JUDGMENT : S. Krishna Pillai, J. The appeal arises out of a suit for maintenance instituted by the wife against the husband. The parties are governed by the Hindu Mitakshara Law. The 1st defendant, husband died during the pendency of the suit. Himself, the second defendant, his widowed mother and the 3rd defendant, widow of a deceased brother had filed a joint written statement in which they contested the plaintiff's claim for separate maintenance. The lower court decreed the suit awarding past maintenance for six years and future maintenance at the rate of ten rupees per mensem together with interest and costs. Against this decree the defendants 2 and 3 have come up in appeal. 2. Two questions were argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants. One was that the plaintiff had failed to establish any ground for separate maintenance and the second was that even if the court were to find that the plaintiff was entitled to separate maintenance there was no reason for decreeing any arrears. 3. P.W. 4 is the plaintiff. It is common ground that the 1st defendant was a man of slender means and that he was receiving off and on some allowance as a low paid clerk at different places during this period. The plaintiff belonged to a more well-to-do family. During the period between 1102 and 1111 the husband and wife were living together under the same roof some times in the husband's family house and at other times in other rented house. Exts. A to D letters of the 1st defendant to the plaintiff's father in 1104 would show with what great difficulty the husband was eking out an existence at that period. These letters also indicate how niggardly and half-hearted he was in undertaking the responsibilities of marital life. He felt happy when the father-in-law supported both himself and his wife, but discontended and unhappy when the support failed. It is clear from the pleadings that from 1112 the plaintiff has been living in her father's house and that the husband did not desire to have her company or stay with her or look after her comforts. It is admitted that early in 1112 the movables belonging to the plaintiff were returned to her. According to the defendant his father died in 1117 and the plaintiff was called upon to go and live with him from that period. It is admitted that early in 1112 the movables belonging to the plaintiff were returned to her. According to the defendant his father died in 1117 and the plaintiff was called upon to go and live with him from that period. But we are unable to say that even if it were true it was supported by any good faith. The relationship between the couple was probably cordial and except that the plaintiff did not chose to go in pursuit of her husband there is no blame that can be attributed to her. No doubt she was taken care of in her own house by her father, but that does not exonerate the husband from his liability towards his wife. It is clear law that the husband's liability to maintain the wife is a matter of personal obligation arising from status and independent of the possession by the husband of any property ancestral or self-acquired. Ordinarily the wife's duty to her husband is to submit herself obediently to his authority and to remain under his roof and protection but where the husband is unmindful of his duties and neglects to take the wife and maintain her in his own house the wife must be held to be compelled to live apart from him. In that case the wife could not be expected to impose herself on her husband's company or set out in pursuit of the husband or stay in his house so as to constitute herself a nuisance. 4. It was conceded in argument that if the plaintiff was entitled to separate maintenance the rate fixed by the lower court was not excessive. It was contended that unless cruelty of some kind was established against the husband which would endager the life or person of the wife she had no excuse in not living with him or claiming any separate maintenance. However justifiable the view might have been under the old custom in the by-gone days it cannot be laid down as a rule governing the marital tie under modern life. Not only cruelty, but desertion is a valid ground for the award of separate maintenance. The question in each case would be whether having regard to the facts disclosed the husband could be held to have been guilty of desertion of his wife. Not only cruelty, but desertion is a valid ground for the award of separate maintenance. The question in each case would be whether having regard to the facts disclosed the husband could be held to have been guilty of desertion of his wife. In other words whether his conduct was such as to indicate to a reasonable mind that it amounted to a refusal to perform the obligations which marriage brings on him. In India the matter is now governed by the Hindu Married Women's Right To Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946. Under this enactment a Hindu married woman is entitled to separate maintenance and residence from her husband if the husband is proved to have been guilty of desertion of the wife, that is to say of abandoning her without her consent or against her wish. In these circumstances we confirm the finding of the lower court that the plaintiff is entitled to claim separate maintenance from her husband. After the death of her husband there is no one legally bound to maintain the plaintiff nor can the two widows, defendants 2 and 3, have any right to insist on the plaintiff, another widow, to live with them. 5. The second question relates to past arrears which the plaintiff has claimed for six years preceding the date of suit. We have already found that the first defendant's conduct amounted to wilful desertion and that the plaintiff is entitled to claim separate maintenance. It is a legal right enforceable in law from the date of desertion. In this sense a demand in writing or an open demand and refusal may at best furnish evidence of desertion only and not lay the foundation for the claim. The award of arrears is however in the sound discretion of the court which it has to exercise according to the circumstances of the case. If from the conduct of the parties it appeared that there was an abandonment or waiver of the claim, there was a really substantial reason for disallowing arrears. Maintenance ordinarily should come from the income of a person and not from the corpus of his estate. If from the conduct of the parties it appeared that there was an abandonment or waiver of the claim, there was a really substantial reason for disallowing arrears. Maintenance ordinarily should come from the income of a person and not from the corpus of his estate. This was emphasised by the Privy Council in Rajah Yarlagada Mallikarjuna v. Rajah Yarlagadda Durgaprasada (I.L.R. 24 Madras 147) where their Lordships observed as follows: "It may well be that if he (the defendant) had been misled into the belief that the claim for maintenance was abandoned and had in consequence not set aside any porti on of his annual income to meet such a claim, he would have had a good defence to the present action." In Panchakshara v. Pattammal (A.I.R. 1927 Madras 865) following the Privy Council decision it was stated as follows: "There is no doubt that the plaintiff's claim for past maintenance is a legal right and unless adequate grounds are shown for inferring that she has waived or abandoned that claim the defendants cannot escape liability." In Sobhanadramma v. Narasimhaswami (A.I.R. 1934 Madras 401) a Bench of the Madras High Court after an exhaustive examination of the case law stated the law in the following terms: "The only legal answer to such a claim is either abandonment, waiver or such conduct on the part of the plaintiff as may have misled the defendant into thinking that such a claim would not be made, thereby inducing him not to make any provision for it specially as maintenance is a provision to be made out of the current income of the estate or of the person liable." In this case the resources of the defendant were limited and the current income is shown to be hardly sufficient to maintain both. The plaintiff was apparently well cared for in her own house and there was no warning that the plaintiff ever intended to claim any separate maintenance from him. During this period he had his aged parents to maintain a fact known to the plaintiff. These, in our view are indications from which waiver might be inferred. In these circumstances we disallow the arrears of maintenance claimed and reverse the decree of the lower court to that extent. We therefore modify the decree of the lower court by disallowing the claim for arrears of maintenance and confirm the decree in other respects. These, in our view are indications from which waiver might be inferred. In these circumstances we disallow the arrears of maintenance claimed and reverse the decree of the lower court to that extent. We therefore modify the decree of the lower court by disallowing the claim for arrears of maintenance and confirm the decree in other respects. Maintenance awarded from the date of suit will carry interest at the rate of six per cent per annum. 6. In the result we disallow the plaintiff's claim for arrears till date of suit, modify the decree of the lower court to that extent and confirm the decree in other respects. The appellants will pay one-half of the costs of the appeal to the respondent and suffer their own.