Judgment Mahabir Prasad, J. 1. Mr. D. N. Varma for the respondents raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal. He contends that the appellants were no parties to the partition suit nor to the final decree passed in that suit which is under appeal. No appeal against the decree is entertainable at their instance. 2. The facts are these. On 6-8-1926, two members of a joint Hindu family, Raghunandan Lal & his son Sankar, instituted a suit for partition of the joint family properties im-pleading five persons, other members of the family, as defts. A preliminary decree for partition was passed in 1929. There was an appeal against the preliminary decree to this Court. The decree was confirmed by this Court in 1932. It appears that during the pendency of the appeal one Lalmohar Lal came to be a purchaser of the interest of the plff. Raghunandan Lall to the extent of 4 annas in the joint family ptoperties, & he was substituted in the place of Raghunandan Lal. One Raghuraj Dubey was also substituted as a party to the suit as having purchased 4 annas interest of Kedar Lal, one of the defts, in the suit. In the year 1943 a pleader-commissioner was appointed to partition the properties & to carve out separate takha to Lalmohar Lal as representing the interest of Raghunandan, the plff. & Raghuraj Dubey as representing the interest of Kedar Lal, the deft. The pleader-commissioner made necessary allotments & submitted his report on 4-4-1944. It appears that before the Commissioner had made the allotments, three persons, who are the appellants before us, Basistha Lal, Banarsi Lal & Ramjanam Lal filed petitions before the Commissioner alleging that some of the properties which under the preliminary decree were to be partitioned had been purchased by them in execution of rent decrees against the joint family & were no longer divisible amongst the parties to the decree. On failing to get any relief from the commissioner, these persons filed petitions on 27-5-1944, before the Court, making the same allegations regarding purchase by them of some of the properties sought to be partitioned, & praying that those properties might be excluded from partition. The learned Subordinate Judge summarily rejected their applications as not being entertainable, & passed the final decree. 3. The appellants have filed this appeal against the final decree. The learned Subordinate Judge summarily rejected their applications as not being entertainable, & passed the final decree. 3. The appellants have filed this appeal against the final decree. They have also along with the memo, of appeal filed an application under Order 41 Rule 20 & Sec.151, Civil P. C. praying that they may be added as parties & be permitted to prosecute the appeal filed by them against the respondents. Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath appearing for the appellants contends that it was competent to the purchasers of some of the properties involved in the partition suit, Under Sec.146, Civil P. C., to prefer this appeal against the final decree, passed by the Subordinate Judge. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Madras H. C. in the case of Sitaramaswami V/s. Lakshmi Narasamma, 41 Mad 510, which certainly supports the contention. Sec.146 of the Code provides : "Where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him." In the Madras case, while the suit was pending in the District Munsifs Court, the suit property was mortgaged by the deft. to the appellant. On the suit being decreed by the Subordinate Judge in favour of the plff., the deft. did not prefer an appeal. The appellant, as the mortgagee of the suit property pending suit, alleging collusion between the plff. & the deft., filed an application in the District Court under Order 22, Rule 10, for an order allowing him to prefer an appeal, & also preferred an appeal against the decree. The District Judge dismissed both the petition & the appeal as incompetent. The appellant preferred to the High Court a civil Misc. Appeal & a Second Appeal against the decision respectively. It was held that while an application under Order 22 Rule 10 could not be entertained by the appellate Court of the District Judge as the suit had ended, & there was no appeal pending before the District J., it was competent to the mortgagee Under Sec.146 of the Code to prefer the appeal to the District Court against the decree of the Subordinate Judge. It is clear, therefore, that the appellants before us are entitled to take the proceeding by way of filing this appeal as being persons claiming under the parties to the partition suit. The preliminary objection raised by Mr. Varma, therefore, fails. 4. Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath appearing for the appellants next contends that apart from the fact that these appellants are entitled to appear against the final decree passed in the suit under Sec.146, there is no bar to this Court dealing with this matter as an appeal against the order of the Court refusing to add them as parties to the suit. Their applications dated 27-5-1944, although did not contain in so many words a prayer that they be added as parties, were in effect applications under Order 22 Rule 10, Civil P. C. for being made parties to the suit on the ground that some of the properties which were sought to be partitioned had come to be vested in them by reason of their purchase pendente lite, & the order rejecting their application is appealable. 5. Mr. K.D. Chatterji appearing for one of the respondents meets this contention by raising the question that the applications filed by the appellants before the Court below for excluding the properties purchased by them from partition could not be construed as applications made by them under Order 22 Rule 10. These appellants, he submits, did not apply & could not have applied for being substituted in the place of any of the parties to the suit. Their application in question can, if at all, be deemed to be an application for being added as parties to the suit. An application for addition of parties is provided for by Order 1 Rule 10, Civil P. C. Rejection of such an application is not appealable under the Code. This appeal, therefore, cannot be dealt with on the footing of being a Misc. Appeal against the order refusing to give leave under Rule 10 of Order 22 as provided for in Clause (1) of Rule 1 of Order 43, Civ. P. C. In support reliance has been placed on the case of Jitendra Nath V/s. Harindra Nath, 42 C W N 1183, & the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Manindra Chandra V/s. Ram Kumar Lal, 1 Pat 581. P. C. In support reliance has been placed on the case of Jitendra Nath V/s. Harindra Nath, 42 C W N 1183, & the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Manindra Chandra V/s. Ram Kumar Lal, 1 Pat 581. It will appear that none of these cases is an authority for the proposition contended for. In the Calcutta case what was held was that Order 22 Rule 10, Civ. P. C. can only apply before a final decree or order has been passed or made in the suit. It appears that in the Calcutta case subsequent to the final decree being passed, the property was sold. An application to substitute under Order 22 Rule 10 & for leave to be added as a party to the suit was made after the passing of the final decree. It is clear that in the circumstances of that case, the Court before which the application for leave to be added as a party was made did not have the seisin of the case, & the application was clearly not entertainable. In the case before us the applications in question were made while the suit was still pending, & the proceeding for passing a final decree was going on. In the case of Manindra Chandra Nandi, 1 Pat 581, the question was entirely different. What was attempted to be done was to join as a deft. to the suit a tenant to whom during the pendency of the suit the deft. had left the property so as to compel the tenant to account for profits which he had received from the land after a decree for possession & mesne profits had been obtained against the defts. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee differing from the High Court held that in an action to recover possession of land where the deft., while he is in possession, has granted leases, but the persons to whom such leases are alleged to have been granted do not assert to be in possession under the leases, are not assignees within the meaning of Order 22 Rule 10, Civ. P. C. No such question arises in the present case, & the decision has no application to the facts of the present case. P. C. No such question arises in the present case, & the decision has no application to the facts of the present case. The appellants in the present case are purchasers of some of the properties involved in the action, An interest in the properties alleged to have been purchased by them has devolved upon them. If the facts constituting devolution of the interest claimed by them are contested by any of the parties to the suit, they have to be investigated. Such an investigation can only be done on an application made by the person on whom such interest has devolved, under Order 22 Rule 10. The rule in question by its language, does not require assignment, reation or devolution of the whole of the interest involved in the suit on the person entitled to make an application for substitution. A person on whom only a part of the interest involved in the suit devolves is certainly entitled, to make an application to be substituted tor the purpose of representing the part of the interest devolved upon him. In such a case his application must obviously be for being added as a party to the suit. The contention raised by Mr. Chatterji that an application for being added as a party to the suit cannot be made under Order 22 Rule 10 is not well founded. There seems no difficulty in acceding to the contention raised by Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath that it is possible to deal with the present appeal as a Misc. Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 Clause (1), Civil P. C. against an order refusing leave to the appellants to be added as parties to the suit. This appeal can, therefore, be dealt with on the footing as if it is an appeal against an order & not against the final decree. 6. Coming to, the merits of the appeal, it is clear that the learned Subordinate Judge did not apply his mind to the merits of the application filed by the appellants, & without investigating into the facts alleged by them, he rejected their applications, as not being entertainable because he thought that the applications were not made in due time. 6. Coming to, the merits of the appeal, it is clear that the learned Subordinate Judge did not apply his mind to the merits of the application filed by the appellants, & without investigating into the facts alleged by them, he rejected their applications, as not being entertainable because he thought that the applications were not made in due time. The learned Subordinate Judge says this : "The Commissioner was appointed for partition long after these alleged purchases, but these persons viz Bashist Lal, Benarsi Lal & Ramjanam Lal having made no application in due time to the Court for being made parties on the ground of their having purchased certain properties sought to be partitioned, their applications after the submission of the Commissioners report are not entertainable. I, therefore, reject their applications." There is no limitation prescribed for filing applications under Order 22 Rule 10 for being added as parties to the suit on the ground of the devolution of an interest during the pendency of a suit, & the learned Subordinate Judge was cer-ainly in error in not considering these applications on merits on the ground of their being not filed in due time. In the circumstances the order of the learned Subordinate Judge refusing to entertain these applications cannot stand & has to be set aside. It has to be ordered that these appellants be added as defts. to the suit, & the facts alleged by them for excluding the properties purchased by them from partition be investigated. 7. In the circumstances, the final decree passed by the Court below cannot be allowed to stand. If these appellants were wrongly denied the right of being made parties to the suit before it was finally concluded by passing of the final decree in question, & the order refusing to make them parties is set aside, the final decree to which they could not be parties on account of the erroneous order of the learned Subordinate Judge, has to be set aside. It is clear that if, as a result of these appellants being made parties to the proceedings, & their allegations regarding their purchase of some of the properties under partition being found correct, the properties purchased by them have to be excluded from partition, the allotments made by the commissioner on which the final decree is based will have to be disturbed & reallotment will have to be made. It is, however, to be observed that in the event of these appellants failing to make good their case regarding their purchase of some of the properties in question, the allotments made by the Commissioner & now forming part of the final decree need not be disturbed, & the learned Subordinate Judge will be perfectly entitled to pass the final decree in the same terms & containing the same allotments as at present. 8. It is ordered accordingly that the final decree under appeal be set aside, that the appellants be added as party defts. to the suit, & the case be remanded to the learned Subordinate Judge, for the application dated 27-5-1944 being reheard & decided in the presence of the appellants as parties to the proceeding pending before him. The parties will be entitled to adduce evidence for & against the facts alleged in the application dated 27-5-1944 & required to be investigated. 9. What remains to consider now is the cross objection filed by Hira Lal, one of the defts. to the partition suit. The cross objection it is contended, by the other respondents is not entertainable, in so far as the grounds taken are not against the appellants but against the decree passed in favour of the co-respondents Although as a rule a respondent has to urg the cross-objections against the appellant, the is no bar to his urging cross-objections against a co-respondent. In suits for partition, for dissolution of partnership & for accounts the matters to be decided are not only betweer the plff. on the one hand, & the defts., on the other, but between all the parties, & it is oper to any respondent to prefer cross-pbjections against a co-respondent on any item in dispute between them. There is ample authority in support of this view. Nor there is anything in the language of Rule 22 of Order 41, Civil P. C., to militate against this view. There is ample authority in support of this view. Nor there is anything in the language of Rule 22 of Order 41, Civil P. C., to militate against this view. The cross-objection, therefore, must be held to be maintainable. The cross-objection, however, has no merits. None of the grounds, except the one which is covered by the appeal, is of any substance. The objection regarding some of the properties having gone out of possession of the joint family by purchase made by the appellants will certainly be heard by the learned Subordinate Judge at the instance of the appellants who have been ordered to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings. The cross objection is accordingly dismissed. 10. In the circumstances, the application filed by the appellants for being added as parties in this Court need no consideration & is dismissed. 11. The appeal is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Das, J. 12 I agree.