This is an appeal from the judg­ment and decree of the learned Sub-Judge, Cachar, by which the order of the learned Mun­siff dismissing plaintiff's suit was affirmed. Plain­tiffs have appealed to this Court. (2) The only question in the case is whether the requirements of the proviso to S. 33, Assam (Temporarily Settled Districts) Tenancy Act had been satisfied. (3) Plaintiff's case was that they required the land in suit for cultivation by themselves. They stated further that this had become necessary as the land they had in their possession was not sufficient for the maintenance of their family. The correctness of this allegation was repudiated by the defendant. The trial Court came to the conclusion that plaintiffs had land exceeding about 4 hals. In view of this, the learned Mun­siff was of the opinion that they are not in need of the suit land for their cultivation. He also observed that plaintiff 2 had money-lending busi­ness. The learned Sub-Judge did not agree with the reasoning of the learned Munsiff. He pointed out that the mere fact that plaintiffs had enough land for their maintenance was not sufficient for non-suiting them. He was not prepared to place an interpretation on the proviso which would require the plaintiffs to prove that land was needed by them for their maintenance. He also recognised the fact that even if the landlord had sufficient land for his maintenance, he could still demand ejectment of the tenant if he could satisfy the Court that he wanted to bring the land under his own cultivation. He then pro­ceeded to observe that he found it difficult to accept the contention of the pleader for the appellant that mere intention of the landlord to bring the land under his own cultivation was sufficient for the purpose and then without referr­ing to any evidence on the record he held that the Court ought to be satisfied about the 'bona fide' requirement, which might be the landlord's maintenance of his family or due to other rea­sons. He then affirmed the order of the Court below. He then affirmed the order of the Court below. (4) The proviso lays down that if a raiyat "has at the commencement of this Act, field the land continuously for not less than ten years, he shall not be liable to ejectment on the ground specified in Clause (e) unless the land­lord has satisfied the Court that he requires the land, for his homestead or for cultivation by him­self or by members of his family or by hired ser­vants or labourers". (5) The plaintiffs in this case clearly alleged that they required the land for cultivation by themselves which obviously included the members of their family. The legal requirement is that, plaintiff should satisfy the Court that' he is requiring the land for cultivation by him­self or by members of his family. The learned Sub-Judge was perfectly right to this extent. In fact, so far as the proviso is concerned, it has been laid down by this Court that it is open to a landlord to claim as much land from his tenant as he really wants to cultivate by himself. The intention of the Legislature was not to impose any restriction on the right of the landlord, to cultivate his own land. All that the Court could insist on was that he should satisfy it that he wanted to cultivate the land himself. The view of the learned Senior Sub-Judge that mere inten­tion of the landlord to bring the land under his own cultivation was not sufficient would not1 seem to be correct on this interpretation of the proviso. If a landlord genuinely wanted the land for his own cultivation and if no other circum­stances are brought out which would show that the real intention was not to cultivate the land but that there was some ulterior motive in ejecting the tenant, e.g., the motive to bring in al new tenant or to enhance the rent, the Court cannot refuse to eject the tenant. (6) In this case the only basis that one can conceive of for the decision of the learned Sub-Judge is that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the Court that the land was needed for the pur­pose of maintenance of their family. There are no other circumstances brought out from the side of the defendant. The learned counsel has not been able to suggest any such ground. There are no other circumstances brought out from the side of the defendant. The learned counsel has not been able to suggest any such ground. The finding of the lower appellate Court, therefore, is influenced by a somewhat incorrect interpre­tation of the proviso. The learned Judge was of the view that the mere fact that the landlord or the plaintiff really intended to use the land for his own cultivation was not enough to satisfy the requirements of the proviso. If this incorrect view would not have been taken, the result would have been different. The practical result is that there is no real difference bet­ween the judgment of the trial Judge and that of the learned Sub-Judge. In fact, the learned Sub-Judge while realising that plaintiff's alleged need for the land for their maintenance was not strictly relevant allowed himself to be influenced by that consideration. His finding is not that he is not satisfied of the intention of the plaintiff. If that finding had been arrived at, it would have been open for the respondent to urge that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requirements of the proviso or that a finding of fact which could not be assailed in second appeal came in the way of the appellant. That, however, is not the case. For these rea­sons the order of the learned Sub-Judge is not sustainable. (7) The learned counsel for the respondent has referred me to a case reported in 'Basant Lai v. P. C. Chakravarty, 54 OWN 20: (AIR (37) 1950 Cal 249). This was a case under the West Ben­gal Premises Rent Control Act XXXVIII (38) of 1948, B C). Section 11 (1) of the Act was inter­preted by the learned Judge in that case. Ac­cording to that section the landlord could eject a tenant if he required the premises for his own occupation provided that his requirement was 'bona fide'. The learned counsel concedes that the Act under which that case was decided related to urban areas. It did not apply tok agricultural land. The provisions of S. 11 (1) of the Act are not in any sense analogous to the proviso to S. 33, Assam Tenancy Act and I do not think that the 'Calcutta case' can be re­garded as any authority for the purposes of the interpretation of the proviso. It did not apply tok agricultural land. The provisions of S. 11 (1) of the Act are not in any sense analogous to the proviso to S. 33, Assam Tenancy Act and I do not think that the 'Calcutta case' can be re­garded as any authority for the purposes of the interpretation of the proviso. The only common feature is that the word 'require' occurs in both the provisions. We have consistently interpreted that word in a certain sense in its application to agricultural land. Besides, so far as the pro­viso to S. 33 is concerned, the requirement is qualified by the words "for cultivation by him­self or by members of his family" so that if a plaintiff can show that he wants to cultivate the land himself that would be his requirement with­in the meaning of this proviso. All that he has to do is to satisfy the Court that he wants to cultivate the land himself or through the mem­bers of his family, etc. If there are circum­stances justifying a finding that he has got some purposes in view other than that expressed in the proviso, he would not succeed. (8) In this view of the matter, the appeal must succeed and is, therefore, allowed. The orders of the Courts below are set aside and the claim of the plaintiffs for the ejectment of the defen­dant is decreed. Parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.