Judgment Patanjali Sastri, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 27th November, 1942, affirming a judgment of the Joint First Class Subordinate Judge at Belgaum whereby the appellant’s suit for partition of certain immoveable property was dismissed. The appellant claimed one half share in the properties belonging to the family of one Gadeppa who had three sons. Antappa, Shantappa and Dada. Antappa ceased to be a member of Gadeppa’s branch having been adopted to Bharmappa, the undivided elder brother of Gadeppa. The appellant claimed to be the adopted son of Shantappa. He alleged that he was adopted by Shantappa’s widow, Gangabai, on 16th October, 1936, at a place called Nandani in Kolhapur State and that the adoption was confirmed by her on 9th July, 1937, at Balgaum to obviate possible objections on the ground that the prior adoption had been made in the Kolhapur State. Dada and his son Anna, who were defendants 1 and 2 in the suit, denied both the adoptions put forward by the appellant and averred that they had divided the family properties between them on 15th November, 1936, and that, after such partition, Anna was adopted by Antappa’s widow Krishnabai of Bharmappa’s branch. They further pleaded that, even if the second adoption of the plaintiff alleged to have taken place at Belgaum was proved, it could not entitle the plaintiff to claim a share of the family properties as the coparcenary in Gadeppa’s branch had previously come to an end by virtue of the partition aforesaid. The learned trial Judge held that the appellant failed to establish that he was adopted by Shantappa’s widow at Nandani on 16th October, 1936, as alleged by him but the later adoption said to have taken place on 9th July, 1937, at Belgaum was true and valid. He further found that there was a partition of the family properties between defendants 1 and 2 on 15th November, 1936, as alleged by them and he held, following the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Balu Sakharam Powar v. Lahoo Sambhaji Tetgura1 and certain other decisions based thereon, that the appellant’s adoption was ineffectual to re-open the prior partition between defendants 1 and 2. He accordingly dismissed the suit. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal to the High Court, a Division Bench of that Court (Beaumont, C.J. and Sen, J.) confirmed the findings of the trial Court on all the issues of fact and law and dismissed the appeal. Thereupon the appellant preferred this appeal to His Majesty in Council, having obtained the necessary leave under section no of the Code of Civil Procedure, but by virtue by the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act (No. 1 of 1948), the appeal has to be decided by this Court. After the case was disposed of by the High Court, it appears that the decisions of the Full Bench in Balu Sakharam Powar v. Lahoo Sambhaji Tetgura1 on which the Courts below relied was overruled by the Privy Council in Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shanker Ramachandra Patil2 and the appellant herein therefore claims that the decisions of the Courts below should be set aside and his claim for one half share of the properties in suit should be decreed. It was not disputed by Mr. Datar appearing for the respondents that the decisions followed by the High Court were no longer good law in view of the later decision of the Privy Council referred to above. But he sought to distinguish the present case on the ground that, the coparcenary consisting of the only male members of the family at the time having been put an end to by the partition of November, 1936, the plaintiff’s adoption could not revive the coparcenary so as to entitle the plaintiff to re-open the partition and claim a share in the family properties. It was pointed out that Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shanker Ramachandra Patil2 was a case where there was no disruption of the coparcenary by a partition among all the members then living and all that was held was that an adoption by the widow of a predeceased coparcener was effectual to divest the properties vested by inheritance in the heir of the last surviving coparcener. We are unable to appreciate this distinction. It is true that no question as to the effect of partition by the members of a family in relation to the power of adoption of the widow of a predeceased coparcener arose in that case. We are unable to appreciate this distinction. It is true that no question as to the effect of partition by the members of a family in relation to the power of adoption of the widow of a predeceased coparcener arose in that case. But the principle on which their Lordships based their decision, namely, that the rights of the adopted son relate back to the date of the adoptive father’s death must equally apply to the facts of the present case and the plaintiff must be deemed, by a fiction of Hindu Law, to have been in existence as the son of Shantappa at the time of the latter’s death in 1921 so as to entitle him to a share in the family properties. It is clear that their Lordships considered the question also from the point of view of the extinction of the coparcenary in such cases, for they observed: “If, then, the appellant’s adoption was valid, can it be held that it does not take effect on the property which had belonged to the joint family because there was no coparcenary in existence at the date of the adoption.” (Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shanker Ramachandra Patil2.) If, notwithstanding the extinction of the coparcenary by the death of the last surviving coparcener, the adoption by the widow of a predeceased coparcener could effectively divest the property vested by inheritance in the heir of the last surviving coparcener, we are unable to see why such adoption should not equally operate to entitle the adopted son to claim a share in the family properties in spite of the extinction of the coparcenary by virtue of a partition. There cannot exist on principle any distinction between extinction of a coparcenary by the death of the last surviving coparcener and its extinction by partition so far as the right of the widow of a predeceased coparcener to make a valid and effectual adoption is concerned. Indeed, the principle of their Lordships’ decision must apply a fortiori to cases where the coparcenary became extinct by partition, for, the family properties would still be in the hands of the members of the family though divided, and there would be no question of divesting property vested in a stranger to the family. Indeed, the principle of their Lordships’ decision must apply a fortiori to cases where the coparcenary became extinct by partition, for, the family properties would still be in the hands of the members of the family though divided, and there would be no question of divesting property vested in a stranger to the family. It is worthy of note that their Lordships expressly referred to and approved the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Bajirao v. Ramkrishna1 and of the Madras High Court in Sankaralingam Pillai v. Veluchami Pillai2, both of which are cases of adoption made after a partition in the family. We are therefore of opinion that the principles laid down by their Lordships in Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shanker Ramachandra Patil3 and since reaffirmed in Neelangouda Limbangouda v. Ujjangouda Shankargouda4 are applicable in full force to the facts of this case. In this view the appellant will be entitled to one-fourth share in the family properties as the second defendant’s adoption into Bharmappa’s branch has been held established. We accordingly allow the appeal and remit the case to the High Court with the direction that a preliminary decree for partition and delivery of possession of the appellant’s one-fourth share in the properties in suit together with mesne profits from the date of suit pertaining to such share be substituted for the decree dismissing the appellant’s suit. The appellant shall have the costs in this Court but in the peculiar circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs in the Courts below. V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.