JUDGMENT : K. Sankaran, J. Additional 9th defendant who is the legal representative of the 3rd defendant has preferred this appeal against that portion of the lower court's decree which is against him. Plaintiff and the first defendant are brothers and their mother's sister's son is the second defendant. The properties described in the plaint schedule belong to the Kanni-Vinayagar Temple situated at Azhagiapandipuram. The temple and the properties form a private trust brought into existence by the ancestors of the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. On the allegations that defendants 1 and 2 are mismanaging the affairs of this private trust, plaintiff instituted the present suit for the removal of defendants 1 and 2 from trusteeship, for a rendition of accounts and also for framing of a scheme for the proper management of the trust. Certain alienations made by these defendants in favour of defendants 4 to 6 were also sought to be set aside. The third defendant who had been employed as the Poojari of the plaint temple had, obtained three decrees against the plaint trust and the first defendant for recovery of the shanti-udama due to him for the services rendered by him. These are the decrees in O.S. 351 of 1106, O.S. 308 of 1108 and O.S. 279 of 1111. In execution of these decrees the items specified in paragraph 11 of the plaint were attached and sold in court auction and were purchased by the third defendant. He also obtained a delivery of these items through court. Plaintiff has impeached the decree and execution proceedings in these three cases as having been brought about fraudulently and collusively by defendants 1 to 3. Plaintiff has sought for recovery of those items after getting the decrees and execution proceedings set aside. The third defendant and after him the ninth defendant resisted plaintiff's suit in respect of these items and maintained that the decrees and execution proceedings are valid and are binding on the plaint trust and they are not liable to be set aside. The lower court found that the three decrees obtained by the third defendant against the plaint trust are valid and binding on the trust, that the execution proceedings in those cases were also properly conducted and that they are not vitiated by any fraud or collusion. The lower court found that the three decrees obtained by the third defendant against the plaint trust are valid and binding on the trust, that the execution proceedings in those cases were also properly conducted and that they are not vitiated by any fraud or collusion. All the same a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff to recover those items from the ninth defendant on payment of the auction amount within 30 days from the date of the decree. The appeal is directed against this portion of the lower court, decree. The plaintiff-respondent has also filed a memorandum objecting to certain findings in the lower court's judgment which are against him. The third defendant who had been appointed as the priest charged with the duty of performing the poojas and other ceremonies in the plaint temple obtained three decrees against the trust and against the first defendant trustee for recovery of the arrears of salary due to him. These are the decrees in O.S. 351 of 1106, O.S. 308 of 1108 and O.S. 279 of 1111. The three suits were tried and disposed of together. Ext. XX is the copy of the leading judgment by which these three cases were disposed of. Exts. E, F and G are the copies of the execution diaries in these cases. It is seen from Exts. E, F and G that in execution of the decrees obtained by the third defendant the properties mentioned in paragraph 11 of the plaint were attached and sold in court auction and purchased by the third defendant and that he obtained delivery of those items in the year 1114. One of the grounds on which these decrees and execution proceedings are impeached by the plaintiff is that the plaint trust was not properly represented in those proceedings. It is conceded in the plaint that the first defendant was the sole trustee in the management of the trust affairs from the time of his attaining majority till Kanni 1111. It was only by Ext. A compromise petition dated 8.3.1111 filed in O.S. 61 of 1106 that provision was made for associating the second defendant also in the management of the trust affairs. All the same it is admitted by the second defendant in his written statement that he did not function as a joint trustee as contemplated in Ext. It was only by Ext. A compromise petition dated 8.3.1111 filed in O.S. 61 of 1106 that provision was made for associating the second defendant also in the management of the trust affairs. All the same it is admitted by the second defendant in his written statement that he did not function as a joint trustee as contemplated in Ext. A compromise and that the first defendant continued to be the sole trustee. Plaintiff's complaint also is to the same effect. The question whether the first defendant alone could represent the plaint trust in view of the provision made in Ext. A compromise can arise only in respect of the transactions entered by him subsequent to the date of that compromise. The three decrees obtained by the third defendant related to an anterior period when the first defendant alone was in management of the trust. In that capacity he had been impleaded in those cases to represent the trust. It follows therefore that there is no force in the plaintiff's contention that the trust was not properly represented in those cases. It may also be pointed out in this connection that the plaintiff has not objected to the definite findings recorded by the lower court that the trust was properly represented in the three cases already mentioned and that the decrees and execution proceedings in those cases are binding on the trust. Those findings have therefore become final. The next and the most important ground on which plaintiff wanted to avoid the decree and execution proceedings in Exts. E to G cases is that they were brought about as a result of fraud and collusion by defendants 1 and 3. Plaintiff does not appear to have been serious about this allegation because he has not cared to adduce any independent evidence to substantiate it. The manner in which the first defendant was resisting the three suits filed by the third defendant as is disclosed by Ext. XI judgment, clearly indicates that there must be no collusion between them. The third defendant's claim was hotly contested by the first defendant and both sides appear to have examined some witnesses and filed several documents to substantiate their respective contentions. The third defendant's attempt to realise the amount due to him under the three decrees by the sale of the trust properties was also resisted by the first defendant-trustee. The third defendant's claim was hotly contested by the first defendant and both sides appear to have examined some witnesses and filed several documents to substantiate their respective contentions. The third defendant's attempt to realise the amount due to him under the three decrees by the sale of the trust properties was also resisted by the first defendant-trustee. He had even sought to have the court-sale in those cases set aside under O. XI R. 87 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was after facing all such contests at the trial stage as well as in the execution proceedings that the third defendant was able to obtain delivery of the properties purchased by him in court auction in those cases. It has come out from the evidence of the plaintiff himself that he knew even in the year 1111 that the third defendant had obtained the decrees in question against the plaint trust. He has further admitted that the execution proceedings were also known to him while they were in progress. In the light of all these facts and circumstances, it is idle to contend that the decrees and execution proceedings in those cases were brought about as the result of any fraud or collusion by defendants 1 and 3. We would therefore hold that the findings of the lower court that the decrees and execution proceedings in those cases are not vitiated by any fraud or collusion and that they are valid and binding on the plaint trust and are not liable to be set aside. After having overruled all the contentions of the plaintiff against the validity and binding nature of the decrees and the court-sales in favour of the third defendant, the lower court is seen to have passed the decree in favour of the plaintiff enabling him to pay to the third defendant the auction amount in those cases within a month from the date of the decree and to recover possession of the properties covered by the court-sales. The learned Advocate for the appellant contends that such a decree is unsustainable in the face of the other findings recorded in the case. We think that this contention has to be upheld. The learned Advocate for the appellant contends that such a decree is unsustainable in the face of the other findings recorded in the case. We think that this contention has to be upheld. The only ground which weigh with the lower court in passing the decree in favour of the plaintiff is that the properties which have been endowed for the upkeep of the plaint temple are in their very nature inalienable and that the debts incurred even for legal necessities binding on the trust could be realised only out of the income of those properties. The Privy Council rulings reported in I.L.R. 50 Madras 497 and I.L.R. 6 Patna 137 have been cited in support of such a position. The broad proposition of law stated by the lower court that under no circumstances trust properties could be sold is not correct, and no such general rule is laid down in the two rulings cited by it. It was only laid down there that the proper decree to be passed in a suit for realising a debt due from the trust would be to direct the appointment of receiver for the trust properties for the purpose of collecting the rents and profits and of utilising the same for the discharge of the debt. But this does not mean that even in a case where the adoption of such a course is not practicable, the trust properties cannot be sold and that the creditor should go without any remedy. It is settled law that for proper and legal necessities of the trust the corpus of trust property should also be alienated if there is no other means of meeting such necessities. It has been so laid down in Sreemuth Devasikhamani Pandarasannadhi v. Pazhaniyappa Chettiar, I.L.R. 34 Madras 535 (where the case-law on the subject has been fully discussed). In Mahant Mahabir Das v. Jamuna Prasad Sahu, I.L.R. 8 Patna 48, it was ruled that although the property devoted to religious purposes is as a rule inalienable, it is competent to the court to direct the sale of such property if it is satisfied that the loan for which the property was charged was raised for a necessary purpose. In Mahant Mahabir Das v. Jamuna Prasad Sahu, I.L.R. 8 Patna 48, it was ruled that although the property devoted to religious purposes is as a rule inalienable, it is competent to the court to direct the sale of such property if it is satisfied that the loan for which the property was charged was raised for a necessary purpose. These rulings were followed by the Travancore High Court in Damodaran Nambiar v. Narayanan Nambiar, 24 T.L.J. 436, where it was laid down that there is no absolute prohibition of the alienation of the corpus of endowed property but only a discretion vested in the court for the appointment of a receiver for paying up the debt from the rents and profits and if such a course is an impracticable one, then the properties themselves could be proceeded against. In the present case the debts due to the third defendant were incurred towards the requirements of the performance of the poojas and the other ceremonies in the plaint temple and as such the debt was incurred for a valid and legal necessity binding on the trust. The three decrees were obtained by him for recovery of such debts from the trust. The decrees were not charged on the trust properties. It is also seen that even though the trustee had contended the three suits, he had not invoked the aid of the trial court for the exercise of its discretion to the matter of directing the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents and profits of the trust properties and to pay off the debts out of such rents and profits. When the third defendant took out execution and attached some of the items of the trust properties, then also the trustee does not appear to have moved the court for resorting to such a course for the discharge of the debts. It has already been found that the failure on the part of the trustee to invoke the discretion of the court in that matter was not the result of any fraud or collusion on his part. On the other hand, he appears to have been actively resisting the third defendant's claim by putting forward several other objections both on the trial side as well as on the execution side. On the other hand, he appears to have been actively resisting the third defendant's claim by putting forward several other objections both on the trial side as well as on the execution side. The present plaintiff who was admittedly aware of the execution proceedings in question did not also choose to intervene and move the court for preventing a sale of the trust properties and for directing the satisfaction of the third defendant's claim out of the rents and profits of the trust properties. Since the discretionary power of the court was not invoked by anybody interested in the trust at any stage of the proceedings in the three suits filed by the third defendant, it cannot be said that the court went wrong in selling some of the trust properties in court auction. Even if the discretionary power of the court had been invoked at the proper stage, the court could have prevented such a sale only if it was satisfied that there were other reasonable facilities for a satisfaction of the debts due to the third defendant. As matters stand at present, the decrees obtained by the third defendant were for valid debts binding on the trust. It is also seen that those decrees and the execution proceedings which followed them have not been vitiated by any fraud or collusion or gross negligence on the part of defendants 1 and 3. It follows therefore that the court-sale in those cases are valid and not liable to be set aside. The mere fact that no attempt had been made to see if the debts could be discharged out of the rents and profits of the trust properties cannot be accepted as a valid ground at this stage for avoiding the court-sales. The third defendant who had become the owner of the properties purchased by him in court auction in the three cases already referred to could not be divested of his rights over those properties by a payment of the debts due to him. In the face of the findings recording the validity of the court-sales, the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of those properties from the third defendant's legal representative on payment of the debts for which the properties happened to be sold. In the face of the findings recording the validity of the court-sales, the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of those properties from the third defendant's legal representative on payment of the debts for which the properties happened to be sold. In the result, this appeal is allowed and plaintiff's suit as against the third defendant and the properties purchased by him in court auction in O.S. 351 of 1105, O.S. 308 of 1108 and O.S. 279 of 1111 is dismissed. The objection memorandum filed by the plaintiff-respondent is also dismissed. The appellant will get his costs in this Court as well as in the lower court from the plaintiff. Interest on costs at 6 per cent. Appeal allowed.