Judgment :- 1. The defendant is the appellant in this Second Appeal. The plaintiff's suit was for eviction with past and future rent. The suit was based on Ext. A executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. In that he had undertaken to cultivate the vacant space in the properties scheduled in Ext. A and to pay the plaintiff a rent of Rs. 60/-. Out of this he was to appropriate Rs. 10/- towards fencing and other miscellaneous expenses. The defendant was allowed to cultivate the vacant space only for one year. The plaintiff stated that the defendant had no right of possession over the trees and the house in the compound, that he was only to raise vegetable crops and that he was to surrender whatever possession he had after the expiry of one year. The defendant had not surrendered possession after one year and so the prayer was for recovery of possession of whatever right the plaintiff had over Ext. A property and to order payment of past rent and settlement of accounts and future rent at the rate of Rs. 85 a year. 2. The defendant contested the suit. He objected to the enhanced rent claimed and contended that he had discharged the whole dues to the plaintiff. He had also a contention that he was not liable to be evicted as he was to be deemed to be a Verumpattomdar mentioned in Act VIII of 1118. The courts below had concurrently found that he would not come under the category of Verumpattomdar as understood in Act VIII of 1118, that he was liable to surrender the property, that the discharge pleaded was not true, that the plaintiff was not entitled to enhance the rent and that the property could be delivered over to the plaintiff only with past and future rent at the rate provided for in Ext. A. 3. The question for consideration is whether Ext. A would come under the category of a lease as defined in the Transfer of Property Act XVIII of 111. The lease is not defined in the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act VIII of 1118 and so the Pattom or lease contemplated therein would be governed by the definition of the term in the Cochin Transfer of Property Act. A would come under the category of a lease as defined in the Transfer of Property Act XVIII of 111. The lease is not defined in the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act VIII of 1118 and so the Pattom or lease contemplated therein would be governed by the definition of the term in the Cochin Transfer of Property Act. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. The word "enjoy" used in this definition has been the subject of comment in several cases and the result of a comparative study of the same is thus mentioned at page 1609, Vol. III of the Commentaries of the Transfer of Property Act by Chitaley and Rao, 1950 Edn. "The word "enjoy" is, however, not used as the equivalent of "possess". The connotation of the word "possession" as used in the Act is distinct from "enjoyment" and does not necessarily include enjoyment. This is clear from Ss. 58 and 76 of the Act. Those sections show that though a usufructuary mortgage is entitled to the possession of the mortgaged property, he is not entitled to the enjoyment of the property. Because, the usufruct of the property is treated as belonging not to the mortgagee but to the mortgagor. The mortgagee has only the right to receive such usufruct and reimburse himself for his debt from it. Under a lease, however, the usufruct of the property belongs to the lessee. The transfer of a bare right of possession without the right to the usufruct is not a lease. Thus, the word "enjoy" seems to be used in the sense of the beneficial occupation of property. Such a meaning is not inconsistent with the literal sense of the word. Because the meaning of this word is to occupy as a good or profitable thing." "There must be a transfer of the exclusive right of possession of the leased property in order to constitute a lease. Such a meaning is not inconsistent with the literal sense of the word. Because the meaning of this word is to occupy as a good or profitable thing." "There must be a transfer of the exclusive right of possession of the leased property in order to constitute a lease. The continuance in the transferor, after the transfer, of any share in the right of possession is detrimental to its character as a lease. This does not mean that there cannot be a lease of an undivided share in joint property. What is meant is that the transferor cannot reserve to himself any share in the right of possession." 4. In Ext. A, the extent of the property which comes to 6 acres and 82 7/8 cents is mentioned. It was stated there that there were trees and houses in the property. The same were excluded and permission was granted to cultivate the vacant space. The exact extent of the property or the location of the same where the defendant could raise the crops were not mentioned in the document. It was also not mentioned that the defendant was to have exclusive possession of the vacant site. The evidence in the case showed that even over this vacant space the plaintiff was exercising the right of possession by planting trees. The defendant as D.W.1 had admitted that he had planted about 200 Anjili plants in the property. But it is significant that he has not claimed any compensation for value of improvements on account of any plantation made by him. The plaintiff as P.W.1 had sworn that he had planted the vacant space with several trees and his version appeared to be a correct one for the defendant himself had not claimed any compensation for planting trees after Ext. A was executed. This was a clear indication that the defendant was not given the exclusive possession of the property. Ext. A will not therefore come under the category of a lease and the Full Bench ruling in Ag. Secretary Board of Revenue v. S.I.R. Railway Company (AIR 1925 Mad. 434) is in support of this position. The test whether a document was a lease or not was held to be whether it vested any exclusive interest in immovable property in the transferee or whether it gave him merely a right to enter on the property and to do something thereon. 434) is in support of this position. The test whether a document was a lease or not was held to be whether it vested any exclusive interest in immovable property in the transferee or whether it gave him merely a right to enter on the property and to do something thereon. The ruling in Venugopala v. Thirunavukkarasu (AIR 1949 Mad. 148) relied on by the appellant is in no way against the decision mentioned above. In this case the defendant was given the right to enjoy toddy yield and right to enter upon the land for the purpose. It was held that the right to tap cocoanut trees and to obtain toddy was the benefit arising out of land and so that right will come under S.3(25) of the General Clauses Act (India) and was immovable property. Since an exclusive possession over the immovable property had been created so for as the right of enjoyment of the trees was concerned it was held to constitute a lease. There is no such exclusive possession as contemplated there in the present case and so we have to hold that Ext. A though it is styled a Pattomcheetu and the rent to be paid is called Pattom, it could not be a lease as contemplated in the Transfer of Property Act. An agreement for the cultivation of land under which a person is to cultivate another's land and the two are to share the produce in certain proportions may be a lease if there is an intention to transfer an interest in the property. But if there is no such intention such agreement cannot create a lease and the matter is as held in Brahmamoyee Baramani v. Munsur (AIR 1920 Cal. 548) one purely of construction in each case. If there is no intention to transfer an interest in the property, the right will be a licence, and not a lease. The use of the words Pattom and Pattacheetu is not of much consequence. It had been laid down in Lumber v. Philips (1904 App. Case 405) and King v. Allen and Sons (1916) 2 App: Case 54, that in construing such grants the substance of the transaction must be considered and not merely the nomenclature used by the parties. The rulings In re Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. Ltd. of India (A.I.R. 1933 All. Case 405) and King v. Allen and Sons (1916) 2 App: Case 54, that in construing such grants the substance of the transaction must be considered and not merely the nomenclature used by the parties. The rulings In re Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. Ltd. of India (A.I.R. 1933 All. 735), Sherif Dodumivaji v. Emperor (1930 Bom.165), Sabdi Bepari v. Budhai (1925 Cal. 370) and B.N.W. Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Janaki Prasad (1936 Pat. 362) are also in support of this position. Since the defendant had not been given exclusive possession of the vacant site the extent of which was not possible to be determined it had be to held that he had been given only a use of the property for a definite purpose and that the transaction Ext. A would not amount to a lease. Thus in confirmation of the decrees passed by the Courts below, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.