JUDGMENT 1. These two Rules were issued at the instance of two persons who are under detention at the Dum Dum Central Jail under a warrant issued u/s 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1930 read with that of 1932. Petitioner Purna Chandra Ghosh was arrested on November 9, 1948. He was detained under the West Bengal Security Act. It was decided that since the first part of March, 1949, that Act had expired and was not in force, but he was not released and on July 3, 1949, an order was served on him u/s 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act for preventive detention under that Act. Petitioner Dulal Basu was arrested on October 10, 1948 and in his case also action was first taken as a Security Act prisoner and he was after the expiry of the Act not released but served on July 5, 1949, with a fresh order for preventive detention u/s 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. These facts are not in dispute at all. 2. The learned Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the Crown, has frankly conceded that if what had been done by Purna prior to November 9, 1948 and by Dulal before October 10, 1948, could afford any justification for their present detention under the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, Section 2, then and then only could the order passed by the Governor be supported; otherwise, he had no material to show that since that day these persons had done anything, or were doing anything or are doing anything or has done anything or did anything for which their detention could be supported. The law on the point is also clear. The opinion of the Government, whatever may be the reason for the same, will be sufficient, if the detention can be supported u/s 2 of the Act. This Court will have no jurisdiction to go into the reason for detention or to go behind the opinion of the Governor. It is also further clear that, if the Petitioners can prima facie show that the order is mala fide, or not really under the powers conferred by the Act, then the onus will shift on the Government to show their bona fides and their power. The learned Advocate-General accepts these propositions of law as correct. It is also further clear that, if the Petitioners can prima facie show that the order is mala fide, or not really under the powers conferred by the Act, then the onus will shift on the Government to show their bona fides and their power. The learned Advocate-General accepts these propositions of law as correct. Section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act provides: Where, in the opinion of the Provincial Government, there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person-- (i) is a member of an association; * * * * * (iii) or has done or is doing any act to assist the operations of any such association; the Provincial Government may, by order in writing, give all or any of the following directions, namely, that such person-- * * * * (f) shall be committed to custody in jail. 3. In the orders as actually served upon the Petitioners it is said that they are members of an association of the kind mentioned in the section and it is also mentioned that they have done or are doing an act which justifies their detention. The learned Advocate-General has frankly conceded that since his incarceration none of the two Petitioners can be said to be still a member of any association of the kind required under the section. They have been the whole time in jail. He does not attempt to support the order on that ground. It is on the ground that the Petitioners "have done or are doing an act to assist the operation "of any such association" that the learned Advocate-General tries to justify the order. The words "is doing" used contain what is known as the continuous or the extended present tense of the verb "to do". In case of such use of extended present tense, there is a decision of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hirji Shivram Vyas Vs. The Commissioner of Police, AIR 1948 Bom 417 , in which, in view of the distance of time which separated the order passed from the incidents for which the Petitioner was sought to be detained, the Court considered it impossible for the detenue to be doing any act in any manner prejudicial to public safety. The Commissioner of Police, AIR 1948 Bom 417 , in which, in view of the distance of time which separated the order passed from the incidents for which the Petitioner was sought to be detained, the Court considered it impossible for the detenue to be doing any act in any manner prejudicial to public safety. The learned Advocate-General has sought to distinguish this decision on the ground that it was passed in the special circumstances of that case. It appears that Hirji Shivram was arrested on October 17, under the Explosives Substances Act. On the next day, he was remanded till November 1, on which day again there was a prayer for further remand, but this was not allowed and so, instead of being released, he was ordered preventive detention under that Act by an order, which, it appears, was not properly signed. Though Hirji Shivram had not been released by the police on bail, the remand order being refused, a curious petition was filed purporting to be on his behalf on November 15, asking for an extension of time for bail till November 29 and on November 18, an order properly signed was passed under the Bombay Public Security Measures Act of 1947. In the present case, as we have pointed out, the distance of time between the arrest of either of the Petitioners and the order u/s 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act is so great as not to justify the use of the verb "is doing" an act. The extended present tense of the verb "to do" is absolutely inapplicable on a grammatical construction to a case of this nature. We are, therefore, of opinion that on a grammatical construction of Section 2(i)(iii) of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, it cannot be bona fide said that at the time when the order was passed it could not be said of either Petitioner concerned that he "is doing" any act of the nature required under that clause. 4. The learned Advocate-General's main plank is not that any of the Petitioners is doing an act of the kind required under the section, because he himself felt the difficulty of using the continuous or the extended present tense of the verb "to do" in such a case, but he has relied upon the words "has done an act". 4. The learned Advocate-General's main plank is not that any of the Petitioners is doing an act of the kind required under the section, because he himself felt the difficulty of using the continuous or the extended present tense of the verb "to do" in such a case, but he has relied upon the words "has done an act". His contention is that "has done" refers to a past act and therefore, advantage may be taken of the acts prior to November 9, 1948 in case of Purna and October 10, 1948 in case of Dulal. Obviously, this contention of the learned Advocate-General overlooks the distinction in grammar between the use of preterite and the perfect tense. As we are not concerned with the use of the pluperfect tense, we need not consider such a case, but as far as the difference between the use of preterite and the perfect tense is concerned, it may be said without fear of contradiction by any grammarian that the preterite refers to some time in the past without telling anything about the connection with the present moment, while the perfect is a retrospective present which connects a past occurrence with the present time either as continued up to the present moment (this is known as inclusive time) or as having results or consequences bearing on the present moment. In the present ease, there is absolutely no material to show that the past occurrences are connected with the present as continued up to the present moment, that is, the moment of the order u/s 2 of the Act, or as having such results or consequences as bear on the present moment. This is not disputed by the learned Advocate-General. In this connection reference may be made for the use of the preterite and the perfect tense to Ward's "Anatomy of the "English Language" and to "Essentials of English Grammar" by Otto Jesperson, Ph.D., Ltt. D, LL.D, 7th Impre., 1948. 5. Under the circumstances, it is clear that, for what was done in the past and completed, an order u/s 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, after such a long period of detention in jail, is not justified on a grammatical construction of the provisions of Section 2 of the Act. D, LL.D, 7th Impre., 1948. 5. Under the circumstances, it is clear that, for what was done in the past and completed, an order u/s 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, after such a long period of detention in jail, is not justified on a grammatical construction of the provisions of Section 2 of the Act. Further, it will appear that the intention of the legislature, as far as the language used shows, is also what would strictly follow from the grammatical construction, because in Clause (iii) the two tenses used are, as we have pointed out, the extended present tense and the perfect tense and not the ordinary present tense or the preterite, tense. Another reason which will support in the present case the grammatical construction of the section is that it is a case of preventive detention which is being provided for in the section and not punitive action. The object of the section is to prevent something which is likely to happen or what is still going on rather than to punish a man for what was done and is finished. Therefore, looked at from every point of view, the order cannot, fall u/s 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Act in case of either of the Petitioners and therefore, as the detention is illegal, it is ordered u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the two Petitioners be forthwith released from custody. 6. We thank Mr. Talukdar for the extremely able help he gave us in the matter of appearing as amicus curiae in the present case as the Petitioners were not able to defend themselves at their own expense. 7. Let a copy of this judgment be served on the Government.