Judgment S.K.Das, J. 1. The petitioner has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 10 only for contravening a District Board bye-law by placing some logs of wood on a District Board road. The point which has been urged before me in support of the petition for quashing the conviction and sentence, is that on 1st February 1950, the petitioner made an application under the provisions of Sub-section (8) of Sec. 526, Criminal P. C., for an adjournment in order to enable the petitioner to make an application for transfer of the case, and to get an order thereon. The learned Magistrate refused to grant an adjournment for the purpose. It is contended that this was an illegality which vitiated the entire trial. The rule which was issued by this Court was confined to this ground only. 2. In order to appreciate the point raised, it is necessary to state aome more facts. The case against the petitioner was a summons caee. The prosecution evidence closed on 11th January 1950, On 19th January 1950, defence was declined. Later on, on the same date, a petition was filed with a prayer that the trying Magistrate should hold a local inspection. The trying Magistrate held a local inspection on 21st January 1950. On 3lst January 1950, arguments for the prosecution were heard. The defense lawyer was not free on that date, and the case was adjourned to Ist February 1950. On that date an application was filed purporting to be an application under Sec. 526 (8), Criminal P. C. The learned Magistrate refused to grant an adjournment on the ground that the defence had closed its case much earlier, and the application was merely intended to defeat or delay justice. I may state here that no ground whatsoever was alleged why the case should be transferred, and up till now no ground has been alleged why it was considered necessary that the case should be transferred from the file of the Magistrate who tried it. 3. It is true that there are several decisions which have laid down that the provisions of Sub-section (8) of Sec. 526, Criminal P. C., are mandatory, and the Court is bound to grant an adjournment if the conditions laid down in that sub-section are fulfilled. 3. It is true that there are several decisions which have laid down that the provisions of Sub-section (8) of Sec. 526, Criminal P. C., are mandatory, and the Court is bound to grant an adjournment if the conditions laid down in that sub-section are fulfilled. The question in the case before me hinges upon the meaning of the expression "at any stage before the defence closes its case" ocaurring in that sub-section. Sub-section (8), as it stood before the amendments of 1932, did not contain the words mentioned above. Those words were introduced by the amendments made in 1932. In the report of the Select Committee, it was stated as follows : "We recognise the necessity of greater safeguards against the abuse of the section than those now existing. We think that provision should be made for a compulsory adjournment if a party notifies its intention to move for a transfer at any time before the arguments begin, that is to say, at any time before the defence closes its case." It is correct to gay that if the words in a section are clear and admit of no ambiguity, then the report of the Select Committee cannot be looked into for the purpose of giving an interpretation which the words used in the statute cancot bear. Where, however, there is ambiguity, the report of the Select Committee may, I think, be looked into as a matter of history to find out what was the previous law, what mischief the framers of the statute wished to avoid and what remedy they wished to advance. The meaning of the word trial in connection with Sub-section (8) of Sec. 526, as it stood before the amendments of 1932, gave rise to a diversity of decisions in some of which vary strong criticisms were made of the chances of abuse of the right given by the subjection. So far as I am aware, there is no direct decision bearing on the question as to the exact meaning of the words "at any stage before the defence closes its case" There is one decision of this Court to which my attention has been drawn, namely. Ishar Singh V/s. Shama Dusadh, 17 P. L. T. 627 : (A. I. R. (24) 1937 Pat 131), where certain observations were made by way of obiter dicta. Ishar Singh V/s. Shama Dusadh, 17 P. L. T. 627 : (A. I. R. (24) 1937 Pat 131), where certain observations were made by way of obiter dicta. The learned Judge, who made the observations guarded himself by saying : "I do not think I am called upon to decide this point in this case as it does not arise; any expression of my opinion will be purely obiter dictum." There is, therefore, no decision which has held that an application for an adjournment under Sec. 526 (8) can be made in a summons case after the arguments of one of the parties had been concluded. 4 In my opinion, it is not quite necessary in this case to decide the vexed question as to when the defence closes its case in a summons case. The revisional jurisdiction which this Court exercises, is a discretionary jurisdiction. It seems clear to me on the facts of this case that the application for adjournment made on 1st February 1950, was really a trick, a device to defeat and delay justice. No ground whatsoever was alleged for a transfer of The case. It is true, as has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, that Sub-section (8) of Sec. 526, Criminal P. C., merely contemplates that an intimation should be given to the Court that the party intends to apply for a transfer, and the grounds need not be mentioned. But so far nothing has been stated in the various petitions filed by the petitioner right up to this Court _as to why it was thought necessary to apply for a transfer of the case. Nothing had happened up till 1st February 1950, which would give any indication of any reason for a transfer of the case. It seems to me that the only conclusion which can be drawn from the facts and circumstances of this case, is that the application for an adjournment under Sec. 526 (8), Criminal P. C., was not a bona fide application, and was meant merely to prevent the learned Magistrate from proceeding to judgment. 5. In these circumstances, I do not feel called upon to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, and interfere with the conviction and sentence passed. The case is a petty one. 5. In these circumstances, I do not feel called upon to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, and interfere with the conviction and sentence passed. The case is a petty one. The petitioner has had a fair trial, and there is no reason why further wastage of public time and money should be encouraged. 6. I would accordingly dismiss the application.