Judgment 1. This first appeal is by the plaintiffs in a partition suit. When the case was taken up, our attention was drawn to the fact that the Stamp Eeporter had reported a deficit court fee due on the plaint. The stamp report was to the effect that a number of the properties sought to be partitioned stood in the names of two ladies, one of them grandmother of the parties and the other, defendant 4, the widow of one of the members of the joint family. Having regard to certain decisions of this Court, the Stamp Reporter said that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to displace the apparent title of the ladies before they could ask for these properties to be partitioned. The total consideration of the documents relating to these properties came to Es. 19,223, and, the plaintiffs share being one-third, the value of thab share would be Es. 6,407-10-8. Accordingly, he said that the plaintiffs had got to pay ad valorem oourt-fees amounting to Rs. 609. 6-0 on the memo of appeal in this Court and a further court-fee amounting to Bs. 487 8-0 on the plaint. 2. The matter, on the objection of the plaintiffs, came before the learned Taxing Officer in regard to the reported deficit in this Court. He accepted the stamp report and called on the plaintiffs to make up the deficit. Instead of doing so, however, the plaintiffs amended the memo. of appeal cutting out the prayer for relief in regard to these particular properties, bo that, so far as this Court was concerned the appeal in its amended form could proceed on the court-fees paid. But the matter of the deficit due on the plaint still remains, and under s. 12 read with s. 10, Court-fees Act, we have to deal with that matter before the appeal can be heard. 3. In my opinion, the view taken by the Stamp Reporter and the learned Taxing Officer is quite correct, and is fully supported by Division Bench decisions of this Court which are binding upon us. 3. In my opinion, the view taken by the Stamp Reporter and the learned Taxing Officer is quite correct, and is fully supported by Division Bench decisions of this Court which are binding upon us. The question came before a Division Bench in First Appeal No. 64 of 1923, and the Bench held that, so far as the properties sought to be partitioned stood in the name of strangers to the coparcenary, the suit must be regarded as a suit for declaration of title and consequential relief, and consequently ad valorem court-fees were payable. The matter was different in the case of properties standing in the names of members of the coparcenary. 4. The question came again before a Division Bench in Banku Behary V/s. Chatur Pandey, 6 Pat. L. Tim. 655 : A. I. R. (11) 1924 Pat. 640. The Bench referred to First Appeal No. 64 of 1923 with approval and reiterated that in regard to properties standing in the name of male members of the joint family no ad valorem fee was payable, but it was payable in respect of properties standing in the name of strangers, for, it was necessary for the plaintiff to displace the apparent title of those strangers. 5. Our attention has been drawn to certain unreported decisions. One is in civil Revision No, 188 of 1945. There two learned Judges reiterated the principle that, so far as properties standing in the name of strangers who are claiming the properties as their own are concerned, the plaintiff in a suit for partition must pay ad valorem court fees. They went on to observe, however, and this is relied on by the appellants, that the position is entirely different where the plaintiff alleges in the plaint that the properties, though standing in the name of strangers, belong to the joint family and the strangers are alleged to be mere benamidars or name-lenders. In such a case, they said, the plaintiff should not be required to pay ad valorem court-fees because the defendants, after being served with notice of the plaint, did not claim the properties as their own. In such a case, they said, the plaintiff was merely giving information to the Court as to what were the properties which he was seeking to partition. The possession and title to the properties are claimed by the plaintiff jointly with the other defendants. In such a case, they said, the plaintiff was merely giving information to the Court as to what were the properties which he was seeking to partition. The possession and title to the properties are claimed by the plaintiff jointly with the other defendants. [5a] With the greatest respect we find it difficult to follow this reasoning. The question of the court-fees has to be determined upon the frame of the plaint, and it is not permissible in deciding that question to look into the attitude taken by the defendants or the decision of the Court on the question of title. If such a test were to be applied, then, even according to this decision, ad valorem court-fees would be payable in the present case, because it appears that defendant 4, in whose name the properties stand, does in fact claim the properties as belonging to herself exclusively. That, however, as I have said, is not a proper test in determining this question. The decision of the Court of First Appeal No. 64 of 1928 is clear and binding upon us, and no view expressed by the subsequent Division Bench can alter that position. If any subsequent Bench considers the decision wrong, the only course is to refer the question to a Full Bench. But one Division Bench cannot be taken to have overruled another. 6. The same remarks apply to the other case relied on First Appeal No. 200 of 1946 In considering the same question, the Bench in this case expressly purports to follow Banku Behary v, Chatur Pandey, 5 Pat. L. Tim, 655, but, if I may-say so again with respect, the observation made are not consistent with the decision in that case. The learned Judges say that, while ad valorem court-fees are payable in regard to properties standing in the name of persons not members of the joint family, still, in so far as items of property standing in the names of two women, whose husbands are members of the joint family, are concerned, ad valorem court-fee cannot be? required in view of the decision in Bank Behary V/s. Chatur Pandey, 5 Pat. L. Tim. 665. But in that case the Bench was referring to property standing in the names of the members of the coparcenary. In the present case the acquisitions were all made prior to 1938. required in view of the decision in Bank Behary V/s. Chatur Pandey, 5 Pat. L. Tim. 665. But in that case the Bench was referring to property standing in the names of the members of the coparcenary. In the present case the acquisitions were all made prior to 1938. There was no question, therefore, of female members of the family being members of the coparcenary. They might be members of the family, but they were strangers to the coparoenary. There could be no presumption in the case of properties standing in the name of such ladies that they were joint family properties, and clearly the plaintiffs could not get such properties partitioned without a prior decision on the question of titlewithout a decision that the females were not owners, but benamidars. 7. For the appellants distinction is sought to be made between strangers to the family and female members of the family. But quits clearly the real distinction is between those who are members of the ooparcenary and those who are not members of the coparcenary, and the ladies in the present case fall into the latter category. 8. Our attention has been drawn to a decision.; of this Court, to which one of us was a party. in Bamautar Sao V/s. Bam Gobind Sao, I.L.R 20 pat. 780 in which it was pointed out that while in the case of partition suit, which was actually in the nature of a title suit ad valorem court-fees were payable, yet in applying this principle caution must be observed so as not to import into the plaint anything which it does not really contain either actually or by necessary implication. In construing a plaint the Court must take it as it is, not as it thinks it ought to have been. A relief not asked for cannot be imported so as to charge court feethereon. 9. That, in our opinion, is perfectly correct But it is necessary to remember that the reference is to what the plaint contains either actually or by necessary implication. If a plaint by necessary implication contains a prayer for adjudication on a question of title, then clearly the proper court-fees must be paid for in respect of that adjudication. In the present case the prayer for adjudication on this question of benami is most clearly present by necessary implication. Indeed it might almost be called express. If a plaint by necessary implication contains a prayer for adjudication on a question of title, then clearly the proper court-fees must be paid for in respect of that adjudication. In the present case the prayer for adjudication on this question of benami is most clearly present by necessary implication. Indeed it might almost be called express. In para. 3 of the plaint it is recited that owing to the common ancestor, Babu Narain Singh, being a Government servant, transactions were not carried on in his name in spite of his being the karta, but properties were purchased in the names of the two ladies in question. Nevertheless, all the members of the joint family had been in possession of those properties, and those properties constituted joint family properties in which the plaintiffs had one-third share. Here is a quite clear allegation of benami, and in the relief portion of the plaint it is asked that on adjudication of the above facts the plaintiffs share to the extent of one-third in the properties sought to be partitioned may be got partitioned by deputing a Commissioner. The plaintiffs have quite clearly asked for an adjudication of this question of title and indeed they had to get an adjudication of that question before partition of such properties could be ordered. 10. The position, therefore, is that we must follow the Division Bench decision of this Court in which the matter was first expressly decided, and, apart from that, we have no doubt in our minds that in a case like this ad valorem court- fees are payable as held by the learned Taxing Officer. 11. It is sought to challenge the correctness of the figures arrived at by the Stamp Reporter. But there is no substance in the contention that his figures are wrong. Para. 4 of the plaint says that the details of the properties in question are given in various schedules to the plaint, and it is added that there may be other properties which the plaintiffs do not know about and which it is obligatory on the defendants to disclose. The Stamp Reporter has simply added up the value of the properties specified in these schedules, and it is not said that there is any mistake in his addition. 12. The reported deficit on the plaint is Bs. 487-8-0. The Stamp Reporter has simply added up the value of the properties specified in these schedules, and it is not said that there is any mistake in his addition. 12. The reported deficit on the plaint is Bs. 487-8-0. This sum must be paid within one month from today, failing which the appeal will stand dismissed without further reference to a Bench. We feel that, as the appeal has been pending since 1945, it is hot possible to allow any period greater than one month for making up the deficit.