JUDGMENT : S. Krishna Pillai, J. These two appeals are against the decree in O.S No. 49 of 1120 of the Alleppy District Court, defendants 1 and 2 being the appellants in A.S. 144 of 1122 and the third defendant being the appellant in A.S. 380 of 1122. The second defendant is the sole proprietor of the first defendant business concern known by the name of "The Travancore Agencies". On behalf of the first defendant the second defendant issued in favour of the third defendant Ext. A crossed cheque dated 17th July 1944 for Rs.6000 drawn on the Bank of Deccan Ltd., Kottayam. On the 18th July 1944 the third defendant opened an account in his name in the plaintiff's bank and indorsed Ext. A in favour of the plaintiff and got the amount credited in his own account. On the same day the third defendant drew Ext. D cheque payable to himself and received from the plaintiff the full amount of Rs. 6000/- less the discount of Rs. 11-4 as. Thereafter plaintiff indorsed Ext. A cheque in favour of the Presidency Bank Ltd., Kottayam, for collection. But the drawee bank dishonoured the cheque on presentment on the ground that the drawer had countermanded payment and accordingly it was returned to the Presidency Bank Ltd. After issuing notice of dishonour to all the defendants, plaintiff instituted the present suit for recovery from them the amount covered by Ext. A cheque together with interest thereon. All the defendants resisted the suit. The main contentions raised by the second defendant are that he had every right to countermand payment of the amount under the cheque, because the third defendant had failed to act in accordance with the undertaking made by him at the time when the cheque was drawn, that the third defendant is not entitled to the amount covered by Ext. A cheque, that the plaintiff is not a holder-in-due-course, and that the plaintiff's rights, if any, are only against the third defendant. According to the third defendant, he has no liability as an indorser of Ext. A cheque and that, if at all, he could only be made secondarily liable for the plaint claim, the primary liability being on defendants 1 and 2. The lower court repelled all these contentions and decreed the suit against all the defendants. 2. According to the third defendant, he has no liability as an indorser of Ext. A cheque and that, if at all, he could only be made secondarily liable for the plaint claim, the primary liability being on defendants 1 and 2. The lower court repelled all these contentions and decreed the suit against all the defendants. 2. The prayer for remand urged on behalf of the second defendant, appellant in A.S. 144 of 1122, may be considered at the outset. His complaint is that the lower court did not allow him sufficient opportunity to examine all his witnesses. A perusal of the progress diary in the case shows that there is not much substance in this complaint. The issue in the case were raised on 8.8.1120 and the case was posted to 29.10.1120 for evidence and examination of parties. On that date, all the defendants applied for time. Next posting was on 3.12.1120. No witness was present on that day. Hence the case was adjourned to 18.12.1120. On that date also defendants 1 and 2 applied for time and the case was adjourned to 31.12.1120. After two more adjournments the case was posted for examination of parties to 8.2.1121. Again the defendants applied for time and this was allowed on payment of day-costs. On 18.2.1121, the date of the next posting, the second defendant produced one witness. Second defendant himself was examined as D.W. 1 and his witness was examined as D.W. 2. With such examination the evidence on the second defendant's side was closed. Plaintiff was the only other person whom the second defendant wanted to be examined as per his witness list. The plaintiff has also been examined as P.W. 1. But on 27.2.1121, the second defendant filed an additional list of two witnesses. No explanation was offered as to why the names of these witnesses were not included in the first list. Even though it was stated in the supplementary list filed on 27.2.1121 that the additional witnesses will be produced by him, it is seen that he did not produce them on any of the next three adjournment dates. It was only after the case came up for final hearing that the second defendant again moved for the examination of one more witness on his side. That application was rejected by the lower court. It was only after the case came up for final hearing that the second defendant again moved for the examination of one more witness on his side. That application was rejected by the lower court. In view of the circumstances already stated, the lower court was right in not allowing any further indulgence in favour of the second defendant, and we hold that the prayer for remand urged on his behalf does not deserve any serious consideration. 3. Regarding the circumstances which necessitated the issue of Ext. A cheque in favour of the third defendant, conflicting versions are given by himself and the second defendant. It is common ground that there was a motor-car transaction between them. A Chevrolet car T.R.V. 2341, the registration certificate of which stood in the name of the plaintiff's son Venkitasubramonia Iyer, is stated to have been sold to one Gopala Prabhu of Cochin. After two more transfers the second defendant became the owner of that car. But he had not obtained the registration certificate transferred in his name. All the same he gave the car to the third defendant in exchange for an Opel car which belonged to the third defendant and promised to get the registration certificate of the Chevrolet car transferred in the name of the third defendant. This promise of the second defendant was not fulfilled even though the third defendant waited for some time. In the meanwhile the third defendant had spent some more money in effecting certain repairs to the car. On 4th July 1944, the third defendant took the car to the second defendant's office at Kottayam and surrendered it to him and demanded back the price of it together with the amount spent for repairing the car. According to the third defendant, Ext. A cheque for Rs. 6000/- issued by the second defendant was in satisfaction of that claim. Even though the cheque was issued on 4th July 1944 its date was put down as 17th July 1944. The third defendant has stated that the second defendant wanted time till 17th July 1944 to make certain adjustment with the drawee bank and it was to enable him to do so that Ext. A cheque was thus post-dated by him. The Second defendant had given a different reason for the post-dating of the cheque. The third defendant has stated that the second defendant wanted time till 17th July 1944 to make certain adjustment with the drawee bank and it was to enable him to do so that Ext. A cheque was thus post-dated by him. The Second defendant had given a different reason for the post-dating of the cheque. According to him the agreement between himself and the third defendant was that they would meet at Kottayam on the 10th July and then proceed to Trivandrum and make the necessary arrangements for getting the registration certificate of the car transferred in the name of third defendant. This was hoped to be achieved before the 17th of July and accordingly the third defendant was requested to wait till that date. In the meanwhile he was to retain with him Ext. A cheque as security for the price of the car and the understanding was that in case the registration certificate could not be transferred in his name even by the 17th July, he was to surrender the car to the second defendant and then cash the cheque and appropriate the amount towards the price of the car. From the several circumstances disclosed by the evidence on record, the version put forward by the second defendant appears to be highly improbable. It is not likely that the second defendant who is a businessman would have issued a cheque like Ext. A for Rs. 6000/- in favour of the third defendant and at the same time allowed him to retain possession and custody of the car also. It is also not likely that the third defendant who had already waited for a few months to get the registration certificate transferred in his name, who have insisted on getting Ext. A by way of security for the further period of one week alone which the second defendant had asked for. According to the agreement set up by the second defendant, there was time till 17th July to get the registration certificate transferred in the name of the third defendant and nothing was to be done with the cheque prior to that date. All the same, it is admitted by him that even on 11th July he had countermanded payment of the amount due under the cheque. All the same, it is admitted by him that even on 11th July he had countermanded payment of the amount due under the cheque. The reason stated by him is that the third defendant had failed to meet him at Kottayam on the 10th July as he had promised. Even if there was such a promise, the mere omission of the third defendant to meet the second defendant on the 10th could not justify the countermanding of the payment of the cheque. It is admitted by the second defendant as D.W. 1 that in spite of the failure of the third defendant to meet him on the 10th he had sent his own man to Trivandrum to arrange for getting the registration certificate transferred in the name of the third defendant. Even if such attempt failed, the right of the second defendant was only to get back the car and not to prevent the third defendant from getting the money under Ext. A cheque. Over and above all these circumstances which are against the second defendant, there is the direct evidence of D.W. 4 who swears in support of the version put forward by the third defendant. D.W. 4 is an independent and respectable witness who is well-acquainted with the second defendant. This witness has stated that he was present in the office of the second defendant when Ext. A cheque was issued in favour of the third defendant. He says that he heard these two defendants settling the accounts about the price of the car before issuing the cheque. He has also stated that he saw the car in the shed which was just below the room where all these transactions were entered into. D.W. 4 has further stated that when the third defendant left the place with the cheque, second defendant's peon came up and represented that the petrol tank of the car was empty. The second defendant asked the peon to see that the car is secure in the shed. Nothing has been brought out on cross-examination of D.W. 4 to discredit his evidence. The lower court was therefore right in believing his evidence which fully corroborates the third defendant's evidence as D.W. 3. The second defendant asked the peon to see that the car is secure in the shed. Nothing has been brought out on cross-examination of D.W. 4 to discredit his evidence. The lower court was therefore right in believing his evidence which fully corroborates the third defendant's evidence as D.W. 3. In the cross-examination of third defendant as D.W. 3, a question was put to him by the second defendant whether he had not sold the car even on the fourth July to one M.R. Ananthanarayana Iyer of Kottayam. This suggestion was denied by the third defendant. If there was any such sale the same car could not have been seen by D.W. 4 in the second defendant's shed on the same date. Further the second defendant's admission that even after the 10th of July he had sent his man to Trivandrum to arrange for the transfer of the registration certificate of the car would itself go to show that the story of the sale of the car by the third defendant to M.R. Ananthanarayana Iyer is only a wild suggestion. On a consideration of all these aspects of the case, we agree with the lower court in believing D.W. 3 and D.W. 4 and in holding that on the 14th July 1944 the Chevrolet car referred to above was returned by the third defendant to the second defendant and that it was towards the price of that car that Ext. A cheque was issued by the second defendant in favour of the third defendant. 4. Ext. A cheque made the amount payable to the third defendant or order. The cheque was crossed and was made payable to "payee's account only." The effect of such a general crossing was that the Banker on whom the cheque is drawn would not cash it otherwise than through a bank or by crediting the amount to the payee's account in the drawee bank itself. Such crossing did not affect the negotiability of the cheque. Thus it cannot be said that there was anything wrong in the third defendant having indorsed the cheque in favour of the plaintiff who is a banker. Since the cheque was crossed "payee's account only" the third defendant had to open an account in the plaintiff's bank and credit the amount in that account. Accordingly the third defendant wrote Ext. Thus it cannot be said that there was anything wrong in the third defendant having indorsed the cheque in favour of the plaintiff who is a banker. Since the cheque was crossed "payee's account only" the third defendant had to open an account in the plaintiff's bank and credit the amount in that account. Accordingly the third defendant wrote Ext. L letter dated 18.7.1944 requesting the plaintiff to open an account in his name with an initial deposit of Rs. 100/- Ext. G account was thus opened in the name of the third defendant and on the strength of Ext. A (1) indorsement made by him, the amount under the cheque after deducting the discount of Rs. 11-4 as., was credited in Ext. G account. On the same day he drew Ext. D cheque in favour of himself and received the full amount of Rs. 5988-12 as., from the plaintiff and executed Ext. D1 receipt. This amount was debited in Ext. G account. Exts. A(1), D and D1 are all admitted by the third defendant. He has also admitted having received the full amount due under Ext. A cheque from the plaintiff as per these documents. Thus it is clear that Ext. A(1) indorsement in favour of the plaintiff is fully supported by consideration. It has already been found that Ext. A cheque itself was fully supported by consideration and that there was no invalidity about it. The cheque happened to be dishonoured by the drawee bank merely because the drawer had countermanded payment. Ext. I is the letter dated 11th July 1944 sent by the second defendant to the drawee bank requesting them to stop payment of the amount covered by Ext. A cheque. This countermanding was done behind the back of the third defendant. It is admitted by the second defendant as D.W. 3 that no intimation of such countermanding was given by him to the third defendant and that he did not feel that there was any necessity to give such intimation. Thus the third defendant was left to believe in good faith that he could cash the cheque on 17th July 1944 or on any subsequent date. It is admitted by him that it was because he was in urgent need of money that he indorsed the cheque in favour of the plaintiff and received the amount under it. Thus the third defendant was left to believe in good faith that he could cash the cheque on 17th July 1944 or on any subsequent date. It is admitted by him that it was because he was in urgent need of money that he indorsed the cheque in favour of the plaintiff and received the amount under it. At the time of that transaction neither of them was aware of the fact that the cheque had already been countermanded. There was no necessity or occasion for them to enquire about it. It was only when "the Presidency Bank Ltd., Kottayam" to whom plaintiff had indorsed the cheque for collection, returned the cheque as having been dishonoured, that the plaintiff came to know that the second defendant had already countermanded the cheque. It is clear from all these facts and circumstances that the indorsement in favour of the plaintiff was made in good faith and for valuable consideration and that he is a holder-in-due-course. The lower court's finding to that effect is therefore upheld. 5. Since the cheque was dishonoured, plaintiff as a holder-in-due-course is entitled to make the drawer as well as the indorser liable for the amount due to him, provided that he has given due notice to them about the fact that the cheque has been dishonoured on presentment of payment. Defendants in this case have not set up any plea of want of any such notice. Plaintiff says that notices were duly given and he has produced Ext. J and J(1) acknowledgment receipts in proof of the acceptance of such notices by the defendants. It is argued on behalf of the third defendant that he could only be made secondarily liable. According to the second defendant the arrangement between himself and the third defendant was that the cheque may be cashed on any day after the 17th July 1944. It follows therefore that A(1) indorsement on the 18th July 1944 was after maturity. It has also come out in evidence that the plaintiff accepted the indorsement mainly because of his faith in the credit of the second defendant, the drawer of the cheque. In view of these circumstances, we think that equitable relief asked for by the third defendant has to be allowed. It has also come out in evidence that the plaintiff accepted the indorsement mainly because of his faith in the credit of the second defendant, the drawer of the cheque. In view of these circumstances, we think that equitable relief asked for by the third defendant has to be allowed. Thus, while upholding the lower court's finding that all the defendants are liable for the plaint claim, it is directed that the plaintiff should in the first instance proceed against defendants 1 and 2 for realising the amount decreed in his favour. 6. Subject to the direction made above, the decree of the lower court is confirmed and both the appeals are dismissed. The plaintiff-respondent in A.S. 144 of 1112 will get his costs from the appellants. The parties to A.S. 380 of 1122 are directed to suffer their respective costs. Interest on costs at 6 per cent.