JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This appeal is on behalf of Defendant No. 2. The Plaintiff had brought the suit out of which this appeal arises for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by one Raman Das Bairagya in favour of the former on March 1, 1937, was valid and operative and that he is entitled to recover possession of the property from the Defendants. 2. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge has allowed the Plaintiff's claim. 3. Raman Das Bairagya,, Defendant No. 1, had taken into his family the Plaintiff, Nityananda, both of whom were Baishnab Bairdgis. On May 1, 1937, Raman Das executed a registered deed of gift in respect of certain properties in favour of Nityananda. The Plaintiff and Raman Das were living in the same house from before. On March 29, 1938, Raman Das executed and registered another document, which is described as a deed of cancellation, recording that the earlier deed of gift in favour of Nityananda, the Plaintiff, had not been acted upon and that he was cancelling the same. On June 28, 1940, Raman Das executed another document in favour of Bimla Dasi, Defendant No. 2, who also was at that time living with the former. 4. The principal question in this case is whether the deed of gift executed by Raman Das, Defendant No. 1, in favour of Nityananda, the Plaintiff, had been accepted by the latter. If that deed had been acted upon and was operative, the subsequent documents executed by Raman Das, cancelling the earlier deed of gift or making a fresh gift in favour of Bimala, would admittedly be inoperative. In that event the Plaintiff will be entitled to a decree in his favour. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge considered that the only point for decision in the appeal before him was whether the Plaintiff had accepted the deed of gift made in his favour in May 1937. He relied upon Muhammad Abdul Nayeem v. Jhonti Mahton (1917) 41 Ind. Cas. 389, for the proposition that in every case of gift evidenced by a registered document there was a legal presumption of acceptance of the gift by the done. The onus was on the person contesting that there had not been such an acceptance. He relied upon Muhammad Abdul Nayeem v. Jhonti Mahton (1917) 41 Ind. Cas. 389, for the proposition that in every case of gift evidenced by a registered document there was a legal presumption of acceptance of the gift by the done. The onus was on the person contesting that there had not been such an acceptance. In this view, he proceeded to examine the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that non-acceptance had not been proved and accordingly the Plaintiff had been able to prove his title. 6. It is now questioned, whatever might have been the provisions in the Hindu law as found in his original texts, so far as the existing law of gift is concerned, the provisions contained in Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act are attracted for deciding whether a particular gift is valid or not. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that a gift to be valid must be accepted by or on behalf of the done and such acceptance must be made during the life time of the donor and while the latter is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance the gift is void. 7. Hindu law required delivery of possession to complete a gift of immovable property. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act taken with the provisions contained in Section 123 has abrogated that requisite as under the Hindu law. Delivery of possession is now rendered unnecessary. What is now required is that the transfer must be effected by a registered document satisfying the conditions laid down in Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. Delivery of possession, therefore, is not now necessary and in the present case, the court need not examine whether there was actual delivery of possession or not. 8. In view of the order which is to be passed in this case, I would not proceed further with the consideration as to the circumstances under which non-delivery of possession may be of importance to ascertain whether the document itself was either a colourable transaction or was really intended to pass title. 9. What is required to be proved in the present case is that the gift by Raman Das to Nityananda was accepted by the latter. 9. What is required to be proved in the present case is that the gift by Raman Das to Nityananda was accepted by the latter. In Muhammad Abdul Nayeem v. Jhonti Mahton (supra) Mullick J., while considering the provisions contained in Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act observed that in the case of a gift by a Hindu to a, Hindu there should be proof of acceptance by the donee. Acceptance may be either express or implied. So far as these propositions are concerned, they are undisputed. He, however, proceeded to refer to the provisions contained under the English system. See 15 Halsbury, p. 720, Hailsham Ed. Section 1254. Acceptance of the gift was presumed to have been made on the facts appearing in the case before him. Although he did not specifically accept to the fullest extent the implications of the observations made in Halsbury, he, however, stated that, having regard to the circumstances of that case, an inference might be drawn that the deed had been accepted and that the Plaintiff had not shown anything to the contrary. 10. A reference to the passage in Halsbury in Section 1254 above will immediately show that the statement of the law is based upon an observation in Shep. Touch., 7th Ed., p. 285: The law presumes that every grant is for the benefit of the grantee and therefore, until the contrary is shown, supposes an agreement to the grant. 11. This view has been accepted by the English Courts from the 16th century, as in Butler and Baker's case (1591) 3 Co. Rep. 25a : E.R. 684 and other subsequent cases. This statement of the law has no application when there are specific statutory provisions in India. There is no room for raising a presumption in a case of this description. 12. Whether a gift is known or unknown to the donee, there is no presumption in favour of acceptance of a gift in India. The provisions contained in Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act negatives such a presumption. The view expressed by the Patna High Court was not accepted by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Anandi Devi v. Mohan Lal (1932) ILR 54 All. 534. Learned Subordinate Judge was not correct in raising such a presumption relying on the Patna case. 13. The view expressed by the Patna High Court was not accepted by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Anandi Devi v. Mohan Lal (1932) ILR 54 All. 534. Learned Subordinate Judge was not correct in raising such a presumption relying on the Patna case. 13. That the acceptance of a gift may be either express or may be implied is supported by a long line of decisions. Whether there has been an acceptance or not must depend on the facts of each particular case. The learned Subordinate Judge observed, at one place and I should say rightly, that when both sides had adduced evidence, the question of burden of proof becomes immaterial, but, while discussing the different pieces of evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge could not but repeatedly refer to a presumption which had already been raised and referred to by him that by the execution and registration of the deed of gift acceptance by the donee was to be presumed. In this view it was for the Defendant to rebut the presumption. The consideration of the evidence in the case was, therefore, influenced and coloured to a large extent by the wrong statement of the law, that it was for the Defendant to prove that there had been no acceptance of the gift by the donee. The evidence as adduced on behalf of both the parties has to be considered, untrammelled by any presumption in favour of acceptance. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court cannot, therefore, be sustained. 14. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment and decree of the court of appeal below are set aside and the case is remitted to the court of the Subordinate Judge for rehearing of the appeal according to law. He will decide the case of the evidence already on the record. 15. Costs of this hearing will abide the result.