JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by one Kishori Mohan Karmakar, a purchaser of a share in an occupancy holding, against whom an application for pre-emption was made and allowed. 2. The facts briefly are as follows: One Kalipada Karmakar owned an occupancy holding. On August 17, 1943, Kalipada sold a portion of this holding to Upendra Bepari. Upendra died, leaving a widow Sudeshna and a son Panchanan. The kabala in favour of Upendra is Ex. 2. On March 5, 1948, Sudeshna, as guardian of her infant son Panchanan, sold the property to one Bhabataran Paik, who is the opposite party in this Rule. The kabala is Ex. 2A. Before this sale of March 5, 1948, Kalipada had died, leaving a widow Sindhubala as his sole heir. On April 26, 1948, Sindhubala transferred another portion of the occupancy holding, which she had inherited from Kalipada, to the Petitioner, Kishori Mohan Karmakar, by a kabala Ex. B. On August 21, 1948, Bhabataran applied for pre-emption, relying upon the provisions of Section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Kishori objected. In the petition of objection, there were two lines of attack. Firstly, it was said that the sale to Upendra Bepari was a sham transaction and no title passed to Upendra and therefore, Bhabataran by his purchase from Sudeshna as guardian of Upendra's son Panchanan acquired nothing. The next line of attack was that the sale to Bhabataran by Sudeshna by the kabala Ex. 2A was also a sham transaction and therefore, Bhabataran was not a co-sharer. 3. In the trial court, the second line of attack was given up and the case proceeded as regards the allegation that the sale by Kalipada to Upendra was a sham transaction. The trial court held that the transaction was not a sham one and accordingly, allowed the application for pre-emption. I may mention here that before the trial court no ground of non-joinder of parties was taken. Against this decision, Kishori Mohan Karmakar appealed. In the lower appellate court, a new ground was taken in addition to the ground that the sale by Kalipada conveyed no title to Bhabataran. It was argued that the court was not competent to decide the question whether Bhabataran was a co-sharer or not without making Sindhubala, the widow of Kalipada, a party to the proceedings. In the lower appellate court, a new ground was taken in addition to the ground that the sale by Kalipada conveyed no title to Bhabataran. It was argued that the court was not competent to decide the question whether Bhabataran was a co-sharer or not without making Sindhubala, the widow of Kalipada, a party to the proceedings. The lower appellate court found, firstly, that the transaction whereby Kalipada transferred a share in the property to Upendra was not a sham ,one and secondly, that it was not necessary to make Sindhubala a party. 4. The only point argued on behalf of the Petitioner is that the court was incompetent to try the issue whether Bhabataran was a co-sharer or not in the absence of Sindhubala. The argument was that the court could not decide whether the transaction between Kalipada and Upendra Bepari was real or not in the absence of Kalipada's heir, because such a decision would not be binding on Kalipada's heir and would lead to possible repugnant decisions if Kalipada's heir Sindhubala instituted proceedings to establish her right. For this proposition he relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Balai Chand Mandal v. Nibaran Chandra Das ILR (1948) 1 Cal. 430. 5. On behalf of the opposite party it is contended that the above-mentioned case did not support this view and that, even if some of the observations of the learned Judges who decided that case could be said to indicate such view, they were merely obiter dicta. Learned advocate for the opposite party also points out that the facts of that case are essentially different from the facts of the present one. His contention is that as the decision in this case in the absence of Sindhubala would not be binding on her, there was no bar to the court deciding the questions involved in this application in her absence. 6. I am inclined to accept the view of the learned advocate for the opposite party. I am unable to see how it can be said that Sindhubala is a necessary party to the proceeding. The contest is between Bhabataran on the one side and Kishori Mohan Karmakar, the vendee, on the other. The rights of nobody else are directly involved in this application u/s 26P. I am unable to see how it can be said that Sindhubala is a necessary party to the proceeding. The contest is between Bhabataran on the one side and Kishori Mohan Karmakar, the vendee, on the other. The rights of nobody else are directly involved in this application u/s 26P. All that the court has to do is to decide whether Bhabataran is a co-sharer who had complied with the provisions of Section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Bhabataran's case is that he had purchased a share in the property from the heir of Upendra to whom Kalipada had transferred a portion of the occupancy holding. He seeks no relief against Kalipada or Kalipada's heirs. Kishori Mohan Karmakar denied Bhabataran's claim that he was a co-sharer. He also seeks no relief against anybody else. In these circumstances I fail to see how it can be said that the application is incompetent for non-joinder of Kalipada's widow Sindhubala. Take the case of a suit for a declaration of title and recovery of possession. The Plaintiff, in establishing his title, may have to prove his purchase from somebody else. He may also have to prove that that other person had purchased the property from the original owner. It is not necessary at all for the Plaintiff to make all his predecessors in title parties to the suit, merely because the Defendant denies the title of one or other of such predecessors. Cases like this occur every day and I am not aware of any decision which holds that in such a case all the predecessors of the Plaintiff must be made parties. If such were the law, the result would be that such a suit would become unmanageable and cumbrous. I can see no prejudice to any of the parties which can arise from the fact that Sindhubala is not a party. Sindhubala may be called as witness by either of the parties to establish their respective cases. The decision in this case would not be binding on Sindhubala and therefore, there can be no prejudice to her interest if she is not made a party. In my opinion, it is quite unnecessary to make Sindhubala a party in these proceedings. Sindhubala may be called as witness by either of the parties to establish their respective cases. The decision in this case would not be binding on Sindhubala and therefore, there can be no prejudice to her interest if she is not made a party. In my opinion, it is quite unnecessary to make Sindhubala a party in these proceedings. The most that can be said is that Sindhubala may have been joined as a party for a more effectual and complete adjudication of the questions involved; in other words, the most that can be said is that Sindhubala is a proper party. I must not be understood, however, as holding that she is a proper party. In my opinion, she is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. Conceding, however, for the sake of argument, that she is a proper party, even then, the Petitioner cannot succeed, as he has not raised this objection at the earliest stage. In this connection I would refer to Order I, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which lays down the rule that all objections on the ground of non-joinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and that any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived. 7. I shall now deal shortly with the case relied upon on behalf of the Petitioner. This was a suit instituted by the Plaintiff against the Defendant in the court of a Munsif for a declaration that a certain transfer by him was a benami transaction. The suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif on the ground that the matter was res-judicata, it having been decided in a proceeding u/s 26F, in the presence of the Plaintiff, that the transaction was not benami. Against this decree of dismissal of the suit by the Munsif there was an appeal, which was heard by the Subordinate Judge and the learned judge held that the decision in the proceedings u/s 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not operate as res judicata, as they were of a summary character and he decreed the suit in full. Upon appeal, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was set aside and the decision of the Munsif was restored. It is obvious from this statement that the points for consideration in the present application and in the reported case were quite different. Upon appeal, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was set aside and the decision of the Munsif was restored. It is obvious from this statement that the points for consideration in the present application and in the reported case were quite different. In the course of' his judgment Chakravartti J. made certain remarks which, to my mind, are merely obiter dicta. He said that in proceedings u/s 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act the court was bound to decide the question of benami, if it was raised and that in such a case, if it is raised by the transferee, the transferor ought to be made a party under the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. He does not specify under what provisions he should be made a party and it is not quite clear whether my learned brother Chakravartti J. was deciding that the transferor in such a case was a necessary party or merely a proper party. Be that as it nay, in the reported case the Defendant contended that the transferee in the previous pre-emption proceedings alleged that here was no sale to him and that the transaction between him and the transferor was a sham transaction and that this point caving been decided against the Plaintiff transferor in the premption case in his presence it was res judicata. In these circumstances my learned brother Chakravartti J. held that a decision in the pre-emption proceedings would be binding on the transferor as res judicata. In passing, he remarked that the transferor had been properly added as a party in the pre-emption proceedings. The question whether he was a necessary party or not in the pre-emption proceedings was not a question which was directly in issue in the suit and the case cannot be binding authority for the proposition that he was. 8. As I have stated above, the point for decision here is entirely different. The transferee in the present case is alleging that the Applicant for pre-emption had no title, because one of his alleged predecessors-in-title had no title to the property, which is the subject-matter of the controversy. The question of res judicata is not involved. The decision in the case of Balai Chand Mandal v. Nibaran Chandra Das (supra) therefore cannot apply to the present case, which must be decided on its own particular facts. 9. The question of res judicata is not involved. The decision in the case of Balai Chand Mandal v. Nibaran Chandra Das (supra) therefore cannot apply to the present case, which must be decided on its own particular facts. 9. In view of the opinion I have already expressed I must find that no error has been committed by the courts below. 10. This Rule must accordingly be discharged with costs.