ORDER : P.I. Simon, J. The question referred to the Full Bench is clear from the following Order of Reference. "The 2nd defendant in O.S. No. 492 of 1121, on the file of the Thiruvalla Munsiff's Court, is the revision petitioner and this revision is directed against the finding of the lower court on issue No. 1, that the suit is not premature. The suit was for redemption of a mortgage of 1082. The 2nd defendant contended inter alia, that the suit was premature, as the mortgage deed provided for a renewal, on the expiry of 36 years fixed in it, the lower court, raised Issue No. 1, regarding this contention and decided that issue, in favour of the plaintiff. Hence this revision petition." Mr. T.K. Joseph, appearing for the petitioner, produced a copy of the mortgage deed of 1082. On going through that document, I find, that the contention of the 2nd defendant, that there is provision for renewal in the document, is true. From the document, it is evident, that property was, already outstanding on mortgage. The mortgagee, was directed to redeem the previous mortgage, and enjoy the property, for a period of 36 years. After the expiry of that period, there is a clear provision, for renewal of the mortgage, in that document. This is what the relevant portion in the document, says: There is no ambiguity in the language used by the parties, and therefore, it is clear that there is provision for renewal, after the expiry of 36 years. Reliance is placed, for the counter-petitioner, on a previous portion of the document and it runs thus: It is not clear who is referred to as. The reference could not be to the mortgagee, because, in the subsequent portion, he is referred to as. But the portion already extracted, makes it clear, beyond and doubt, that there is provision for renewal. It is contended for the counter-petitioner, that the option regarding renewal, rests with the mortgagor and not with the mortgagee and that therefore, the fact, that the mortgagor has thought fit to sue for redemption, shows that he is not willing to give the renewal. From the wording of the document, no question of option arises. There is a clear statement to the effect that the mortgagor would give a renewal, after the expiry of the period. From the wording of the document, no question of option arises. There is a clear statement to the effect that the mortgagor would give a renewal, after the expiry of the period. Reliance is placed, for the counter-petitioner, on the decision in Kunjan v. Parameswaran (20 T.L.J. 873) for the position, that the option rests with the mortgagor. It is seen from the report, that the conclusion was reached on an interpretation of the document in that case. The decision in Pariethu v. Panicker (1 T.L.J. 147) in favour of the mortgagee, also rests upon the interpretation of the document, in that case. The decision in Kurien v. Karthiyayani (1946 T.L.R. 174), in favour of the mortgagee, also rests upon the interpretation of the clause of the document in that case. As we pointed out already, there is no question of option in this case, and the language used, show beyond any doubt, that the mortgagor was bound to execute the renewal. It is next argued, for the counter-petitioner, relying on the decision in Chacko v. Ouseph (24 T.L.J. 420), which followed the previous ruling of this Court in Kuruvila Varki v. Mathew Acharu (3 S. U.D. 161) that the mortgagee is not entitled to the renewal. No doubt this ruling supports the counter-petitioner, but I find from the reports of the cases, in Pariethu v. Panicker (1 T.L.J. 147), Krishnan v. Kumaran (2 T.L.J. 145), Kurien v. Karithiyayani (1946 T.L.R. 174) that the documents in these cases, did not contain any term, for which the renewal is claimed and yet the courts allowed renewal. It may be noted, that though the expression 'Kanam' is used in the 1 T.L.J. and 2 T.L.J. cases, the documents were construed as embodying a redeemable mortgage, and therefore, no great weight need be attached to that expression. Since the point involved is an important one, and since I entertain doubts, I think it proper, to refer this matter to a Full Bench, for an authoritative decision. The question to be decided, is, whether a mortgagee is not entitled to renewal, if the term for which the renewal is claimed, is uncertain. Without deciding this question, it is not possible to find, whether the suit is premature or not. I would therefore refer this question to a Full Bench, for an authoritative decision. The question to be decided, is, whether a mortgagee is not entitled to renewal, if the term for which the renewal is claimed, is uncertain. Without deciding this question, it is not possible to find, whether the suit is premature or not. I would therefore refer this question to a Full Bench, for an authoritative decision. The matter may be placed before a Full Bench, and a final decision arrived at on the point, involved in the C.R.P. in the light of the opinion of the Full Bench". 2. The suit is to redeem a mortgage executed on 10th Karkadagam 1082 for a term of 36 years. The suit was filed in the year 1121 after the expiry of the term. The mortgagee contended that under the terms of the mortgage he was entitled to a renewal for another term of either 36 years or at least of 12 years. On this contention the issue was raised whether the suit was not premature and the court below held that as the option to renew was with the mortgagor, it was open to him to bring the suit as soon as the original term under the mortgage expired. This revision petition has been filed by the mortgagee against the finding on this issue which was decided as a preliminary issue. 3. The provision for renewal in the deed of mortgage is as follows:- This means that the mortgagor agreed to execute a renewal on the expiry of the term fixed in the document, giving credit to the mortgagee for the value of all the improvements made by him. Except for this undertaking by the mortgagor, his right of redemption on the expiry of the original term in the document could not have been questioned by the mortgagee. The mortgagee's plea that the suit for redemption is premature is to say that the renewal should be deemed to have taken place and that he is the mortgagee under a renewed mortgage. In other words, the clause for renewal occurring in the document is such as could automatically have come into operation on the expiry of the term of the mortgage. The question for decision is whether the provision for renewal extracted above is such as could have come into effect without anything further being done by the parties to the document. 4. The question for decision is whether the provision for renewal extracted above is such as could have come into effect without anything further being done by the parties to the document. 4. In Kunju Pareethu v. Rama Panicker 1 T.L.J. 147 the question arose whether a provision for renewal in a Kanom document was such as could be enforced at the option of the tenant. It was held that it was only in case that the tenant was not willing to take a renewal that he could be redeemed on payment of the kanom amount. It was a case where the tenant had acquired permanent occupancy rights under the provisions of the Jenmi Kudiyan Act. It was again the question of the renewal of a kanam that arose in Narayanan Krishnan v. Easwaran Kumaran 2 T.L.J. 145 where it was decided that the tenant was entitled to a renewal. In all kanom documents renewal is provided as a matter of right on payment of renewal fees and it has been held uniformly that renewal takes effect even without a renewal deed being brought into existence. 5. When in a kanom deed the mortgagor said "I shall either grant you a renewal of the deed, or redeem the property on payment of the kanom", it was held in Narayanan Kunjan Menon v. Narayanan Parameswaran 20 T.L.J. 873 that the option was to be exercised by the landlord and not the tenant. In Chacko v. Ouseph (4) 24 T.L.J. 420 where a mortgage provided a renewal at the option of the mortgagee and no term for the renewed mortgage was mentioned, it was held that the mortgagee could not claim a renewal. The question that arose for decision in Kuriyan v. Karthiyayani (5) 1946 T.L.R. 174 was one of limitation. There a mortgage deed provided that on the expiry of the term on 14th Chingam 1056 the mortgagee will have the option either to surrender the property on receipt of the mortgage amount and value of improvements or take a renewal. The mortgage was neither redeemed nor a renewal was taken on the expiry of the term. Ultimately when a suit for redemption was brought, the mortgagee contended that the suit filed more than fifty years after 14th Chingam 1056 was barred by limitation. The mortgage was neither redeemed nor a renewal was taken on the expiry of the term. Ultimately when a suit for redemption was brought, the mortgagee contended that the suit filed more than fifty years after 14th Chingam 1056 was barred by limitation. It was held that the mortgagee should be deemed to have exercised his option by holding possession for a renewed term of twelve years and no actual renewal deed was necessary to effectuate the option. Limitation therefore was held to run from 14th Chingom 1068 only. 6. The renewal contemplated in Kurian v. Karthiyayani 1946 T.L.R. 174 was on the same terms as in the original mortgage and as the option was with the mortgagee, the renewal automatically came into effect on the expiry of the term fixed in the original mortgage. If a suit for redemption was brought before 14th Chingom 1068, the contention by the mortgagee that the suit was premature would have been a complete answer to the suit. The High Courts in India have consistently held that where there is a covenant for renewal, if the option does not state the terms of renewal, the new lease would be for the same period and on the same terms as the original lease in respect of all the essential conditions except as to the covenant for renewal itself. See Maharaja Srish Chandra Nandi v. Dea Mahamad Byepari A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 77. 7. The terms of the renewed document in the present case are indicated in the provision for renewal although it is not stated for what period of time, the renewal should be. The value of the improvements due to the mortgagee should be ascertained after the expiry of the original term of 36 years and possibly such value should be added on to the original mortgage amount. This is the only indication as to what the terms of the renewed mortgage should be. If the renewal should take place, should initially be an agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee regarding the value of improvements due to the mortgagee. This means that a renewal cannot as a matter of course come into effect on the expiry of the original term. If the mortgage amount is to be varied on ascertaining the value of improvements due to the mortgagee, the renewed document so-called which might come into existence is not really a renewal at all. This means that a renewal cannot as a matter of course come into effect on the expiry of the original term. If the mortgage amount is to be varied on ascertaining the value of improvements due to the mortgagee, the renewed document so-called which might come into existence is not really a renewal at all. The expression renewal is a relative term which has to be construed with reference to the mortgage now subsisting. As is stated in Lani Mia v. Muhammad Easin Mia 20 Calcutta Weekly Notes 948, "the term renewal means a renovation, restoration of a something to a former or original state a repetition, a beginning again; it may mean each or either of these things, so far as there is any difference between them; it must however, be a renewal, a renovation, or repetition or restoration, of the same subject. A renewal of a lease, where the context does not require any different interpretation to be given to it, must therefore mean the obtaining a lease as near as possible in every practicable circumstance to the existing lease, as if the subject, worn or wearing out, was to begin again. The choice lies, in fact, between two alternatives; either to construe the covenant as futile, or to interpret it as intended by the parties to provide for a fresh lease on the same terms as the original lease". If it had not been stated in the covenant in this case that the value of improvements should be assessed and taken into account in granting the renewal, it would perhaps have been possible to hold that a renewal on the same terms as in the original mortgage was in the contemplation of the parties. But as it is, it is not possible to say that it was a renewal strictly that was bargained for, by the parties. It was not the same mortgage the terms of which was expiring that was to be revived or renovated for another period of time. The renewal could not therefore have come into effect without something more being done by the parties and necessarily the mortgagee could not contend that the suit for redemption brought by the mortgagor is premature. It was not the same mortgage the terms of which was expiring that was to be revived or renovated for another period of time. The renewal could not therefore have come into effect without something more being done by the parties and necessarily the mortgagee could not contend that the suit for redemption brought by the mortgagor is premature. The specific question referred for decision to the Full Bench is as follows:- "Whether a mortgagee is not entitled to a renewal, if the term for which the renewal is claimed is uncertain". Unless the term for which the renewal is to be executed is clear from the covenant either expressly or impliedly and unless the renewal is to be otherwise on the same terms as in the original mortgage the mortgagee cannot effectively contend that the suit for redemption is premature. 8. The civil revision petition is therefore without merit and it is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.