Judgement Appeal (No. 58 of 1945) from a judgment and decree of the former Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh (June 4, 1918) as amended by Its successor the Chief Court of Oudh by its order (November 18, 1941) which modified a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mohanlalganj (March 18,, 1916). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. This appeal raised the question what, on the true construction of the will of Raj Gobardhan Singh, was the interest of the appellant thereunder in certain villages in the Kheri District in Oudh, and whether it was proper for the court to make a declaration in regard thereto. Raj Gobardhan Singh, hereinafter called the testator." was a taluqdar owning lage estates in Oudh including ten villages with which the present appeal was concerned, hereinafter referred to as "the ten villages.” He executed his last will on November 13, 1903. At that time he had three Ranis and one child only, a daughter named Musammat Raj Kunwar who was then childless. His nearest male collateral was his nephew Raj Bachan Singh. On June 24, 1904, the testators daughter gave birth to a son, Raj Shatranjai, the appellant, and on July 26, 1904, she died. The testator died on March 8, 1905. He was survived by his three widows, and by the appellant and Raj Bachan Singh. In his will the testator stated that he was the taluqdar of Mohals Bijwa Bhira Ramnagar Kalan and Nighasan and Daulatapur, and that he executed his will to avoid disputes about his estate. He then provided life interests for his three Ranis and proceeded after the death, of all three Ranis the male issue of my daughter Musammat Raj Kunwar……..shall be the owner in possession of the estate and if there be no such male issue then my aforesaid daughter shall be owner in possession of the estate." The result of the will up to that point was that the whole of the estate, including the said ten villages, was given to the appellant, after the death of the three Ranis. The will then proceeded “All the afore-mentioned terms of this will shall be subject to this condition that if by the grace of God a son is born to me, then he shall after my death be the owner in possession of the entire taluqa. The will then proceeded “All the afore-mentioned terms of this will shall be subject to this condition that if by the grace of God a son is born to me, then he shall after my death be the owner in possession of the entire taluqa. Out of the entire taluqa the villages (the testator then named the ten villages) are bequeathed by me in favour of my nephew Bhaiya Raj Bachan Singh for his life after the death of all three Ranis. If there be any male issue to Bhaiya Raj Bachan Singh he shall be the owner of the afore-mentioned villages after the death of Bhaiya Raj Bachan Singh otherwise the afore-mentioned villages shall be included in the taluqa after the death of Bhaiya Raj Bachan Singh and my daughter shall be the "owner of the afore-mentioned villages also. " Raj Bachan Singh having in certain proceedings questioned the validity of that will, the appellant on November 17, 1914, commenced against him in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Mohanlalganj, the suit out of which this appeal arose, claiming a declaration as to the validity of the will and that, under it he was the absolute proprietor of the estates and entitled to possession after the death of the Ranis, and (by amendment) that he was entitled to absolute ownership of the ten villages after the death of Raj Bachan Singh if he did not beget male children. On the question of construction it was urged by the defendant Raj Bachan Singh that in the event of his not having a son the ten villages were undisposed of after the death of the three Ranis and his own death, and on behalf of the appellant that they would be included in the estate of which he was to be the owner in possession. On that issue the learned Subordinate Judge found in favour of the appellant, holding that he acquired a contingent remainder at least in the ten villages. He further decided that the case was one in which it was proper for him in the exercise of his discretion to make a declaration of the appellants title. On that issue the learned Subordinate Judge found in favour of the appellant, holding that he acquired a contingent remainder at least in the ten villages. He further decided that the case was one in which it was proper for him in the exercise of his discretion to make a declaration of the appellants title. Accordingly the learned Judge made a decree the relevant terns of which were as follows— "(2.) that under the said will the plaintiff acquired a "vested remainder in all the items of the list annexed" except in the ten villages; (3) that he had a contingent "remainder in the ten villages; (4.) that the plaintiff " would enjoy all the items save the ten villages after the " death of the Ranis of the testator, that he would have.; " the right of an absolute owner in the ten villages (in which " the defendant had a life estate under the provisions of the will) after the death of the defendant if the latter had no " son or when there was no possibility of the defendant " getting a son. " Against that decree Raj Bachan Singh appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh (Lindsay and Daniels (Judicial Commissioners) and that court by order dated June 4, 1918, modified the decree of the Subordinate Judge. On the construction of the will, so far as it related to the appellants interest in the ten villages, they expressed no decided opinion, having come to the conclusion that in view of the contingencies which might happen the interest of the present appellant in the ten villages was " so remote " and uncertain that it would be premature and futile to give " any declaration regarding it in the present case." But in the result the decree as drawn up did not give full effect to that decision, for, while the declaration numbered (3.) in the decree of the Subordinate Judge was struck out, that numbered (4.) was still left. The appellant therefore still held a decree which gave him all that he wanted. On May 15, 1925, the survivor of the testators three widows died, and the appellant entered into possession of the estate except the ten villages, and Raj Bachan Singh into possession of those villages. The appellant therefore still held a decree which gave him all that he wanted. On May 15, 1925, the survivor of the testators three widows died, and the appellant entered into possession of the estate except the ten villages, and Raj Bachan Singh into possession of those villages. Raj Bachan Singh died on July 8, 1935, without having had male issue, leaving a widow, the respondent Musammat Tej Kumari Devi. Thereupon the appellant entered into possession of the ten villages. It was shortly after that that Raj Raj Bahadur Singh, the original respondent, entered on the scene. On July 12, 1937, he instituted in the Chief Court of Oudh against the appellant a suit in which he claimed possession of all the property bequeathed by the testator on the grounds, amongst others, that the will of the testator was invalid and that he was the nearest reversioner, and in that suit he further raised the contention that, even if the will was valid, on its true construction in the even which had happened the tetator died intestate as to the ten villages and that he, as his only heir, was then entitled to them. The appellant met that contention by pleading that the decree of June 4, 1918, operated as res judicata between the parties on the question of the title to the ten villages, and that view was upheld by Hamilton J. in judgment given on January 18, 1940. Accordingly, on July 25, 1941, the original respondent presented a petition to the Chief Court of Oudh under ss. 151, 152, 153 of the Civil Procedure Code alleging that there was an accidental error in the decree of June 4, 1918, and praying in effect that it might be corrected by striking out the declaration numbered (4.) therein, so far as it referred to the ten villages. On that petition, in which the original respondent claimed to be "the reversioner to Raj Bachan Singh," the learned Judges of the Chief Court (Agarwal and Madeley JJ.) made the order as prayed and the decree of June 4, 1918, was amended accordingly. That left the appellant without the protection of the decree, on which he had (however fortuitously) been able for so long to rely, and he accordingly sought and obtained leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from the decree as so amended. That left the appellant without the protection of the decree, on which he had (however fortuitously) been able for so long to rely, and he accordingly sought and obtained leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from the decree as so amended. The respondents to the appeal were Musammat Tej Kumari Devi, the widow and representative of Raj Bachan Singh, and the representatives of the original respondent Raj Raj Bahadur Singh, who had since died. 1949. Nov. 8, 9 Jopling for the appellant. On the true construction of the will and in the events which have happened the ten villages were given specifically to the appellant. In the alternative, if they were given specifically to Musammat Raj Kunwar the gift lapsed and fell into the gift of the residua of the estate given to the appellant. By his plaint of November 17, 1914, as amended, he claimed a declaration under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, that he was entitled to the ownership of the ten villages after the death of Raj Bachan Singh, and the question whether he was entitled to such declaration was put in issue. The Court of the Judicial Commissioners gave no valid reasons for refusing to make the declaration. The appellants interest in the ten villages was an interest in reversion on the death of the three widows and Raj Bachan Singh and contingent on the latter having no son. Such an interest was not so remote and uncertain that it would be premature and futile to make; any declaration regarding it. The power to make the declaration exercised by the Subordinate Judge was rightly exercised. The question of such discretion appears to have come before the Board in about three cases, two before the Specific Relief Act and one, Thakurain Jaipal Kunwar v. Bhaiya Indar Bahadur Singh (1), after it. In that case both the courts in India had made a declaration, and the Board said that although had they been sitting as a court of first instance they might have taken a different view, they were both to disturb the discretion which was vested in the judges. Those, it is submitted, are the principles on which the Judicial Commissioners should have proceeded in dealing with the present matter. Those, it is submitted, are the principles on which the Judicial Commissioners should have proceeded in dealing with the present matter. They did not direct their mind to s. 42, and did not really consider whether they ought to disturb the discretion of the court of first instance, and on that ground also the appeal should be allowed. Dingle Foot for the respondents. First, the Judicial Commissioners never decided whether the ten villages in dispute passed to the appellant under the will—they left that question open. Secondly, whether they decided that question or not they were right in declining to make any declaration. Thirdly, no declaration ought to be made at this stage of these proceedings. If those submissions be right it would not be necessary to go into the question of the construction of the will, but, if necessary, it is submitted that on its true construction. It was never the intention of the testator that the ten villages should pass to the appellant. The Subordinate Judge was wrong in making a declaration. It was said in Thakurain Jaipal Kunwars case (( 1904) L.R. 31 I.A. 67, 69.) that "in both the courts1 in India it "was realized that under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, " a claim to a declaratory decree is not a matter of right, " but that it rests with the judicial discretion of the courts.” The principles which govern the use of this discretion in India are not dissimilar to those applicable in England. Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tever (( 1875) L. R. 2 I.A. 169 179.), which was before the passing of the Specific Relief Act, lays down that "a declaratory" decree cannot be made unless there be a right to conse quential relief capable of being had in the same court, or, under special circumstances as to jurisdiction, in some other court. " It is submitted that it is still the practice in this country only to grant declarations in respect of contingent interests with very great reluctance; Barraclough v. Brown ([ 1897] A.C. 615, 623.). The Judicial Commissioners said that "in view of the contingencies which may happen the interest" of the plaintiff [appellant] in these ten villages is so remote 44 and uncertain that it would be premature and futile to give 44 any declaration regarding it in the present case." They rightly applied the general principle. The Judicial Commissioners said that "in view of the contingencies which may happen the interest" of the plaintiff [appellant] in these ten villages is so remote 44 and uncertain that it would be premature and futile to give 44 any declaration regarding it in the present case." They rightly applied the general principle. Further, although the appellant says that the circumstances have changed since 1918, this would not be an appropriate case in which to make a declaration now. A reply was not required. Dec. 12. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SIMONDS, who stated the facts set out above and continued It is thus after a very long interval that their Lordships have to determine the matters under appeal. On the question of construction they entertain no doubt as to the correctness of the views of the learned Subordinate Judge, and in their opinion they are fortified by the conclusion reached by the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow in First Civil Appeal No. 53 of 1940. In that suit too the construction of this will was) considered by the court and in a careful and elaborate judgment Kaul and Hagan JJ. determined that the effect of the testators will read as a whole was that his daughters son should take the whole estate subject only to a life interest in ten villages being given to Raj Bachan Singh and a further defeasance provision in the event of his having male issue. The gift in favour of the testators daughter, which by reason of her predeceasing him could not take effect, did not operate to displace his dominant intention that, except in a certain event, the whole estate; should revert to his daughters son. In this view, which their Lordships understand to be that entertained by the learned judges of the Chief Court, they wholly concur. It remains to consider whether a declaration to that effect was properly made by the learned Subordinate Judge. It is clear that it was competent for him to do so under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and it appears to their Lordships that the learned judges of the Chief Court give no sufficient reason for reversing his decision on this point. He exercised and, as their Lordships think, properly exercised a discretion vested in him. It is clear that it was competent for him to do so under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and it appears to their Lordships that the learned judges of the Chief Court give no sufficient reason for reversing his decision on this point. He exercised and, as their Lordships think, properly exercised a discretion vested in him. The parties were vitally and immediately interested in the question which of them in an event, not necessarily remote, would be entitled to substantial property. Nor was anyone else interested. Their Lordships therefore conclude that the learned Subordinate Judge rightly made the appropriate declarations, that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioners as corrected by the Chief Court in 1941 should be set aside, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the courts of Oudh except so far as they relate to the correction of the decree of June 4, 1918. Their Lordships add at the request of the respondents, though it appears superfluous to do so, that they express no-opinion on any of the other matters in dispute between the parties and that the order to, be made herein will be without prejudice to the rights of the respondents on any other issue.