Judgment Imam, J. 1. This is an appeal by the Provincial Government against the acquittal of the respondent, who had been tried for an offence punishable under Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, for contravention of the provisions in Clause (b) of Sec.3, Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 . The respondent had been convicted by a Magistrate of the first class who had sentenced him to one years rigorous imprisonment and had further directed that the entire 190 bags of rice seized from the two country boats shall be forfeited to His Majesty under Sec.14, Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 . The Additional Sessions Judge of Monghyr, however, set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent. 2. According to the prosecution, on 24th April 1947, two country-boats, each containing 95 bags of rice, were seized at Sakarpura Ghat by the Sub-Inspector of police station Bakhri. The respondent was in possession of one of the two boats. According to the statement of the Sub-Inspector in the first information report, he had come to learn from a spy that two boats fully loaded with rice bags bad just arrived at Sakarpura Ghat from Nepal side and that the same would be carried to Bakhri Bazar to be stored in some golas that night. Accordingly, the Sub-Inspector proceeded to Sakarpura Ghat to verify the information and to take necessary action. He actually found two boats loaded with 190 bags of rice at the Ghat. The respondent, who was one of the boatmen, reported that these boats were loaded with 190 bags of rice belonging to Bana Chand Marwari of Hanuman Nagar district Saptari Nepal, and that the bags of rice were to be carried to the gola of Bahoran Potedar of Bakhri. The Sub-Inspector posted constables to guard the boats and the bags of rice were weighed. As the respondent failed to produce a permit or a licence for carrying these bags of rice, the Sub-Inspector charged him for having contravened the provisions of Ordinance XVIII [18] Of 1946. 3. The Sub-Inspector posted constables to guard the boats and the bags of rice were weighed. As the respondent failed to produce a permit or a licence for carrying these bags of rice, the Sub-Inspector charged him for having contravened the provisions of Ordinance XVIII [18] Of 1946. 3. The Additional Sessions Judge in appeal does not appear to have given any findings as to whether the facts alleged by the prosecution had been proved, nor is there anything in the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge to indicate that he differed with the trial Court on the facts which the prosecution purported to prove by the evidence adduced on their behalf. He acquitted the respondent on a point of law, namely, that in keeping more than 20 maunds of grain on a boat, the provisions of Clause (b) of Sec.3, Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947, had not been contravened, as a boat could not be said to be included in the expression "premises". He referred to the meaning of the word (premises as to be found in Chambers Dictionary and held that it could not by any stretch of imagination be thought that the word premises meant a country-boat. The Assistant Public Prosecutor had frankly conceded before him that a country-boat being not a premises, the appellant could not be thought to have contravened the provisions of Sec.3, Clause (b), Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947. As to the order of forfeiture passed by the trial Court, the Additional Sessions Judge found that the 190 bags of rice were in two boats, 95 in each boat, and according to the admission made by the prosecution witnesses 1 and 2 in cross-examination one of these boats was in charge of one Muni Mallah, who was not proceeded_against. In such circumstances, the Magistrate could not pass orders of forfeiture of 95 bags of rice found in possession of Muni Mallah on a separate boat. In setting aside the conviction, he also set aside the order of forfeiture passed by the Court below against the respondent. 4. The principal question for decision is as to whether the word premises found in Clause (b) of Sec.3, Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 , can be read to include a country-boat. In setting aside the conviction, he also set aside the order of forfeiture passed by the Court below against the respondent. 4. The principal question for decision is as to whether the word premises found in Clause (b) of Sec.3, Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 , can be read to include a country-boat. The word premises has not been defined in the Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 , but the word vessel has been defined to include boats of every kind including mechanically propelled boats. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, the word place has been defined in Sec. 4, Sub-clause (q) to include "also a house building, tent and vessel". There is no definition of the word premises in the Code of Criminal Procedure, as far as I can see. In the Penal Code also, there is no definition of the word premises, but the word vessel has been stated in Sec. 48 of the Code, to denote anything made for the conveyance by water of human beings" or of property. It will thus be seen that we can get no assistance from these statutory provisions as to the meaning of the word premises. In the Indian General Clauses Act, there is no definition of the word premises but the word vessel has been stated to include "any ship or boat or any other description of vessel used in navigation", and the word ship has been stated to include "every description of vessel used in navigation not exclusively propelled by cars. In the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, the words vessel and ship are described in the same way as in the Indian General Clauses Act. There is, however, no definition of the word premises. It will, therefore, be noticed that in these various statutory provisions, including the Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 , the word vessel has been stated to mean boats of all kinds. The word ship has been a meaning in the aforesaid two General Clauses Acts to include "every description of vessel used in navigation not exclusively propelled by oars." The word "premises", however, has not been mentioned in these various statutory provisions. The word ship has been a meaning in the aforesaid two General Clauses Acts to include "every description of vessel used in navigation not exclusively propelled by oars." The word "premises", however, has not been mentioned in these various statutory provisions. Websters New International Dictionary, and Edition unabridged, states that with reference to law premises means "the property conveyed in a deed, hence, in general, a piece of land or real estate; sometimes, especially in fire-insurance papers, a building or buildings on land; as, to lease premises; the premises insured. Sometimes loosely applied to personal property, as a vessel." According to Strouds Judicial Dictionary premises in popular language frequently means buildings. It also includes a pleasure garden occupied with a dwelling-house, qua rating for water supply. Strouds Dictionary, however, refers to the case of the Beacon Life, and Fire Assurance Co. V/s. James Gibb, (1862) 16 E. R. 630 : (1 Moore P. C. N. S. 73) show that the word premises in that case referred to a ship. An examination of that case shows that a fire insurance policy had been effected on a ship. It is unnecessary for me to go into the facts of that case, but it is clear that nothing else but a ship was insured by an instrument which was generally used in connection with life insurance, Lord Chelmsford in delivering the decision of the Judicial Committee observed : "Now, the word premises, although in popular language it is applied to buildings, in legal language means, the subject or thing previously expressed; and the question here is, in what sense this word is used, which must be gathered from the contract itself, and not from any external evidence." It will be seen from this observation of his Lordship that the popular meaning given to the word premises is with reference to buildings, but in legal language it means the subject or thing previously expressed and may in certain circumstances come to be construed to include a ship, depending in what sense the word was used in the contract itself. Strouds refers to another case The Queen V/s. Leith, (1852) 118 E. R. 382 : (1 E. & B. 120) for a wide use of the word premises. Strouds refers to another case The Queen V/s. Leith, (1852) 118 E. R. 382 : (1 E. & B. 120) for a wide use of the word premises. An examination of the case, however, does not disclose that there was a definite decision by the Court that a pier or landing place consisting of floating barges, boarded over, and kept in their places by icon chain cables, fastened to iron anchors sunk or imbeded in the bed of the river and connected by wooden bridges with each other and with a platform resting upon an abutment attached and made fast to the wall of the said premises, was premises. The main decision, however, was that it could undoubtedly be regarded as accessory to the land for rateable purposes. One of the learned Judges, Coleridge, J. observed, "The rate is substantially on a tenement made more valuable by the floating pier, which therefore is mentioned in addition to the tenement." Wightman J. observed, "Had the rate been laid on the barges only, as distinct from the land, I should have paused before I affirmed it." In my opinion, this ease in no sense decides that the word premises includes a boat as distinct from a building or land. Such being the situation, I think the ordinary meaning as understood in the English language must be given to the word premises. Normally, it would be a loose expression to use the word premises in connection with a boat. There may, however, be circumstances such as in the case of the Beacon Life and Fire Assurance Company, ((1862) 15 E. R. 630 : 1 Moore P. C. N. S. 73) which may establish that a boat or a ship comes within the word premises. I can even imagine that houseboats, which are so well known in Kashmir, and barges in England used by many as residence, may in certain circumstances come to be included in the word premises. In the present case, however, the boat carried bags of rice from some place to Sakarpura Ghat to be unloaded there and then to be stored in the gola of some person. The boat was not used as a dwelling place, nor was it fixed to any land permanently. The Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 , is a penal law and must be construed strictly. The boat was not used as a dwelling place, nor was it fixed to any land permanently. The Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 , is a penal law and must be construed strictly. The enactment of the said law has restricted the ordinary rights of a citizen to possess foodgrains. It is to be further noticed that in Section 9, Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 , certain powers of inspection search and seizure are given to certain officers, and one of them is : "to enter, inspect or search any places or premises, vehicles or vessels in which he has reason to believe that any violation of the provisions of this Order or of the licences issued under this Order is taking place." As I read this legislation, obviously, in Section 9 a clear distinction is made between the words premises and vessel. Since the Order itself designates the word vessel to include all kinds of boats, the use of the expressions places, premises, vehicles or vessels in Section 9 would suggest that a clear distinction was being made between the words premises and vessels. It seems to me that there is nothing in the terms of the Bihar Foodgrains Control Order to justify giving the word premises a special meaning other than the ordinary meaning given to it in the English language. 5 In the result, I am of opinion that the decision of the lower appellate Court was correct, and the acquittal of the respondent was justified. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Jamuar, J. 6 I agree.