Deonarain v. Principal, Jaswant College, Jodhpur. — 1950 DIGILAW 11 (RAJ)

Bapna, J.—This is an application under section 45 of the Marwar Specific Relief Act, 1930. 2. The petitioner, Deonarain Vyas, was a student of the Jaswant College, Jodhpur, in the session 1948-1949 and appeared at the M. A. previous Examination of the Rajputana University in 1949 held in March in History and was declared successful. The College reopened after the summer vacation in July, 1949, and Deonarain made an application, Ex. 20 on the 6th of August, 1949, for admission in the M. A. Final Class in History. The application was on a printed form supplied by the College, and the following particulars among others, were required to be stated:— No. 2 Name of Father. No. 3 Occupation, monthly income and address of father. No. 4 Name of Guardian. No. 5 Occupation, monthly income and address of guardian. No. 6 Name, address and relationship with the person with whom the applicant proposes to live in Jodhpur. No. 7 Permanent addres. Certain declarations were also required to be filled in, one of them being by Parent or Guardian as under:— "In the event of my son/daughter/ward (name) being admitted to the Jaswant College Jodhpur, I hold myself responsible for his/her conduct in and outside college and for the payment of his/her fees and other dues." 3. The petitioner, while filling his form, mentioned against the aforesaid columns as under:— 2. Jainarain Vyas. 3. Nothing. 4. Jainarain Vyas. 5. Nil. 6. Jainarain Vyas. 7. C/o Jainarain Vyas, Jaswant Sarai Building, Jodhpur, and the declaration meant to be signed by Parent or Guardian was signed by Deonarain himself as under: — Deonarain for Parent or Guardian. 4. Dr. Y. Bhardwaj, Principal of the College, was of opinion that the signing of the declaration by Deonarain himself on behalf of his father was irregular and he gave a remark on the form, purporting to say that Deonarain should get the signature of his father as according to the procedure of admission, his father must be taken to be his guardian. 5. It appears that a few days later, there was some oral discussion between the Principal and Deonarain on the same subject without any fruitful result and the Principal wrote the following letter to Deonarain (Ex. 5. It appears that a few days later, there was some oral discussion between the Principal and Deonarain on the same subject without any fruitful result and the Principal wrote the following letter to Deonarain (Ex. A) on the 16th of August, 1949:— As required in the application form for admission, it is necessary that you shold have the signature of your father at the place meant for the signature of the father or guardian. Since you did not get it done and you refused to be under any guardian, I am sorry, I find it difficult to admit you in the absence of any guardian who may give a declaration for being responsible for your conduct in and outside the College and for payment of your dues, as provided for in the admission form." 6. It is alleged that the petitioner informed the Principal that his father was away from Jodhpur in connection with certain political activities but that he was willing to get the required declaration signed by his maternal uncle or other relation but the Principal declined to accept any body elses declaration. 7. The petitioner further alleged that he approached the Commissioner, Jodhpur Division, for intercession on his behalf. Dr. Bhardwaj was then away from Jodhpur and Mr. Deenanath Bhargava, Professor of English, was carrying on for the Principal, and, as a result of some telephonic conversation between the Commissioner and Mr. Deenanath Bhargava, the latter accepted the declaiation of one Mr. Kis-toor Chand Purohit, maternal uncle of the petitioner, and ordered admission of Mr. Deonarain to the M. A. Final Class in History on 5.9.49, and he began to attend the classes. Before Mr. Deonarain could, however, deposit the tuition and other fees, Dr. Bhardwaj returned to Jodhpur, and on an application by Deonarain to direct the office to accept his fees, Dr. Bhardwaj wrote as follows on 12.9.49: — "I shall accept your admission form only when you get your fathers signature thereon or of another person authorised by your father in writing." 8. The Principal received a telegram on the 16th of September, 1949, purporting to be sent by Mr. Jainarain Vyas from Delhi, as under:— "My politics makes my continued stay in Jodhpur impossible. Shri Dwarkadass Purohit would act as guardian of my son Deonarain in matters educational." 9. It is alleged by the petitioner that Dr. The Principal received a telegram on the 16th of September, 1949, purporting to be sent by Mr. Jainarain Vyas from Delhi, as under:— "My politics makes my continued stay in Jodhpur impossible. Shri Dwarkadass Purohit would act as guardian of my son Deonarain in matters educational." 9. It is alleged by the petitioner that Dr. Bhardwaj declined to accept the declaration of even Mr. Dwarkadass Purohit refusing to believe in the genuineness of the telegram. The petitioner, therefore, approached Mr. Mathuradass Mathur, a friend of his father, who saw the Principal and expressed his willingness to act as guardian for Deonarain, but the Principal declined to accept him. 10. Deonarain thereafter filed the present petition on the 31st of October, 1949, and it is urged on his behalf that (1) Deonarain, having fulfilled all the necessary qualifications for admission to M. A. Final Class in History, had a right to be so admitted; (2) the course for M. A. degree in History was only one, split up in two parts, and, therefore, his admission in the College in the session of 1948-49 and his success in M. A. Previous at the examination held in March, 1949, entitled him to continue the course in the M. A. Final in the session 1949-50 without any fresh admission to the College; (3) the form required to be filled by the Principal was not authorised by the Rules and Regulations of the University; (4) no declaration by any gurdian was necessary in the case of post-graduate students or a student like him, who were earning their own livelihood; (5) the Principal was not authorised to insist on the declaration in the form being signed by his father, Mr. Jainarain Vyas; (8) Dr. Bhardwaj acted malafide in (a) not accepting the telegram of 16. 9. 49. as a valid authority of appointment of Dwarkadass Purohit as his guardian in educational matters and permitting him to sign the declaration; (b) not accepting Mr. Mathuradas Mathur as his guardain for the purpose aforesaid; (7) Dr. Bhardwaj was actuated by malice in cancelling the admission made by Mr. Deenanath Bhargava on 5th September, 1949. 11. It was finally averred that the Jaswant College, being a public educational institution, Dr. Mathuradas Mathur as his guardain for the purpose aforesaid; (7) Dr. Bhardwaj was actuated by malice in cancelling the admission made by Mr. Deenanath Bhargava on 5th September, 1949. 11. It was finally averred that the Jaswant College, being a public educational institution, Dr. Bhardwaj was under a duty to admit Deonarain as student in the Final M. A. Class in History, that his failure to do so would cause great injury and incalculable loss to the petitioner and that there was no other specific legal remedy and it was prayed that the High Court may, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Section 45 of the Marwar Specific Relief Act 1930, and Section 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, direct Dr. Bhardwaj, Principal of the College, to admit the petitioner in the M. A. Final class to enable him to appear at the next M. A. Final Examination in History in 1950. It was further prayed that, as the delay in obtaining admission was likely to result in a fall in the percentage of attendance, the same may be directed to be condoned by the Principal. 12. A notice was issued to the opposite party, Dr. Bhardwaj, Principal of the Jaswant College, to show cause why the order applied for should not be made returnable on the 21st of November, 1949, but on that date only a prayer for adjournment of the case was made on behalf of the opposite party, which was granted, but an interlocutory order was made directing admission of Deonarain to the M. A. Final Class in History in the Jaswant College and permitting him to attend the classes pending disposal of the petition. At the request of the learned advocate for the petitioner, a direction was also made for transmission of the examination fee of the petitioner to the University as it was represented that it was the last date for such transmission. 13. On the 28th of November, 1949, a reply was submitted on behalf of the opposite party. 14. It was contended that, under the rules and regulations of the College, it was necessary to fill up forms of admission at the beginning of every session for all students seeking admission to any class in the College, and the petitioner was rightly asked to fill the prescribed form. 14. It was contended that, under the rules and regulations of the College, it was necessary to fill up forms of admission at the beginning of every session for all students seeking admission to any class in the College, and the petitioner was rightly asked to fill the prescribed form. It was also pointed out that the previous record of students in this respect was very incomplete and it was considered desirable to have fresh forms of admission, which had been newly prescribed, filled up by every student seeking admission to the College in the session 1949-50. 15. It was alleged that in the form, which Deonarain filled up, it was clearly stated that his father, Jamarain Vyas, was his guardian, and he proposed to live with him, but he did not obtain the declaration of the guardian signed by his father as his guardian. On the contrary he signed himself for his father. This was considered quite irregular and, on attempt being made to make him understand the significance of such declaration Deonarain took a defiant attitude and declined to get the declaration duly signed by his father. A few days later, Deonarain requested a return of the form with the ostensible purpose of getting the declaration signed by his father, but the opposite party did not consider it expedient to return a paper which had been mutilated more than once by the petitioner. It was alleged that the petitioner was instructed orally that, if he could get a declaration written out and signed by his father on a separate piece of paper, it would be accepted and that the letter of the 16th of August, 1949, was written with that object. 16. In respect of the admission order passed by Mr. Deenanath Bhargava, the opposite party replied that Mr. Bhargava had committed an error, in his absence, in accepting Mr. Kistoor Chand Purohit as guardian for the student without any proper authority from his father and, on this being pointed out to Mr. Bhargava, the order of admission was cancelled by him in his own pen on 8.9.1949. 17. As to the telegram of the 16th of September, 1949, purporting to have been sent by Mr. Jainarain Vyas, it was alleged that its genuineness was open to doubt as no confirmatory letter was received, and in any case Mr. Bhargava, the order of admission was cancelled by him in his own pen on 8.9.1949. 17. As to the telegram of the 16th of September, 1949, purporting to have been sent by Mr. Jainarain Vyas, it was alleged that its genuineness was open to doubt as no confirmatory letter was received, and in any case Mr. Dwarkadas, referred to in the telegram, never saw the opposite party. It was alleged that the course of action adopted by the opposite party was bonafide in the exercise of his powers and duties as Principal of the College, and non-admission of Deonarain was entirely due to his non-compliance with the formalities required of a student seeking admission to the College. 18. Various affidavits were submitted by the parties and the case was argued with great ability by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 19. It may be stated that the Jaswant College is an affiliated College of the Rajputana University, and it would be proper at this stage to refer to the Act by which the University was constituted and the various Statutes and Ordinances of the University, framed in pursuance of the powers under the Act, as they would have a great bearing on the matters in issue in this case. The Rajputana University was constituted in January, 1947, when the various States in Rajputana had separate semi-independent existence, and, therefore, legislation was undertaken simultaneously in all the States, which agreed to join in constituting the University. 20. In Jodhpur the University of Rajputana Act was passed and promulgated by His Highness Maharaja Umaid Singhji of Jodhpur, and published in the Jodhpur Government Gazette of 8th January, 1947. The Act was accompanied by the Statutes of the University as provided by Section 28 of the Act. The Ordinances and Regulations made by the Executive Council under Statute 6 were passed subsequently, and the Act, the Statutes, the Ordinances, and the Regulations have been printed in book form in the Hand-book of the University of Rajputana, the authenticity whereof is not disputed in this case. 21. The Ordinances and Regulations made by the Executive Council under Statute 6 were passed subsequently, and the Act, the Statutes, the Ordinances, and the Regulations have been printed in book form in the Hand-book of the University of Rajputana, the authenticity whereof is not disputed in this case. 21. The powers of the University are mentioned in Section 4 of the Act, which, among other things, says as under: — "The University shall have the following powers, namely:— (1) to provide for instructions in such branches of learning as the University may think fit, and to make provision for research and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge, (2) to hold examinations and to confer degrees and other academic distinctions upon-(a) persons who have pursued a course of study in the University, under conditions laid down in the Ordinances and Regulations. (7) to maintain, inspect and recognise colleges and hostels and to withdraw such recognition; (8) to supervise and control the residence and discipline of students of the University, and to make arrangements for promoting the health and general welfare;" Section 9 specifies the officers of the University, and among them is the Vice-Chancellor. Section 13 defines the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor, and, among other things, it is laid down that (1) the Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University. (2) it shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to see that this Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances are faithfully observed, and he shall have all powers necessary for this purpose. (4) (a) He may take action in any emergency which, in his opinion, calls for immediate action. Section 21 makes the Syndicate the executive body of the University and Section 22, clause (p), authorises the Syndicate to exercise all other powers of the University not otherwise provided for by the Act or the Statute. Section 32 declares all Colleges recognised at the commencement of the Act as Colleges of the University so long as such recognition continues, and provides for recognition of new Colleges by the Syndicate later on. 22. Among the provisions of the Statutes, the following are relevant; Statute 26 (1) declares every recognised college to be a public educational institution. Statute 26 (4) lays down that the Principal of a college shall be responsible for the internal administration of the college. 22. Among the provisions of the Statutes, the following are relevant; Statute 26 (1) declares every recognised college to be a public educational institution. Statute 26 (4) lays down that the Principal of a college shall be responsible for the internal administration of the college. Statute 26 (5) provides for the constitution of a College Council in every college to advise the Principal in the administration of the college. Statute 28 says that every college shall satisfy the University that it maintains a satisfactory standard of educational efficiency for the purposes for which recognition is enjoyed or sought, in respect of instructions, internal examinations and promotions, tutorial guidance of students, and all other matters. Statute 29 says that every college shall satisfy the University that it is in all respects suitably organised and conducted. Statute 31 says that admission of students to a College shall be subject to the conditions prescribed by the Ordinances in this behalf. Statute 33 declares that only such fees shall be charged in every college as may be approved by the University. Statute 36 lays down (1) that every college shall satisfy the University that proper discipline is maintained in the College and the Hostel, and (2) that every college shall make adequate provision for the residence of its students not residing with their parents or recognised guardians, and shall provide adequate facilities for the physical exercise and health for its students; Statute 37 Clause (5) authorises the Syndicate to cause an enquiry to be made in respect of any matter connected with a College. Statute 37 Clause (7) authorises the Syndicate to withdraw recognition of a college which is not conducted in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Statutes and Ordinances as imposed by the Syndicate. 23. Among the provisions of the Ordinances, the following are relevant:- Ordinance 52 deals with the qualification of students for admission to a course of study for the Intermediate Examination for a Degree Examination. Ordinance 55 lays down that a student shall be recognised as a member of a college as soon as he has been accepted by the Principal and has paid the college fees. Ordinance 55 lays down that a student shall be recognised as a member of a college as soon as he has been accepted by the Principal and has paid the college fees. Ordinance 69 is to the effect that when a student has been guilty of grave misconduct or of persistent negligence of work, the Principal of the College at which he is studying may, according to the nature and gravity of the offence — (a) expel, (b) rusticate for a period not exceeding one academic year, or (c) disqualify such a student from appearing at the next examination. All cases of expulsion are to be reported to the Syndicate for confirmation. Ordinance 70 declares the constitution of the Helth and Residence Board. Ordinance 72 authorises the Health and Residence Board to advise the Syndicate on measures to be adopted, |among other things, for "(v) conditions of residence of students". 24. Certain Regulations, Nos. 113 to 126, have been framed on the subject of residence of students but the only relevant matter is the definition of guardian mentioned in a note after R. 113.- "The term guardian means and includes:- (1) a guardian appointed under the Guardians and Ward Act, or a guardian appointed by the Court of Wards. (2) a person declared in writing by the students parent or if he has no parent living, by the person described in clause (1) above to be his guardian and approved by the Principal of the College. (3) If the student has no parent to guardian, as above, a person approved by the Principal of his college. The person approved under (2) and (3) above, shall reside in or near the town in which the college is situated and shall not be a student still reading in the postgraduate or other classes of the same or another college." 25. Apart from the above provisions of the Rajputana University Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations framed thereunder, there is one more document of great importance, viz., the Prospectus of the Jaswant College, Jodhpur, for the year 1949-50. 26. There is no mention in it as to who was the author of this pamphlet or under what authority it was published Later on, however, it was made clear by an affidavit of Prof. 26. There is no mention in it as to who was the author of this pamphlet or under what authority it was published Later on, however, it was made clear by an affidavit of Prof. Shanti Swaroop that it was issued by the Principal on the recommendations of a sub-committee of the College Council of which the said Professor was the Convener 27. Mr. Murlimanohar Vyas for the petitioner has challenged the validity of some of the provisions of this Prospectus and the objections will be dealt with at a later stage. 28. It is agreed by the learned counsel for the parties that the provisions of Section 45 of the Marwar Specific Relief Act in substance give statutory effect to the principles governing the issue of a writ of mandamus in England, and, while it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the alternative that the powers of this High Court under section 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance are not restricted to the provisions of section 45 of the Marwar Specific Relief Act, the main arguments for the parties were advanced on the footing that we had to look to the provisions of the said Section in dealing with the present petition. 29. The power of the High Court under Section 28 of the Ordinance to issue orders in the nature of a writ of Mandamus is, however, restricted to the enforcement of such rights as are given by any law for the time being in force . The aforesaid provision does not lay down the mode or circumstances in which the said power can be exercised. Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act contains the provisions of law which point out the circumstances in which the writ can be issued, and, therefore, it is that provision which has to be looked into for guidance in this matter. 30. It was contended at the outset by Mr. Modi for the non-petitioner that the petitioner had not fulfilled any of the five conditions, (a) to (e), of Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, and therefore, the petition should be thrown out summarily. 30. It was contended at the outset by Mr. Modi for the non-petitioner that the petitioner had not fulfilled any of the five conditions, (a) to (e), of Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, and therefore, the petition should be thrown out summarily. It was urged that, in order to obtain relief under Section 45 of the Act, all the five conditions laid down in the proviso had to be fulfilled, as they were cumulative, and non-fulfilment of any one of the conditions would disentitle the petitooner to the grant of any relief whatsoever. It was contended (I) that the petitioner had no personal right to be admitted to the College, (2) that there was no duty cast on the non-petitioner, the Principal, to admit the petitioner, (3) that the applicant had other specific and adequate legal remedy, (4) that the remedy, even if given by the order applied for, would not be complete, and (5) that it would not be consonant with right and justice to grant the relief prayed for. 31. Mr. Vyas, who appeared for the petitioner, did not dispute the contention that all the five conditions laid down in the said section were cumulative so that all of them must be fulfilled before the order applied for can be obtained, but he vehemently argued that all requisite conditions laid down in the Proviso were fulfilled in the present case and that it was a fit one for issue of the writ in terms of the reliefs prayed for. The contentions raised will be examined seriatim. 32. Mr. Modis first contention is that according to Proviso (a) to section 45, the application should be by a person whose property franchise or personal right would be injured by the forbearing of the specific act, which in this case is the non-admission of the petitioner in the college. The first two categories are obviously not applicable and, even as to personal right, it cannot be said that any student has a personal right to be admitted to the college. Reliance was placed on a passage in Halsburys Laws of England, Vol, IX (Hailsham Edition), Paragraph 1302. The first two categories are obviously not applicable and, even as to personal right, it cannot be said that any student has a personal right to be admitted to the college. Reliance was placed on a passage in Halsburys Laws of England, Vol, IX (Hailsham Edition), Paragraph 1302. "No mandamus will lie to the benchers of any of the Inns of Court to compel them to admit a certain person as a student of the society or to call a student to the Bar." But, as pointed out in para 648 of the book, "The Inns of Court are voluntary unincorporated societies independent of the State and they are outside the jurisdiction of the Courts, but are subject to the visitatorial jurisdiction of the Judges". Thus these bodies, having their own rules, are not dependent upon the exchequer and have absolute rights to manage their affairs. 33. The Jaswant College, though affiliated to the Rajputana University, is maintained by the Government, i. e by public funds, and according to Statute 26 is a Public educational institution. It is reasonable to hold that any student who is qualified according to the Rules and Regulations of the University and fulfils the conditions, laid down by the University, or by any authority duly empowered in this behalf, is entitled to obtain admission to the College for the purpose of receiving higher education in any course or courses for which facilities may exist at the said college unless he is disqualified by any valid rule or order issued by proper authority. 34. In the present case, Deonarain, after the B.A., degree joined the Jaswant College in the post-graduate course for Master of Arts degree in History in Session 1948-49 and has passed the Previous Examination of the University held in March, 1949. According to the Handbook of the University, pages 146 and 147. the examination for the degree of Master of Arts is to consist of two parts: (a) the Previous Examination and (2) the Final Examination. According to the Handbook of the University, pages 146 and 147. the examination for the degree of Master of Arts is to consist of two parts: (a) the Previous Examination and (2) the Final Examination. A candidate who has completed a regular course of study in an affiliated college for one academical year after taking his Bachelors degree is to be admitted to the Previous Examination and a candidate who has completed a further regular course of study for one academical year in an affiliated college after the Previous M.A., Examination of the University is to be admitted to the Final Examination for the degree of Master of Arts. As laid down at page 158, the entire course for two years covers seven papers including an essay. The essay paper must be taken in the Final Examination and, of the remaining six, any three can be taken in the Previous and the remaining three in the Final. 35. Deonarain was, therefore, only seeking admission to the M.A., Final class in History by way of continuing the study for the Master of Arts degree, a part of the course whereof he had already completed at this very college. According to the petitioner, he was fully qualified for the admission and was ready and willing to fulfil all valid conditions laid down by the authorities empowered in this behalf, and, as it appears, there existed ample facilities for pursuing the particular course of studies at the college. No disqualification for admission has been suggested and we do not see why in the aforesaid circumstances on the allegations made, Deonarain cannot claim a personal right to get admission in the College. 36. The only | point of consideration would be whether he was ready and willing to fulfil all the valid conditions laid down for the admission of students, as he alleges, or whether, as alleged by the opposite party, he had intentionally failed to comply with a condition which the Principal considered was a vita) one for the petitioner to comply with, before he could agree to his admission in the M.A. Final class. 37. If the argument had been restrict-ed to this simple and perhaps the only material question, the case would not have taken much time for its disposal. 38. 37. If the argument had been restrict-ed to this simple and perhaps the only material question, the case would not have taken much time for its disposal. 38. Before taking this question on the merits, it would be proper to discuss the second objection as well, as in the end it will also lead us to a consideration of the same question. 39. It was argued by Mr. Modi that a Principal, as head of the College, was responsible for the internal administration of his college, and, therefore had an absolute discretion to admit or refuse admission to any student and that it was not incumbent upon him by any law to admit Deonarain and on that ground the conditions laid down in proviso (b) of Section 45 remained unsatisfied and, therefore, no relief could be granted to the petitioner. 40. In the first place, a distinction may be made between an admission to the college and an admission to a class. As regards admission to the college, Statute 31 lays down that. | Admission of students to a college shall be subject to the conditions prescribed by the Ordinances in this behalf. So that it is not a matter of absolut discretion with the Principal whom he shall or shall not admit. The Principal of a recognised college is bound to comply with the directions given by the University and to demand neither better nor worse qualifications than those laid down by the University for the admission of students to the College. As head of the institution he no doubt is responsible for the internal administration of the college (Statute 26), but it is his duty to run the college affairs in a manner which would give satisfaction to the University (Statute 29) and that satisfaction would certainly relate to the fact that the rules laid down by the University requiring facilities for instructions in the several branches of learning at any affiliated college—a power exercised under Section 4 of the Act - are not set at naught by a refusal of the Principal to admit students at his sweet will. Nevertheless, within certain limits, the Principal must be deemed to have discretion. 41. The contention of Mr. Vyas that the Principal of a College has no discretion in the matter of admission to the College is equally untenable. Nevertheless, within certain limits, the Principal must be deemed to have discretion. 41. The contention of Mr. Vyas that the Principal of a College has no discretion in the matter of admission to the College is equally untenable. Within the Statutes and the Ordinances themselves, certain duties are laid on the Principal, and these may well relate to the matter of admission as to other matters, which involve the exercise of discretion. 42. As already observed, under Statute 26 (4), the Principal is made responsible for the internal administration of the college. Under Statute 36 (1), every college must satisfy the University that proper discipline is maintained in the college. It is possible to conceive of a case in which, if a Principal has reasons to believe that the admission of a particular student would lead to indiscipline in the college, he may refuse admission since it is he who is responsible for seeing that discipline in the college is not endangered. In such a case, he will have to exercise his discretion whether he will, or will not, take the risk. 43. Under sub-section (2) of Statute 36, every college must make adequate provision for the residence of its students not residing with their parents or recognised guardians. As to who can be recognised as guardian, the definition of the term guardian mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment gives a wide discretion to the Principal and rightly so, Since, as the head of the institution, the future of so many young men is placed in his hands and he must see to it that the young men of to-day, who are the citizens of tomorrow and on whom depends the future of the nation, are not surrounded by unhealthy, immoral or evil influences, and, therefore, in doubtful cases, he will have to exercise a discretion whether a particular student with particular surrond-ings should or should not be admitted. The matter may be one which not only concerns the particular student but may be one in which the welfare of other co-students of the college may have to be taken into consideration. 44. Under Statute 29, referred to already, every college must satisfy that it is in all respects suitably organised and conducted. It may be that there are a smaller number of seats in a college for a particular subject than the number of students seeking admission. 44. Under Statute 29, referred to already, every college must satisfy that it is in all respects suitably organised and conducted. It may be that there are a smaller number of seats in a college for a particular subject than the number of students seeking admission. A discretion in admission will have to be exercised by the Principal and it may be that the Principal may admit only those students who, by their proficiency in the last examination passed by them or in any other way are considered to be more likely to profit by their admission, or whose admission may be more desirable in the interests of the college. 45. Such instances can be multiplied by references to other provisions of the Statutes and Ordinances but the above are sufficient to illustrate that, within certain limits, the Principal has a discretion in the matter of admission of students to the college even where he is bound to follow the instructions as to qualifications and other matters laid down by the University in this matter. 46. As to whether, in cases where a public officer has a discretion in any matter, any interference can be made under the provisions of Section 45 of the Specific. Relief Act, the point will be discussed later. 47. According to Ordinance 55, however, once a stadent is accepted by the Principal, i. e., admitted to the college and has paid his fees, he is to be recognised as a member of the College. 48. Ordinances 56 and 58 mention the procedure where the student desires to leave the particular college and join another and Ordinance 60 empowers the Principal to expel a student from the college under certain circumstances subject to the condition that the order of expulsion has to be confirmed by the Syndicate. 49. It appears to us that the scheme of the Ordinances does not contemplate that a student should seek admission to the college every year and be subject to the risk of being left out at the discretion of the principal even when there were ample facilities for study at the college and the student was willing to abide by all lawful rules and regulations. In the ordinary course, the Principal would have to take recourse to the provisions of the Ordinance 60 in order to get rid of any student whose presence may be considered undesirable by him, and in that case, he would have to lay bare his action to the scrutiny of the Syndicate. 50. There was some confusion at an early stage of the arguments whether the form required to be filled in by Deonarain was for a fresh admission to the college or for a fresh admission to a particular class, and the learned advocate for the non-petitioner candidly conceded that the case may be considered on the basis that the form was required to be filled in as for a fresh admission to a class but contended that, in doing so, certain particulars required for a fresh admission to the college were also required to be filled in as the record of students prepared in the previous year prior to the appointment of Dr. Bhardwaj as Principal was irregular and incomplete. 51. In the Prospectus of the Jaswant College, Ex. F., Rule 8 lays down that all students, including those promoted to II and IV Year Classes, shall submit their applications for admission by 30th June at the latest and pay their dues in time. 52. The dues are mentioned under the heading College Fees and no objection has been raised on behalf of Deonarain that any improper demand was made nor on behalf of the opposite party that Deo Narain was not able or willing to pay the proper fees, and, therefore, the amount of dues assessed in this case need not be examined beyond making the observation that in the first item an annual levy of Rs. 2/- per annum appears a bit curious. As discussed above, the admission to a college is a single affair. Re-admission after a break may also be deemed to be an admission but the levy of an annual fee is one which may require scrutiny by the University under the powers reserved to it by Statute 33. 53. As to the time within which the application was to be presented, the opposite party had also allowed a great latitude and no grievance can exist on that score. 54. It was argued by Mr. 53. As to the time within which the application was to be presented, the opposite party had also allowed a great latitude and no grievance can exist on that score. 54. It was argued by Mr. Vyas that the Rule 8 made by the Principal was in excess of his powers since, according to Statute 31, the matter of admission is to be regulated by Ordinances which again speak of only first admission to a college (Ordinances 52 and 55), and therefore, the opposite party, Dr. Bhardwaj, had no authority to frame Rule 8 requiring all students already studying in the college to seek admission in the college afresh for the purpose of studying in the higher or same class according as they did or did not pass the last annual examination. 55. As observed earlier, the argument loses sight of the distinction between seeking admission to a fresh class and seeking fresh admission to the college. 56. We do not see why students of the same college should not be called upon to indicate their decision to con-tinue their studies at the beginning of a new session. Every college has a limited accommodation and, with the increasing popularity of education, more and more students flock for the admission to the college. There does not seem to be any thing objectionable in the act of the Principal in trying to find out in due time how many of the existing students of the college want admission to the next higher or the same class in order to enable him either to make proper arrangements for them or to decide what students coming from other educational institutions can be further admitted or even to refuse admission to failures in order to make room for new] students. 57. As already mentioned, the duty is cast on the Principal for making adequate arrangements for the tuition of the students and for organising and conducting the affairs of the college in a suitable manner. It was, therefore, within his discretion to frame such rules as would enable him to find out the number of students seeking admission to each class in pursuance of his duty to secure suitable organization and proper conduct of the affairs of the college. As pointed out in the affidavit of Dr. It was, therefore, within his discretion to frame such rules as would enable him to find out the number of students seeking admission to each class in pursuance of his duty to secure suitable organization and proper conduct of the affairs of the college. As pointed out in the affidavit of Dr. Bhardwaj dated 28.11.49, the previous records of student were incomplete and irregular and it may be that, for completing the records, it may have been considered necessary that the existing students should for once furnish particulars as required for a fresh admission to the college. We have from the affidavit of Prof. Shanti Swaroop dated 6.1.1950 that this rule and the forms were recommended by the Committee appointed by the College Council and approved by the Principal. 58. In our opinion, the Principal was acting within his authority in framing Rale 8 mentioned in the Prospectus and requiring Deonarain to fill-in the prescribed form. 59. It was contended at one stage by Mr. Modi that it was not necessary to go into this question as the final authority to decide as to whether Mr. Deonarain had or had not complied with the conditions of admission was the Principal himself and what was within his discretion to do, no Court can compel him to do. Reliance was placed on the open-ing words of Para 1301 of Vol. IX of Halsburys Laws of England, "The Court will not compel any authority to exercise a power which is merely permissive, and which does not impose an obligation". But in the very next sentence, it is stated that Where, however, a Statute has been interpreted and action taken in the light of matters which ought not to have been taken into account, that is to say, which the Court considers not to be proper for the guidance of the discretion entrusted to the persons concerned, the latter will be considered not to have exercised their discretion according to law, and a mandamus will issue commanding them to exercise the powers, given them under the Statute in question". Where a public body has a discretion to exercise the duty is to exercise that discretion conscientiously. Banerjis T. L. L., 2nd Edn., pages 539-40. In Alcock Ashdown and Company v. Chief Revenue Authority Bombay (1. A.I.R. 1923. P.C.138.). Where a public body has a discretion to exercise the duty is to exercise that discretion conscientiously. Banerjis T. L. L., 2nd Edn., pages 539-40. In Alcock Ashdown and Company v. Chief Revenue Authority Bombay (1. A.I.R. 1923. P.C.138.). It has been held that, if the Legislature, says that a public officer shall do a thing and he, without cause or justification refuses to do that thing, the Court will interfere. Reference may also be made to 35 Calcutta 915 at 920 and 40 Calcutta 836 to 844. 60. It was also argued by Mr. Modi that, in any case, there was no duty on the Principal by any law to admit Deonarain and, therefore, no interference can be made. 61. It has already been discussed that one of the duties of the Principal under the Statutes framed under the Act would be to admit students properly qualified and willing to abide by all valid rules and regulations of the college to the several courses of studies for which facilities exist at the college and are provided by the University in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Act. 62: This takes us again to the question whether Deonarain had or had not fulfilled or was or was not ready and willing to fulfil all the valid conditions laid down for his admission to the M. A. Final Class. The argument of Mr, Vyas that Rule 8 was ultra vires the powers of Principal has already been dealt with and it has been held that it was in the just exercise of the power that the rule was made and wasvalid at least for the Sessions 1949-50. 63. It was urged that no declaration by any guardian was necessary in the case of post-graduate students or students like him who were earning their own livelihood. Dr. Bhardwaj has conceded that in respect of certain post-graduate students mostly students of the LL. B. Class who were earning their own livelihood and employed in certain Departments of the State, he had relaxed the rule and had noted where they had been employed in case any reference in future was necessary. 64. In our opinion, this was a sort of concession which Dr. Bhardwaj extended to some students in respect of whose antecedents and. B. Class who were earning their own livelihood and employed in certain Departments of the State, he had relaxed the rule and had noted where they had been employed in case any reference in future was necessary. 64. In our opinion, this was a sort of concession which Dr. Bhardwaj extended to some students in respect of whose antecedents and. status in life he was satisfied but it cannot be held that he was bound to extend the same concession to Deonarain, for whom, as would be stated shortly, he held a different opinion. 65. In the form as filled in by Mr. Deonarain at first, i. e., on 6 - 8 - 1949, he stated his father Mr. Jainarain Vyas to be his guardian. In column 6 he proposed to stay with his father and also gave the permanent address "C/o Mr. Jainarian". He did not show that he was living all alone by himself and earning his own livelihood. It was, therefore quite proper for the Principal to hold that Deonarains signature on behalf of his father on the declaration to be made by parent or guardian could not be accepted, and, as appears from his note on the application, he ordered Deonarain to get the signatures of his father on the declaration. On the same day Deonarian replied (Ex. 9) that, "My father is not my guardian and as I am over 25 years, there was no legal necessity for my fathers signature (as guardian). There is also no condition in the form (for such signatures) hence I request you to admit me without my fathers guardianship. It may be noticed that in this reply he did not say that he was earning his own livelihood. The petitioner seems to have been labouring under a misconception that guardians were required only for students who were minors. 66. Statute 36 contemplates residence of students only at 3 places (1) in the hostel, or (2) with the parent, or (3) with the guardian. This is but proper since it is not only the atmosphere during college hours but even outside it which has to be kept clean and healthy and such as may further the disci pline among students, which may be a sort of asset in after life for which the students are prepared at the University. 67. This is but proper since it is not only the atmosphere during college hours but even outside it which has to be kept clean and healthy and such as may further the disci pline among students, which may be a sort of asset in after life for which the students are prepared at the University. 67. A passing reference may be made to the action of Deonarain in trying to mutilate the word "JAINARAIN" into "DEONARAIN" in columns 4 and thereby trying to declare himself as his own guardian. It was a futile act in view of what has been stated above. 68. It was next argued that the Principal was not right in insisting that the declaration should be signed by Mr. Jainarain Vyas, the father of the petitioner. 69. It appears from the copy of the letter of the Principal to the. Administrator dated 7.8.49 (Ex. 10) that the Principal was not happy with Deonarain and the following extract from the letter is self-explanatory:- "It is necessary that in the case of Deo-narain, who stays with his father at Jodhpnr, who is a well known and esteemed public worker, that the declaration of his father must be on the application form so that there may be somebody responsible both, for his conduct and payment of college dues...... Mr. Deonarain when he approached me talked arrogantly.........and the general feeling about him which has come to my notice is that he is not a well behaved student and is also one of those who are generally up for any kind of trouble.........I am told that he wields or is able to wield sufficient influence on such stud-ents as are mischievious and are apt to create or have created trouble in the past." 70. It is but natural for the Head of the College who is responsible for discipline in the College to look for a proper guardian for asistance in case any untoward contingency arises. 71. The term guardian, as already observed, has been defined by the University and the Principal was in the right when he asked for the declaration to be signed either by the parent himself or by any person authorised by him in writing. 72. It was next argued that Dr. Bhar-dwaj acted malafide in not accepting the telegram of 16/9/1949 as a valid authority by Mr. Jainarain appointing Mr. Dwarka-dass as guardian for Deonarain. 72. It was next argued that Dr. Bhar-dwaj acted malafide in not accepting the telegram of 16/9/1949 as a valid authority by Mr. Jainarain appointing Mr. Dwarka-dass as guardian for Deonarain. The explanation offered is that it was not confirmed by a letter. The explanation, though plausible, is rather shaky. While in official communications a confirmation by letter is usually made, it is not uncommon among ordinary people to consider a telegraphic message as complete by itself. The matter is however, not of much importance as Mr. Dwarkadass never contacted Mr. Bhardwaj. In his affidavit he only states that he tried to contact with the . Principal on the phone but could not do so and later left the matter with Deonarain. This was hardly a satisfactory method of dealing with this matter. 73. It was argued with some vehemence that the Principal was not authorised to cancel the admission permitted by Mr. Deenanath Bhargava on 5th September in the absence of Mr. Bhardwaj. 74. An affidavit has been produced that Dr. Bhardwaj was away on official duty on that day and, while Mr. Bhargava was to carry on in his absence, he could only deal with routine matters. Mr. Bhardwaj had not handed over his charge as Principal and had gone out in the discharge of his duties as Principal. Obviously Mr. Bhargava the Vice Principal, while carrying on routine business, could not have powers to go against the previous order of the Principal. It appears that Mr. Bhargava, at the instance of Deonarain, accepted one Kistoorchand as his guardian and, after obtaining his signa tures, directed Deonarains admission. Mr. Bhargava himself seemed to have realised his mistake when it was pointed out by Dr. Bhardwaj on 8.9.1949 on bis return and he noted " Admission is cancelled because the Principal points out to me that his admission is wrong as no letter of authority from the father has been submitted about the appointment of Kistoor Chand as guardian of Deonarain", Mr. Bhargavas endorsement on 8.9.1949 was not in perfect order since, in the presence of the Principal he could not cancel the admission. It is explained that Mr. Bhargava was allowed to write it out of courtesy. There is, however, an ord by Dr. Bhardwaj dated 12.9.49 (Ex. Bhargavas endorsement on 8.9.1949 was not in perfect order since, in the presence of the Principal he could not cancel the admission. It is explained that Mr. Bhargava was allowed to write it out of courtesy. There is, however, an ord by Dr. Bhardwaj dated 12.9.49 (Ex. 9) on the application of Deonarain, request-ing that fees may be taken from him, that "I shall accept your admission only when you get your fathers signatures thereon or of another person authorised by your father in writing." 75. It was next argued that the M. A. degree in History being split up in two parts, the admission of Deonarain in 1948-49 for the M. A. Previous should be held sufficient for the M. A. Final Class as well and no new form could be necessary. Reliance was placed on the earlier form. The argument would have had force if that form had been in order. The declaration by Guardian in that case is as follows: — "I hereby declare that I have an average income of Rs. 1500/- per mensem and I have to support----------members in my family. I am able and willing to support Deonarain who is my son at the Jaswant College, Jodhpur, for the. next years until he passes the final examination of the College If this had been signed by Mr. Jainarain, the petitioners position would have been stronger but, as it appears, it is signed by "Deonarain for Jainarain Vyas". This was done on 30 - 6 -1948. Needless to state that this declaration was of no value and Dr. Bhardwaj, who took charge of his post in December, 1949, was in all likelihood induced by such forms to make Rule 8 in the Prospectus for 1949-50. 76. The argument that Deonarain had fulfilled all the necessary conditions, therefore, falls to the ground and it must be held that, as he did not fulfill all the requisite valid conditions, he had no right to be admitted and the Principal was not under a duty to admit him in M. A., Final Class in History in which he sought to be admitted. 77. It is unnecessary to discuss the other objections but, since they have also been argued at length, a short reference to them may be made. 78. 77. It is unnecessary to discuss the other objections but, since they have also been argued at length, a short reference to them may be made. 78. It was argued that as the ultimate object of seeking the relief was to appear at the M. A. Final Examination of the University in 1950 but as owing to the lapse of time, the petitioner would not* be able to put in sufficient attendance as required by the University, any order regarding admission of the petitioner even if passed would not afford a complete relief to the petitioner. 79. The learned advocate for the petitioner frankly conceded that it was beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to condone the fall in percentage of attendance but he nevertheless urged that he could try with the University authorities in this behalf. In view of this statement, we are not concerned whether in the event of his getting the admission he would or would not be able to appear at the Examination of 1950. 80. It was contended by Mr. Modi that the applicant had other specific and adequate legal remedies. 81. Many authorities were cited at the bar but it appears to us that the matter can be disposed of by a reference to the provisions of the University Act, Statutes and Ordinances. * 82. The College being one of the recognised colleges, is a party of the University (Section 32). The claim of the present petetioner is that the Principal had refused admission to him contrary to the provisions of the laws of the University. Under Section 13, a duty has been laid on the Vice-Chancellor to see that the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances are faithfully observed, and he is authorised to exercise all powers necessary for the purpose. 83. It was argued by Mr. Vyas that there was no provision for appeal1 to the vice-chancellor nor could he expect a speedy decision at the hands of the Vice-Chancellor who would have to consult the Syndicate (Section 21). 84. Clause (d) of Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act only requires that no other specific and adequate legal remedy should be available to the petitioner. The remedy is not required to be by way of appeal. It may be by petition. 84. Clause (d) of Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act only requires that no other specific and adequate legal remedy should be available to the petitioner. The remedy is not required to be by way of appeal. It may be by petition. Legal remedy includes any remedy given by law and would not necessarily be confined to a legal remedy enforceable in a Court of law. The remedy could also be a speedy one since under Section 13 clause 4, the Vice-Chancellor is empowered to take action in any emergency which in his opinion calls for immediate action. 85. In our opinion, the present petition does not therefore fulfil the condition laid down by clause (d) as well. 86. It is unnecessary to add that an un-warranted interference with the affairs of the University would not be consonant with right and justice. 87. In our opinion, this petition was mis-conceived and can not succeed. It is, therefore, dismissed. 88. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. The interlocutary order is discharged.