JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by the Defendant No. 1 in a suit instituted by the Plaintiffs for certain reliefs, which I shall specify later. The Defendant No. 2 is the tenant of the Defendant No. 1. This Rule relates to the question of valuation and court-fees. 2. The Plaintiffs' case is that this suit is governed by Section 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act and they have put their own valuation upon the suit at Rs. 300 and paid the court-fees accordingly. The Defendant raised an objection to this and contended that the suit has been under-valued. The learned Munsif has accepted the Plaintiffs' valuation, both for the purpose of jurisdiction and court-fees, as correct and he has rejected the objection of the Defendant. Against this decision the present Rule has been obtained. 3. I shall now describe the nature of the suit and the reliefs claimed. The suit relates to certain property, which belonged, to one Nagendrabala. It was purchased on March 24, 1922, by her brother Raghunath. Raghunath died leaving a widow Prafulla Nalini and a son Ranajit Mukherji. Ranajit inherited this property and in the year 1936, executed a deed, which purported to be a deed of gift, whereby he gave this property to his mother Prafulla Nalini. Ranajit died a bachelor and was survived by his mother. She executed a deed of settlement, whereby it was provided that the Defendant No. 1, Mahitosh, would get this property after her death. Prafulla Nalini died in December, 1944. The property was in the possession of the Defendant No. 1 Mahitosh through his tenant Sudhir Chandra Ganguli, the Defendant No. 2. Nagendrabala's sons are the Plaintiffs and they would undoubtedly inherit the property if these two deeds were not in existence. They brought the present suit for a declaration that the deed of gift executed by Ranajit and the deed of settlement executed by Prafulla Nalini were invalid and of no effect on the ground of collusion and fraud. They also claimed recovery of khash possession of the property in suit by evicting the Defendants, their agents, sub-tenants, representatives and servants therefrom; vide Clause (f) of para. 18 of the plaint. They also claimed recovery of khash possession of the property in suit by evicting the Defendants, their agents, sub-tenants, representatives and servants therefrom; vide Clause (f) of para. 18 of the plaint. There was an alternative prayer that if the Court found the deeds to be legal and valid, it should direct the Defendant No. 1 to re-transfer the property to the Plaintiffs on payment of value thereof as the Plaintiffs had a right of pre-emption. We are not concerned at present with the alternative prayer. The Plaintiffs valued the suit in the following way: Claim for declaration of title, khash possession, permanent injunction and mesne profits valued at Rs. 350. 4. In para. 17 of the plaint the Plaintiffs state that the value of the suit for declaration of title and khash possession was Rs. 800 and for mesne profits Rs. 50. The court-fees were paid ID these two sinus and they amount to Rs. 37-8. 5. The Defendant No. 1 contends that this amounts to an under-valuation. The argument is that the court-fees should be paid on the claim for khash possession of the property and that the court was not bound to accept the arbitrary valuation put by the Plaintiffs in their plaint. The learned Munsif has held that, as the claim for possession is merely a consequential relief and ancillary to the relief for a declaration that the deeds were void, no court-fees are payable for the ancillary relief by reason of the provisions of Section 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act. On behalf of the Defendant, learned advocate contends that this decision is erroneous. The learned Government Pleader was given notice of this Rule, as it involved a question of court-fees and he supports the view urged on behalf of the Defendant. 6. It was contended by the learned Government Pleader and by learned advocate for the Defendant that, even if it be held that this suit is governed for the purpose of court-fees by the provisions of Section 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, nevertheless the Plaintiffs would be bound to pay court-fees for the consequential relief of possession, if the value of that relief exceeds the value of the relief by way of a declaration that the deeds are void. For this purpose my attention was drawn to the provisions of Section 7iv(c), 8C and 17(2) of the Court-fees Act and to certain cases dealing with this subject. I may mention here that, in the court below, the Defendant took up the attitude that this was a suit governed by Section 7v of the Court-fees Act and contended that the suit should be valued in accordance with the provisions of Section 7v of the aforesaid Act. In my opinion, the suit is not governed by the provisions of Section 7v of the Court-fees Act. It is undoubtedly a suit for a declaratory decree, where a consequential relief is prayed for and it falls within the description of suits in Section 7iv(c) of the aforesaid Act. The claim for possession is a consequential relief and is ancillary to the claim for a declaratory decree. Section 7v has no application to such a suit. It applies to a suit where the principal claim is for possession of land. It has no application to a suit where claim for possession is merely ancillary. I do not think it necessary to cite any cases to support this view. The sections are perfectly clear. 7. The question which now arises is whether the suit, being governed by the provisions of Section 7iv(c), the Defendant's contention regarding the court-fees should be accepted. There was a conflict of decision regarding this matter previously. In the case of Bibi Umatul Batul v. Nanji Koer (1907) 11 C.W.N. 705 it was held that in a suit governed by Section 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, although it is for the Plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief sought and although the amount of court-fees payable varies with the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, it is open to the court, if a question is raised as to the true valuation of the suit, to determine such question and it is within the power of the court to take action u/s 54 under the old Code of Civil Procedure, which corresponds to Order VII, Rule 11 of the present Code. Put shortly, the view taken by the Court was that, if there was any objective standard by which the suit could be valued, then the court could adopt this objective standard and it was not obligatory on the court to accept the valuation put by the Plaintiff in the plaint. An opposite view was taken by this Court in the case of Official Trustee of Bengal v. Gobardhan Guchait (1928) 33 C.W.N. 231. There are certain other cases also relied upon for this opposite view, one of them being the case decided by Rankin C.J. : In re Kalipada Mukherji ILR (1930) Cal. 281. All these cases were considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society Limited v. Mafljuddin Ahmad ILR (1934) Cal. 796 and there it was held that the court was not bound by the value put by the Plaintiff in a suit governed by Section 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, but that the court could, in certain cases, revise that valuation and come to its own decision where there was an objective standard available. The Full Bench held, however, that, so lond as there were no rules framed u/s 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, in most cases the court would have no standard on which it may regard the Plaintiff's valuation as an under-valuation. They expressed the view that the case of Bibi Umatul Batul v. Nanji Koer (supra) was correctly decided. After this decision by the Full Bench, the Court-fees Act was amended and Section 8C was introduced. The section says that, if the court is of opinion that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongly valued, it may revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation and may hold such enquiry as it thinks fit for such purpose. The section contains the words "any suit" and these words must include, therefore, a suit governed by Section 7iv(c) of the. Court-fees Act. That Section 8C applies to suits u/s 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act was held in the case of Kumudini Kanta Mukherjee v. Municipal Commissioners of the Barasat Municipality (1937) 42 C.W.N. 315. There it was held that, if there was an objective standard available, the Court could make an enquiry u/s 8C of the aforesaid Act and correct the valuation of the Plaintiff in accordance with this objective standard. There it was held that, if there was an objective standard available, the Court could make an enquiry u/s 8C of the aforesaid Act and correct the valuation of the Plaintiff in accordance with this objective standard. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs relied very strongly upon the decision of Bankin C.J. in the case mentioned above, namely: In re. Kalipada Mukherji (supra). There are certain remarks, it is j true, in that case which may afford ground for the argument urged by learned advocate for the Plaintiffs that the court, in suits governed by Section 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act is bound by the; valuation of the Plaintiff; but if the case be carefully scrutinised it will be found that no such wide principle has been laid down. Be that as it may, that case is no longer the law, having regard; to the Full Bench decision referred to above. I hold, therefore, that the learned Munsif is wrong in his view that the court was bound by the valuation put by the Plaintiffs on their suit. In this case there is certainly an objective standard. The Plaintiffs, apart from seeking for a declaration, are also seeking for khash possession of certain property. The relief for khash possessions is capable of being determined on the objective basis; when a person claims khash possession of property, the value of his claim would be the value of the property, which was the subject-matter of the claim. As to how such subject-matter is to be valued is laid down in the provisions of Section 7v of the Court-fees Act. In this case, as the property, with respect to which khash possession is sought, has been leased out, the value of the subject-matter of this claim for khash possession would be determined in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 7v(a) of the Court-fees Act. 8. There is another objection which learned advocate for the Plaintiffs has raised. Belying upon the decision, In re Kalipada Mukherji (supra), he says that there should be one valuation only in a suit u/s 7iv(c) and that there cannot be separate valuations for the separate reliefs claimed. 8. There is another objection which learned advocate for the Plaintiffs has raised. Belying upon the decision, In re Kalipada Mukherji (supra), he says that there should be one valuation only in a suit u/s 7iv(c) and that there cannot be separate valuations for the separate reliefs claimed. A passage occurs at p. 284, in which his Lordship says that the Plaintiff is to put down one single entire sum as representing the value of the total relief sought by him in the suit and that there should not be separate valuations for each relief claimed. Reliance was placed by the learned Chief Justice on Section 17 of the Court-fees Act as it stood at the time, but this view of the learned Chief Justice is no longer the law by reason of the amendment of Section 17 by the introduction of Sub-section (2) which is in the following terms: Where more reliefs than one based on the same cause of action are sought either jointly or in the alternative, the fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable. 9. The sub-section clearly lays down that, where more reliefs than one based upon one cause of action are sought, the court-fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable. Learned advocate for the Plaintiffs contends that the relief for khash possession is not based on the same cause of action as the relief for a declaration that the deeds are void and he says that Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Court-fees Act does not apply, because it stipulates that the relief should be based on the same cause of action. In my opinion, this contention is not sound. It is difficult to define in precise terms what is meant by the words "cause of action". The phrase cause of action implies a bundle of facts upon which--the Plaintiff relied for the reliefs claimed. Here, the Plaintiffs seek for a declaration and for khash possession and these two claims are based on the fact that the Plaintiffs are the reversioners. If the Plaintiffs were not the reversioners, they could not claim either of these two reliefs. The phrase cause of action implies a bundle of facts upon which--the Plaintiff relied for the reliefs claimed. Here, the Plaintiffs seek for a declaration and for khash possession and these two claims are based on the fact that the Plaintiffs are the reversioners. If the Plaintiffs were not the reversioners, they could not claim either of these two reliefs. I hold, therefore, that both the reliefs are based on the same cause of action and that, consequently Section 17(2) of the Court-fees Act applies. The Court will, therefore, have to determine what the fees payable are in respect of each cause of action and then compel the Plaintiffs to pay the court-fees on the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable. 10. Having regard to the views expressed above, the Rule must be made absolute with costs. The matter is sent back to the learned Munsif, who shall ascertain the value of the relief of khash possession in accordance with the provisions of Section 7v(a) of the Court-fees Act. If the court-fees payable on this valuation is larger than the court-fees payable for the declaratory relief, then the Plaintiffs shall be directed to pay the larger court-fees.