JUDGMENT : S. Govinda Menon, J. This Second Appeal arises from an order passed by the Additional District Munsiff of Nagercoil on C.M.P. 2261/1118 filed by the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debt in O.S. No. 310 of 1111 seeking to get a refund of the excess amount alleged to have been collected by the decree-holder. The Munsiff upheld the claim. However, on appeal by the decree-holder (A.S. No. 219/1119) the Temporary second Judge of Nagercoil instead of granting any relief to him modified the order of the Munsiff somewhat to his detriment. Hence this second appeal by him. 2. Under the decree in O.S. No. 310 of 1111 the decree-holder was entitled to recover possession of the decree schedule property with mesne profits, both past and future, at the rate of 4 1/2 kottas of paddy a year. The price of paddy had not been fixed in the decree. The complaint of the petitioner is that in realising the decree debt value of paddy had been claimed at an excessive rate by the decree-holder. Hence their application for refund. 3. The controversy between the parties centres round two questions, viz., (1) what exactly is the nirak rate-or market rate to be adopted for fixing the money equivalent of the paddy recoverable by way of mesne profits or in other words the rate prevailing on which date is to be accepted; and (2) which of the several execution applications filed by the decree-holder is to be treated as his first execution application for recovering the debt. 4. Point No. 1. This matter is now concluded by the latest ruling of the erstwhile Travancore High Court reported as Mathunni v. Kocheepen, 1948 T.L.R. 110. According to the Full Bench decision in that case the value of paddy should be calculated as on the date of the first execution application. That is the view taken by the District Munsiff relying on the decision in Mathen v. Kuriyen 12 T.L.J. 59. The learned Judge of the lower appellate court following the decision in Agnisarmaru Namboodiri v. Rama Iyer, 1945 T.L.R. 712 held that the rates should be those prevailing on the due dates. As already said, the Full Bench decision in Mathunni v. Kocheepen, 1948 T.L.R. 110 has set at the rest the controversy regarding this matter. Therefore, the Munsiff’s decision on this point has to be restored. 5. Point No. 2. As already said, the Full Bench decision in Mathunni v. Kocheepen, 1948 T.L.R. 110 has set at the rest the controversy regarding this matter. Therefore, the Munsiff’s decision on this point has to be restored. 5. Point No. 2. The decree in the suit was passed on 20.11.1111. The first application for execution was filed by the decree-holder on 19.11.1114. The prayer contained in that application was for the realisation of the mesne profits and other amounts decreed to him by attachment of the properties of the deceased judgment-debtor. However, it was dismissed by court on 20.11.1115 for the reasons that the decree-holder omitted to apply as directed for recovery of possession of the property decreed to be surrendered. Subsequently the decree-holder filed three more execution petitions, viz., one on 11.12.115, another on 8.2.1117 and a third one on 1.12.1117. The present contention of the appellant is that for the purpose of fixing the commutation rate the date of the first execution application to be reckoned is not 19.11.1114 but 11.12.1115, the date of his second petition by which he successfully applied for execution. There is no substance in this contention. The first application filed by him for execution on 19.11.1114 was, as already said, an application for the recovery of the mesne profits awarded to him under the decree and the prayer contained therein was for attachment of the properties of the judgment-debtor. In our view, that application should treated as the first execution application as contemplated by the decision in Mathunni v. Kocheepen, 1948 T.L.R. 110 for the purpose of fixing the nirak rate. The rejection of that application by the executing court for the omission on the part of the decree-holder to comply with its direction is certainly no ground for holding that it was not a proper execution application. The question whether under that application the decree-holder obtained any relief is totally irrelevant. The Munsiff’s decision regarding this matter also is correct. 6. In view of the modification made by the District Judge in the order of the District Munsiff this Second Appeal has to be allowed. We allow the same and setting aside the decision of the court below restore that of the District Munsiff. In the circumstances we direct the parties to bear their costs both here and in the court below. Appeal allowed.