Judgment Shearer, J. 1. This is an application under Clause 9, Letters Patent, asking that a suit now pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Parbhauga be removed to and tried by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. Clause 9, Letters Patent states that this jurisdiction is to be exercised "for purposes of justice", and the purposes of justice are served when the questions which arise in the suit are questions of public importance and unusual difficulty and when the interests of neither party will be seriously prejudiced if the suit is tried in this Court instead of being tried locally Harendra Lall Roy V/s. Sarvamangala Dabee, (24 Cal. 183). Two questions of constitutional law arise in this suit. One is whether a person, whose interests are likely to be prejudicially affected by a law which has been passed by the Provincial Legislature and has received the assent of the Governor-General is entitled to ask for a declaration that the law is unconstitutional and for an injunction restraining the Provincial Government from bringing the law into operation. That is obviously a question of great public importance and of some little difficulty. The other is whether, what a proprietor or tenure-holder is to receive as compensation under the Abolition of Zamindari Act, 1948, for his estate or tenure is, in fact, compensation within the meaning of that expression as it is used in Sub-section (2) of Sec.299, Government of India Act. That, again, is a question in the determination of which a very large number of persons are vitally interested and it is a question of some considerable difficulty. Mr. P. B. Das, for the plaintiff, states that his client does not propose to adduce oral evidence, except possibly oral evidence of a purely formal character, and contends that the questions which arise in the suit are purely and simply questions of law. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, while disputing this, has not said or suggested that, if oral evidence is to be adduced by the defendant, that oral evidence will not be given by persons who can as conveniently attend this Court as they could the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge. 2. An affidavit has been put in on behalf of the defendant by Mr. Singeshwar Prasad Sinha, who is the Secretary to the Provincial Government in the Revenue Department. 2. An affidavit has been put in on behalf of the defendant by Mr. Singeshwar Prasad Sinha, who is the Secretary to the Provincial Government in the Revenue Department. The grounds set out in this affidavit are not, and do not purport to be grounda for declining to remove the suit to this Court but rather grounds for postponing the trial of the suit sine the or for not trying it at all. In para. 8 of the affidavit it is stated that "the suit is premature". I take this to mean that the plaintiff has not, as yet, any cause of action. If that is so, the suit will be dismissed. Again, paras. 10 and 11 of the affidavit contain the following : "10. That the new constitution will be in force from January 1950 and under the provisions thereof, questions such as are raised in the present suit are non-justiable. 11. .... As there is no intention on the part of the Provincial Government to bring into force the impugned Act before the new constitution comes into force, it will be a waste of public time and money to go into the investigation of matters involved in the present suit, and any decision in the suit, it is respectfully submitted, will be infractuous and of no effect when the new constitution cornea into operation and the certificate is granted by the President." Cases have occurred in England in which an injunction has been granted ex debito juatitiae to restrain a nuisance and the Court has, at the same time, suspended the operation of the injunction in order to enable legislation to be introduced in Parliament which would legalise the nuisance: Roberts V/s. Gwyrfai District Council, (1899) 2 Ch. 608 at p, 615 : (68 L. J. Ch. 757). If this suit is maintainable, and the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction, then, if it is also clear that, on the President giving the certificate referred to in Sub-section (6) of Sec.24, Constitution Act, the existence of an injunction would lead to an impasse in the administration, this Court might well, in order to prevent that impasse, take the course of suspending the operation of the injunction for a specified period. I am not pre-judging this matter, and I am well aware from what was said by Mr. I am not pre-judging this matter, and I am well aware from what was said by Mr. P. E. Das, for the plaintiff, that if such a course were proposed to be taken, Mr. Das would oppose it on the ground that what, in his view, is a wrong today will not cease to be a wrong in consequence of the Presidents certificate, and would contend that Sub-section (1) of Sec.24, Draft Constitution is not to be read in conjunction with Sub-section (2) and confers on every citizen a right to property which Sub-section (2) does not take away or curtail. That argument will presumably, have to be considered sooner or later, and I can see no good reason myself why, if the necessity and occasion arises, it should not be considered in this suit and should instead be left to be considered in a suit instituted after the constitution comes into operation. Ordinarily, I would not, in dealing with such an application as this, have made these observations, and I have hesitated to make them, but I feel constrained to do so in consequence of a statement which was made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Aiyar in the course of his argument. My recollection as to what was said is confirmed by a very full and accurate account of the proceedings which has appeared in the "statesman" newspaper. Sir Alladi is there reported as having said : "It is not the province of a Court to ait as a third branch of a Legislature and invalidate legislation passed by it with plenary powers in any particular subject. It is or will be the duty and privilege of this and any other Court, when the occasion arises, to interpret and give effect to the will of the sovereign people as embodied and expressed in the Constitution Act." This Court is not unmindful that the principles to be applied in construing the Constitution Act are not precisely the same as it would apply in construing an ordinary document, nor is it insensible to the responsibility which it under takes if and when it pronounces any law to be an unconstitutional law. At the same time, it is also the duty of this Court to see that to no suitor who comes before it justice is either delayed or denied. At the same time, it is also the duty of this Court to see that to no suitor who comes before it justice is either delayed or denied. The plaintiff may or may not be entitled to relief, and any relief to which he may be entitled may, in the event, be illusory and of no avail to him. But that is no reason why his suit should not be tried. The suit will be removed from the Court below and will be tried by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. The costs of this application will be costs in the suit. The hearing fee is assessed at six gold mohurs.