Judgment Patanjali Sastri, J.-This is a second appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge’s Court of Ellore which affirmed a decree of the District Munsiff, Ellore, declaring that the appellant (defendant) had no right to bring the properties in the possession of the respondents (plaintiffs) to sale in execution of the decree in O.S.No.349 of 1932 of the same Court whereby those and other properties had been charged with her maintenance. The appeal was heard in the first instance by Chahdrasekhara Aiyar, J., who considered that the case should be decided by a Division Bench “as the question is not free from difficulty and there is no direct authority on the point.” One Guruva Reddi obtained a decree for money in O.S.No.527 of 1930 in the Court of the District Munsiff, Ellore, against the appellant’s son Sura Reddi and in execution attached 21 items of immoveable’ property. Some of these items, eight in number, were sold in 1934 but the sale having proved insufficient to satisfy the decree in full he proceeded to bring the remaining properties to sale. The appellant then intervened with an application (E.A.No.1250 of 1936), dated 13th July, 1936, claiming that the properties sought to be sold had been charged with her right to maintenance under the decree in O.S.No.349 of 1932, dated 13th August, 1935, and passed against Sura Reddi, and praying that “they should be sold subject to the charge or the sale should be stayed.” On that application the Court passed the following order on the same day: “Notify the suit presented and the charge claimed by the petitioner.” The suit referred to was O.S.No.231 of 1936 on the file of the same Court brought by Guruva Reddi and Kota Reddi, the first respondent herein, on behalf of all the creditors of Sura Reddi, against the latter and his mother, the present appellant, for a declaration that the decree in O.S.No.349 of 1932 was obtained collusively to defraud those creditors and that the maintenance charged created thereby could not affect the properties already purchased by Guruva Reddi in execution of his decree in O.S.No.527 of 1930 or his right to bring to sale in further execution the remaining thirteen items of property already attached free of the maintenance charge. While that suit (O.S.No.231) was pending, Gurava Reddi proceeded with the execution of his decree (in O.S.No.527 of 1930) for the balance due thereunder and some more properties were brought to sale on the 17th July, 1936, of which 5 items (which are shown as items 1 to 5 in the plaint schedule) were purchased by the first respondent and one item (item 6 of that schedule) by the second respondent. The appellant took no steps to establish the validity of the charge claimed by her presumably because the same issue had been raised in O.S.No.231 of 1936 already instituted as aforesaid and pending the decision of that suit it was thought, naturally enough, to be unnecessary to start fresh proceedings for the same purpose. But what may appear to be natural and sensible conduct in such circumstances led her, as a result of certain decisions of this Court hereinafter referred to, into difficulties from which she seeks in the present appeal to extricate herself. O.S.No.231 of 1936 was carried to this Court in S.A.No.1276 of 1941 and it was therein decided that (i) the decree in O.S.No.349 of 1932 was not vitiated by any fraud or collusion between the present appellant and her son, (ii) the suit was not maintainable under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act as the maintenance charge was created by the decree and not by the debtor Sura Reddi, (iii) the charge was operative only from the date of that decree, viz., 13th August, 1935, (iv) the properties sold before that date in execution of Gurava Reddi’s decree (in O.S.No.527 of 1930) were not affected by the charge and that a declaration to that effect should be made, but (v) items sold after that date (which included the properties now in question) “will be subject to the charge created in favour of the third defendant (i.e., the present appellant) and in regard to these items of property the plaintiff’s suit must necessarily fail.” A decree was passed accordingly on the 29th January, 1943. When, however, the appellant sought to enforce her charge by executing the decree for maintenance the respondents initiated the present proceedings seeking a declaration that “she has no right to bring the plaint schedule properties to sale in execution of her maintenance decree in O.S.No.349 of 1932 on the file of this Honourable Court.” and also a permanent injunction restraining her from doing so. That is to say, they raised the same issue which the appellant fought to a successful conclusion in S.A.No.1276 of 1941 as aforesaid. The ground of claim was however no longer that the appellant’s decree was obtained by collusion with her son but that “the defendant did not institute any suit till now to establish the charge claimed by her on the plaint scheduled properties. Consequently the order of the Honourable Court dated 13th July, 1936, passed against her on her objection petition E.A.No.1250 of 1936 is conclusive against her and she has therefore no longer any right to enforce the charge claimed by her against the said properties in the hands of the plaintiffs.” Both the lower Courts relying upon certain decisions of this Court overruled the appellant’s plea of res judicata and decreed the suit. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., was inclined to think that the bar of res judicata operated against the respondents under the circumstances. He apparently doubted the correctness of some of the decisions relied on by the Courts below but considered that they did not directly cover the case. In the Courts below as well as before Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., no distinction appears to have been made between the first and second respondents in regard to the plea of res judicata. But, clearly, they do not stand on the same footing inasmuch as the second respondent was not a party to O.S.No.231 of 1936. It is true that the suit, as already stated, was brought by the plaintiffs therein (Guruva Reddi and the present first respondent) on behalf of all the creditors of Sura Reddi, but that could have reference only to the prayer for a declaration that the maintenance decree obtained by the appellant herein was void as against those creditors. As regards the declaration sought in respect of the purchase by the plaintiffs of certain items of property the action could hardly be regarded as representative. As regards the declaration sought in respect of the purchase by the plaintiffs of certain items of property the action could hardly be regarded as representative. Nor is there any evidence to show that the second respondent was one of the creditors of Sura Reddi. No doubt Gurava Reddi was a party to O.S.N0.231 of 1936 but the second respondent cannot be said to claim under him and so does not come within section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, though, as the purchaser in the execution proceeding in which the appellant unsuccessfully preferred her claiming he is entitled to take advantage of the conclusive effect of the order made against her which she did not sue within one year to displace. (See Velu Padayachi v. Arumugam Pillai1 and Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi2. Mr. Subba Rao on behalf of the appellant conceded that, in view of the Full Bench decision in Cannanore Bank, Ltd. v. Madhavi3, which has placed a very wide interpretation on the words “the party against whom an order is made” in Order 21, rule 63, he could not successfully maintain that the aforesaid order was not one made “against” the appellant within the meaning of that rule. The position, however, as regards the first respondent who is the purchaser of items 1 to 5 is different. He was a co-plaintiff with Gurava Reddi in O.S.No.231 of 1936 in which the appellant’s right to enforce the charge against these and other items was directly and substantially in issue and was heard and finally decided by this Court in favour of the appellant so far as the said items were concerned. In the present suit again the same right is challenged, though on a different ground, viz., the conclusive effect of the order on the appellant’s claim petition, which, it is now alleged, precludes her from enforcing the charge against the same properties since purchased by the first respondent. This ground of attack was available to the plaintiffs in the former suit but was not put forward. This ground of attack was available to the plaintiffs in the former suit but was not put forward. It was argued that inasmuch as O.S.No.231 of 1936 was a representative action in which the appellant’s charge was impeached as having been collusively obtained in fraud of Sura Reddi’s creditors the ground of attack now urged by the first respondent as the auction-purchaser of items 1 to 5 could not have been properly put forward in that suit; and stress was laid on the fact that the order in E.A.No.1250 of 1936 was passed and the first respondent’s purchase was made after the institution of that suit. The argument has no force. As we have already observed, the pleadings and the judgments in O.S.No.231 of 1936 show that the action was not entirely representative in character as reliefs relating to specific properties purchased by the plaintiffs therein were included within the scope of the suit. Although the present ground of attack based on the order as well as the first respondent’s right as auction purchaser to put it forward to protect his purchase arose a few days after O.S.No.231 of 1936 was instituted, the subsequent proceedings, particularly the judgment of this Court in the second appeal, show that both Gurava Reddi and the first respondent herein were contending that their respective purchases prevailed over the maintenance charge of the appellant on various grounds, and the Court held that while the purchase of Gurava Reddi, having been made before the charge came into existence, was not affected by it, “subsequent purchasers” (of whom the first respondent was one) “must be found to be holding the property purchased by them after the 13th August, 1935” (date of the appellant’s decree) “subject to the charge created in favour of the third defendant” (that is the present appellant). This decision was given while holding that the suit, in so far as it was framed as a representative one under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, must fail both because the charge was created bona fide and not in fraud of creditors and because it was effected not by the debtor but by a decree of Court. This decision was given while holding that the suit, in so far as it was framed as a representative one under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, must fail both because the charge was created bona fide and not in fraud of creditors and because it was effected not by the debtor but by a decree of Court. It is thus clear that the first respondent’s claim to hold items 1 to 5 purchased by him free of the appellant’s maintenance charge was brought within the scope of the former suit however it might originally have been framed, and was one of the matters in controversy therein at any rate in its later stages. In respect of that matter, the conclusive effect of the order on the appellant’s claim petition was very relevant and might and ought to have been put forward by the first respondent. Not having been put forward it “shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue” within the meaning of Explanation IV to section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and to have been decided against him, as his claim to hold items 1 to 5 free of the appellant’s charge was held to be unsustainable. Prima facie therefore, the Court is precluded under section 11 from trying the same issues again in the present suit. It is urged, however, that this view is inconsistent with the decision of this Court in Akkammal v. Kumaraswami1, where it was held that in view of the mandatory provisions of rule 63, a later judgment inter partes could not operate as res judicata to supersede an earlier order on a claim petition which had become conclusive under that rule. The appellant in that case purchased the property in question in execution of a decree obtained by him against one of two brothers after a claim preferred by the respondent as the purchaser from the Receiver in the insolvency of the other brother was rejected. Subsequently, however, it was decided in a partition suit in the family of the brothers that the property belonged to the respondent’s predecessor. Both the appellant and the respondent were parties to the suit and though they were both ranged as defendants all the conditions necessary to constitute the decision res judicata as between co-defendants were present. Subsequently, however, it was decided in a partition suit in the family of the brothers that the property belonged to the respondent’s predecessor. Both the appellant and the respondent were parties to the suit and though they were both ranged as defendants all the conditions necessary to constitute the decision res judicata as between co-defendants were present. The respondent then brought the suit out of which the appeal to this Court arose to recover the property from the appellant who had in the meantime taken possession in pursuance of his auction purchase, and the question arose whether the later decision in the partition suit which upheld the respondent’s title did not effectively supersede the earlier conclusive order which was not put forward in that suit. Leach, C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observed: “In view of the mandatory provision of rule 63 there is no room for the application of the principle on which Patanjali Sastri, J., based his decision. Rule 63 says that the order passed on the claim petition shall be conclusive unless the petitioner files a suit within one year to establish the right which he claims. The fact that the decree-holder may file another suit within twelve months to establish a right which he claims does not relieve the objector from the necessity of complying with rule 63. The wording of the section itself is clear on this question, but we have in addition the three decisions of this Court to which reference has just been made.” The three decisions referred to are: B. Krishna Rao v. Lakshmana Shanbhogue2, Peela Yarakayya v. Venkata Krishnamaraju3, Kumaran Unni Achan v. Kunhi Krishnan Nair4. It was held in those cases that an order under Order 21, rule 63 or rule 101 not set aside by the aggrieved party by instituting an independent suit for the purpose becomes conclusive against him and cannot be re-opened in a suit brought by the other party in regard to the same property, though such suit was pending on the date of the order or was brought within one year from that date. It is worthy of note that in each of those cases the order on the claim proceeding which had been allowed to become conclusive was put forward in the subsequent suit to bar an adjudication on the merits of the unsuccessful claimants title and there was accordingly no such adjudication. In none of the cases did the Court have to consider the position that would arise if the conclusive effect of the earlier order was not put forward in the later suit, and the Court upheld the title of the person against whom that order had been made. Thus no question arose as to whether in such a case it was the later adjudication or the earlier order that should prevail when a dispute regarding the same property arose between the same parties on a subsequent occasion. That question no doubt arose in Akkammal v. Komarasami1, as it arises here, and the decision certainly supports the first respondent’s contention that in the present suit the final adjudication in S.A.No.1276 of 1941 does not operate as res judicata and that it is open to him to rely on the conclusive effect of the order in E.A.No.1250 of 1936 to get a declaration in his favour contrary to that adjudication. We are, however, of opinion that the point requires re-consideration. As we have already pointed out, the decisions relied on in Akkammal v. Komarasami1, are distinguishable, and do not seem to warrant the proposition that the principle of res judicata ceases to operate when once an order on a claim proceeding was made and has not been set aside in the manner contemplated in Order 21, rule 63. The learned Chief Justice referred to the mandatory character of that provision, but that can hardly, we think, be regarded as intended to override or exclude the operation of the general principle of res judicata. The terms of section 11, Civil Procedure Code, which is a statutory application of the principle in this country, are no less mandatory and it is difficult to see why this rule should not operate where a previous order however conclusive was not put forward in the proceedings which resulted in the later adjudication. The terms of section 11, Civil Procedure Code, which is a statutory application of the principle in this country, are no less mandatory and it is difficult to see why this rule should not operate where a previous order however conclusive was not put forward in the proceedings which resulted in the later adjudication. We are therefore of opinion that the decision in Akkammal v. Komarasami1, requires re-consideration and we accordingly refer the following question to a Full Bench: “Was Akkammal v. Komarasami1, correctly decided?” The further hearing of this appeal will await the decision of the Full Bench. In pursuance of the above order of reference to the Full Bench the above appeal coming on for hearing before the Full Bench The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Horwill, J.-On 19th August, 1935, the decree-holder in O.S.No.527 of 1930 attached the six items of property with which we are now concerned and a few other items in E.P.No.383 of 1935. When the property was posted for sale on 13th July, 1936, the mother of the judgment-debtor intervened and claimed in her application, E.A.No.1250 of 1936 (Ex.P-3), that she had been given a maintenance charge over these six items in a suit brought by her for that purpose (O.S.No.349 of 1932) on the file of the District Munsiff’s Court of Ellore). Four days before E.A.No.1250 of 1936 was filed, the decree-holder and another filed a suit representing the general body of creditors for a declaration that the charge decree obtained by the mother of the judgment-debtor was collusive and not binding on the creditors and that the property already purchased in execution of the decree in O.S.No.527 of 1930, as well as the items under attachment, were not therefore liable for her maintenance. On 13th July, 1936, when E.A.No.1250 of 1936 came on for hearing, the decree-holder informed the Court that he had filed O.S.No.231 of 1936 on 9th July, 1936. The Court thereupon passed the order, “Notify the suit presented and the charge claimed by the petitioner.” The property was thereupon brought to sale and items 1 to 5 were purchased by the first plaintiff in the suit out of which this second appeal arises and item 6 by the second plaintiff. O.S.No.231 of 1936 was dismissed on 15th December, 1939. O.S.No.231 of 1936 was dismissed on 15th December, 1939. The appeal of the plaintiffs was allowed, the Subordinate Judge holding that the decree obtained by the mother of the judgment-debtor was vitiated by fraud and collusion. In second appeal to this Court, however, the decree of the District Munsiff was restored as far as it related to items 1 to 6, the rights to which are now in question. When the mother of the judgment-debtor, who is the appellant in this second appeal, filed E.P.No.146 of 1943, to enforce her maintenance decree, the application was resisted; and the purchasers 6f the properties filed the present suit, O.S.No.91 of 1943, for a declaration that since the appellant had not filed a suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, within a year of the adverse claim order, they had obtained, as auction purchasers, an absolute right to the property. They also prayed for an injunction restraining her from executing her decree in O.S.No.349 of 1932. The appellant’s defence to that suit was that her right to execute the decree was raised in O.S.No.231 of 1936, which had ended in her favour and that it was no longer open to the respondents to contend afresh that she was not entitled to execute her decree. The Courts below held that the respondents were not barred by res judicata from putting forward their claim again. In second appeal to this Court Patanjali Sastri and Bell, JJ., were of opinion that section 11, Explanation IV of the Code of Civil Procedure did bar the respondents from again questioning the mother’s right to execute her decree, notwithstanding the fact that she had not filed a suit to set aside the adverse claim order. As however the learned Judges were confronted with the decision in Akkammal v. Komarasami1 a case almost identical with the present case, in which it was held that the only way of getting rid of an adverse claim order was to file a suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, the principle of res judicata would not apply, the learned Judges referred the question “Was Akkammal v. Komarasami1 correctly decided?” to a Full Bench. As neither of the learned Judges is now sitting in this Court, the appeal as well as the question referred by the learned Judges have been posted before us for decision and disposal. As neither of the learned Judges is now sitting in this Court, the appeal as well as the question referred by the learned Judges have been posted before us for decision and disposal. It has first been argued for the respondents that even apart from the mandatory provision of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, the matter would not be res judicata as a result of the decision in O.S.No.231 of 1936; because the parties were litigating under different titles in the two suits. O.S.No.231 of 1936 was filed as a representative suit by the creditors; whereas the present suit was filed by auction-purchasers who did not claim as creditors or through a creditor but through the judgment-debtor, whose interest, they had purchased. The fact that one of them was also a decree-holder was immaterial. It was held in S.A.No.1276 of 1941 by Abdur Rahman, J., that the suit was not maintainable as a representative suit; but he treated it as one by the two respondents with regard to their own rights. It is true that in that suit they figured as creditors and here as representatives of the judgment-debtor; but in both the suits there was a triangular fight between the decree-holder, the judgment-debtor, and the appellant. The appellant was contending on the one hand that she was entitled to this charge and was claiming that charge against the interests of both the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder. There was therefore a conflict between the judgment-debtor and the appellant in the former suit, and in the latter between the appellant and the respondents, who claimed through the judgment-debtor. In Akkammal v. Komarasami1, under similar circumstances, it was held the bar of res judicata would undoubtedly have applied had it not been for the mandatory requirements of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code. We respectfully agree. In Akkammal v. Komarasami1, under similar circumstances, it was held the bar of res judicata would undoubtedly have applied had it not been for the mandatory requirements of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code. We respectfully agree. The learned referring Judges were of opinion that the provisions of section 11, Civil Procedure Code, were as mandatory as the provisions of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code; and it has therefore been argued before us that even though the adverse order in the claim petition became final as a result of the appellant’s failure to institute a suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, the finality of those proceedings could and should have been put forward by the respondents in their suit and that since they had not done so, the decision in O.S.No.231 of 1936 was final and must be regarded as having, by implication, decided against the plea of the respondents based on the finality of the claim proceedings. It has however to be borne in mind in this connection that O.S.No.231 of 1936 was filed before the order on the claim petition had been passed, and it remained pending during the whole period of one year from the date of the adverse order, i.e., 13th July, 1936. The plea that the adverse claim order had become final could not therefore have been put forward in the plaint in O.S.No.231 of 1936, though there can be no doubt that the plaintiffs could have put it forward at a later stage. The question is whether they were bound to do so, under penalty of being barred in any subsequent suit from raising that point. Upon the expiry of the period of one year from the adverse claim order, the respondents obtained an indefeasible right to the property. They had purchased it subject to the result of any suit that the appellant might have brought within the period of one year; but subject to the result of that suit, their title to the property could not be questioned by the appellant. Upon the expiry of that term, therefore, they had acquired a right in that property in much the same way as a person would acquire a title to immoveable property if he remained in adverse possession for a period of twelve years. They had therefore obtained a fresh cause of action. Upon the expiry of that term, therefore, they had acquired a right in that property in much the same way as a person would acquire a title to immoveable property if he remained in adverse possession for a period of twelve years. They had therefore obtained a fresh cause of action. From Arichendrana Deo Garu v. Ramanna Chandiri1 onwards, it has been a well-recognised principle of law that a plaintiff who acquires a fresh claim during the pendency of his suit or afterwards can bring another suit on the fresh cause of action. In that case, the plaintiff claimed a right to resume a certain jeroiti land which had been temporarily alienated. He eventually failed on that cause of action; but during the pendency of the suit the Government had transferred to him the rights in that village. He thereupon filed a fresh suit in which he claimed that the mokhasa which was the subject of the litigation in the earlier suit had lapsed to the Government and had been transferred to him by the Government. It was held that he was entitled to put forward that plea and that the decision in the earlier suit did not operate as res judicata. The principal cases relied on by the appellant in support of her contention that the respondents were bound to put forward the finality of the claim order in the earlier suit are Vinayak v. Datlatraya2 and Manikbhai v. Virchand3. The former related to a suit for redemption in which it was found by the trial Court that Rs.8,200 were due by the plaintiffs. Upon that amount being paid, possession was given to the plaintiffs. In appeal by the defendant, it was found that the sum really due was Rs.9,809-9-9. The difference was paid by the plaintiffs. In a fresh suit, the mortgagee claimed that since the amount due to him had not been fully-paid until long after possession had been given to the mortgagors as a result of the decree of the trial Court, he was entitled to mesne profits for the period from the date on which the mortgagors had obtained possession to the date on which they had fully paid to him the amount found to be due to him by the appellate Court. It was held that he was bound to have put forward that claim in the suit for redemption and could not raise it in a separate suit. The learned Judges however specially emphasised the peculiar nature of redemption suits. The learned Chief Justice remarked: “But the decree in a suit for redemption must be such as to enable the Court to do complete justice . . . . . . . and, ‘as far as it is possible the Court endeavours to make a complete decree that shall embrace the whole subject and determine upon the rights of all the parties interested in the estate’ . . . . . So in this case the claim on which we are now asked to adjudicate is one that could and ought to have been advanced in the former suit. Without a determination on it (the question of mesne profits) there was not a complete adjustment of the right of the parties.” The learned Chief Justice, after referring to a remark of Blackburn, J., that the dectrine of res judicata applies to all matters which existed at the time of giving of the judgment, went on to say: “Beyond doubt must this be so in a redemption suit, which has for its purpose the complete adjustment of the rights of the parties, and the decree in which, when properly framed, provides for matters even up to the time when it is ultimately carried into effect. The comprehensive character of suits, relating to mortgages and the obligation incumbent on litigants to see that the decree in them covers all their rights has been repeatedly recognised by the Courts . . . . . .” This is the only case placed before us in which it has been suggested that where a right accrues during the pendency of a suit, it must be put forward by the. party acquiring the right on pain of being, in a subsequent suit, barred from putting it forward by the principle of res judicata. In Manikbhai v. Virchand1, the plaintiff brought a suit as the heir of her father for accounts in a partnership of which her father was a partner. It was held that the claim was barred by time. party acquiring the right on pain of being, in a subsequent suit, barred from putting it forward by the principle of res judicata. In Manikbhai v. Virchand1, the plaintiff brought a suit as the heir of her father for accounts in a partnership of which her father was a partner. It was held that the claim was barred by time. She thereupon filed another suit for accounts, in which she pleaded that upon the death of her father, her mother became a partner, and that as the heir of her mother she was entitled to bring the suit. It was held that her claim in the second suit would be barred by res judicata, only if it were shown that she was aware of her right as the heir of her mother during the earlier suit. This case does not, however, help the appellant, because both pleas were there available to the plaintiff when the first suit was filed. In Fakir Chandra v. Ekkari Sarkar2, the plaintiff filed two suits claiming the same property; but it was held that the plaintiff was not hit by the principle of res judicata, because he was not aware when he filed his earlier suit that he had an alternative cause of action. There, as in Jatindra Nath Chowdry v. Azizur Rahman Shana3 and several other cases quoted to us, it was pointed out that whether a particular point of attack should be pressed in a particular suit depends on the facts of each case. In Jatindra Math Chowdry v. Azizur Rahman Shana3, it was held that the new point of attack should have been put forward and was available on the date when the earlier suit was filed. In Kanhaya Lal v. Banke Behari4 and Rajani Kumar Mitra v. Ajmaddin Bhuiya5, it was held that the finality of an order on a claim petition is a point, that should be relied on in a suit filed subsequent to the date of the order. If it is not, the right resulting from the finality is deemed to be waived and cannot be raised in a subsequent suit. If it is not, the right resulting from the finality is deemed to be waived and cannot be raised in a subsequent suit. In Srimut Rajah Moottoo Vijaya Raganadha Bodha Gooroo Sawmy Periya Odaya Tever v. Katama Natchiar, Zamindar of Sivaganga6 where the plaintiff pleaded that the property she claimed, was undivided, she could however have also pleaded that even though the property had been divided, she was entitled to certain items of the suit property by virtue of a will in her favour; but to the end she disclaimed the will and said that the instrument was not testamentary. Clearly in such a case a suit would not subsequently lie on the will. The above cases do not suggest that where a right accrues after the institution of the suit, as in Arichandrana Deo Garu v. D. Ramanna Chandiri7, the plaintiff is bound to put forward that right as soon as it accrues to her. Admittedly, an amendment of the plaint would be necessitated if he did so, and the Court might or might not allow that application. Ordinarily, such an application would be rejected on the ground that it was raising a fresh cause of action which was foreign to the suit as originally instituted, though no doubt it would be within the competence of the Court to permit an amendment of the plaint and thereby extend the scope of the suit. In Muyyarikandi Kunhi Pakki v. Muthuvana Cheeru8, the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act (Act IV of 1938), had become law during the pendency of an appeal and clearly had retrospective effect, and it was held that the debtor was bound to put forward his rights under the Act, the reason being that the Court had to administer the law as it stood on the date of its decision; and if it decided the case wrongly in ignorance of the law prevailing at the time, the decision was none the less binding and conclusive. In such a case, a separate suit based on the debtor’s right under the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act would clearly not be maintainable. It remains to consider briefly the decision in Akkammal v. Komarasami9 which the learned referring Judges considered needed re-consideration. In such a case, a separate suit based on the debtor’s right under the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act would clearly not be maintainable. It remains to consider briefly the decision in Akkammal v. Komarasami9 which the learned referring Judges considered needed re-consideration. The parties to the suit were the respondent, claiming through the Official Receiver, who had had an alienation set aside on the ground that it was a sham transaction, and the appellant, who had brought the property to sale in execution of a decree obtained against one Krishna Aiyar, who had earlier sold the property to the insolvent. In a suit filed by the sons of Krishna Aiyar for partition, it was declared that the sale to the insolvent was not binding on the sons. The appellant and the respondent were both parties to this suit; and the learned Judges held that if one had regard to the principles of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code alone, then undoubtedly the decision in the earlier suit could not be questioned in the second suit. They however held, following Krishna Rau v. Lakshmana Shanbhogue1, Peela Yarakayya v. Kanumuri Venkata Krishnamraju2 and Kumaran Uni Achan v. Kunhi Krishnan Nair3, that the provisions of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, were mandatory, and that the decision in a claim application is final, unless the party aggrieved takes the course indicated in the rule by instituting a suit to supersede it. The learned Judges did not discuss the point made by the learned referring Judges that even when a matter has been concluded, if its conclusiveness is not put forward in a suit, where the conclusiveness would be a good point of attack or defence, the party not doing so is barred by the principle of res judicata from relying on it in another independent proceeding, but there can be no doubt that the learned Judges in Akkammal v. Komarasami4 regarded the specific provisions of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, as overriding the more general principle enunciated in section 11, Civil Procedure Code. It is however unnecessary for us to go so far; for the right accrued to the respondents here after their suit had been filed and they were not bound to rely on that new right in the pending suit. It is however unnecessary for us to go so far; for the right accrued to the respondents here after their suit had been filed and they were not bound to rely on that new right in the pending suit. The learned referring Judges distinguished the cases of the first and second respondents; but it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that no such distinction can be made. In view of our decision that the later suit by the respondents is maintainable, it is unnecessary for us to consider this point. The appeal is dismissed with costs. (Advocate’s fee Rs.100). K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.