Judgement CHAGLA, C.J. - Both these appeals raise an interesting question as to the applicability of S. 66, Civil P.C. Section 66 was enacted in order to prohibit a suit against the certified purchases by a real owner on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the real owner of on behalf of someone through whom the plaintiff claims, and this rule was enacted for reasons of public policy. It will be noticed that this section runs counter to the well-known equitable principle that the Court would give effect to the real and not to the nominal title. It is perfectly true that inasmuch as this section contravenes a well-established principle of equity, it must be strictly construed. 2. The facts which give rise to these appeals are very brief. The plaintiff sued for possession alleging that he had been dispossessed some time before he filed the suit, and the suit was resisted by one of the defendants on the ground that he was a purchaser at a court-sale and a sale certificate had been issued in his name. Therefore it is quite clear that in order to succeed in his suit the plaintiff had to displace the title which the Court had conferred upon defendant 4. He could only get possession provided he proved that defendant 4 had purchased the property not as the real owner but as his benamidar. I should have thought that a suit of this character would come clearly within the mischief of S. 66. 3. Mr. Desai has drawn my attention to various decisions which have construed S. 66 and which have tried and confined its operation within the strict bounds of the language of the Legislature. These decisions go to show that S. 66 is more a weapon of defense than a weapon of offence It is a section which a court purchaser can avail himself of in defence against a suit for possession by the real owner. He cannot avail himself of this section in order to file a suit against the real owner who is in possession. He may even file a suit for a declaration that he is not the real owner but that someone else is. He cannot avail himself of this section in order to file a suit against the real owner who is in possession. He may even file a suit for a declaration that he is not the real owner but that someone else is. The Calcutta High Court has gone as far as holding that if a real owner is in possession, he can file a suit for a declaration that the defendants title was merely benami and the real title was in the plaintiff. See Sasti Churn Nundi v. Aunopurna, 23 Cal 699. But the Allahabad High Court has dissented from that view taken by the Calcutta High Court. See Bishan Dial v. Ghazi-ud-din, 23 All 175 : (1901 AWN 44). The Patna High Court has taken the same view as Allahabad. See Keshri Mull v. Sukan Bom 13 Pat 616 : (AIR (20) 1933 Pat 364). Mr. Desai has drawn my attention to a decision of the Privy Council is Muhammad Abdul Jalil Khan v. Muhammad Obaid Ullah Khan, 31 Bom LR 1393 : (AIR (16) 1929 PC 228). In that case the Privy Council points out that the effect of a. 66 was not to make benami transactions illegal, and what they decided in that casa was that if the real owner has perfected his title by adverse possession, he could sue the nominal owner on that title although the nominal owner had in his favour a Court certificate. The Privy Council is at pains to point out that the plaintiffs suit was based not on his title as the real owner as against; the nominal owner, but the suit was based on the fact that he was in adverse possession for more than 12 years and his title arose from that adverse possession. The other question that might arise was expressly left undecided by the Privy Council, and that was a case where a plaintiff might sue the nominal owner when his possession was for less than 12 years and had not ripened into a title. Mr. The other question that might arise was expressly left undecided by the Privy Council, and that was a case where a plaintiff might sue the nominal owner when his possession was for less than 12 years and had not ripened into a title. Mr. Desai strongly relies on the observations in the judgment of the Privy Council appearing at p. 1401, and these observations are : "Now it is clear under these rulings that, (and the Privy Council referred to earlier rulings of their own) while the section protects the certified purchaser, so long as he retains the possession given him by the Court, from a suit by the true owner, if ha allows the real purchaser being the true owner to get possession, the section does not enable him to sue for possession, because possession has come into the bands of the true owner, who is entitled to it." "What Mr. Desai says is that in this case the true owner was in possession. He was dispossessed and he is suing because he was dispossessed, and therefore, the possession of the nominal owner should not be protected. Mr. Desai reads this passage to mean that it is only the possession of the certified purchaser which has to be protected and not his title, and if the certified purchaser allows his possession to be interfered with and the real owner to get possession, then S. 66 cannot come to the rescue of the certified purchaser. It must be noticed that in this case the Privy Council expressly states that this section will not help the certified purchaser if he sues for possession. Therefore the Privy Council was contemplating a case where a certified purchaser having lost possession sues for possession against the real owner. 4. But the case we have before us is not a case of that character at all. This is not a case where a certified purchaser is suing the real owner for possession; the case is the other way about; it is the real owner who is suing for pos, session against the certified purchaser and, in my opinion, the mere fact that the real owner a in possession for some time has no relevancy to the decision of this question. At the date of the suit the certified purchaser was in possession. At the date of the suit the certified purchaser was in possession. That possession was pursuant to his title and that title was based upon the sale certificate issued by the Court. The plaintiff in order to succeed bad to destroy the validity of that certificate and the validity of that certificate could only be destroyed by the plaintiff establishing that the defendant was a benamidar and he was the real owner. In my opinion, that is exactly what S. 66 precludes the plaintiff from establishing. In my opinion, therefore, both the Courts below were right in taking the view that the plaintiffs suit was barred under S. 66. 5. The result is that both the appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.