JUDGMENT : 1. The respondent made an application to the Debt Conciliation Board, Indore, for conciliation of the debt owed by him to the appellant. An agreement was reached at between the parties on 4-9-1942, the debtor agreeing to pay Rs. 250 by annual instalments of Rs. 25 commencing from Fagoon Sudi 15 Samvat 1999. (1943 A. d.) The agreement was registered on 8-9-1942. The fourth instalment falling due in the year 1946 was not paid by the debtor. The creditor made an application on 5-6-1946, to the Subba under S. 16, Debt Conoiliation Act, (hereinafter called the Act), to recover the amount due as an arrear of land revenue. It was dismissed, having been made more than 90 days after the date of the default. 2. On 31-10-1947, the appellant-creditor, to recover the amount due to him, made an application to the Munsiff, Indore, for execution of the agreement. The respondent-debtor objected to the exeoution on the ground that the application to the Subha had been dismissed. The learned Munsiff disallowed the objection holding that under S. 14 (2) of the Act the agreement after registration took effect as if it were a decree of a civil Court. On appeal the learned District Judge, Indore, reversed the order holding that in view of the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of S. 16 of the Act a decree for the amount due cornea into existence for the first time when the amount is certified to be irrecoverable by the Subha. The creditor has come up in second appeal to this Court against the order of the learned Judge. 3. There is an apparent conflict between section 14 (2) and section 16 (4). This conflict was noticed and discussed in two cases decided by the Nagpur High Court and reported in Ramchandra v. Zolba, A. I. R. (26) 1939 Nag. 220: (188 I. C. 509) and Laxman Sonaji v. Hari Nathuji, A. I. R. (30) 1943 Nag. 324 : (I.L.R. (1943) Nag. 696). These have been discussed by the learned District Judge in his judgment. I do not propose to discuss these because I am of the opinion that there is no actual conflict in the two provisions of the law. Under S. 14 (2) of the Act it is the agreement which on registration acquires the effect of a decree of a civil Court. I do not propose to discuss these because I am of the opinion that there is no actual conflict in the two provisions of the law. Under S. 14 (2) of the Act it is the agreement which on registration acquires the effect of a decree of a civil Court. Each amount recorded in the agreement as payable to the creditors is not to have the force of a decree as it has under S. 16 (4) of the Act. An unpaid creditor can only apply for the execution of the agreement as a composite decree and the assets realised in the execution by the civil Court could be held by it for the benefit of all the creditors who may be entitled to receive payments on the date. This becomes abundantly clear on a perusal of S. 16 of the Act. Provision is made therein for recovery of an amount due under the agreement by the application to the Subba. The Subba will not pay the amount realised to the applicant alone. The manner in which the amount realised will be applied by him is set forth in the several clauses of sub-s. (a) of S. 16. Section 16 reads as follows: "(1) If a debtor defaults in paying any amount due in accordance with the terms of an agreement registered under sub-s. (2) of S 14, such amount shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue on the application of the creditor made within ninety days from the date of the default. (2) Where the Subha has, under sub-s. (1) recovered any amount which was payable in accordance with the terms of the agreement, he shall proceed to make payments as follows; (a) He shall in the first instance, apply the sum realised from the sale of any portion of the immovable property referred to in the S. 15 to the payment of any amount payable under the agreement on account of a debt which is secured by a mortgage, lien or charge on such property in order of priority determined in accordance with the provisions of the T. P. Act, and if the said sum is insufficient to meet such payments, the amounts which have remained unpaid shall rank equally with unsecured debt. (b) If there is a surplus after the payments have been made under cl. (b) If there is a surplus after the payments have been made under cl. (a) the Subha shall apply to the payment of any other amounts payable under the agreement the sum of the surplus and of the proceeds realised from the sale of such portion of any other property of the debtor as will, together with the surplus, be sufficient to meet the payment of such amounts, (c) If the sum of the surplus and the sale proceeds referred to in cl. (b) is insufficient to meet the payment of other amounts referred to therein, such other amounts and any amount payable on account of any unsecured debt for the recovery of which a decree has been passed by a civil Court and of which details are given in the agreement shall rank equally-between themselves for the purposes of payment. (d) Any further surplus remaining after the payments have been made under cls. (a), (b) and (c) shall be paid by the Subba to the debtor. (3) Where the Subha falls, under sub-s. (1) to recover as an arrear of land revenue any part of the amount referred to therein, be shall certify that it is irrecoverable and thereupon the agreement shall cease to subsist. (4) Where an agreement ceases to subsist, any amount which was payable under such agreement but has not been paid shall be recoverable as if a decree of a civil Court had been pissed for its payment." From the language used, it is clear to my mind that the assets realised are available for the benefit of all the unpaid creditors in the order mentioned in the clauses. When any amount due under the agreement cannot be recovered and a certificate is issued to that effect by the Subha, the agreement, it is declared by S. 16 (3), shall cease to subsist and these words are significant. If unity for the purposes of realisation and distribution of the debts was not the characteristic of the agreement, there was no occasion to declare that the agreement shall cease to subsist. All that was necessary to say would be that on certification by the Subba that any debt due under the agreement was irrecoverable, the unsatisfied creditors could have recourse to the civil Court, for the recovery of their unpaid debts why should it be necessary to declare that the agreement has ceased to subsist? All that was necessary to say would be that on certification by the Subba that any debt due under the agreement was irrecoverable, the unsatisfied creditors could have recourse to the civil Court, for the recovery of their unpaid debts why should it be necessary to declare that the agreement has ceased to subsist? The object, of the provision is that no more property of the debtor being available for sale, the creditors released from the union and each one of them holds thereafter a separate decree in place of the common one. Under S. 14 (1) there is to be one agreement only. The agreement cannot be recorded unless the creditors to whom not less than forty per cent, of the total debts are due come to an amicable settlement. A list of the immovable properties of the debtor with particulars of any mortgage, lien or charge subsisting thereon are to be recorded in the agreement. From these two provisions it appears to me that the proceedings is in the nature of an insolvency proceeding, the properties of the debtor enuring for the benefit of the asserting creditors. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the agreement can be executed as a decree by the civil Court also but assets will be applied to the benefit of all the unpaid creditors. This is not so expressly stated but follows as a matter of necessity from the provisions of S. 16 (2) and (3). The drafting of these sections is obviously most inadequate and lacking in precision. The machinery of distribution prescribed in S. 16 (2) is inadequately expressed, but the intention of the Legislature not being in doubt, the Court has the inherent power to invent the machinery and adapt the award provisions of the law according to the needs of justice, equity and good conscience. In Kunj Behari Lal v. Kishan Behari Lal, 39 Cal. 33 at p. 49: (4 I. C. 491) it was observed "Since laws are general rules, they cannot regulate the time to come so as to make express provisions against all inconveniences which are infinite In number and that their dispositions should express all the cases that may possibly happen. In Kunj Behari Lal v. Kishan Behari Lal, 39 Cal. 33 at p. 49: (4 I. C. 491) it was observed "Since laws are general rules, they cannot regulate the time to come so as to make express provisions against all inconveniences which are infinite In number and that their dispositions should express all the cases that may possibly happen. It is, therefore, the duty of the judges to apply the laws not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions, but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended within the express sense of law or within the consequences that may be gathered from it." To sum up, an unpaid creditor whose name appears in the agreement may, as it suits him, execute the agreement as a decree either in a civil Court or by application to the Subba under S. 16 of the Act but assets realised will enure for the benefit of all the unpaid creditors in the order mentioned in S. 16 of the Act. Separate decrees come into existence only when the agreement has ceased to subsist under S. 16 (3). 4. The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside. The execution shall proceed. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant throughout.