Judgement Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 67 ( 1948- 1949) N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious 23 Appeal (No. 94 of 1947), by special leave, from a judgment and order of the High Court (November 6, 1944) which revised a judgment and decree of the Court of the District Judge of Ramnad at Madura (August 7, 1943). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The only matter which arose for determination in this appeal, and on which special leave to appeal was granted, was whether the learned judges of the High Court had any power to interfere in revision with the order of the District Judge. On July 1, 1907, one Narayana, the grandfather of the appellants, made a will by which he founded a temple and directed his male heirs to act as trustees of the temple. Narayana died in 1910, and in 1915 the family became divided. Thereafter each branch of the family managed the temple for one year in rotation. In 1927, the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Mad. Act II of 1927) (hereinafter, with its amendments, referred to as the “Act") was passed. The Act authorized the creation of a Hindu Religious Endowment Board and empowered it to take over control of temples dedicated to the use of the public. Section 63 of the Act empowered the board to settle a scheme of administration for the endowments connected with a math or temple. Section 84 of the Act was in the following terms " (1.) If any dispute arises as to whether an institution is a " math or temple as defined in this Act or whether a temple " is an excepted temple, such dispute shall be decided by the " Board. " (2.) Any person affected by a decision under sub-section (1.) may, within one year, apply to the Court to " modify or set aside such decision ; but, subject to the result " of such application, the order of the Board shall be final.” The respondent board was duly constituted under the Act, and, in or about the year 1930, demanded a contribution under the Act for the upkeep of the temple constituted by the will of Narayana from N.S. Narayana, another grandson of the testator, though representing a different branch from the appellants. The said N. S. Narayana objected to paying on the ground that the temple was a private one. On January 15, 1931, the respondent, having decided to hold an inquiry under s. 84 of the Act, served a notice on N. S. Narayana informing him that his contention that the temple was a private one would be heard by the board on February 26, 1931, and that he should appear either in person or by counsel. On August 4, 1931, the respondent, having held an inquiry at which N. S. Narayana had been represented, declared the temple to be a public one which was to be classed as an excepted one under the Act. The contention of the appellants was that the said N. S. Narayana was not at the date of those proceedings a trustee of the temple, that the order was never served on the trustees, and that the appellants were not bound thereby. In 1933, the respondent asked Sadagopa, another grandson of the testator, to make a contribution out of the temple funds. Sadagopa objected to the levy on the ground that it was illegal. On September 8, 1933, the respondent ordered the cancellation of the contribution demanded from the temple funds. From 1933 to 1937 the respondent did not appear to have made any further demand for contribution ; but in 1938 the respondent asked for a contribution from the appellants, who refused to pay on the ground that the temple was a private one. In answer to that refusal the respondent, on January 19, 1938, wrote a letter to the appellants in the following terms "Sir, " Reference—Your letter dated 3.1. 1938, regarding " recovery of contribution, I have to state that your " contention that the temple is Private is untenable as " the temple was already declared by the Board in its order " No. 820, dated 4.8. 1931, to be an Excepted Temple " as defined in the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments " Act, 1926, and as that order has not been set aside by the " Court." Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 67 ( 1948- 1949) N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious 24 On April 15, 1939, it appeared that the respondent made an order under s. 63 of the Act that a scheme relating to the endowments of the temple should be framed, and that was subsequently done. 76 Ind. App. 67 ( 1948- 1949) N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious 24 On April 15, 1939, it appeared that the respondent made an order under s. 63 of the Act that a scheme relating to the endowments of the temple should be framed, and that was subsequently done. On January 19, 1939, the appellants filed a petition, O.P. No. 15 of 1939, purporting to be under s. 84, sub-s. 2, of the Act, asking for a declaration that the order of the respondent dated January 19, 1938, was without jurisdiction and void, to have that order set aside, and for a declaration that the temple was a private temple. On October 16, 1939, the appellants appeared to have filed a suit against the respondent and three others asking to have the scheme set aside. The learned District Judge tried the petition and suit together and gave judgment on August 7, 1943, in both matters. He held that the temple was a private one and that the appellants were not bound by the order of the respondent made on August 4, 1931. On the petition he passed an order setting aside the alleged order of the respondent dated January 19, 1938, and declared the temple to be a private one. The learned judge was clearly in error in purporting to set aside the so-called order of January 19, 1938, because no such order existed. In the letter of that date the respondent merely informed the appellants that they were bound by the order of August 4, 1931. The effective part of the order of the learned District Judge was his declaration that the temple was a private one. In the suit the learned judge passed a decree that the scheme be set aside. From the order passed by the learned District Judge on the petition an application for revision was presented to the High Court at Madras under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and there was also an appeal to the court from the decree passed in the suit. On November 6, 1944, the learned judges delivered one judgment in both matters. On November 6, 1944, the learned judges delivered one judgment in both matters. In the suit they allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the lower court so far as it held the temple to be a private one, and remanded the suit to the lower court for a decision on certain issues raised in the suit. No appeal was presented to His Majesty in Council from that order made in the suit, and such order was unaffected by the judgment in this appeal. On the revision application Mockett J. expressed the view that the decision of the case depended entirely on the construction of the will of Narayana. He considered that the conclusion of the learned judge, on the construction of the will was so entirely out of accord with the meaning of the document that it required interference by the High Court, and that the wrong construction put on the will by the learned District Judge involved such material misuse of jurisdiction as to involve interference by the High Court. Kuppuswami Ayyar J., in a concurring judgment, expressed the view that the High Court was justified in interfering in revision under sub-cl. (c) of s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was in the following terms “The High Court may call for the record of any case” which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such " High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such " subordinate Court appears— " (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by " law, or " (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, "or " (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction " illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court " may make such order in the case as it thinks fit." 1948. Dec. 15, 16. Eddy K.C. and R. Parikh for the appellants. The District Judge has not (a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, nor (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him, nor (c) acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, and the High Court Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 67 ( 1948- 1949) N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious 25 had no jurisdiction to interfere. 76 Ind. App. 67 ( 1948- 1949) N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious 25 had no jurisdiction to interfere. The District Judge decided this case first of all on his construction of the will of July 1, 1907, and secondly, on the evidence of a number of witnesses. The High Court has dealt with the matter wholly on its view of the true construction of the will. Whereas the District Judge came to the conclusion that this was a private temple, the High Court were of the opinion, which, if necessary, it will be submitted is erroneous, that it was a public temple. It matters not whether the District Judge was right or wrong on the question of law, the point is whether or not he " acted " illegally or with material irregularity " within the meaning of s. 115 (c) of the Code in finding as he did, and it is submitted that he did not Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (( 1884) L. R. 11 I. A. 237, 239.) ; Muhammad Yusuf Khan v. Abdul Rahman Khan (( 1889) L. R. 16 I. A. 104.) ; Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 261, 267.). [Counsel cited from those authorities the passages set out in the judgment of the Board, and reference was also made to Mullas Code of Civil Procedure, nth ed., p. 419, where it is said that " it is settled that where a court has jurisdiction-to determine " a question and it determines that question, it cannot be said " that it has acted illegally or with material irregularity " because it has come to an erroneous decision on a question " of fact or even of law.” This was a purely private temple, and outside the jurisdiction of the respondent board; there are no words in the will to suggest that it was built for the villagers in general. The contention of the appellants is that they were not affected by the order of the Endowment Board of August 4, 1931, and that they were never served with it. [Reference was made to Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroop (( 1939) L. R. 67 I. A. I.).] The respondent did not appear. 1949. Jan.24. The contention of the appellants is that they were not affected by the order of the Endowment Board of August 4, 1931, and that they were never served with it. [Reference was made to Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroop (( 1939) L. R. 67 I. A. I.).] The respondent did not appear. 1949. Jan.24. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts set out above and continued As long ago as 1884 in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (( 1884) L. R. 11 I. A. 237, 239.), the Privy Council made the following observation on s. 622 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was replaced by s. 115 of the Code of 1908 " The question then is, did the judges of the lower Courts " in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally " or with material irregularity. It appears that they had " perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before " them, and they did decide it. Whether they decided rightly” or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case; and even " if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.” In Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 261, 267.) the Board observed "It will be observed that the section applies to jurisdiction” alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal " assumption of it. The section is not directed against” conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction " is not involved." In the present case the learned judges of the High Court did not act on this principle. They set aside the judgment of the District Judge because they considered that he had made a serious mistake in the construction which he had placed on the will of the testator, and they seem to have thought that a serious error of law could be corrected in revision. There have been, no doubt, decisions in some High Courts in India which lend support to the view on which the judges acted. The cases are collected in the fourth edition of Chitaley and Rao on the Code of Civil Procedure, vol. I, p. 1105. There have been, no doubt, decisions in some High Courts in India which lend support to the view on which the judges acted. The cases are collected in the fourth edition of Chitaley and Rao on the Code of Civil Procedure, vol. I, p. 1105. In Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj Das v. Khetter Moni Dassi (( 1896) 1 C. W. N, 617, 626.), the High Court of Calcutta expressed the opinion that sub-cl. (c) of s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was " intended to authorize the High Courts to interfere and " correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate courts, so as " to prevent grave injustice in non-appealable cases." This passage was dissented from by the Calcutta High Court in Enat Mondul v. Baloram Dey (( 1899) 3 C. W. N. 581.), but was cited with approval by Lort-Williams J. in Gulabchand Bangur v. Kabiruddin Ahmed (( 1930) I. L. R. 58 C. 111.). Their Lordships can see no justification for any such view; it would, indeed, be difficult to formulate any standard by which the degree of error of subordinate courts could be measured. Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 67 ( 1948- 1949) N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious 26 court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters, (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction ; (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction ; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. No such matters arose in this case, and the order of the High Court on the petition was without justification. If the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. No such matters arose in this case, and the order of the High Court on the petition was without justification. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be allowed, that the order made by the High Court at Madras on November 6, 1944, on the original petition No. 15 of 1939 be set aside and that the order on such petition made by the learned District Judge at Ramnad, dated August 7, 1943, so far as it declared the temple to be a private one, be restored. Their Lordships, however, must not be understood as expressing any opinion on the question whether the temple is a private one or a public one, which question is not before them. The respondent must pay the costs of the revision application to the High Court made in O.P. No. 15 of 1939 and of this appeal.