JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is on behalf of the judgment debtorsand is directed against the order of the learned District Judge of Morena, dated 18th November 1948, by which the decree-holder's application for execution of a decree has been held to be within limitation. 2. The relevant facts are as follows: The decree holder applied to the Pergana Court Sabalge, rh on 9th August 1937 for execution of a decree against the judgment-debtors. This application for execution was numbered Execution Case No.38 of 1994. Therein the decree-holders had applied for sale of a house belonging to the judgment debtors and in due course the said house was attached. There were several uzardaris (objections) before the sale of the property and in that connection the executing Court received a stay order. The executing Court recorded an order on 9th May 1939 in the following terms: "The order for stay of the proceedings has been passed. It is not necessary to keep the file pending. Hence the file should be consigned to the record room. The decree-holder can proceed after the disposal of the uzardari." 3. The said uzardari was decided on 14th April 1941; and on 25th January 1947 (after a period of five years and nine months) an application was put in on behalf of the minor son of the decree-holder requesting the Court to revive the execution proceedings and order the sale of the property attached. 4. The judgment-debtors took the objection that this application was barred by time and the execution Court upheld this objection, out in the second appeal the District Judge overruled it. 5. It is quite clear that on 9th May 1939 the executing Court had merely shelved the matter and consigned the file to the record room only as a temporary measure. There was no default on the part of the decree-holder and the application must, therefore, be deemed to have remained pending and only provisionally shelved. As held by the Judicial Committee in Shiaikh Karamudian v Jawahar Lal, 27 ALL 334; (32 I.A. 102 P.C.), such application is in substance as wall as in form, an application to revive and carry through a pending execution and not an application to initiate a new one. 6. As held by the Judicial Committee in Shiaikh Karamudian v Jawahar Lal, 27 ALL 334; (32 I.A. 102 P.C.), such application is in substance as wall as in form, an application to revive and carry through a pending execution and not an application to initiate a new one. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants (judgment-debtors) however contends that as the application was not made before 14th April 1944 (i.e. within 3 years of the date of the discharge of injunction) it should be held to be time barred. Reliance is placed on Girdhari Lal v. Damodar Das, AIR (1) 1914 oudh 430: (17 O.C. 169); Balwant Singh v. Budh Singh, AIR (7) 1920 ALL. 174: (42 ALL. 564); Sat Narain v. Ganga Jal, AIR (13) 1926 ALL. 409: (94 I.C. 1005) and Bibi Hajo v. Har Sahai, AIR (13) 1926 Pat. 62: (89 I.C.992).The Allahabad High Court has all along taken the view that Art.181, Limitation Act applies in such cases. The Patna High Court is also of the same opinion. This view proceeds upon the basis that a decree-holder under these circumstances is bound under the law to apply for continuation of the execution proceedings after the removal of the bar. 7. The Calcutta High Court is of the opinion that in such cases the right to apply is a right which accrued from day to day and, therefore, it cannot be barred by lapse of time: Kedar Nath v. Harchand Dutt, 8 Cal. 420. 8. This decision was followed by the Madras High Court in Chalavadi Kotiah v. P. Alimelammah, 31 Mad. 71: (18 M.L.J. 46), wherein Miller and Munro JJ., held that so long as proceedings initiated by the decree-holder are pending, his right to apply for their continuance accrues from day to day i.e., on every day on which the Court does not suo mote continue them. The right to apply will then not be barred till three years have elapsed after the proceedings have ceased to be pending. This proposition was agreed to by Benson and Abdur Rahim JJ., in Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeran Pillai, 36 mad. 553:(14 I.C. 264). 9. In Kristo Kamini v. Girish Chandra, AIR (23) 1936 Cal. 239:(63 cal. The right to apply will then not be barred till three years have elapsed after the proceedings have ceased to be pending. This proposition was agreed to by Benson and Abdur Rahim JJ., in Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeran Pillai, 36 mad. 553:(14 I.C. 264). 9. In Kristo Kamini v. Girish Chandra, AIR (23) 1936 Cal. 239:(63 cal. 57), R.C. Mitter J., referred to the above decisions and then observed: "When an execution case is still pending, but cannot be proceeded with further by reason of an injunction, and has been "struck off the file" or is removed by an order which does not terminate it finally but has the effect of only removing if from the list of pending cases, we do not see why it must be said that the decree-holder is bound to apply for revival of the said proceedings after the removal or discharge of the injunction. His application in substance only conveys to the Court that the bar has been removed. It is also the duty of the Court to have in eight all undisposed cases and when the bar is removed to direct the party to take necessary steps of the case. For these reasons we do not agree with the view of the Allahabad and Patna High Courts." Henderson, J. agreeing with this opinion remarked: "It has, however, some times, been held that after the removal of an injunction staying execution and further proceedings, the decree-holder is bound to file a petition for permission to go on with his case within three years. This implies that a duty is cast upon the decree-holder to file such a petition. With great respect to the learned Judges who have take that view, we are of opinion that such a petition is entirely redundant and the decree-holder cannot be prevented from going on with his pending case in the ordinary way. Indeed in some cases it is not necessary for the decree-holder to do any thing at all……When a decree-holder files a petition asking the Court that a pending case be proceeded with, the Court should inquire wheher there is in fact such a case pending or not. If there is, the decree-holder is obviously entitled to go on with it. If there is not, the application is clearly misconceived and would fail. But in neither case can any question of limitation arise." 10. If there is, the decree-holder is obviously entitled to go on with it. If there is not, the application is clearly misconceived and would fail. But in neither case can any question of limitation arise." 10. The reasoning adopted by the two learned Judges in the above case is convincing and is fundamentally correct. It has my respectful concurrence. This view, I may add, had been repeatedly followed in the Courts of Gwalior State (Vide 2000 G.L.R. 210, 2002 G.L.R. 274; 2003 G.L.R. 151 and 2004 G.L.R. 69). 11. I accordingly hold that the application for continuation of the execution proceedings was rightly held by the learned District Judge to be within time and I, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.