This is a second appeal arising out of a suit instituted by plaintiff-respondent for a declaration of his title to and possession of the suit land by removal of the structures exist­ing thereon. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the decree was affirmed in appeal. [2] The suit relates to 171/2 lessas of land from dag No. 557 of Haibargaon mouza. It is included in patta No. 105. The total area of the dag is 1 K. 1L. [S] The plaintiffs' case is that the land in dispute along with other plots of patta No. 105 belonged to one Hussain Ali, who is dead. After his death it devolved on his heirs. Furkan Ali one of his sons and an heir managed the pro­perty on behalf of other heirs. In 1939 there was a partition amongst the sons, daughters and the widow of the deceased Hussain Ali. The suit land fell to the share of the pro forma defen­dants 2-4 and their mother Mt. Hedikannessa. Abdul Gafur, one of the contesting defendants, was taken in as a tenant of the land on a monthly rent of Rs. 8 by Furkan Ali who repre­sented other heirs of Hussain Ali. On partition the rent became payable to pro forma defen­dants 2-4 and their mother. [4]"On 11th June 1942 when Nowab Ali plain­tiff purchased the suit land from the heirs of Hussain Ali to whom it had been allotted on partition, a sum of Rs. 100 was due on account of arrears of rent from Gafur. The arrangement then made was that plaintiff should pay up the arrears of rent and that he should recover from Gafur later. After purchasing the property plaintiff asked Gafur to vacate the land. He then repudiated the title of the plaintiff by set­ting up the title of contesting defendants 2-5, who alleged that they had purchased the land on 11th June 1941 from a son and a daughter of Jahurnnessa, who was a sister of Hussain Ali. [5] The contesting defendants pleaded that the land of patta 105 belonged to Farmud Ali and not to his son Hussain Ali and that the plot in, suit corresponded to dag 489 of the settlement of 1887-88. After Farmud Ali's death the land devolved on his son, Hussain Ali and Jahurnesaa his daughter. Mt. [5] The contesting defendants pleaded that the land of patta 105 belonged to Farmud Ali and not to his son Hussain Ali and that the plot in, suit corresponded to dag 489 of the settlement of 1887-88. After Farmud Ali's death the land devolved on his son, Hussain Ali and Jahurnesaa his daughter. Mt. Jahurnnessa was entitled to share in the property and she and after her death her heirs, a son and a daughter, remained in joint possession of the property along with the other co-heirs, the descen­dants of Hussain Ali and his widow. Contesting defendants got a conveyance of the share of Mt. Jahurnneasa from her heirs on 11th June 1941 and Gafur defendant 1 was a tenant on their behalf. These defendants raised several legal objections also. [6] At an early stage of the case, the plaintiff finding that the land in suit was included in a patta in Farmud's favour modified his case by a rejoinder. He admitted that the property originally belonged to Farmud but contended that it devolved on his son Hussain who was its full owner as his sister Mt. Jaharnnessa relinquished all rights in favour of her brother. [7] On the pleadings of the parties no less than 10 issues were framed. We are now con­cerned only with issue 8 in which is involved the question which calls for determination at this stage. [8] Issue 8 is as follows : " Whether the plaintiff has acquired any right, title and interest to and in the suit." It was under this issue that the Courts below found that plaintiff was entitled to protection under S. 41, T. P. Act. [9] In the lower appellate Court it was argued on behalf of the contesting defendants that the plaintiff had not specifically pleaded that he was a bona fide transferee from an ostensible owner of the property and that the transfer satisfied the requirements of S, 41, T. P, Act. The point was not specifically put in issue either. The plea, therefore, was not admissible. The learned Judge, Assam Valley Districts, in appeal held that the point arose from the evidence recorded and it was covered by the general issue. He also ob­served that all evidence necessary for the deci­sion of the case was on the record and that he did not consider that any more evidence could be produced. The learned Judge, Assam Valley Districts, in appeal held that the point arose from the evidence recorded and it was covered by the general issue. He also ob­served that all evidence necessary for the deci­sion of the case was on the record and that he did not consider that any more evidence could be produced. [10] Before us the learned counsel for the appellants has observed in passing that the plea, should not have been considered by the Courts below. He did not seriously press the point. It appears to us that the plea was essentially involved in issue 8. The case of the plaintiff in its modified form was that Hussain Ali was the full owner even though he had inherited the pro­perty from his father and there was a sister Mt. Jahurnnessa in existence when the succes­sion opened. It was open to him to urge that if Hussain Ali or his heirs were not the full owners he was at least an ostensible owner who con­veyed the property to him under the circum-, stances which bring his case under S. 41, T, P. Act. In these circumstances, the plea of purchase though not specifically put forward in the plaint could be taken as involved in the issue and its consideration would be permissible. [11] The only question which has been argued before us is whether S. 41, T. P. Act, affords any protection to the plaintiff respondent in this case. The section reads as follows : "Where, with the consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be void­able on the ground that the transferor was not autho­rised to make it: provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer has acted in good faith." It is not denied that the transfer was for consi­deration. But before plaintiff can claim the benefit of S. 41, T. P. Act, it is to be seen whether other requirements of the section exist. The foundation of the principle embodied in 8. 41 obviously is that the person who transfers im­movable property should be its ostensible owner with the consent, express or implied, of the person interested therein. But before plaintiff can claim the benefit of S. 41, T. P. Act, it is to be seen whether other requirements of the section exist. The foundation of the principle embodied in 8. 41 obviously is that the person who transfers im­movable property should be its ostensible owner with the consent, express or implied, of the person interested therein. The learned counsel contends that the evidence on record does not show that the pro forma defendants from whom plaintiff acquired title were ostensible owners with the consent, express or implied, of the heirs of Mt. Jahurnnessa. This takes us on to the evidence bearing on this point. [After consider­ing the evidence, the judgment proceeded.] In the circumstances we do not see any reason to differ from the concurrent finding arrived at by the Courts below that the transferors of the plaintiffs were ostensible owners of the entire land with the implied consent of Mt. Jahurn­nessa and her heirs. [12] The learned counsel for the appellants has relied on Amir Jahan Begam v. Khadim Hussain Khan, A. I. R. (18) 1931 Oudh 253 : (132 I. 0. 75), in support of the contention that mere mutation of the name of one of the heirs would not make him an ostensible owner. This case is easily distinguishable. The mutation in that case was attested in the following circum­stances. A Muhammadan died leaving 4 sons and 4 daughters. An agent representing the daughters appeared in the course of the mutation proceedings and stated on their behalf that there was no objection to the mutation of the entire property in favour of one of the four sons of the deceased. It was found that the mere fact of the mutation having been made in the name of one of several heirs was not sufficient to make him ostensible owner of the property specially when the mutation entry disclosed the fact that other persons were co-heirs and claimed owner. ship in the property. The facts of the present case are very different. Here Formud Ali died before 1896-07. Hussain Ali had the property entered in his name. He lived for about 30 years. On his death, the property was entered in the name of one of his co-heirs. Hussain and after him his heirs were in the exclusive enjoyment for about 55 years and were making alienations. Here Formud Ali died before 1896-07. Hussain Ali had the property entered in his name. He lived for about 30 years. On his death, the property was entered in the name of one of his co-heirs. Hussain and after him his heirs were in the exclusive enjoyment for about 55 years and were making alienations. One of the contesting defendants dealt with them as ostensible owner in 1928 and executed a kabujliyat in their favour. This formidable combination of circumstances leaves no room for doubt that Hussain and his heirs were ostensible owners of the property and it is also established beyond any doubt that they were so with the implied consent of Mt. Jahurnnessa. [13] The proviso to S. 41, T. P. Act, further requires that the transferee after taking reason­able care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer should act in good faith. We have no doubt that even this require­ment has been fulfilled in this case. [Their Lord­ships considered the evidence and continued.] The Courts below are agreed that his conduct was that of a reasonable and a prudent man of business and held him entitled to the protection which a bona fide transferee can claim under S. 41, T. P. Act. [14] The learned counsel for the appellants laid great stress on the point that necessary enquiry was not made by the plaintiff. If he had acted like a prudent man, he should have discovered that Formud Ali left a daughter who was entitled to 1/8 share in the property. In sup-port of this contention he has relied on several decided cases. The first important case cited by him is reported in Fazal Hussain v. Mahomad Kazim, A.I.R. (21) 1934 ALL. 193: (56 ALL. 582). It was held in this case that a transferee in order to bring his case within the purview of 8. 41, T. P. Act should show that he acted like a reasonable man of business and with ordinary prudence. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows: "We do not think that any hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the extent to which a transferee from the ostensible owner should 'take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows: "We do not think that any hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the extent to which a transferee from the ostensible owner should 'take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer. Each case must necessarily depend on its own circumstances." On' the facts before them, they held that the transferee or his nephew who had arranged the transaction was not unaware of the fact that the transferor had a sister whose son would be a co-sharer with the transferor. While, therefore, agree­ing with the learned Judges that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the extent to which a transferee from the ostensible owner should take reasonable care, we do not think this case is of any avail to the appellants as it is so obviously distinguishable on facts. [15] The next relied on is Kartar Singh v. Mt. Mehrnishan, A.I.R. (21) 1934 Lah. 885 : (16 Lah. 313). In this it waa held that Khaara Paimash of the municipality was cot a record of title. It carried no presumption of correctness so far as the question of ownership was concerned. Simi­larly, house census records of the police for the levy of a punitive tax are in no wise records of title as they are merely for registering names of occupants on whom tax could be levied. In this view of the matter, it was held that the transferee by examining these records had not discharged his obligation under S. 41, T. P. Act The trans­feree had depended on the municipal records of 1900 and the police records of 1911, whereas in this case the entries in the municipal records relied on are recent. Besides, it is not these entries alone which show that heirs of Hussain Ali were ostensible owners. The evidence on the point that Hussain Ali and his heirs held the property as ostensible owners is indeed overwhelming. [16] The last case to which reference was made was a Full Bench decision from the Lahore High Court reported in Shamsher Chand v. Melir-chand, A. I. R. (3d) 1947 Lah. 147 : (I. L. B. (1917) Lah. 749. The evidence on the point that Hussain Ali and his heirs held the property as ostensible owners is indeed overwhelming. [16] The last case to which reference was made was a Full Bench decision from the Lahore High Court reported in Shamsher Chand v. Melir-chand, A. I. R. (3d) 1947 Lah. 147 : (I. L. B. (1917) Lah. 749. In this case Rai Sahib Lakhmi Chand, a Hindu, died leaving three sons, Meher Chand, Sohan Lai and Narinder Chand. Before his death he had made a will in favour of Shamaher Chand, son of Mehr Chand, In March 1933 he died. The land bequeathed to Shamaher Chand was mutated not in his name but in the names of his father and his two brothers. Shamaher had not yet attained the age of majority. The share of Sohanlal was sold in execution of a decree against him in 1938 without any objection from Shamaher Chand to whom the land had been bequeathed. In 1939 Narinder Chand sold his share to Fazal Muhammad and Abdul Rasid and in December 1941 Shamasher Chand instituted a suit for poss­ession of the land against his father Mehr Chand, the two uncles Sohan Lal and Nariuder Chand and the two alienees from Narinder Ohand. The Full Bench consisted of distinguished Judges. Cornelius J. held that Shamsher Chand must have known of his ownership when he became sui juris as no proof had been adduced by him to the contrary. Auction sale of Sohan Lal's share came after this. He did not object. He, therefore, gave implied consent to the ostensible ownership of Narinder Chand. [17] Din Mohammad J. came to the conclusion after a review of the authorities placed before him for consideration that the transferees could rely on the entries in revenue records which show that Narinder Chand was a co-sharer in the property. He observed as follows: "As I look at the matter the facts and the circum­stances of each cage shall have to be looked into in order to determine whether reliance on such records only would afford sufficient protection to a transferee under - B. 41. In the present case Rai Sahaib Lakhmi Chand was on his death shown in the revenue records to be succeeded by his three sons and this wag quite consistent with the natural course of events. In the present case Rai Sahaib Lakhmi Chand was on his death shown in the revenue records to be succeeded by his three sons and this wag quite consistent with the natural course of events. On no account, there­fore, could the suspicion of the prospective transferees be aroused as to the falsity of this entry, nor could they be put on further enquiry on any valid basis. Even if they bad made such an enquiry from the registration office, they could not come across any transaction regarding this land since the demise of Eai Sahib Lakhmi Chand. I consider, therefore, that if the first requirement of law relating to the express or implied consent of the person interested in immoveable property had been satisfied in this case, the vendees would certainly have been entitled to the benefit of S. 41, but as they have failed on that score, I would allow this appeal." [18] The third Judge (Mahajan J.) agreed with Din Mohammad J. that in ordej effectively to deprive the real owner of the right that he pos­sesses it had to be proved that he had given his consent either express or implied to another person to represent himself as the owner of the said property and that some kind of such assent must be established before the section can be invoked against him. But he differed from him on the point whether reasonable care had been taken by the transferee in the case. On the fact before him, he found that a mere examination of the record of rights by the transferee without any further enquiry was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of S. 41 and that the transferee was not protected on that basis. The learned Judge in the course of the discussion observed as follows : "The degree of care required is that of an ordinary prudent man acting under the circumstances of the particular case. The learned Judge in the course of the discussion observed as follows : "The degree of care required is that of an ordinary prudent man acting under the circumstances of the particular case. The ordinary standard of diligence that would constitute 'reasonable care' for the purpose of ascertaining the transferor's power to transfer would be to enquire about the title of the transferor to the pro­perty and to inspect the title deeds, if any produced." [19] While discussing the question as to whe­ther reliance could be placed on revenue records alone for claiming protection under S. 41, he-agreed with Din Mohammad J. in holding that the facts and circumstances of each case shall have to be looked into in order to determine whether reliance on such records only would afford protection to a transferee under S. 41. [20] The decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court is obviously not helpful. There was a registered will in that case which had not been given effect to in the revenue re­cords. There was then an auction sale to which the real owner did not object. But he had the advantage that his suit to recover possession of the property was within the period of limi­tation allowed to him by law. The three dis­tinguished Judges composing the Bench who are known for their weighty pronouncements differed in their conclusions. The case amply illustrates the futility of laying down a general rule or test of universal application for finding out what would amount to reasonable care on the part of a transferee in order that he should be able to; claim protection under s. 41, T. P. Act. The most that may be said is that a transferee claiming the benefit of S. 41 should show that he acted like a reasonable man of business and with ordinary prudence. Whether a particular transferee has acted like a reasonable and a prudent man of business must depend on the circumstances of each case, and no hard and fast rule may be laid down on the point as this would be an attempt to fetter the discretion which the law confers on a Judge who is called upon to decide the question in the particular case before him. The consensus of legal opinion seems to be in favour of this view. The consensus of legal opinion seems to be in favour of this view. This was the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High. Court in Fazal Ilussain v. Mahomed Kazim A.I.R. (21) 1934 ALL. 193 : (56 ALL, 582) and the-only point on which all the three learned Judges of the Lahore High Court seemed agreed was that facts and circumstances of each case must be looked into in order to determine whether reliance on the record of rights only would afford sufficient protection to a transferee under S. 41. According to this view mere examination of the records may amount to reasonable care in a particular case. [21] In view of the conclusion we have reached all that we have to see is whether the transferee in this case acted like a reasonable and prudent man of business. Both the Courts below have accepted his statement that he made enquiries into the title of his transferors, He found him-self confronted with a massive array of facts; extending over a period of 60 years. There were-two devolutions. There was exclusive enjoyment of the property by Hussain Ali and his heirs. There were kabuliyats and sale deeds. There was a deed of partition and all this must have been known to Mt. Jaharnnessa and her heirs. The transferee could have easily been induced into the belief that his transferors could pass valid title. There was nothing in the history of the property indicating anything to the contrary. The good faith of the transferee in this case is not at all open to any doubt. He was, therefore, fully entitled to protection under S. 41, T. P. Act which the Courts below allowed him. [22] The learned counsel has cited certain authorities bearing on the question of adverse possession. This question was not decided by the Courts below and it is not necessary to consider these cases. [23] As no other point has been argued before us, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. R.G.D. Appeal dismissed.