JUDGMENT Harish Chandra, J. - The applicants, Mohammad Ahmad and Haji Abdul Shakur, as partners of the firm entitled the Allahabad Supply Company, were prosecuted along with the third partner of the firm, namely, Brij Mohan Das, two servants of the firm, namely Sarju Prasad and Kulli Miyan and one Ram Naresh, a lorry driver, under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules for contravening the provisions of paragraph 8 of the United Provinces Oilseeds and Oilseeds' Products Control Order, 1945. Kulli Miyan and Ram Naresh were acquitted by the learned Magistrate. He, however, convicted the applicants as well as Brij Mohan Das and Sarju Prasad. Sarju Prasad and Brij Mohan Das were sentenced to fines of Rs. 100/- and Rs. 150/- respectively while the applicants were sentenced each to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. There was an appeal which was dismissed by the Sessions Judge. Only Abdul Shakur and Muhammad Ahmad have come to this Court in revision against their conviction and sentences. 2. It is not disputed that 300 tins of mustard oil were despatched by the Allahabad Supply Company in a lorry from Allahabad to Katni on the 1st April, 1946. The lorry crossed into the territory of the State of Rewa at Chak Ghat and was stopped there by the police. The only question that we have to consider is whether the applicants can or cannot be held responsible for the contravention of the provisions of paragraph 8 of the older in question. Admittedly Brij Mohan Das was the managing partner of the firm and was working as Munib. So far as Abdul Shakur is concerned there is no finding that he was actively connected with the business of the firm. As regards Muhammad Ahmad it appeared that he had in fact an active connection with the business of the firm. There is evidence that whenever the firm fell short of money Mohammad Ahmad used to provide it. At the close of the day the cash often went to his house. It is also in evidence that he used to sign contracts on behalf of the firm. There is evidence that whenever the firm fell short of money Mohammad Ahmad used to provide it. At the close of the day the cash often went to his house. It is also in evidence that he used to sign contracts on behalf of the firm. There is nothing, however, to indicate that he was in any way connected with the day to-day business of the firm and thus there can be no presumption that the despatch of these 300 tins of mustard oil by the firm to Katni was within the knowledge of Mohammad Ahmad. The evidence shows that in the Bahi Khata of the firm a sum of Rs. 4,834-3-0/- was entered as the proceede of the sale of 300 tins of mustard oil on the 31st March, 1946, to Sita Ram Raja Ram. There is no evidence to show whether any firm of the name of Sita Ram Raja Ram was actually in existence and it cannot be presumed on the evidence that Mohammad Ahmad was at all aware that these 300 tins of mustard oil had been despatched outside the United Provinces. 3. The learned Magistrate, however, relied on Rule 122 of the Defence of India Rules which is akin to Section 9 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. The rule is reproduced below: 122. If the person contravening any of the provisions of these Rules, or, of any order made thereunder, is a company or other body corporate, every director manager, secretary or other officer or agent thereof shall, unless he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention, be deemed to be guilty of such contravention. 4. It is contended on behalf of the applicants that a firm cannot be described as a 'company or other body corporate' within the meaning of this rule. It is not denied that this is in fact so. 4. It is contended on behalf of the applicants that a firm cannot be described as a 'company or other body corporate' within the meaning of this rule. It is not denied that this is in fact so. In Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1938 Edition, under "Corporation" the following distinction is brought out between corporations and trading partnerships: The distinction between corporations and trading partnership is, that in the first the law sees only the body corporate and knows not the individuals, who are not liable for the contracts of the corporation in their private capacity, their share in the capital only being at stake: but in the latter the law looks, not to the partnership, but to the individual members of it, who are therefore answerable for the debts of the firm to the full extent of their assets. 5. That a firm is not a body corporate will also be clear from the following observations which occur in the Full Bench case of Purshottam Lal Jaitly v. W.T. Henleys Telegraph Works Ltd, (1933) 2 A.W.R. 288: The name of the firm is only a compendious description of the partners in reference to the common interest which they possess in a certain concern. When the firm is arrayed as a Defendant all the partners should be deemed to be in the array of the Defendants in their capacity as partners. 6. The presumption therefore which arises Under Rule 122 of the Defence of India Rules in the case of every Director, Manager, Secretary or other Officer or agent of a Company or other body corporate will not arise in the case of partners in a partnership firm. 7. It is, however, urged that a partnership firm is a 'person' as defined in the General Clauses Act and that therefore when an offence is committed by a partnership firm all the members of such firm should be held liable for that offence. But there is nothing to indicate that the offence in the present case was committed by (he firm as a firm and not by one or more of its partners. Moreover, the firm as such was not and could not have been prosecuted for the offence and we have to see if the partners who were prosecuted for the offence were in fact responsible for it. Moreover, the firm as such was not and could not have been prosecuted for the offence and we have to see if the partners who were prosecuted for the offence were in fact responsible for it. But there is neither any direct evidence that they were responsible for despatching the goods outside the province, nor can any such presumption be made against them in view of the circumstances already mentioned above, Their responsibility for the offence complained of is therefore not established. 8. Some of the High Courts in India had, however, taken the view that no question of mens rea arose where there was an absolute prohibition. But this view was not accepted by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee (see Srini Mall Bairoliya v. King-Emperor, 1947 A.L.J. 497. The following may be reproduced from that judgment: The High Court took the view that even if the 1st Appellant had not been proved to have known of the unlawful acts of the 2nd Appellant, he would still be liable, on the ground that question of mans rea arises, the master is criminally liable for the acts of his servant," With due respect to the High Court their Lordships think it necessary to express their dissent from this view. They see no ground for saying that offences against those of the Defence of India Rules here in question are within the Limited and exceptional class of offences which can be held to be committed without a guilty mind. See the judgment of Wright, J. In Sherras v. De Rutzau, (1891) 1 Q.B. 918 at 421. They see no ground for saying that offences against those of the Defence of India Rules here in question are within the Limited and exceptional class of offences which can be held to be committed without a guilty mind. See the judgment of Wright, J. In Sherras v. De Rutzau, (1891) 1 Q.B. 918 at 421. Offences which are within that class are usually of a comparatively minor character, and it would be surprising result of this delegated legislation if a person who was morally innocent of blame could be held vicariously liable for a servant's crime and so punishable "with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years." Their Lordships agree with the view which was recently expressed by the Lord Chief Justice of England, when he said: "It is in my opinion of the utmost importance for the protection of the, liberty of the subject that the Court should always bear in mind that, unless the statute either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a Defendant should not be found guilty or an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind." Braid v. Wood, 110 J.P. 316 (318). 9. We are therefore of opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish that any offence was committed by the applicants. 10. We accordingly allow the application and setting aside the convictions and the sentences passed upon the applicants direct that they be acquitted. The fines, if paid, will be refunded to then.