Judgement Appeal (No.12 of 1947), by special leave, from an order of the Chief Court in its appellate criminal jurisdiction (Davies C.J. and Thadani J.) (July 18, 1945) which had summarily dismissed the appeal of the appellants from the conviction and sentences passed on them by a judge of that court exercising Sessions Court jurisdiction (Tyabji J.) (March 24, 1945). The trial judge, in accordance with the majority verdict of a jury, found (1.) both of the appellants guilty of being parties to a criminal conspiracy to cheat one Rochiram Asoomal Canser (s. 120 B read with s. 420 of the Indian Penal 64 Law Rep. 77 Ind. App. 7 ( 1949- 1950) Sanmukhsing V. King 165 Code) (2.) the first appellant guilty of having, in pursuance of the said conspiracy, forged two documents (referred to in the Record as Exhibits A and B) purporting to be an agreement in duplicate executed at Lahore by a fictitious "person called Dr. S. C. Rao, described therein as " General Manager, Herbarium Lahore, " and at Karachi by the said Rochiram as " Chairman, Sunderson Limited, " wherein receipt of Rs. 3,000 as paid by the first appellant to the Herbarium on behalf of Rochiram, was acknowledged (s. 467 I.P.C.) (3.) the second appellant guilty in pursuance of the said conspiracy of having aided and abetted the first appellant in forging the said documents (s. 467 read with s. 109, I.P.C) (4.) both of the appellants guilty of having in pursuance of the said conspiracy, fraudulently and dishonestly used the said documents in an attempt to induce Rochiram to pay to them Rs. 3,000 (s. 471, I.P.C.); and sentenced the first appellant to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months under (1,), for 5 years under (2) and for 5 years under (4.); and the second appellant to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months under (1.), for 2 years under (3.) and to 2 years under (4.); and directed the sentences in each case to run concurrently. 1949. Nov. 3, 7. Dingle Foot and Alfred Stone for the appellants. The grounds of appeal fall under two heads first, the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the appellants because the proceedings were barred by s. 195, sub-?. 1949. Nov. 3, 7. Dingle Foot and Alfred Stone for the appellants. The grounds of appeal fall under two heads first, the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the appellants because the proceedings were barred by s. 195, sub-?. 1 (c), of the Criminal Procedure Code, and secondly, throughout, at every stage, these proceedings were marred by gross irregularities of such a character as to constitute a denial of justice. Under s. 195, sub-s. 1 (c), before proceedings can betaken there must be a complaint by the trial court or by the court which is subordinate. It is common ground that in this case there was no complaint either by the First Class Magistrate or by the trial court. This question of jurisdiction was never considered by the Chief Court in its appellate jurisdiction. It is submitted that s. 195, sub-s. 1 (c), protects both of the appellants. In the alternative, the proceedings against the second appellant, Aparparsing, were barred by that sub-section, and it was not open to the court, on a charge which indicted both the appellants jointly for conspiracy, to convict one of the accused only. Where a complaint is not made as required it is a defect of jurisdiction which cannot be cured under s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The necessity for a complaint is to prevent the misuse of the criminal law, and the whole of s. 195 must be taken into account in considering how it should be construed. The whole purpose of the section would be defeated if were held that sub-s. 1 (c) only applies to an original document and not to a copy of it. Here copies of the alleged forged documents were produced in evidence, there was no complaint as required, and accordingly the jurisdiction of the trial court was barred. Of the authorities K. V. Munisamy Mudaliar v Rajaratnam Pillai (( 1922) I.L.R. 45 M. 928.) does not really assist on the present case, and Hayat Khan v. The Crown (( 1932) A.I.R. (Sind) 90), so far as it goes, is in the appellants favour. That leaves only Girdhari Lal v. Emperor (( 1925) A.I.R. (Oudh) 413), in which it was held that s. 195, sub-s. 1 (c), refers only to the document alleged to be forged and not to a copy of it it is submitted that that ease was wrongly decided. That leaves only Girdhari Lal v. Emperor (( 1925) A.I.R. (Oudh) 413), in which it was held that s. 195, sub-s. 1 (c), refers only to the document alleged to be forged and not to a copy of it it is submitted that that ease was wrongly decided. There are next the various irregularities in the proceedings. The most serious complaint is of the great mass of evidence, extending over a long period of time, all of which was calculated to show that the accused either had committed other offences or that they were generally persons of bad character. That evidence was led at considerable length at the trial, and referred to at still greater length in the summing-up. It must have affected the mind of the jury, and it is not possible to say that they would necessarily have come to the same conclusion if that evidence had been excluded. There could not be a worse example of where all kinds of irrelevant evidence have been brought in by the Crown. The matter went even further than Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales ([ 1894] A.C. 57, 65.) the principles of which are applicable in India. [Reference was also made to Maxwell v. Director of Public Prosecutions ([ 1935] A.C. 309, 319.).] Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to the present case, which is eminently one which in which it should be held that there has been a miscarriage of justice. 64 Law Rep. 77 Ind. App. 7 ( 1949- 1950) Sanmukhsing V. King 166 Pringle K.C. and Jayakar for the respondent were not called on to argue. Nov. 7. LORD SIMONDS announced that their Lordships would humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and that they would give their reasons later. Nov. 29. The reasons for their Lordships judgment were delivered by LORD SIMONDS, who stated the facts set out above and continued It will be observed that the appellants were charged with forging or abetting the forgery of certain documents and were convicted of this offence. Nov. 29. The reasons for their Lordships judgment were delivered by LORD SIMONDS, who stated the facts set out above and continued It will be observed that the appellants were charged with forging or abetting the forgery of certain documents and were convicted of this offence. It is contended on their behalf that the court had no jurisdiction to try them for this offence because by s. 195, sub-s. 1 (c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure a court is barred from taking cognizance " of any offence described in s. 463 or punishable under s. 471, " s. 475 or s 476 of the same Code [the Indian Penal Code], " when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a " party to any proceeding in any court in respect of a document " produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except " on the complaint in writing of such court, or of some other " court to which such court is subordinate." It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the documents in respect of which the charge of forgery was laid had been produced or given in evidence in certain proceedings in the Magistrates Court at Lahore, that the Lahore Magistrate had made no such complaint in writing as s. 195 prescribed, and that accordingly that section barred the jurisdiction of the Chief Court of Sind. It appears, however, to their Lordships that this challenge, which was no doubt the substantial ground on which special leave to appeal was given, is based on a misapprehension of the facts. For on a further examination of them it is clear that the documents in question were not in fact produced or given in evidence in the Lahore Court, but, on the contrary, there were produced in that court documents which purported to be copies (but without the names of the executants) of the documents alleged to be forged. In these circumstances their Lordships think it plain that s. 195, sub-s. 1 (c), cannot operate as a bar. They concur in the opinion expressed by the Chief Court of Oudh in Girdhari Lal v. The Emperor (( 1925) A.I.R. (Oudh) 413.) that the .section can only refer to the document alleged to be forged, not to a copy of it. They concur in the opinion expressed by the Chief Court of Oudh in Girdhari Lal v. The Emperor (( 1925) A.I.R. (Oudh) 413.) that the .section can only refer to the document alleged to be forged, not to a copy of it. This view, which accords with the plain grammatical meaning of the words, is supported by the practical common sense of the matter, for, as was observed in that court, the court before which a copy of a document is produced is not really in a position to express any opinion on the genuineness of the original. It was suggested that a forged document might at least be said to be " given in evidence " if a copy was produced, but it appears to their Lordships that, though by production of a copy secondary evidence of the contents of a document might be said to be given, the forged document itself would not thus be given in evidence. This ground of appeal therefore fails. Numerous other grounds of appeal were urged by learned counsel for the appellants, all of which their Lordships have carefully examined. The appeals to the Chief Court of Sind having been summarily dismissed, their Lordships have not the advantage of knowing how far the learned judges of that court were influenced by s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but their Lordships are satisfied, on a review of the %hole case, that, whether that section is invoked or the more stringent test adopted which their Lordships have so frequently prescribed for the determination of criminal appeals, it is abundantly clear that there has been no such failure or miscarriage of justice as would justify an interference with the order of the Chief Court. They do not propose to examine in detail the several matters of complaint which were urged by learned counsel. It is sufficient to say that any irregularities that a scrutiny of the proceedings may disclose afford no grounds for reversing the decision of the Chief Court.