JUDGMENT : 1. Learned counsel for the appellants in this second appeal contends that unlike a son the grandsons of Khuman deceased are not liable for a debt contracted by Khuman as surety unless it is proved that consideration was received by the grandfather for accepting the suretyship. This distinction between the liability of a son and that of a grandson was made in Narayan v. Venkatacharya, 28 Bom. 408 : (6 Bom. L. b. 434). This decision is noted in Mulla's Hindu Law without any comment upon it. In Gour's Hindu Code (Edn. 4) an opinion is expressed at p. 515 that this decision is not correct. In view of the decision of the Privy Council in Masitulla v. Damodar Prasad, 53 I. A. 204 : (A. I. R. (13) 1926 P. C. 105) which lays down that under Mitakshara law the liability of the sons, grandsons and great grandsons is co-extensive, this Bombay Court decision to the extent that it lays down a different rule for the sons and grandsons is regarded by Mr. S. V. Gupta in his Hindu Law (1947 Edn.) at p. 738 to have been overruled. 2. In Mahabirprasad v. Sri Narayan, A. I. R. (5) 1918 Pat. 345 : (3 Pat. L. j. 396) and in Balkrishna Sahai v. Syam Sunder Sahai, A. I. R. (7) 1920 Pat. 201 : (56 I. C. 962), the Patna High Court expressed the opinion that a son and a grandson are equally liable (or the payment of the surety debts. But in both the cases it was only the question of son's liability which was involved and the opinion about the law regarding the grandson's liability must be considered as obiter. In Lyallpur Bank Ltd. v. Mehr Chand, a.i.R. (21) 1934 Pesh. 132 : (153 I. C. 78), Almond J. C. followed Narayan v. Venkatacharya, 28 Bom. 408 ; (6 Bom. L. R. 434) and observed that in the Privy Council case Masitullah v. Damodar Prasad, A. I. R. (13) 1926 P. C. 105 : (53 I. A. 204), the' question was not one of surety debt, and so the general remarks of the Privy Council about the coextensive nature of the liability of the son and grandson cannot be applied to the case of surety debt. 3. 3. The position thus comes down to this : that there are only two reported cases bearing directly on the point. The Peshawar decision only follows the reported ruling of the Bombay High Court, and with respect to the learned Judge, it is difficult to find any convincing reasoning in the observations of Chandavarkar J. who delivered the Divisional Bench judgment in Narayan v. Venkatacharya, 28 Bom. 408 : (6 Bom. L. R. 434). He merely says at p. 411 that "the law as laid down in the Mistakshara, by which (he parties are governed, is that a grandson is not liable to pay a debt which his grandfather contracted as a surety unless the latter in accepting the liability of a surety received some consideration for it." 4. As remarked by Sulaiman C. J. and Rachhapal Singh J. in Dwarka Das v. Kishen Das, 55 ALL. 675 : (A. i. R. (20) 1933 ALL. 587), "with great respect to the learned Judge, there stems to have been some mistakes in assuming that the law is laid down in these terms in the Mitakshara. As a matter of fact, we can find no passage therein wherein the liability of the grandson to pay the debt of a grandfather, contracted as a surety, is subject to the receipt of consideration." The learned Judges in this case after citing many extracts from Manu, Yagnavalkya, Mitakshara, Mayukha, Vishnu and others, were of opinion that the liability of the son exists in the case of surety for payment, but the liability of the grandsons for the payment of the debt incurred as surety does not exist at all. The case before the learned Judges was that of the liability of the son of the surety and not of his grandson and the remarks mentioned above should be taken to be obiter, though it must be conceded that the conclusions about the grandson's liability appear to be fully supported by the extracts quoted from the various Smritis in this ruling. 5. The Mitakshara is a book of the highest authority in the Bararas School and the subject is dealt with at length in its commentary on Ch. S. of Yajnavalkya Smriti (Vol. 2 Part 3 of the Collection of Hindu Law Texts as edited and translated by Principal Gharpure). 5. The Mitakshara is a book of the highest authority in the Bararas School and the subject is dealt with at length in its commentary on Ch. S. of Yajnavalkya Smriti (Vol. 2 Part 3 of the Collection of Hindu Law Texts as edited and translated by Principal Gharpure). Verse 54 of the said Smriti deals with the liability of the son of a surety and lays down that the sons are liable to pay the debt of their father incurred as surety for payment only. Mitakshara commenting on this verse quotes Vyasa as saying: "A grandson should pay the debt of the grandfather; a son should also pay tbat debt which is incurred as surety, equal in amount to the principal only : their sons, moreover, should not pay ; this is the fixed rule." 6. Mitakshara thus clearly is of the opinion that a grandson should pay only ordinary debts of his grandfather. He should not pay debts incurred as surety. 7. Sulapani in his Dipakalika comments on verse 54 by quoting Katyayana as saying: A surety obligation is never to be paid by the grandsons; by the son even as equal amount is to be paid in all cases of paternal debt. (Gharpure, Edn. 2 p. 811). 8. The Mitakshara further adds that where a surety for appearance or a surety by assurance has stood surety after obtaining a sufficient pledge, there even his sons should pay the surety debt out of that very pledge. 9. In this connection the following verse of Katyayana is approved and quoted in the Mitakshara: (Where a man stands surely for appearance after obtaining a sufficient pledge from the debtor, his son shall be compelled to pay the debt from the pledge in the absence of the father i. e. when the father is dead or has gone to a distant place.) 10. It may be noted here that the original word is It may be accurately rendered as equivalent to "pledge". I find that in some English translations and in certain judicial decisions this expression is taken as equivalent to 'consideration" which is not correct. There is a district difference between 'pledge' and 'consideration'. It may be noted here that the original word is It may be accurately rendered as equivalent to "pledge". I find that in some English translations and in certain judicial decisions this expression is taken as equivalent to 'consideration" which is not correct. There is a district difference between 'pledge' and 'consideration'. Anything done, or any promise made for the benefit of the principal may be a sufficient consideration for giving a guarantee, (S. 127, Contract Act); and the forbearnce of a claim against a third person is regarded as a sufficient consideration for a surety bond, although there may be no express contract by the obligee to forbear, Jagadindra Nath v. Chandra Nath, 31 Cal 242. As 'pledge' clearly implies a bailment of goods so, the decisions in Ghulam Hussain v. Faiyaz Ali, a. i. R. (27) 1940 Oudh 346: (15 Luck. 656), Kalicharan v. Abdul Rahman, a. i. R. (5) 1918 P. C. 226: (50 i C. 651) and in Jagadindra Nath v. Chandra Nath, 31 Cal. 242, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents, have no bearing on the case before me. 11. Another point to be observed is this that the verse of Katyayana applies only to the case when a person becomes a surety for the appearance of a debtor. There is no reference here to the surety for payment. Thus, it is not correct to say that in the Mitakshara it is laid down that a grandson is liable to pay a debt which his grandfather contracted as a surety for payment of the latter received some consideration for it. 12. After discussing certain authorities Mahamohopadhyaya Kane at p. 447 of his History of Dharma Shastra, Vol. 3 (1946 Edn.) also observes: "As regards the suretyship debts of the father Yaj (II 54) Vyasa and Katyayana provide that when the father was a surety for a payment, then the son was bound to pay the principal of the debt for which the father stood surety, but the son of a son was not liable at all to pay the surety debt of his grandfather even when the latter was a surety for payment." 13. This is, therefore, the law as laid down in the Mitakshara. The question whether any consideration was received by the grandfather does not arise in such cases. This is, therefore, the law as laid down in the Mitakshara. The question whether any consideration was received by the grandfather does not arise in such cases. It does not seem necessary here to refer to Mayukha as parties in this case are governed by the Mitakshara school. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents, then, contends that the grandsons are, under S. 50, Civil P. C. (Gwalior, S. 260) liable to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to their hands and has not been duly disposed of It may be observed in this connection that in the case of a joint Hindu family on the death of a joint member who happens to be a debtor, there are no assets that can be followed; because the deceased's share lapses into the family by the principle of survivorship. The grandsons get their property in their own right neither through their father nor through their grandfather. The test in such cases is that (whether ?) the property which the father could sell in his lifetime is the only property that could be pursued by the creditor on his death in the hands of his sons (per Mukerji J. at p. 224 in Binda Prasad v. Raj Ballabh Sahai, A. I. R. (13) 1926 all. 220: (91 I. C. 785). 15. The burden of proof thus was on the decree-holder to show that the occupancy holding was the self-acquired property of the deceased Khuman, that when he acquired it either by dint of his labour or by his money, Khuman's father was not joint with him, or that Khuman's son had no share either in the labour or in the money. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent relies on the testimony of Karan Singh which is held to be thoroughly unreliable by the learned Subordinate Judge. I do not think Karan Singh's oral evidence consisting of a single sentence can help the decree-holder or can be taken to be true. The Sub-Judge has observed that there is no evidence to show either that the Khata was Khuman's self-acquired property or that it was ancestral. The Sub-Judge then argues that if it had been ancestral the judgment-debtors would have produced documentary evidence about the mutation proceedings ending in favour of Khuman. I think this argument is fallacious. The Sub-Judge has observed that there is no evidence to show either that the Khata was Khuman's self-acquired property or that it was ancestral. The Sub-Judge then argues that if it had been ancestral the judgment-debtors would have produced documentary evidence about the mutation proceedings ending in favour of Khuman. I think this argument is fallacious. The burden of proof being on the decree-holder, it was his duty to show that the deceased Khuman did not inherit this Khata from his father but acquired it himself. The burder of proof not being properly discharged, the conclusion of the learned Sub-Judge is unwarranted. 17. The mutation proceedings of 12-4-43 show that Khuman died on 9-1-43 and one of his sons Ram Din (father of the appellants) had pre-deceased him; the other son Jwali survived along with the appellants grandsons). Under the circumstances I hold that the grandsons' share is not liable for the security debts of their grandfather. 18. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Court of first instance is restored with costs in the lower Appellate Court and this Court.