, he may act upon the complaint made by another court. These are exceptional cases. In the present case the position is quite different. There is a mere application drafted by a pleader before the court in which certain allegations are made. It cannot have any more effect than a petition of complaint and if a petition of complaint requires the taking of a statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation, a petition of this description would also require such solemn affirmation. 6. I hold, therefore, that the order issuing the warrant against the Petitioner is a bad order and I set it aside. I express no opinion as to whether the second petition should be treated as affording sufficient material for indicating even prima facie the complicity of Ramanlal Phumra in the offence of cheating by Bhatiya. That is a matter which will have to be decided, if and when proper proceedings are instituted against the Petitioner. The Rule is made absolute.