JUDGMENT : SANGHI, J. 1. The facts of the case, out of which this appeal arises, are there one Kamataprasad owned houses and agricultural lands in Segaon. He died in year 1918. His brother Raghurangh's widow Laxmibai took possession of the properties. Her name in respect of the lands was mutated in the Revenue Papers. She was not an heir of the deceased and her claim was not founded on any other title. Her possession was, therefore adverse to the next heir. She died in the year 1942 and her possession having been perfected by prescription the houses and the lands were her property on her death. After her, Sarjuprasad (Appellant) entered into possession of the lands and houses. On 30-6-1943, Dayashankar (Respondent) instituted a suit in the Court of Munsiff, Sendhawa claiming possession of the houses and lands as the next heir of Laxmibai. The claim was resisted on two grounds. Firstly that the plaintiff was not the next heir and secondly that he himself had acquired a title under the will dated 21-7-1936, made in his favour by Laxmibai. He also set up title as the validly adopted son of Laxmibai but this ground was abandoned at the hearing of the appeal and so no more need be said about it. 2. The learned Munsiff found that the plaintiff had proved his relationship to Laxmibai's husband to make him in Hindu Law her next heir. He also found the will proved. Section 50, Indore Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, however, declares bequests of agricultural holdings made by pattedar tenants to be said and the defendant (Appellant) did not therefore acquire title of the lands under the will. Decree for possession of the lands only was made in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by Sarjuprasad the defendant, the appeal was dismissed. He has come to this Court in second appeal. 3. His learned counsel at the hearing urged two grounds only out of the several put into the memorandum of appeal. He urged that in finding the respondent's relationship to Raghuvansh established, the Courts below had erred, This is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed in second appeal. The learned counsel did not suggest that the Courts had taken any inadmissible evidence into consideration. This ground therefore fails. 4. He urged that in finding the respondent's relationship to Raghuvansh established, the Courts below had erred, This is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed in second appeal. The learned counsel did not suggest that the Courts had taken any inadmissible evidence into consideration. This ground therefore fails. 4. The other ground urged was that by reason of the provisions of S, 136 (1), Indore Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, no civil Court could entertain the suit out of which the appeal arises. Sub-section (1) of S. 136 of the Act is in these terms: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which Government or a Revenue Officer is, by this Act empowered to determine decide, or dispose of." I could not understand how the suit falls within the wording of this section. The learned counsel relied on a unreported decision of this Court in S. A. No. 225 of 1948. This was an appeal from Dhar State. A pattedar tenant had delivered possession of his agricultural holding to the defendant by an unregistered instrument permitting him to use and enjoy the land for a period of seven years in lieu of a debt owed to the defendant. The pattedar tenant sued the defendant for possession in the holding on the ground that he had title to it under the patta. Rege J. who heard the appeal construed the transfer to be a lease and not a mortgage and the lease being for a period of more than one year was held to be void under the Land Revenue and Tenancy Act in force in Dhar State. The plaintiff would, therefore, be entitled to possession claimed by him. But the learned Judge held that his suit cannot be entertained by a civil Court, being prohibited by S. 174, Dhar State Act. The wording of that section corresponds precisely with wording of S. 136, Indore State Act, set forth above. The learned Judge disposed of this question in these words ; "There is however a pure question of law which has been overlooked in the Court below. The wording of that section corresponds precisely with wording of S. 136, Indore State Act, set forth above. The learned Judge disposed of this question in these words ; "There is however a pure question of law which has been overlooked in the Court below. Section 174, Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts to entertain a suit or application made to obtain a decision on any matter which the Darbar or a Revenue Officer is by that Act empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. The provisions above discussed together with those of S. 68 which give power to the Darbar to validate an improper transfer leave no doubt that prima facie the matter in this suit is within the competence of the Durbar and the Revenue authorities and civil Courts have no jurisdiction." With much respect I am unable to concur with the learned Judge in his opinion. He gives no reason for his decision. Looking back at the wording of S. 136 of the Indore Act, to bar jurisdiction of the civil Court it should be established that the suit was instituted to obtain a decree on a matter which the Government or a Revenue Officer was empowered to decide. Now, what were the matters to obtain a decision on which the suit under appeal was instituted by the respondent in the civil Court ? The matters were that he was the nest heir of Laxmibai and that on this ground he was entitled to possession of the agricultural holdings, which stood in her name. Neither the Government nor any Revenue Officer is empowered by the Act to determine title nor is it or he empowered to make the order that a person not in possession shall be put in possession of the holding in dispute. So also in Dhar case. It is inverting the position in law. It is the Revenue Officer who could not entertain the suits. If a person, in pursuance of a void transaction, is in possession of an agricultural holding, he is liable to be evicted by a Revenue Officer under S. 30, Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. So also in Dhar case. It is inverting the position in law. It is the Revenue Officer who could not entertain the suits. If a person, in pursuance of a void transaction, is in possession of an agricultural holding, he is liable to be evicted by a Revenue Officer under S. 30, Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Independent of any person's claim to such a land a Revenue Officer can exercise the power of eviction but because eviction of such a person is involved as a necessary consequence of a suit instituted by a plaintiff to obtain possession of the land based on title it cannot be said that jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. The criterion is has the Revenue Officer the power to decide the matter which constitutes the plaintiff's cause of action? If he has, the civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted. Rege J. has observed that under the Act the Government has the power to validate an improper transfer. I fail to see how this fact can affect the jurisdiction of the civil Court. To obtain ex post facto validation by the Government the defendant in wrongful possession may ask for stay of the suit but the power to validate can have no bearing on the want of power in the Revenue Officer or the Government to decide matter touching the title of the plaintiff which is the crux of the question. 5. The appeal is without substance. It is dismissed with costs. 6. Mehta, J. :-I agree.