JUDGMENT : Krishna Pillai, J. The appellant who is the son of the original mortgagee is the first defendant in a redemption suit. Ext. A is the mortgage deed dated 16.4.1081 and it provided that the mortgagee would pay over to the mortgagor (first plaintiff's ancestor) thirty two parahas and five and two-thirds edankalies of paddy every year as Michavaram. The mortgagee failed to pay any Michavaram and the plaintiffs who have succeeded to the interests of the mortgagor have instituted the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for redemption and for an account for all the thirty-six years prior to the date of suit during which Michavaram remained unpaid. In settling the accounts the plaintiffs claimed the michavaram due for the whole period of thirty-six years partly by way of set off against the mortgage amount and the balance amounts to Rs. 1780/- in cash. They also prayed for recovery of the mesne profits of the properties from the date of suit. The lower court allowed the suit and, in appeal, two contentions were raised on behalf of the appellant, firstly, that the decree for arrears of Michavaram except for a period of six years preceding the date of suit was unsustainable in law, and secondly that after the date of suit it was not mesne profits that should have been awarded but only Michavaram at the contract rate. Both points have to be decided on the principles governing the legal relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee. 2. The general rule relating to all possessory mortgages is that as soon as the moneys due under the mortgages has been fully satisfied out of the rents and profits received by the mortgagee, his duty is to delivery up the property to the person entitled to possession of it, his position being that of a trustee for the owner. The accounting period is not limited by time except when relinquishment of possession takes place and so long as possession continues so long does the liability continue. Though a mortgagee cannot be compelled by the mortgagor to quit possession except upon payment of principal and interest or so much thereof as has not been satisfied out of the rents and profits received, as from the date when principal and interest have been discharged he will until conveyance be liable as a rule to account with yearly rests. Though a mortgagee cannot be compelled by the mortgagor to quit possession except upon payment of principal and interest or so much thereof as has not been satisfied out of the rents and profits received, as from the date when principal and interest have been discharged he will until conveyance be liable as a rule to account with yearly rests. In discussing the mode of determining the liability of the mortgagee for rent and profits during the period of occupation, it was observed by North, J. in Ashworth v. Lord 36 Chancery Division 545, as follows: "But, after they have been paid in full, they are, as was pointed out by the Master of the Rolls in Wilson v. Metaclfe, 1 Russ. 530, persons who are in receiving the rents after their debt has been fully paid, availing themselves of another man's money for their own use and benefit, and they ought to be charged with interest. Int hat case annual rests were directed to be made from the time at which the mortgage debt was fully paid, and that is what I have always understood to be the practice in the few cases in which the point has arisen". The law is succinctly stated in the following words in Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage, seven edition, page 736. "As soon as no principal remains due, the effect of the order is to charge the mortgagee with compound interest on the excess of rents and profits over outgoings at each rest. And generally, when the mortgagee has been paid off his interest and principal out of rents and profits, and nevertheless continues in possession he becomes a debtor to the mortgagor in respect of subsequent receipts and annual rests will be directed in the account against him, although no rests were directed in the original order for accounts." 3. The Indian Law is not different. By S. 76(h) of the Indian Transfer of Property Act, which deals with possessory mortgages, all receipts by the mortgagee from the mortgage holding must after deductings on account of collections and interest due on the mortgage amount be applied in reduction or discharge of the mortgage money and if there is a surplus it shall be paid to the mortgagor. This is a statutory obligation which is not limited to any period of time. This is a statutory obligation which is not limited to any period of time. In Parasurama Pattar v. Venkatachalla Pattar, 25 M.L.J. 561, following the decisions of the Calcutta High Court on the subject, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court stated as follows: "At the time of redemption, when the mortgagor is required to pay the amount due by him under the mortgage, the mortgagee is also bound to give him credit for all payments which he is bound to make under it. The rule, of course, will not apply to any payments that the mortgagee is liable to make to the mortgagor otherwise than under the contract of mortgage." In Thekkamannangath Raman alias Kochu Poduval v. Kakkasseri Pozhiyot Manakkal Karnavan, 28 M.L.J. 184, Sadasiva Iyer, J. points out that no question of limitation arises as between mortgagor and mortgagee when accounts are taken at the time of redemption. A contention that the accounting period should be limited to twelve years was repelled by the Allahabad High Court in Banwari Singh v. Sakhraj Singh, (A.I.R. 1931 Allahabad 585), where Niamatullah, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court pointed out that, on account being taken, sums due from one to the other during the continuance of the mortgage should be included. 4. On the question of limitation the provisions of the Limitation Act are also instructive. Art. 92 of the Travancore Limitation Act (corresponding to Art. 105 of the Indian Limitation Act) deals with the mortgagor's suit to recover surplus collections received by the mortgagee. It allows a period of three years from the date when the mortgagor re-enters on the mortgage property. It is therefore obvious that limitation does not run for a suit for recovery of rents and profits from the mortgagee until the mortgagor secures possession of the mortgaged properties. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the accounting period may be anything so long as the mortgage amount remained undischarged but that as soon as the mortgage discharged, the relationship between the two was that of creditor and debtor which allowed only six years for enforcement of the claim. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the accounting period may be anything so long as the mortgage amount remained undischarged but that as soon as the mortgage discharged, the relationship between the two was that of creditor and debtor which allowed only six years for enforcement of the claim. In Ramanath Iyen v. Devan Nanayar, 2 T.L.J. 193, a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court expressed the view that the mortgagor could not get a decree for more than six years arrears accruing due prior to the commencement of the suit though he could utilise the arrears for a set off without any limitation of time. The reason for the limitation imposed by that rule was, however not stated nor was the principle underlying the law of accounting discussed or referred to. The law allows accounting between persons standing in certain jural relationship in which accounts are taken for all the period prior to commencement of action and mutual rights and liabilities are settled without limitation of time. As an example we may refer to the case of partners and principal and agent. The relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee in respect of accounts is not different and we hold that no question of limitation can arise until re-entry by the mortgagor. We therefore hold that the decree in favour of the plaintiffs for the balance due for the period between the date of the mortgage and the date of suit is not open to objection. We therefore confirm it. 5. On the second point also our decision is against the appellant. His contention is that he should be made liable to account only at the rate of thirty-three and odd parahs of paddy which was what he had agreed to pay as Michavaram and not for the rents and profits of the properties. This contention is without any substance. The mortgagee did not wish to go out of the property even though he had received all that was due to him under the mortgage long prior to the date of action. The Michavaram that he had undertaken to pay annually was nothing but the rents and profits of the properties less deduction on account of interest due for the mortgage amount. After mortgage was discharged there was nothing which the mortgagee could appropriate for himself. The Michavaram that he had undertaken to pay annually was nothing but the rents and profits of the properties less deduction on account of interest due for the mortgage amount. After mortgage was discharged there was nothing which the mortgagee could appropriate for himself. The true rule is as pointed out in Ashworth v. Lord, referred to above, that the defendant "will be regarded as availing himself of another man's money for his own benefit, and he ought to be charged with interest." We therefore over-rule this objection and hold that the award of mesne profits at the rate of one hundred and thirty parahs of paddy from the date of suit till surrender of property is not open to any objection. 6. The appellant's learned counsel also pointed out that the plaintiffs had paid more court fee than they were liable to be charged with on the plaint. This question was not raised in the lower court and we do not think that it arises properly at this stage. The assessment does not appear to be improper and at any rate it was not for overcharging the defendant. 7. The appeal is dismissed with costs.