JUDGMENT : The appellant is the landlord and the respondent is his tenant. The appellant instituted a suit to eject the respondent from the house occupied by him and his subtenants. The rent was Rs. 15 per month. The suit was compromised and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed. It was provided by the compromise that the tenant-respondent should give vacant possession of the house by 31 August, 1947, and, if he did not he would be liable to pay from that date (sic) Rs. 50/- per month as damages (mesne profits). This was on 29th July, 1947. On 3rd September, 1947, appellant made an application for the execution of the decree. The relief sought was possession of the house. The learned Munsiff held that under the compromise the appellant was not entitled to enforce delivery of possession, he could only claim the mesne profits. On appeal the District Judge was of the same opinion. Hence this second appeal. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the decree of a Court should not be so construed as to render it inexecutable. The decree is in terms of the compromise and it is the compromise which has to be interpreted not the decree. There is the Rent Control Order in force in the city of Indore, since 1943, and tenants cannot be ejected unless they are not ready and willing to pay the rent. This plea had been taken by the respondent. The question is whether the compromise should be understood as giving the option to the tenant to quit the house or remain therein paying a rent of Rs. 50/- instead of the original rent of Rs. 15/- or that the house was to be vacated by 31st August 1947, and that the Rs. 50/- per month was to be the measure of the mesne profits for the time that might elapse before possession was actually obtained. The compromise is entered into on 29th July 1947 and the tenant is to quit by 31st August, 1947 that is, within one month and two days and if he unlawfully remains after this date he is to pay Rs. 50/-as damages for the period of unlawful occupation. The compromise is entered into on 29th July 1947 and the tenant is to quit by 31st August, 1947 that is, within one month and two days and if he unlawfully remains after this date he is to pay Rs. 50/-as damages for the period of unlawful occupation. I am of the opinion that what was meant was that the tenant was to have a month's time in which to make up his mind whether to quit or stay on the premises at the enhanced rate of rent. The significant word in the agreement is the word indefinite 'sic' that is 'thereafter.' If the period in between the date fixed and the date of obtaining actual possession was meant, it would have been so stated. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the compromise were construed against him, he would for all time be debarred from ejecting the respondent. I do not think so. The respondent continues under the agreement, to be appellant's tenant from 1st September, 1947 at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- per month. The use of word (sic) (damages or mesne profits) is merely a disguise to hide the fact of enhanced rent. I am of the opinion that in the decree is embodied the agreement of the parties and it is inexecutable. The agreement is but an instance of the frantic efforts made by landlords to evade the operation of a severe law. The contract gains no strength by being embodied in a decree : 'Krishnabai v. Hari', 31 Bom 15. 3. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.