JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for redemption of a house alleged to have been mortgaged with possession by one Bhayyaji s/o Kanaji to one Keshavram for Rs.71 on 16th August 1926 (Shrawan sudi 8 Samvat 1983). The plaintiff Onkarlal and his sons and grandsons are plaintiffs claiming to be the heirs of Bhayyaji. Defendants Nathulal and his minor son, Bherulal are heirs of mortgagee and Khyaliram and his minor sons have been impleaded as licensees of Keshavram, the uncle-in-law of Khyaliram. 2. Nathulal denied liability contending that he was separate from his brother Kesharam and had nothing to do with the alleged mortgage. Khyaliram denied the mortgage as also the heirship of the plaintiffs and claimed ownership by adverse possession. In Para.7 of his written statement, he alleged that about fifteen years ago, he found the house entirely dilapidated and since vacant land in the village was considered to be Government property, he occupied it and constructed the present house on it on the advice of Keshavram at a cost of about six or seven hundred rupees. He claimed Rs.700 as compensation if the plaintiffs were held entitled to redeem the property. He declined to be the guardian of his minor sons, and Mr. Ratnavat who was appointed guardian virtually adopted Khyaliram's defence. The suit was tried on the following issues: 1. Whether the house in suit was mortgaged by Bhayyaji the brother of plaintiff 1's father with Keshoram to cousin brother of defendant 1 for Rs.71? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the house in dispute? 3. Whether defendant 3 spent Rs.700 over the said house and be is entitled to recover it? 4. Whether defendants 4 to 7 are liable for the plaintiff's claim? 5. Relief. 3. The learned Munsif, Garoth, held that the mortgage was not proved, that the question of redemption did not arise; but if the mortgage was held proved, the plaintiffs would be entitled to redeem; that there was no proof of the actual expenditure on the house. But it is proved, however, that the defendant did spend something and that he built the house. He has not been able to prove, however, that he spent Rs.700 to 800. The defendant is entitled to recover this amount. The mortgage deed also says he is so entitled. But it is proved, however, that the defendant did spend something and that he built the house. He has not been able to prove, however, that he spent Rs.700 to 800. The defendant is entitled to recover this amount. The mortgage deed also says he is so entitled. The learned District Judge, Garoh, set aside this decree in appeal holding the mortgage proved and the expenses unproved and decreed the plaintiff's suit. Khyaliram has come up in second appeal. His minor sons were represented here by Mr. Shaha, pleader. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the finding regarding the proof of the mortgage is without ground. (On consideration of the evidence his Lordship upheld the finding and proceeded). 5. It was then contended that whatever the claims against the heirs of Keshavram, the suit against Khyaliram ought to fail first because he is not a necessary party and has been wrongly impleaded and secondly because of his claim by adverse possession. These questions were not canvassed in the Courts below by joining issue but as they are pure questions of law to be determined on the facts proved, I shall discuss them in some detail. 6. The appellant's learned counsel referred to the decision of a Bench of this Court, to which I was a party, that a party, not interested in the mortgage but claiming on his own title need not be joined in a suit on the mortgage. Then, however, there was no question about the title of the party which had been previously adjudicated upon. The distinction in this case is that the appellant does not expressly deny the mortgagor's prior title but claims one in defence by adverse possession. Indeed, it is difficult to understand his claim. According to him, he entered on land which was not his own, on the advice of Keshoram, that it was Government land, but even if Keshoram had kept the mortgage a secret, the occupation by Khyaliram cannot be said to have been with due care and caution. It is in evidence that Keshoram was himself in occupation of the house, prior to Khyaliram and ordinarily one would impute knowledge of the mortgage to the latter too. Again, there can be no question of adverse possession in the circumstances of this case. It is in evidence that Keshoram was himself in occupation of the house, prior to Khyaliram and ordinarily one would impute knowledge of the mortgage to the latter too. Again, there can be no question of adverse possession in the circumstances of this case. There is no evidence of the assertion of a hostile title by Khyaliram to the knowledge of the plaintiff and at best the possession would be adverse to the mortgagee. The mortgagor plaintiff was not during the period of the mortgage entitled to possession; and it is well settled that possession cannot be adverse to a person who has no present right to possession. Salig Ram v. Gauri Shanker, AIR (22) 1935 ALL. 542: (159 I.C. 151); Dutraj v. Lalji Sahai, AIR (16) 1929 Pat. 639: (9 Pat. 632); Tarabai Ramrao v. Dattaram, AIR (12) 1925 Bom. 465: (49 Bom. 539); Kamala Kanta v. Annanda Chandra, AIR (11) 1924 cal. 357: (71 I.C. 1030); Amar Nath v. Duni, AIR (22) 1935 Lah. 315: (16 Lah. 724). In Peria Aiya Ambalam v. Shunmugasundaram, AIR (1) 1914 Mad. 334: (38 Mad. 903 F.B.), it was held that unless there is denial of the mortgagor's title to his knowledge, there is no adverse possession against him and affirmatively it has been held in Munawar Ali v. Jagamilan Ram, AIR (14) 1927 ALL. 177: (99 I.C. 280) and in some other cases that denial of the mortgagor's title to his knowledge makes possession adverse. This view has been doubted in Chitaley's Limitation Act (Note 85 on Art.142, Art.144) but it is unnecessary to consider the question at length in this case as there has been no express denial of the plaintiff's title and the entry of Khyaliram into the house which was previously in occupation of the mortgagee in possession, does not even by implication constitute a denial particularly in view of the relationship between the mortgagee and Khyaliram, and even if the plea of licence or collusion is repelled and the occupation of Khyaliram be considered adverse to the mortgagee the proper view would be that Khyaliram acquired the rights of the mortgagee in possession and that the mortgagor has the right to redeem. I am fortified in this view by the decision reported in Vithoba v. Gangaram, 12 B.H.C.R. 180. 7. The next question is as regards compensation. I am fortified in this view by the decision reported in Vithoba v. Gangaram, 12 B.H.C.R. 180. 7. The next question is as regards compensation. The learned Munsiff has found that the expenses have not been proved but curiously followed this up by a finding that the defendant is entitled to the expenses, since he must have incurred some. I would observe that more than an academic discussion, it is the duty of a Court to apply the principles of law to the particular case before it, and determine not merely the right but the extent to which the parties are entitled to remedy. 8. The claim of the defendant to compensation can only be considered on the equitable doctrine of acquiescence and estoppel. This doctrine is attracted only when there is equity in favour of the person claiming compensation; for who seeks equity must come with clean hands. In the leading English case of Ramsden v. Dyson (1865-66) 149 R.R. 543 at 549: (14 W.R.926) Lord Cranworth L.C. observed: "But it will be observed that to raise such an equity two things are required first, that the person expending the money supposes himself to be building on his own land, and secondly that the real owner at the time of the expenditure knows that the land belongs to him, and not to the person expending the money in the belief that he is owner. For, if a stranger builds on my land, knowing it to be mine, there is no principle of equity which would prevent my claiming the land, with the benefit of all the expenditure made on It. There would be nothing in my conduct, active or passive, making it inequitable in me to assert my legal rights. It follows as a corollary from these, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say it form part of them, that if my tenant builds on land which he holds under me, he does not thereby, in the absence of special circumstances, acquire any right to prevent me from taking possession of the lands and buildings when the tenancy has determined. He knew the extent of his interest and it was his folly to expend money upon a title which he knew would or might so come to an end." 9. He knew the extent of his interest and it was his folly to expend money upon a title which he knew would or might so come to an end." 9. The principle has been followed in India with the modification that a party building on the land of another without the acquiescence of the latter is allowed to remove the structure. Nand Kishore v. Damodar Balaji, I.L.R. (1942) Nag. 232: (AIR (29) 1942 Nag. 59), Jai Narain v. Jafer Beg, 48 ALL. 353: (AIR (13) 1926 ALL. 324), Ranchodlal v. Secy. of State, 35 Bom. 182: (9 I.C. 765), Kanhaiya Lal v. Hamid Ali, 122 I.C. 774: (AIR (17) 1930 Oudh. 235), Stocking B. v. Tata Iron and Steel Co., 41 I.C. 175: (AIR (4) 1917 Pat. 234); 4 C.W. Notes. It cannot be said in the present case that action of Khyaliram was bona fide and as being in the shoes of the mortgagee, he must give possession to the plaintiffs by way of redemption. There is no proof of expenditure or structure which calls for an order of compensation or removal. 10. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. The plaintiff-respondents shall have their costs in this Court from the appellant who shall bear his own.