1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs Kanhaiyalal and Prahalad against the appellate decree of the learned District Judge Bhilwara upholding the decree of the learned Town Munsiff Bhilwara, dismissing the plaintiffs suit for redemption of two Nohras and three shops situated in the town of Bhilwara. Jamnalal, defendant No. 1 was made the principal defendant and Chhaganlal and Pannalal were also made defendants Ganeshram and Andiram were also made defendants No. 4 and 5 on the allegation that the defendant No. 1 had given the possession of one of the shops in dispute to them. It would be convenient to give the pedigree given by the plaintiffs in their plaint before proceeding any further. Sawantram Jagannath Kajodimal Jankidas Kishanlal Shivkaran|| Barmakaran|| Ramkaran(died issueless) Pannalal (Defdt. No. 3) Chhaganlal (Defdt No. 2) Haridas|| Mohanlal (Adopted son) Prahlad (PI. No. 2) Kanhaiyalal(Pl. No. 1) Mohanlal(Adopted by Barmakaran) 2. The plaintiffs originally brought their suit on the allegation that one of the Nohras in suit was usufruc-tuarily mortgaged by the ancestors of the plaintiffs with the ancestor of the defendant No. 1 about Samvat 1968 for a sum of Rs. 300/-, and three shops in suit were usufruc-tuarily mortgaged in about Samvat 1942 with Messrs Hansraj Radha Kishan of Ratlam (to be herein after referred to as Ratlamwalas) by Shiv-Karan and Haridas for a sum of Rs. 300 - The said three shops came into the possession of defendant No. 1 Jamnalal by a submortgage from the Ratlamwalas. As regards the second Nohra in suit it was alleged that in about Samvat 1963 it was usufruc-tuarily mortgaged with defendant No.1 for a sum of Rs. 400/- by Chhaganlal and Pannalal defendants No. 2 and 3. It was further alleged that the whole of the property in suit came into the possession of the plaintiffs ancestors by way of possessory mortgage from certain Suranas who sold it to the plaintiffs father and grand-father in Samvat 1958. The defendant No. 2 and 3 therefore had no right in these properties but they were allowed to mortgage the Nohra simply because they required money for their fathers expenses. 3. Subsequently an application for amendment of the plaint was made on the 19th September 1944 to the following effect :— (i) Kanhaiyalal successor of Ratlamwalas to be added as defendant No. 6. 3. Subsequently an application for amendment of the plaint was made on the 19th September 1944 to the following effect :— (i) Kanhaiyalal successor of Ratlamwalas to be added as defendant No. 6. (ii) The date of the mortgage deed by Suranas in favour of the plaintiffs ancestors to be given as Magh Vadi 6, Samvat, 1922 and the amount of mortgage money as Rs. 957/-. (iii) The date of mortgage of three shops by the plaintiffs ancestors to Ratlamwalas to be given as Kartik Sudi 1, Samwat 1941 and the amount of mortgage money as Rs. 1000/-. It would thus be seen that by this amendment the three shops were alleged to have been mortgaged to Ratlamwalas on Kartik Sudi 2, Samwat 1947, instead of Samwat 1942 as originally alleged and the amount of the mortgage money as Rs. 1000/-instead of Rs. 300/-, thus bringing the total amount of the mortgage money of all the property in dispute to Rs. 1700/- instead of Rs. 1000/-. 4. This amendment was allowed by the order dated 20th September, 1944. 5. On the 27th October 1944, the defendants No. 4 and 5 applied that their brother Rambilas be also made a party, and consequently by an order dated the same day Rambilas was arrayed as defendant No. 7. 6. The defendant No. 4 and 5 in their written statement dated 1st November, 1944 pleaded that they had nothing to do with the suit and that they bad purchased two of the shops in suit for a sum of Rs. 1000/-from defendant No. 1 out of which Rs. 500/- had been paid as earnest money and the balance was still due. The sale deed had not been executed but they had been put in possession. 7. On the 15th November, 1944 the defendant No. 1 filed his written statement alleging that all the 3 shops were his own property and the allegation about their having been mortgaged by plaintiffs ancestors was not true. It was also alleged that only a moiety share in one of the Nohars in suit had been mortgaged by the plaintiff No. 1s father and grand-father for a sum of Rs. 221/- to him (defendant No. 1) on Phalgun Sudi 15, Samwat 1968, and that a sum of Rs. 365/-/6 was spent by him on repairs of that portion. It was also alleged that only a moiety share in one of the Nohars in suit had been mortgaged by the plaintiff No. 1s father and grand-father for a sum of Rs. 221/- to him (defendant No. 1) on Phalgun Sudi 15, Samwat 1968, and that a sum of Rs. 365/-/6 was spent by him on repairs of that portion. The remaining hall of the said Nohra was mortgaged with him by Pannalal Ramkaran for a sum of Rs. 221/- on Mrigsir Sudi 3, Samwat 1965. On that portion Rs. 82/6/- were spent as repair during the mortgage. It was also alleged that the other Nohra was mortgaged with him by Chhaganlal defendant No. 2 for a sum of Rs. 281/-on Bhado Vadi 3, Samwat 1971 and a sum of Rs. 126/13/6 was spent on its repairs. It was finally alleged that there was misjoinder of defendants and causes of action and in any case the plaintiffs alone had no right to bring the suit without making the defendants No. 2 and 3 as co-plaintiffs as according to his own saying they were also members of the plaintiffs family and interested in the firm Sanwatram Jagannath. 8. The defendants No. 2 and 3 in their written statement pleaded that the plaintiffs had nothing to do with the property mortgaged by them to the defendant No. 1/- and had consequently no right to redeem it. They also alleged that in the 3 shops in dispute they were also co-sharers to the extent of § and that the said shops were mortgaged by their ancestor as well as those of the plaintiffs to the Ratlamwalas. 9. In proof of their assertion the plaintiffs in addition to the oral evidence, filed inter alia an extract from their Nakal Bahi Ex. P.I and an extract from the Nakal Bahi of Ratlamwalas Ex. P. 7, an extract about the alleged mortgage by Suranas in favour of Sawantram Jagannath dated Magh Vadi 6, Samwat 1922. Ex. P. 2 and Ex. P. 3 purporting to be an unregistered sale deed dated Chait Sudi 9, Samwat 1951 executed by Suranas in favour of firm Sawantram Jagannath. The Bahi of Ratlamwalas from which the above extract Ex. P. 7 was taken was produced by Chhaganlal defendant No. 2 as a witness for the plaintiffs. 10. Ex. P. 2 and Ex. P. 3 purporting to be an unregistered sale deed dated Chait Sudi 9, Samwat 1951 executed by Suranas in favour of firm Sawantram Jagannath. The Bahi of Ratlamwalas from which the above extract Ex. P. 7 was taken was produced by Chhaganlal defendant No. 2 as a witness for the plaintiffs. 10. The learned Munsiff held that it was not proved that the three shops were mortgaged and afterwards sold by Suranas in favour of Sawantram Jagannath and that they were mortgaged by the plaintiffs ancestors in favour of Ratlamwalas and thereafter sub-mortgaged by the latter in favour of the defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to redeem them. He also held that one of the Nohras was mortgaged by Chhaganlal and a moiety share in the other Nohra by Pannalal in favour of the defendant No. 1 and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to redeem them too. Holding that the plaintiffs had proov-ed the mortgage of only half of the other Nohra from their ancestors to the defendant No. 1 for a sum of Rs. 221/- he gave a decree for redemption to the plaintiffs of this half share in the Nohra on a payment of Rs. 221/-within six months. 11. Against the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff the plaintiffs went in appeal to the court of the District Judge, Bhilwara who has confirmed the decree of the first court. The plaintiffs came in appeal to the former Mewar High Court and by an order of the Division Bench the case was sent back to the first court for recording evidence of Jamnalal under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. This evidence has been submitted to this court. 12. It has been argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the lower courts were wrong in rejecting Exs.P.1, P.2, P.3, and Ex.P. 7 which clearly proved that the three shops in dispute were first mortgaged by the Suranas in favour of the firm of the plaintiffs family styled Sawantram Jagannath and that the latter mortgaged them with Ratlamwalas. 12. It has been argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the lower courts were wrong in rejecting Exs.P.1, P.2, P.3, and Ex.P. 7 which clearly proved that the three shops in dispute were first mortgaged by the Suranas in favour of the firm of the plaintiffs family styled Sawantram Jagannath and that the latter mortgaged them with Ratlamwalas. It has also been argued that it is proved that the Nohras in dispute also belong solely to the plaintiffs and in order to accomodate the defendants No. 2 and 3 who were their relations the plaintiffs ancestors did not raise any objection against the former mortgaging them to the defendant No. 1. It has further been argued that in any case the defendants No. 2 and 3 were made a party to the suit and therefore the decree should have been given for the redemption of the whole property. 13. On behalf of the defendant No. 1, it has been argued that the findings of the lower courts are entirely those of facts and cannot be disturbed in second appeal. It is contended that no mortgage deeds or its copies have been produced. The lower courts have rightly held that Ex.P.1, P.2, P.3 and P.7 were neither properly proved nor were of any value to prove that the mortgages relied on by the plaintiffs were in fact made or were made under the circumstances alleged by the plaintiffs. It has further been stressed that the mortgages of one Nohra and 1/2 of the other Nohra were made by Chhaganlal and Pannalal defendants No. 2 and 3 respectively. These two defendants are very distant relations of the plaintiffs according to the family tree filed by the plaintiffs. There Is therefore no presumption that the plaintiffs were members of the joint Hindu family with Pannalal and Chhaganlal and the fact that Shivkaran Haridas made a mortgage of 1/3 of one Nohra only whereas Pannalal made a mortgage of the other half and Chhaganlal made a mortgage of the second Nohra shows that they were separate and were dealing with the property separately. Under the circumstances therefore it would not be reasonable to presume that the plaintiffs had any right left in the property mortgaged by these two defendants alone. Under the circumstances therefore it would not be reasonable to presume that the plaintiffs had any right left in the property mortgaged by these two defendants alone. It has further been urged that the mortgages having been made by Pannalal and Chhaganlal alone the plaintiffs were not entitled to redeem them. As regards the three shops it has been argued that there is no satisfactory evidence to prove that they were mortgaged by the plaintiffs ancestors to Ratlamwalas and there is no legal evidence whatsoever to prove that a sub-mortgage of these shops was made by Ratlamwalas in favour of the defendant respondent No. 1. The plaintiffs had therefore no right to redeem any property excepting one half of one of the Nohras. 14. We have given are anxious care to the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties and have also perused the record. We shall take up first the case of the three shops. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that these shops were mortgaged by Kastoorchand Kajodi-mal Suranas of Bhilwara in favour of Firm Sawantram Jagannath in Samwat 1922. To prove this the plaintiffs have filed a copy of Khata Ex. P.2 which shows that three shops and two Nohras were mortgaged by Kastoorchand Kajodimal in favour of Sah. It is however not clear as to who is meant by the word Sah. Moreover it has not been shown as to in whose hand writing the said entry in the original is. The document purports to bear the signatures of Kastoorchand but no proof of the signatures has been given. It was argued that this document should have been read in evidence under Section 90 of the Evidence Act without any proof as it purports to be more than 30 years old. No request was however made to the first court to presume this document to be correct under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. It was for the lower courts to have exercised their discretion or not under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. They have not exercised this discretion in favour of the plaintiffs. It is too late in the day to ask this court to presume the document to be genuine under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. We therefore do not feel inclined to read this document into evidence under the circumstances of the case. They have not exercised this discretion in favour of the plaintiffs. It is too late in the day to ask this court to presume the document to be genuine under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. We therefore do not feel inclined to read this document into evidence under the circumstances of the case. Even if this document be read in evidence it does not throw any light on the question whether the defendant No. 1 is holding this property as a mortgagee from the plaintiffs ancestors or as a sub-mortgagee from any mortgagee of theirs. Similarly Ex. P. 3 which is said to be the sale deed of the said property does not help the plaintiffs. First of all it is an unregistered document a: d sale deeds of immovable property were compulsorily registrable according to the law prevailing in Mewar even in Samwat 1958 when this sale deed is said to have been executed. Secondly it does not throw any light upon the real question in issue whether the property was mortgaged by the ancestors of the plaintiffs in favour of Ratlamwalas and a sub-mortgage was executed by the latter in favour of the defendant No. I. 15. The real question in the case is whether a usufructuary mortgage of these three shops was made by the plaintiffs ancestors in favour of Ratlam walas and by the letters a sub-mortgage was made in favour of the defendant No. 1. In order to prove this the plaintiffs placed their reliance upon Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 7. So far as Ex. P. 7 is concerned it purports to be an entry from Nakal Bahi of the Ratlamwalas Firm. It has not been proved as to who made that entry. A question was specifically put in cross-examination to Chhaganlal who produced the original as to in whose hand writing the said entry was, but he replied that he did not know. 16. It has been argued that the trial court ought to have raised a presumption about the genuineness of this entry, and should have read it in evidence. First of all we do not find that any request was made on behalf of the plaintiffs that this entry ought to be taken as proved under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. It has been argued that the trial court ought to have raised a presumption about the genuineness of this entry, and should have read it in evidence. First of all we do not find that any request was made on behalf of the plaintiffs that this entry ought to be taken as proved under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. Secondly we do not think that such a presumption would have been justified in relation to this entry. According to Section 90 of the Evidence Act such a presumption can be raised if the document it-self shows in whose hand writing the contents are which are being relied upon. No presumption can be made in the case of an anonymous document vide A. LB. 1939 Madras page 926 (Sawanthan Karakkattitathial Chanduku-tti Nambiar Vs. Chirakkal Kovelakth Ram Verma Raja Avergal and another.) It was held in that ruling that Section 90 does not lay down that there is any presumption regarding anonymous document the writer of which is not known. Hence where an entry in ancient document is not signed by the person who wrote it and there are no materials upon which one can say that a particular person purports to have written it except a general statement that it is kept amongst the family records as a record of the family trans-actions, the document cannot be taken to be properly proved by virtue of presumption under Section 90.There is also no evidence to show how the custody of Chhaganlal who produced this document was proper custody. As we have said above that it is for the trial court to raise such presumption or not and the trial courts have raised no such presumption about this document. It is therefore not for us to say in second appeal that the document should have been taken into evidence. We are supported in this view by a ruling reported in 61 Indian Cases page 959 Harprasad Upadhyay Vs. Vikrimjit Singh and others (Oudh Judicial Commissioners Court). 17. There remains now to consider whether Ex. P. 1 should have been acted upon by the lower courts. This document appears to be a sort of a copy of a mortgage deed executed in favour of Ratlamwalas relating to a lot of property including three shops and two Nohras embodied in the Nakal Bahi of the plaintiffs firm. 17. There remains now to consider whether Ex. P. 1 should have been acted upon by the lower courts. This document appears to be a sort of a copy of a mortgage deed executed in favour of Ratlamwalas relating to a lot of property including three shops and two Nohras embodied in the Nakal Bahi of the plaintiffs firm. It shows that a certain property was mortgaged by Kajodimal Kishanlal and Jankidas in favour of Ratlamwalas for certain debts out standing against them. No attempt has however been made by the plaintiffs to identify the three shops mentioned therein with the three shops in suit. Moreover the plaintiffs did not summon the alleged mortgage deed from Ratlamwalas or from defendant No. 1. Under these circumstances they were not entitled to put in any secondary evidence to prove the mortgage alleged by them. Where a transaction is evidenced by a deed it is incumbent on the party relying upon that transaction to prove it by the original deed. It is only when the original deed is destroyed or cannot be found or the person in possession thereof does not file it after due notice that any other evidence of its contents can be given. Under the circumstances we do not find that the lower courts erred in not acting upon Ex.P.1. Thus there is no satisfactory evidence to prove that the three shops in dispute were usufructuarily mortgaged by the plaintiffs ancestors to Ratlamwalas. So far as the question of the alleged sub-mortgage by Rat-lamwalas to defendant No. 1 is concerned there is no legal evidence worth the name to prove it. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the finding on fact of the two lower courts that it is neither proved that the three shops were mortgaged with Ratlamwalas nor that they were sub-mortgaged by the Ratlamwalas to the defendant No.1. 18. Coming; to the two Nohras it is quite clear that: the mortgage of the one Nohra was made by Chhaganlal and the mortgage of 1/2 other Nohra by Pannalal alone. The plaintiffs or any of his ancestors were not a party to them. As has been said above it cannot be held under the circumstances of the case that the family of the plaintiffs and defendants No. 2 & 3 was a joint Hindu family when the two mortgages were made. The plaintiffs or any of his ancestors were not a party to them. As has been said above it cannot be held under the circumstances of the case that the family of the plaintiffs and defendants No. 2 & 3 was a joint Hindu family when the two mortgages were made. Pannalal and Chhaganlal in their written statements alleged that they alone were the owners of the property mortgaged by them and the plaintiff or his ancestors had nothing to do with it. No doubt in the appeal, finding that it was to their advantage if the whole property was redeemed by the plaintiffs on the ground of its being a joint Hindu family property of the plaintiffs and the defendants No. 2 & 3, they put in an application that the whole of the property in suit belonged jointly to themselves and the plaintiffs. But this was against their own pleadings and cannot override their pleadings and evidence in the case. Besides, the plaintiffs set up quite different mortgages of these properties in their plaint. It was alleged that one of these Nohras was mortgaged by the defendants No. 2 and 3 in favour of the defendant No. 1 for a sum of Rs. 400/- in Samvat 1963 and the other in Samvat 1968 by the plaintiffs ancestors for a sum of Rs. 300/-. It has now transpired as a result of evidence that no such mortgages were made. The plaintiffs assertion therefore that the mortgage of one of these Nohras was made by the defendants No. 2 & 3 for Rs. 400/-/- at the connivance of the plaintiffs in order to accommodate the defendants No. 2 & 3 falls to the ground. The plaintiffs cannot take advantage of different mortgages not set up by them. Vide A. I. R. 1938 Oudh page 16, Gaurishan-ker Vs. Lala and another. In our opinion the appeal has no force and it is dismissed with costs to the contesting respondents.