JUDGMENT : Mehta, J. 1. The facts leading to this revision application are briefly as follows. In Small Cause case No. (460/1946) Ramsevak was the plaintiff and Durgadin (the present applicant) was the defendant. Ramsevak secured a decree for Rs.455 on 13th April 1946 against Durgadin. Thereafter, the judgment-debtor Durgadin made payments towards the decree out of Court. Rupees 200 were paid on 15th April 1946 and Rs.130 were paid on 12-08-1946 to the decree-holder by Dargadin, The decree-holder Ramsevak filed Execution cases Nos. 1765/1947 and 1994/1947 in which Rs.330 which were paid by Durgadin out of Court were not given credit for. Plaintiff Durgadin, therefore, filed this suit for a breach of contract and for damages of Rs.330 for which Ramsevak did not give him credit. The main contention of the defendant was that the payment of Rs.330 made to him by the plaintiff was not towards the decretal amount but for some other transaction. He also contended that the plaintiff has got no cause of action for filing the present suit, and that the present suit is premature. These contentions of the defendant found favour with the learned Small Cause Judge who held that the suit was premature and that there was no cause of action, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. Hence this revision application by the plaintiff. 2. The main question in this case is as to when the cause of action for such a suit arises; whether it arises as soon as an application for execution is presented, or only after the amount is actually recovered in execution. In Karim Bakhsh v. Debi, AIR (20) 1933 ALL. 511:(160 I.C. 460), it has been held that in order to create a valid contract there must be consideration and if the debtor pays his creditor some portion of the amount which is due, that payment cannot amount to consideration. The mere fact that the Civil Procedure Code casts upon the decree-holder a duty of certifying any such payment would not amount to consideration for the mere receipt of such money which is due. The main point on which stress was laid in the aforesaid decision is that even if there was a contract, it was held, there can be no action for breach of contract unless damage has been actually suffered. The main point on which stress was laid in the aforesaid decision is that even if there was a contract, it was held, there can be no action for breach of contract unless damage has been actually suffered. In this case the action was commenced by the judgment-debtor before he had paid the amount due twice over to the decree-holder and such action is not maintainable. There is not damage in paying only what is due. The same view is followed in Ram Das Sahu v. Sukhdeo Ram, AIR (26) 1939 Pat. 156: (178 I.C. 196) and Onkara v. Bridichand, AIR (10) 1923 Nag. 290; (73 I.C. 1037); it was held that the cause of action arises only when the damage is actually sustained, that is the money is recovered a second time. However, in Azim Khan v. Sahib Jan, AIR (30) 1943 Pesh. 13: (205 I.C. 20), the view is expressed that the filing of execution application by the decree-holder against the judgment-debtor, who alleges that he has paid off the decree-holder privately in itself gives the judgment-debtor cause of action to bring a suit for relief, and for doing so, the judgment-debtor need not wait till he is made to pay debtor not twice over, or suffered some damage. It was further held that private payment of the decretal amount by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder brings into existence a contract casting a duty on the decree-holder to certify that payment in Court and relieve the judgment-debtor of his responsibility to that extent and implies his liability to pay back the whole amount to the judgment- debtor, if he fails to do so. Breach of such a contract entitles the judgment-debtor to ask that the decree-holder should be made to carry out his implied promise, that he shall return the money paid to him if he fails to certify the payment. So also in Medai Thalalvoi v. Kaliam Anni, 30 Mad. 545: (3 M.L.T. 15), it is held that the law casts on the decree-holder receiving payment out of Court the duty of certifying such payment in satisfaction of the decree under S.258, Civil P. C. (under O.21 R.2, Civil Procedure Code). The judgment debtor has got a cause of action against the decree-holder, when the latter having received the decree amount not only does not certify, but actually takes out an execution. The judgment debtor has got a cause of action against the decree-holder, when the latter having received the decree amount not only does not certify, but actually takes out an execution. It is not necessary that money should have been actully recovered in execution. In Ram Das Sahu v. Sukhdeo Ram, AIR (26) 1939 Pat 156: (178 I.C. 196), the judgment-debtor was made to pay the decretal amount twice over, and cause of action of the suit arose on the date when the judgment-debtor paid the amount over again to save his property from sale. In fact this ruling does not help the case of the plaintiff in this case. On a full consideration of all these authorities, it appears to me that Karim Bakhsh v. Debi, AIR (20) 1933 ALL. 511: (150 I.C. 460), contains a very sound reasoning which commends itself to me and I am inclined to follow this Allahabad ruling. There can be no cause of action under a breach of contract unless the damage has been suffered and so long as the plaintiff has not been made to pay twice over he has not suffered any damage and hence he has got no cause of action. Merely because the decree-holder files an execution without giving credit for uncertified payments does not give cause of action to the plaintiff. It is only when the plaintiff is made to pay twice over that he suffered damage and hence no cause of action had arisen in this suit, plaintiff having suffered no damage. I, therefore, agree with the Allahabad ruling that on the claim as laid no action lies at all. I am further of of opinion, that it was the duty of the judgment- debtor to minimise the damage, and if he fails to do so when it was in his power, he cannot recover the damage which he could have avoided. Thus under S.72, Contract Act, it was the duty of the judgment debtor to have the adjustment of payment certified. If he had done so, it is clear he would have suffered no damage. He failed to do so when it was in his power and therefore, he puts himself out of Court as regards his claims for damages. 3. Thus under S.72, Contract Act, it was the duty of the judgment debtor to have the adjustment of payment certified. If he had done so, it is clear he would have suffered no damage. He failed to do so when it was in his power and therefore, he puts himself out of Court as regards his claims for damages. 3. On a review of all these authorities, I am of opinion that there is no cause of action for the plaintiff and his claim deserved to be dismissed. This revision application is, therefore, dismissed with costs. 4. Sanghi, J. - I agree with my learned brother Mehta, J. that the petition should be dismissed with costs. Whether an action of the kind in dispute is founded on contract or tort, the cost for the action will in neither case, arise only when the damage is suffered and that will be when the payment is made a second time.