JUDGMENT Banerjee, J. - In execution of a decree for payment of money passed on July 30, 1948, this Court made an order on February 1, 1949, whereby it appointed a Receiver subject to his furnishing security of certain Provident Fund money payable to the Defendant who prior to his retirement on January 31, 1947, was a clerk in the Dead Letter Office, Calcutta. The Receiver furnished security and demanded payment of the Provident Fund money from the relevant authority to be held by him as such Receiver. But the money has not been paid to the Receiver. 2. The Dominion of India has intervened and moves this application for setting aside the order made on February 1, 1949. The judgment-debtor does not appear. 3. Counsel on behalf of the Dominion submits that the Receiver should not have been appointed of the Provident Fund Money. He relies on secs. 2(a), 2(d) and 3 of the Provident Funds Act (XIX of 1925). 4. Sec. 2(a) defines the nature of "compulsory deposit" and sec. 2(d) "Government Provident Fund." 5. The sections in my view are not particularly relevant for our present consideration. Sec. 3 is as follows:-- A compulsory deposit in any Government or Railway Provident Fund shall not in any way be capable of being assigned or charged and shall not be liable to attachment under any decree or order of any Civil, Revenue, or Criminal Court, in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the subscriber or depositor and neither the official assignee nor any receiver appointed under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, shall be entitled to, or have any claim on, any such compulsory deposit. 6. Counsel for the Dominion submits that as the Provident Fund money is not capable of being assigned or charged and is not liable to attachment under a decree or order of any Civil Court, etc., in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the subscriber or depositor, no Receiver can be appointed. In aid of his argument Counsel refers to the case of Secretary of State v. Bai Somi A. I. R 193 Bom 350, a decision of the High Court of Bombay, where it was held that an order appointing a Receiver to collect future maintenance was illegal. 7. In aid of his argument Counsel refers to the case of Secretary of State v. Bai Somi A. I. R 193 Bom 350, a decision of the High Court of Bombay, where it was held that an order appointing a Receiver to collect future maintenance was illegal. 7. But this decision is opposed to the judgment of the Privy Council given in Rajindra Narain Singh v. Sundara Bibi L. R. 52 I. A. 262. In the Privy Council case their Lordships appointed a Receiver of certain property given to a person in lieu of maintenance without power of transfer during his lifetime. 8. Such a property is not transferable by private alienation [see sec. 6(dd) of the Transfer of Property Act]. It is well-known that such property cannot be attached in execution under the Code of Civil Procedure. Yet their Lordships of the Judicial Committee did not hesitate to appoint a Receiver of such property. At pp. 264-5 their Lordships observed as follows :-- Their Lordships are of opinion that the right of maintenance is in point of law not attachable and not saleable. They think that S. 60 of the Civil Procedure Code, head (n), precludes an application for that purpose. The proper remedy lies in a fitting case, in the appointment of a receiver for realising the rents and profits of the property, paying out of the same a sufficient and adequate sum for the maintenance of the judgment-debtor and his family, and applying the balance, if any, to the liquidation of the judgment-creditor's debt. The High Court point out in their judgment the appropriate remedy is what is known as equitable execution or Indirect execution--namely, by the appointment of a receiver who takes the place of the debtor and acts as an officer subject to the directions of the Execution Court in collecting and disbursing the debtor's income in accordance with the directions of the Execution Court towards the discharge of the claim of the decree-holder.' These views appear to the Board to be sound. 9. This case is a clear authority for the proportion that though a property may not be transferable by private alienation nor liable to attachment in execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, a Receiver may be appointed of it in suitable cases. 10. The High Court of Bombay has referred to this case and sought to distinguish it. 10. The High Court of Bombay has referred to this case and sought to distinguish it. I regret, I am unable to follow the reasoning on which the distinction is based. With great respect to the learned Judges, I think they have overlooked the first of the two paragraphs. I have set out above from the judgment of the Privy Council. I am, therefore, unable to take the view adopted in the Bombay case. 11. Further, sec. 3 expressly says that "neither the official assignee nor a receiver appointed under the Provincial solvency Act, 1920, shall be entitled to, or have any claim, on any such compulsory deposit." This, of course, goes principle that property of an insolvent does not, under the law of insolvency, include any property which is exempted by the CPC from liability to attachment in execution of a decree. But the point which I seek to emphasise is that when the legislature thought fit, it made express provision that, an Official or a Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act shall not be entitled to, or make any claim on the compulsory deposit. I am disposed to think that if it were the intention of the legislature that a Receiver in execution cannot be appointed of Provident Fund money, it would have expressly said so, but the legislature has not done it. I, therefore, think that a Receiver an be appointed in a suitable case over Provident Fund money [see Baramdeo Pandey v. Mrs. F. Smith 44 C. W. N. 636 (1940)]. 12. A point was taken on behalf of the decree-holder that as the judgment-debtor is not before the Court, the Dominion has no locus standi to make the application. I do not see much force in this contention. The Dominion. I think, can apply as in a pro interessee suo application. But having regard to the views I have taken on the merits of the case, I have not considered this preliminary objection and I do not express my final opinion on it. I dismiss this application with costs against the Dominion. Certified for Counsel.