The appellant Jahangir Khan filed a suit in the court of the City Munsiff Udaipur against Karamdat Khan and the State Council Udaipur for an injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from a house situated near Surajpoi in the town of Udaipur. During the pendency of the suit Karamdat Khan executed a sale deed in favour of Mohan-lal respondent and he died thereafter. The plaintiff Jahangir Khan alleging that there was no other legal representative of the deceased excepting his own self got the name of Karamdat Khan struck off from the record without any substitute. On the 6th December, 1947, Mohanlal filed an application under O. 22 R.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the substitution of his name in place of that of Karamdat Khan on the ground that the property in dispute had been assigned to him by Karamdat Khan. The learned Munsiff however on the same day rejected the application on the ground that Mohanlal was not the heir of Karamdat Khan and his name could not be substituted in place of that of the deceased against the will of Jahangir Khan and that if he wanted to assert his claim he could institute a separate suit. Mohanlal did not file any appeal against this order. Ultimately on the 23rd December, 1947, the suit was decreed. 2. The State Council went in appeal against this judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff to the court of the learned District Judge Udaipur. This appeal is dated 13th February, 1948. Mohanlal also filed an appeal on the 2nd March, 1948 and along with it presented an application under O. 22 R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code that he might be brought on the record in place of Karamdat Khan. Jahangir Khan was asked to show cause against this application of Mohanlal. After hearing the objections of Jahangir Khan the learned District Judge made Mohanlal party to the appeal under O. 22 R. 10 vide his order dated 4th May 1948. Against this order Jahangir Khan did not file any appeal. The learned District Judge heard both the appeals and by a single judgment dated 29th Septem-ber 1948 set aside the decree of the first court and remanded the suit for completion of the defendants evidence and for disposal. 3. Against this order Jahangir Khan did not file any appeal. The learned District Judge heard both the appeals and by a single judgment dated 29th Septem-ber 1948 set aside the decree of the first court and remanded the suit for completion of the defendants evidence and for disposal. 3. The plaintiff Jahangir Khan has come in appeal against this appellate order of the learned District Judge and has made the Government of the United State of Rajasthan and Mohanlal respondents therein. Hereinafter in this judgment Jahangir Khan will be referred to as the appellant the Government of the United State of Rajasthan as the respondent No. 1 and Mohanlal as the respondent No. 2. 4. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of both the respondents that the order of the learned District Judge is not open to appeal. It has been argued that the only order of remand which is appeal-able is an order under O.41, R. 23 of the Civil Procedure Code. The order Under appeal is not an order under O. 41, R. 23 of the Civil Procedure Code, and, therefore, no appeal lay against it. On Behalf of the appellant it has been argued that the order of the learned istrict Judge does come under Order 41, Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. On a careful consideration of the argument of the learned counsel for the parties we are of opinion that the order in question is not an order under O. 41, R. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order under the said provision of the Code presupposes that the lower court has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point. The learned Munsiff however did not dispose or the suit on a preliminary point. He considered all the issues in she suit and after giving his findings thereon decreed the suit. The. suit was therefore decided on merits and not upon a preliminary point. The order cf the learned District Judge cannot therefore be under Order 41, Rule 23. The only order of remand appealable under the Code is an order of remand under Order 41, Rule 23. The order in question is therefore not appealable. 6. An oral request was made on behalf of the appellant that if the court holds that the order is not appealable, the appeal might be treated as a revision. The only order of remand appealable under the Code is an order of remand under Order 41, Rule 23. The order in question is therefore not appealable. 6. An oral request was made on behalf of the appellant that if the court holds that the order is not appealable, the appeal might be treated as a revision. The parties were therefore heard on merits. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the respondent No. 3 was not a arty to the suit. He had, therefore, no right to appeal against the decree of the learned Munsiff. It was further argued that the application of the respondent No. 2 for substitution of his name under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was dismissed by the learned Munsiff on the 6th December 1947. No appeal against this order was brought under Order 43, Rule 1(1). He had therefore no right to bring an appeal against the decree after the period for an appeal under O. 43, R. 1 (1) had expired. The order of remand of the lower appellate court was therefore without jurisdiction and interference could be made in revision. 7. On behalf of the respondent it has been argued that the respondent No. 2 being an assignee from Karamdat Khan could be substituted in his place as the decree adversely affects the interest of the respondent No. 2. If the decree for injunction against the respondent No. 1 subsists, the respondent No. 2 would not be able to get possession of the property. It was argued that the law allowed the substitution of his name in place of that of Karamdat Khan under O. 22, R. 10 C.P.C. An application was made by him to the first court for the substitution of his name but it was rejected. Only about a fortnight after the rejection of his application the decree was passed. He had therefore not sufficient time to file an appeal against the said order before the decree. He was consequently compelled to bring the appeal against the original d cree and applied to the appellate court for bringing his name on the record under O. 22,R. 10 in place of Karamdat Khan deceased. His application was granted by the appellate court and his name was brought on the record by the order dated 6th May 1948. He was consequently compelled to bring the appeal against the original d cree and applied to the appellate court for bringing his name on the record under O. 22,R. 10 in place of Karamdat Khan deceased. His application was granted by the appellate court and his name was brought on the record by the order dated 6th May 1948. Now when the decree of the first court had been set aside, the appellant cannot complain why his (respondent No. 2s) name has been brought on the record. As regards the question, that he, having filed no appeal against the order rejecting his application for substitution by the first court, was not entitled to appeal against the decree, it was argued that even though he did not file an appeal against the said order, he was entitled to appeal against the decree and agitate the point of his substitution in the appeal. The ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council reported in VII Moores Indian Appeals Page 283, Maharaja Moheshur Sing Vs. The Bengal Government has been relied upon in this connection. 8. Having considered the argument of the learned counsel for the parties, we find that there is no cause for interference in revision. It appears from a ruling of a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court. (A. I. R. 1918 Allahabad page 309. Banarasidas Vs. Sheodarshan-das Shastri) that even if an assignee did not make any attempt to bring his name on the record in the first court, he can file an appeal if he applies to the appellate court to be brought upon the record as successor to his assigner. Of course in that case the name of the assignee was not brought on the record at the appellate stage as he never applied to the appellate court in that behalf. But it appears from their Lord ships judgment that he would have been heard in the appeal if he had applied to the court to be brought on the record and the court had allowed his application. But it appears from their Lord ships judgment that he would have been heard in the appeal if he had applied to the court to be brought on the record and the court had allowed his application. In the present case an application was made by the respondent No. 2 to the appellate court to bring his name on the record under O 22, R. 10 C. P. C. and after allowing an opportunity to the appellant to object, the name of the respondent No. 2 was brought on the record by the order dated 6th May 1948. The respondent No. 2 had made an attempt for his name to be brought on the record in the first court also by his application dated 6th December, 1946 but unfortunately it failed. Their Lordships of the Madras High Court also, in a ruling reported in A. 1. R, 1918 Madras page 409 (Subba Piliai V. Ranga Swami and others,), have held that where a mortgagee who purchases the property in execution of a decree for enforcement of the security is resisted in taking possession and driven to instituting a fresh suit to establish his mortgage, he can be permitted to appeal against the decree as representing the mortgagor or his representative against whom the decree was passed. In that case the mortgagee did not figure as a party in the suit but was allowed to appeal after his name had been brought on the record in persuance of his application filed along with the appeal. 9. In view of the above rulings it cannot be said that the lower court either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if it be granted that the order of the lower court was bad in law, the mere fact that an order is not legally correct would not entitle a party to interference in revision. 10. Similarly, the question whether the objection of the respondent No. 2 should have been heard in the appeal against the decree, when he had not appealed against the order under 0..22 R.10 C. P. C. within the time prescribed by law is entirely a question of law. No revision lies on a mere mistake of law. 10. Similarly, the question whether the objection of the respondent No. 2 should have been heard in the appeal against the decree, when he had not appealed against the order under 0..22 R.10 C. P. C. within the time prescribed by law is entirely a question of law. No revision lies on a mere mistake of law. It lies only when, as has been said aobve, the lower court acts illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. This has been so held in a recent ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council reported in A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 156 N.S.Venkatagiri Ayyangar and another Vs The Hindu Religious Endowment Board, Madras. 11. For the above reasons we do not find any cause for interference with the order of the lower court in revision. 12. The appeal treated as revision is dismissed but under the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs thereof.